A. A. ROGOZHIN

PhD in Economics Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences

M. V. MATYUKHIN

Applicant Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: energy security, Asia, foreign investment, oil, gas

December 2012 was marked by a unique event for the global energy market. After lengthy negotiations, the Chinese state-owned company CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) received approval from the Canadian government to take over Nexen Inc., which is engaged in oil production in Canada (in the tar sands region) and in the United States (in the Gulf of Mexico region). For China, this is the largest acquisition of a foreign company ($15.1 billion).¹. Neither Canada nor any other country has ever sold such large assets to Chinese investors before.

This transaction is the most striking manifestation of a rapidly developing new phenomenon: emerging market economies, primarily Asian ones, are increasingly using investments in oil and gas assets abroad to ensure their energy security.

This phenomenon is evaluated differently not only in developed but also in developing countries.

For many national oil and gas companies (NOCs), investment abroad is increasingly becoming an integral part of their efforts to ensure energy security. First of all, this is due to the increase in energy prices over the past 10 years. Accordingly, the level of international investment by many, mainly Asian, NNCS has also increased. The Chinese are leading the way, but companies from Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam have also stepped up. With the exception of Malaysia's Petronas and Vietnam's Petrovietnam, they all represent countries that are net importers of oil or gas.

These Governments have provided significant support, including financial and diplomatic support, to their NOCs. It is considered that if a company has the right to develop oil and gas fields abroad, it is logical to provide it with equivalent fields at home. It becomes a domestic supplier of oil or gas, thus ensuring the security of part of the country's energy supply chain.

However, some public and state figures question the feasibility of such foreign investments on the grounds that:,

because they are a waste of limited public funds, it would be better to spend these funds on more important matters. In their opinion, NOC's overpay for such assets, spend money inefficiently, and these investments do not contribute to a real increase in the reliability of supply in the domestic market.

This article examines the question of how much foreign investment by NOC increases the reliability of energy supply to the domestic market. The analysis is based on the traditional view of energy security, which defines it as "continuous and sufficient access to energy at stable and reasonable prices"². Modern use of it

The interpretation takes into account the costs associated with the preservation of the environment and the observance of human rights. It seems that the governments of Asian oil-importing countries still adhere to the traditional approach when making decisions about assets abroad.

FLUCTUATIONS IN OTTAWA AND WASHINGTON

The process of penetration of the Chinese oil and gas company PetroChina into the Canadian oil and gas sector began in 2011. In particular, it entered into a preliminary agreement with one of the leading companies in this sector, Enpapa Corporation, to acquire a 50% stake in the Cutbank Ridge shale gas project in the provinces of British Columbia and Alberta for $5.4 billion. However, it was not approved by the Canadian government, and in June 2011 it was revoked ³. Nevertheless, in December 2012, a joint venture (JV) was created, in which PetroChina received $ 1.2 billion. 49.9% of the property. The company will develop the Duvernay shale gas field in Alberta ⁴.

The takeover of Nexen Inc. has raised concerns in government circles in Canada and the United States, even prompting Canadian Prime Minister Brian Harper and U.S. Undersecretary of State Robert Hormats to make specific statements about the restrictions that will continue to apply to such agreements. Harper explained why such restrictions are imposed: "When we say that Canada is open for business, we do not mean that our country is put up for sale to foreign governments." Therefore, in the future, "except in exceptional circumstances, foreign participation in Canadian companies will be limited to minority interests." As for future investments by foreign state-owned companies, according to Harper, they will be evaluated based on how the buyer companies can influence the companies and industries being sold, as well as the extent to which they themselves are influenced by the state owners of their countries.⁵

However, in the first wave of numerous responses to the deal, positive assessments still prevailed. There are very influential supporters of expanded access to the oil and gas and other industries of foreign, including Chinese, state-owned investors. In particular, the Canadian Board of Governors has provided strong support for the approved agreements, with the expectation of future reciprocity on the part of the Chinese authorities. This is the largest and most influential business association in the country, which unites the top officials of the 150 largest Canadian companies, about 40% of which are controlled by foreign (mainly American) capital. The Council emphasized that in doing so, Canada confirmed its reputation as a country "open to investment and consistently supporting the liberalization of international trade and investment regimes" ^.6

