Review on: Religious and social life of Russian regions. T. I. / Scientific editorship of S. Filatov, Moscow: Letny sad Publ., 2014, 620 p . Religious and social life of the Russian regions, vol. II. / Nauch. edited by S. Filatov, St. Petersburg: Summer Garden Publ., 2016, 512 p.
Introduction
In March 2016, the second volume of the Russian-English project "Religious and Social Life of Russian Regions"was published. This publication is the eleventh book published jointly by representatives of the Russian academic community and the Keston Institute as part of the basic research "Encyclopedia of Contemporary Religious Life in Russia". During their collaboration, which began in 1997, the international authors 'collective has published such publications as:" Religion and Society. Essays on the modern religious life of Russia "(Moscow; SPb., 2002), " Modern religious Life of Russia. Experience of systematic description" (Vol. I-IV, 2003-2006)," Atlas of Modern Religious Life in Russia "(Vol. I-III, 2005-2009)," Religion and Russian Diversity "(Moscow; SPb., 2012)," Religious and Social Life of Russian regions " (Vol. I, 2014).
However, if in the noughties the tasks of the collective's work were reduced to "introducing the reader to those in the religious life of our country that are little or not known at all" 1, and the publications were more focused on providing information and reference information about religious organizations (full names, number of members, leadership, addresses, contacts, etc.). etc.). Then the publications of the tenth years set as their goal the presentation of historical-
1. Atlas of Modern Religious Life in Russia, vol. 1, ed. by M. Burdo and S. Filatov, St. Petersburg: Letny Sad Publ., 2005, p. 7.
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analytical information, namely, a description of the main trends in the religious and social life of the Russian regions. According to the project participants, the shift of emphasis from informational to analytical activities is primarily due to the widespread use of the Internet in Russia. The increase in high-speed Internet coverage has made it easier for the population to access information about religious organizations and communities and eliminated the urgent need for specialized information and reference publications (you can now get this information with a couple of clicks of a computer mouse). However, the development of technological progress has not eliminated the problems of the need to separate sources, conduct a fair analysis and compact presentation of information. The authors ' team of the project "Religious and Social life of Russian Regions"undertook to overcome these difficulties and outline the main directions of development of religious and social life.
Structure
The structure of the presentation of material in the publications of the project "Religious and Social life of Russian Regions" is somewhat different from the design previously used in the"Atlas of Modern Religious Life in Russia". If in the Atlas the regions are grouped according to the order used in the Constitution of the Russian Federation (first in alphabetical order are the republics, and then the territories and regions), then in the "Life of Russian Regions" all subjects are represented by a single alphabetically ordered list. The first volume of the series describes the situation in 19 regions of the Russian Federation from the letter A (Republic of Adygea) to I (Republic of Ingushetia), and the second volume reveals the religious and social life of 14 more Russian regions from I (Irkutsk region) to K (Krasnoyarsk Territory). The choice of such a design is more suitable for an encyclopedic project, but at the same time it is associated with some difficulties that fall on the shoulders of both authors and readers.
First, the alphabetization of subjects requires significant logistical costs for researchers conducting interviews with insiders, since the distance between regions whose names begin with the same letter in Russia can be thousands of kilometers (Amur, Arkhangelsk, and Astrakhan regions). Second, the polarity
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and the contrast of the socio-religious situation prevailing in the regions that are consistently presented one after another can cause dissonance in the reader, making it difficult to perceive the material presented. With the current form of submission, the constituent entities of the Russian Federation are torn out of their geographical, economic, socio-political, and cultural contexts, which hinders understanding of the processes taking place in the region, makes it difficult to compare religious and social life in neighboring regions, and does not allow us to fully reveal the many-sided conflicts formed as a result of the discrepancy between secular and religious administrative-territorial borders. In addition, after a deep dive into the specifics of the religious and social life of one subject of the federation, it is not an easy task to switch consciousness to comprehend the features of another region that is radically different from the previously studied one and is located almost on the other side of the globe.
In this regard, it is more logical to group the Russian regions by federal districts rather than alphabetically. Choosing such a strategy would reduce logistics costs when collecting materials. In this case, researchers would not have traveled from one end of the country to the other when writing each volume, but would have systematically visited neighboring regions of a particular district. At the same time, information for each district could be presented in a separate book (there are eight districts in the Russian Federation, not counting the Crimean one, but as many as seven volumes are planned to be published as part of the project). Moreover, the arrangement of regions by federal districts would also help to organize the reader's knowledge and form a holistic, rather than fragmentary, view of the religious and social life of Russian regions. In this way, groups of regions that are located in relatively similar geographical, economic and cultural conditions would be represented, which would minimize contrast and facilitate the process of complex assimilation of the realities presented by the authors.