It was expected that the main obstacle to the final completion of the agreement could be the position of the US authorities: the fact is that part of the assets of the company being sold is involved in oil production in the Gulf of Mexico. Accordingly, the review of the agreement was carried out by the US authorities, namely, the Committee on Foreign Investment. This committee has the power to make demands and negotiate the terms of proposed transactions, and in particular on issues related to "threats to national security".

The probability that Washington will block the deal at all was estimated very high - at the level of 60-70%. According to most experts, Chinese investors are traditionally treated with much more caution in the United States than in Canada.⁷ However, the Committee on Foreign Investment, under the influence of lobbyists of American companies interested in investing in China and fearing retaliatory actions from the Chinese side, agreed to the deal with Nexen Inc., and its final legal registration took place in ^{February 2013.8}

SLOWLY BUT SURELY

Until the beginning of the 21st century, Japan was the most active Asian country in the search for foreign sources of oil supplies. This search began in 1965, when the government-owned firm Japan Petroleum Exploration (JAPEX) was allowed to conduct exploration activities abroad.

Since 1966, a private company (with state participation)has been involved in foreign projects INPEX (первоначально - North Sumatra Offshore Petroleum Exploration). It has grown into a leading global energy company in Japan and one of the world's largest. As of June 30, 2013, INPEX was involved in 80 oil and gas projects in 29 countries-Indonesia, Australia, Canada, as well as in the Middle East, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caspian Sea region, and South America9.

Established in 1967, the state-owned Japan Petroleum Development Corporation, renamed Japan National Oil Co (JNOC) in 1978, has developed a portfolio of 119 projects. But in 2004, it was disbanded by the government due to its low efficiency [¹⁰] and became part of the state-owned Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)."JOGMEC provides capital or loan guarantees to Japanese private companies and provides them with technical, informational, diplomatic and other assistance. In 2012, the corporation participated in 309 foreign oil and gas projects (including 79 in Russia-

Table 1

Overview of foreign investment in field development and raw material extraction operations of some Asian NOC's in 2010

* A barrel of oil equivalent (bp) is equal to the weighted average amount of energy contained in a barrel of crude oil. It is used for estimating proven oil reserves (editor's note).

Source: Andrews-Speed Philip. Investments by National Oil Companies Enhance Energy Security At Home? A View Erom Asia // Oil & Gas for Asia. Geopolitical Implications of Asian Rising Demand; Andrews Speed Philip, Herberg Mikkal E., Tomoko Hosoe Tomoko, Mitchell John V. and Zha Daojiong. The US National Bureau of Asian Research Special Report N 41. September 2012, Washington, D.C., p. 33.

energy production), Asia and Oceania (166), North and South America (53), Africa (33), the Middle East (26), Western Europe (21)and the CIS (10) 12.

The Indian state-owned oil and Natural Gas Co (ONGC) has been active in Iran, Iraq and Tanzania since the 1960s.¹³ In 1989, she set up ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) to invest abroad. In 2012, OVL owned stakes in oil and gas projects in 12 countries around the world. The company plans to invest at least $200 billion ⁱⁿ such projects by 2030.14

In the 1990s, the process of internationalization of NOCs from Malaysia, South Korea, and China gradually took place.

The first step for Petronas, a Malaysian state-owned corporation established in 1974, was the discovery of the Rubi oil field in Vietnam in 1994. Petronas now ranks 75th among the world's largest corporations in terms of size and 18th in terms of profitability.¹⁵ Operations abroad accounted for about 40% of the company's profit in 2008,16 In 2012, a quarter of its existing oil and gas reserves were located abroad.17 In 1978, its subsidiary Petronas Carigali Inemational¹⁸.

South Korea began overseas operations in the 1990s through the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) and Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS). The first one is 100% owned by the state, and the second one is 60% owned. As of February 2011, KNOC has participated in 191 overseas projects in ²⁵ countries19.

China's NOC started investing abroad in 1993, initially through the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and later through the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)*. Chinese NOC investments have increased significantly since 2002, and the global financial crisis that broke out in 2008 has given them additional opportunities to expand, especially in the Americas. The total investment of these three companies in field development and raw material extraction operations in more than 50 countries in 2011 was more than $100 billion - about half of China's estimated $200 billion of foreign investment.²⁰ In 2012, the total volume of oil and gas produced by Chinese companies, including Sinochem, Zhenhua and Citic21, reached 180 million metric tons**.

Some results of investment activity of Asian companies as of the end of 2010 are summarized in Table 1.

It should be noted that in recent years, the interest of Asian oil and gas companies in investing in North America has sharply increased, which is caused by a noticeable increase in the role of the United States and Canada in the global energy market, especially in its gas segment (see Table 2). Asian NOCs are attracted not only by the rapidly expanding resource base of North American countries, but also for gas importers, the pricing system used in recent years for transactions with North American gas. In particular, there is no correlation between the price of gas and the price of oil. As expected, the upcoming large-scale gas supplies from the east and west coasts of the United States and Canada will be regulated by a similar pricing mechanism.

* For more information, see: Fang Tingting (China). Razvitie neftegazovogo sektora Kitay [Development of the oil and gas sector in China]. Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 1.

** 1 million tons of oil equivalent is equal to 1.111 billion cubic meters of natural gas (editor's note).

Table 2

Major acquisitions of oil and gas assets by Asian companies in the United States and Canada in 2008-2012 (only transactions worth more than $1 billion were counted)

* JV - a joint venture in which, as a rule, a partner from Asia owns a minority stake (less than 50%).

Source: Slutzjames. The U.S. - Canada Energy Relationship and the Growing Role for Asia. 2013 Pacific Energy Summit Working Paper, p. 12.

Investments in North American oil and gas assets for Asian NNCS - a kind of financial hedging (insurance)method their economic interests in case of further price increases. As energy prices rise, so will the value of their acquired assets. In addition, by investing in oil and gas companies in the United States and Canada, Asian NOCs gain access to unique technologies for extracting unconventional types of gas, primarily shale. In almost all of these cases, Governments set far-reaching goals for their NOC to import oil from their foreign assets and supported the companies through public funds, bank loans, and diplomatic channels.

In December 2012, the Canadian government approved the acquisition for $6 billion. Malaysian company Petronas leading Canadian gas production corporation Progress Energy Resources Corp. from Calgary. Petronas plans to build a liquefied natural gas (LNG)export terminal in British Columbia ²².

INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY NOCs

Although it may seem that foreign investment by NOC is only part of government programs to ensure the security of energy supplies, the reality is much more complicated. Many participants in these transactions have their own specific interests. There are four groups of such participants: governments of Asian countries where NOCs are registered, Asian NOCs themselves, Governments of countries that import capital, and, finally, national companies of the host country.

Thus, the initial incentive for the Chinese government to support the internationalization of its NOCs was the country's rapid transition in the early 1990s from a major net oil exporter to a growing net importer. China's lack of knowledge about the nature of international oil markets at the time and its fear of the dominant role of Western countries, especially the United States, led to a desire to overcome dependence on these markets and achieve a high degree of control over the entire supply chain. Thus, NCCs have become one of the key instruments in China's energy policy, including through foreign investment.

These investments are seen as a way to reduce the risk of a physical supply disruption and ensure that China has enough oil at all times, as well as reducing price risk. The State, in particular, has supported investments in oil and gas fields in neighboring countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Myanmar; the reserves of these fields can flow to China via pipeline, thus avoiding transportation via the sea routes of South and East Asia. In addition, the PRC believes that the presence of large, competitive hydrocarbon companies with foreign assets will increase the status and influence of China in the international oil and gas markets.

The Chinese government had other goals that coincided with ensuring the stability of energy supplies. These include: promoting the development of key industries to make them major players in the global market, the need to retain hundreds of thousands of jobs in the oil industry, and the potential for additional tax revenues and other types of revenue. Finally, when combined with other forms of economic assistance, investment, and trade, investment in foreign oil and gas assets significantly enhances China's diplomatic status in many parts of the world, not just in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.

Ensuring the stability of energy supplies is also a key task for Japan, South Korea and India. Their governments have focused heavily on the need to address the country's growing dependence on supplies from the Middle East, growing restrictions on foreign direct investment in oil-producing States, and increased competition from other Asian oil importers such as China and India.

As in the case of China, supporting overseas investment in Japan was part of a broader strategic agenda that includes diversification of supply sources, diplomatic measures, and technical support. Unlike China, however, there was a heated debate in Japan between advocates of investment and international markets, and those who distrusted them and preferred a more independent approach.

Like China, other Asian States encourage their NOC's to invest in nearby or neighboring countries and facilitate the construction of pipelines for energy imports. Central Asia has become a preferred investment destination for oil companies from Japan, South Korea, India and China, which actively compete in this region. They also compete in Myanmar, Iran and Angola.

The Governments of Japan and South Korea attach great importance to the presence of domestic oil companies that are competitive on the world market. For Malaysia, Petronas has always been one of the main sources of foreign currency, as well as an important tool for influencing this relatively small country on the world stage and supporting other Muslim states.

IN THE NAME OF SURVIVAL

NNCS themselves, especially in China, India and Malaysia, play a key role in developing investment strategies abroad. Given the limited oil and gas reserves on the domestic market, this is a matter of survival for them in the long run. In addition, they get the opportunity to enjoy state support for their plans to become large international companies.

Foreign capital investments also provide an opportunity to increase their profitability, provided that a reasonable approach to project selection and good management is taken. Abroad, Asian NOCs can avoid the price controls that prevail in their domestic energy markets, reduce the number of their non-commercial obligations, and relax the oversight of their governments.

China's oil and gas field production expensesreferences-

As a rule, it is significantly higher in the domestic market than in higher-quality deposits abroad. This was an important incentive to expand production outside the country.

There are other motivations, especially when it comes to Chinese NOCs.

First, they seek to gain expertise and technology, and not just for their internal operations, such as creating and managing the LNG supply chain, deep-sea exploration and production, and developing unconventional oil and gas sources. Second, companies are diversifying their sources of oil supplies to refineries within the country. Third, NOC's can compensate for their unbalanced structure by vertically integrating operations related to the development of deposits and production of raw materials (Sinopec and CNOOC) and operations related to the processing, transportation and sale of petroleum products (CNPC and PetroChina).

Although all Asian NOCs are under State influence, the balance of power between the two parties and the degree of autonomy of companies varies by country. Despite party-state control, Chinese corporations seem to be the most powerful and relatively independent among NPCs. Their size, well-established connections in the Chinese bureaucracy, long-term experience in domestic oil and gas production, and large cash holdings often give them greater freedom to act in accordance with their corporate interests (except when projects are either very large or located in strategically important regions such as the Middle East and the CIS)..

In Japan and South Korea, NOC positions are weaker due to their lack of sufficient domestic oil and gas production, and the associated income and experience. The Indian company OVL occupies a middle position, although the government retains a fairly tight control over investment decisions on foreign projects.

BYPASSING BARRIERS AND FOR THE SAKE OF DIVERSIFICATION

Host States play an important role in the internationalization of Asian NOCs, as their Governments or their own NOCs enter into deals and sign contracts.

Some Governments prefer Asian NOCs when seeking investment in the oil and gas sectors. This is due to both economic and political considerations.

Countries like Iran, Sudan or Myanmar urgently need foreign investment in the energy sector, which will allow them to develop technologies, gain experience and financial support. Since the United States and other Western governments prohibit or discourage their companies from investing in these countries (their approach to Myanmar has recently changed), they have no choice but to seek investment in other countries - China, India, Russia or Malaysia.

Chinese NOCs have invested in gas production and the construction of oil and gas pipelines in Myanmar, which borders China to the southwest. Despite the tumultuous political events and ethnic conflicts in Myanmar, which appear to have undermined China's plans to build hydroelectric power stations in the country, the oil and gas production program does not seem to be under threat. In the next few years, however, Myanmar's oil sector is likely to see an increase in the number of active international companies, including Western ones.

Indian, Malaysian and Chinese oil companies have long been active in Sudan, and China has increased its presence in Iran's energy sector.

Governments in countries such as Equatorial Guinea and Kazakhstan have said at various times that they want to diversify investment away from excessive reliance on Western oil companies.

On the other hand, the governments of oil-rich countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Oman, have completely different goals. These governments understand that Asia, not the West, will be their biggest customer in the future, and therefore they should be more active in building economic and political relationships with the governments of this region.

According to the International Energy Agency's forecast, demand for energy resources will increase by a third by 2035, with 60% of the increase coming from China, India and some countries in the Middle East, including oil producers, while demand in economically developed countries will barely exceed the current level. ²³ According to the American Energy Information Administration, economically developed countries will consume 45 to 52 million barrels of oil per day in 2040, while other countries will consume 59 to 73 million barrels of oil per day, respectively. ²⁴

Finally, in the area of partnership with Asian NOCs, some Governments are driven by purely political motives, both domestic and international. In 2005, CNPC's acquisition of PetroKazakhstan from its Canadian owners was made possible by the sale of 33% of the company to Kazakh firm KazMunaiGaz. In addition, in 2009, a Chinese loan enabled KazMunaiGaz and CNPC to jointly acquire MangistauMunaiGaz from its Indonesian owners.

HOST COUNTRY NOC OBJECTIVES

Although the objectives of a host country's NOC are generally consistent with the policies of its Government, the NOC of these countries may have a number of specific practical objectives.

First, the Asian NOC,

especially in China, it can attract other service and construction companies that work at relatively low prices and adhere to the rules of intensive work ethics, which usually leads to timely completion of even the most complex projects. This has certainly been the case in Africa and the Middle East, such as Angola, Sudan and Iraq. In addition, although Chinese companies are not the most technologically advanced in the world, they are still ahead of other NOCs and have great potential and many years of experience in the field of onshore field development.

Second, host countries ' NOC may have a shortage of funds to implement an investment program and thus seek to attract companies with large cash reserves to participate in a joint venture or to obtain cash loans. For example, two Russian state-owned oil companies, Rosneft and Transpeft, as well as Brazil's Petrobras, cooperate with China. In February 2009, the Chinese government agreed to provide $25 billion. Rosneft and Transneft in exchange for a guaranteed supply of 15 million tons of oil per year for 20 years. Within the framework of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2013, Rosneft signed an agreement with China's CNPC to expand Russian oil supplies from the current 15 million tons annually for 20 years by another 360 million tons over 25 years (approximately 14.4 million tons per year) with an advance payment of $60 billion.²⁵ NOVATEK, Russia's largest independent gas producer, and CNPC have signed an agreement to buy and sell a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project, which provides for the construction of a liquefied natural gas plant. The agreement also provides for NOVATEK to conclude a long-term contract for the supply of LNG to China in the amount of at least 3 million tons of LNG per year. The Chinese side will assist in attracting external financing for the project from Chinese financial institutions.

The China Development Bank recently agreed to lend $10 billion to Petrobras. in exchange for the supply of 8 million tons of oil per year.

Finally, large Middle Eastern NOC companies that do not have a large domestic market are seeking vertical integration of refining and retailing in markets such as China. The first joint Saudi Aramco-Sinopec refinery in Fujian Province was commissioned in 2009. Another Saudi company, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC), is planning to build a cracking plant in Tianjin.

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and Qatar Petroleum Company are also planning to build refineries and petrochemical plants in China. To some extent, this strategy reflects the fact that Chinese NOC's can help them become large international companies.

PROTECTION AGAINST SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS

A number of Asian Governments continue to encourage foreign investment in their NOCs, in the hope that this will provide protection against supply disruptions. Given that most of the oil and gas produced by many NOC's, such as Chinese and Indian ones, abroad is not directly returned back to their homeland, this policy, at first glance, does not contribute to ensuring the stability of energy supplies. It is possible that during a crisis, the government of an oil-producing country may demand that the NOC supply oil to the domestic market again.

However, this strategy will be difficult to implement unless the country has its own tanker fleet, which China is currently building, and it also does not address major disruptions in key shipping lanes such as the East China Sea and South China Sea. A possible exception to this may be those foreign projects that are not related to sea supplies, because they directly supply energy to the country through pipelines. The best examples are CNPC's oil fields in Kazakhstan and gas fields in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which bring energy to China through pipelines thousands of kilometers away. But pipelines and pumping stations are even more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than sea lanes. Thus, most foreign investments are not only unlikely to provide immediate protection in the event of supply disruptions, but it is also not obvious that they can protect consumers in the domestic market from a price shock if the government or NOC suffers financial losses.

Despite the apparent lack of direct benefits of foreign investment for the security of energy supplies, it can be argued in the case of China that indirect benefits can occur by contributing to the high diplomatic and economic status that China currently enjoys in the main oil and gas producing regions of the world. This was due to a combination of investment in oil and gas production, infrastructure construction, oil and gas imports, oil credits, and the growing power of the navy.

COSTS AND RISKS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Against the backdrop of these mixed benefits, Asian States face a range of costs and risks of their NOC's foreign investment promotion policies. These problems arise mainly as a result of low commercial or operational performance of NOCs. Financial losses (or low

profitability) may arise due to higher prices, poor exploration performance, or inefficient production management. The scale of funds available to Chinese NOCs makes it possible to suspect them of offering prices "above market".

Today, ONGC and KNOC are also being criticized for wasting money, and even the performance of Petronas ' overseas exploration businesses has been disappointing. The reasons for this extravagance are the weak budgetary constraints under which most Asian NOCs operate, ambiguous incentives and non-profit commitments, inadequate governance systems, and the ability of Governments to impose strategic decisions. One example illustrating the latter reason is the CNPC gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, which caused about $2 billion in financial damage in 2011. due to the low level of gas prices in China's urban utilities sector.

As a consequence of their lack of experience and the specific economic and political environment in which they operate, Asian NOCs tend to underestimate or even neglect political risks. This is clearly demonstrated by the presence of Chinese NOCs in countries such as Iran, Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Myanmar, and Sudan. Finally, in China, India, and Malaysia, there are often demands to redistribute funds in favor of developing national oil and gas reserves, to increase energy savings and energy-saving technologies, as well as to produce alternative energy sources (such requirements were very strictly put forward, in particular, with regard to the Indian ONGC).

Foreign investment by Asian NOCs undoubtedly affects the global security of energy supplies. These investments increase the amount of gas and oil on international markets, as Asian NOC's operate where international oil companies either cannot or prefer not to operate. They also often carry out projects faster than international oil companies, such as the construction of pipelines by Chinese oil companies. In addition, the emergence of new entrants to the global market should increase the level of competition in these markets.

Thus, it can be argued that foreign investment by NOCs contributes to ensuring the stability of global energy supplies and thereby contributes to the energy stability of the countries of origin of NOCs. These investments also help achieve other goals, including industrial and diplomatic priorities, but they are costly.

^{Gillies Rob.} 1 Canada OKs CNOOC's takeover bid for Nexen // Associated Press, 7.12.2012; The Oil & Gas Journal. 24.12.2012.

^{Sapir Jacques.} 2 Energobezopasnost ' kak obshchee blago [Energy security as a universal good]. 2006, N 12.

³ Encana and PetroChina end Cutbank Ridge joint venture negotiations // Encana, 21.06.2011 - http://www.encana.com/news-stories/news-releases/details.html?release=608974.

⁴ Encana Announces Joint Venture to Develop Duvernay Lands // Encana, 13.12.2012 - http://www.encana.com/news-stories/news-releascs/details.html?release=726812

^{Gillies Rob.} 5 Op. cit.

⁶ About CCCE // Canadian Council of Chief Executives - www.ceocouncil.ca/about-ccce

^{Kapp Robert A.} 7 The Impeding Tide of Chinese Investment in The United States. The US National Bureau of Asian Research Brief. Washington, 14.01.2013.

⁸ Quite often, oil and gas companies that sell their assets on the market are very interested in solid buyers. For example, China's Sinopec International Petroleum Exploration & Production Corp. It is in talks to acquire a 50% stake in the gas assets of the second-largest U.S. gas company Chesapeake in Northern Oklahoma for $1.02 billion. The operation is expected to help Chesapeake reduce its very high debt level - $12 billion, as of January 1, 2012 / / The Oil & Gas Journal Daily Update, 02/25/2013.

⁹ INPEX CORPORATION Annual Report 2013 - www.inpex.co.jp/english/ir/library/pdf/annual report/inpex_annualreport2013_en.pdf

^{Koike Masanari.} 10 Japan' s Overseas Oil Development and a Role of Technology // The University of Tokyo, May 2008 - http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/documents/GraSPP-DP-E-08-002.pdf; Koike Masanari, Mogi Gento and Albedaiwi Waleed H. Overseas Oil-Development Policy of Resource-Poor Countries: A Case Study from Japan // Energy Policy, 2008, N 5.

¹¹ Сайт Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC). History of JOGMEC - www.jogmec.go.jp/english/about/about003.html

¹² http://www.jogmec.go.jp/content/300054875.pdf

¹³ For more information, see: Madan Tanvi. India's ONGC: Balancing Different Roles, Different Goals;/ames A Baker III Institute for Public Policy. Rice University, Houston, Texas, 2007.

¹⁴ The Oil & Gas Journal. 3.12.2012.

¹⁵ Fortune Global 500 // CNN Money - money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/5

^{Lopez Leslie.} 16 Petronas: Reconciling Tensions between Company and State // Huts Victor and Thurber Thomas. Oil and Governance. L., p. 815.

^{Сайт Petronas -} 17 www.petronas.com.my/our-business/exploration-production/Pages/petronas-ep-quick-fac ts.aspx

¹⁸ Energy Business Review - www.energy-business-review.com/companies/petronas_carigali_internationalsdnbhd

¹⁹ About KNOC // DNV - www.dnv.com/press_area/press_releases/2012/dnvtocooperatewithkoreanationaloilcorporatio nonehsq.asp; Jeon Sujin. Overseas Oil Development of South Korea. February, 2011 - eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/3697.pdf

²⁰ The New York Times, 4.05.2011.

²¹ China's Oil Companies Overseas Business Overview and Sino-Japan Cooperation Potentialities // CNPC Economic and Technology Institute, 6.12.2012 - http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/data/4650.pdf

²² Petronas-Progress Energy takeover completed after Ottawa's approval // The Canadian Press, 12.12.2012 - business.financialpost.com/2012/12/12/petronas-completes-6-billion-progress-energy-acquisit ion-after-deal-gets-ottawas-approval/?_lsa=6790-ac59; Petronas and Progress Energy welcome - www.petronas.com.my/media-relations/media-releases/Pages/article/-PETRONAS-AND-PR OGRESS-WELCOME-FAVOURABLE-CANADA-RULING.aspx

²³ World Energy Outlook, 2012, p. 1 // International Energy Agency - http://www.iea.org/termsandconditionsuseandcopyright/Executive_Summary_1

²⁴ U.S. Energy Information Administration // Annual Energy Outlook 2013, p. 58 - www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf

²⁵ Website of the President of the Russian Federation. Meeting with First Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhang Gaoli. 20.06.2013 - http://xn-90aoqlh7c4a.xn-dlabbgf6aiiy.xn-plai/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE% D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8/18375

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