The choice of the proposed research design is also supported by the fact that the author's team itself does not fully adhere to the alphabetical strategy of presenting the material. So the chosen principle is violated already in the first volume, where after the disclosure of information about the-
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The article presents materials on the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, which is both a subject of the Russian Federation and an integral part of the Arkhangelsk Region. In addition, data on the religious and social situation in the federal city of Moscow is also planned to be presented bypassing the chosen research strategy.
The chapters of the reviewed publications are information and analytical articles for 30-40 pages, revealing the religious and social life of the regions for each religious group in them. Structurally, the text of each article is divided into several semantic blocks: Features of the historical development of religion in the region/ROC / Alternative Orthodox Churches / RCC / Protestant Churches/ Judaism/ Islam/ Buddhism/Paganism/ Neo-paganism. In some cases, chapters end with a bibliographic list. At the same time, the part about the Orthodox Church includes the following blocks: Organizational structure/Features of diocesan life/Religious policy of the authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church/Population/Educational establishments/Monasticism.
Sections about the Russian Orthodox Church (in traditionally Muslim regions, there are also sections about Islam) and Protestant churches differ in the largest volume. There are reasons for this imbalance. They consist not so much in the authors 'desire to describe in detail the relationship of regional authorities with representatives of the most widespread religious groups in Russia (the number of Russian Protestants varies from 500 thousand to 2 million, depending on calculations, which significantly changes their place in the" rating " of religious groups), but in the desire to reflect the real significance of specific religious communities in socio-political life of Russia. However, such a statement of the question can also be seen as a disadvantage associated with the traditional focus of Russian religious studies on Orthodoxy and Islam, to the detriment of disclosing information about less numerous and less well-known religious groups.
Content
It seems that for a significant part of readers, the most interesting sections will be " Features of the Diocese-
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Religious life" and "Religious Policy of the authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church", as they set out an analytical vision of the main trends in the religious and social life of Russian regions.
The sections "Features of diocesan life" give a fairly brief but at the same time succinct idea of the main features of the church life in Russian regions and the differences that exist within the Church. The materials presented in the book shed light on the reasons for the attempts under Patriarch Kirill to strengthen the power vertical within the Church and increase the bureaucratization of church life. According to the vision presented in the book, these actions are based on the desire to rein in the radical part of the clergy and increase control over the huge and poorly managed church machine, torn from within by religious, ideological, financial and moral contradictions. As the authors 'collective notes in the first volume of " Religious and Social Life of Russian Regions": "In parallel with the growth of Orthodox activity, the self-consciousness of clergy and lay people speaking from Orthodox positions is also growing, the diversity of positions, discussions and ideological conflicts is growing. The Russian Orthodox Church is becoming a field of debate not only on purely ecclesiastical issues, but also on issues of socio-political significance. Often, against the will of the church authorities, Orthodoxy becomes a sphere where moral and ideological positions collide " (Vol. I, p. 4).
After reading the sections "Religious policy of the authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church", there is a strong desire to doubt the thesis broadcast by state bodies about the unity and similarity of Russian regions and sing an ode to regionalists who, in their duty, need to understand all the difficulties and vicissitudes of each region of our country. Information about the religious and social life of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation included in our peer-reviewed publications is difficult to present in a generalized form, because the situation in each region is unique in its own way, and an attempt to generalize inevitably leads to the loss of authentic elements and voicing evidence.
In the list of characteristics common to all subjects discussed in the book, it is worth noting the following points::
1. Centralized religious policy in the Russian Federation
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it doesn't exist. Regional authorities try to capture the intentions coming from the federal center and copy the federal practices of dialogue with religious organizations, but due to the lack of a clearly defined position and standardized criteria for evaluating activities, the form and intensity of relations between the authorities and religious organizations in the regions differ significantly. The situation is similar within the religious body of the Russian Orthodox Church, where the responsibility for relations between metropolitans and local authorities falls entirely on regional church hierarchs.
2. State-confessional dialogue takes place in all the regions represented, but the name of the institutions responsible for its maintenance and control, their place in the organizational and staff structure, and the influence exerted on the political decision-making process vary in each subject of the federation.
3. The intensity, focus and effectiveness of the state-confessional dialogue on the ground directly depends on the personal orientation of decision-makers in state and church positions in the regions, and does not depend on their party affiliation.
The book presents a retrospective of the transformations that take place in the religious and social life of the regions after the change of the governor or a high-ranking church hierarch, perfectly illustrates this thesis. At the same time, the party affiliation and ideological views of the governor/mayor/person responsible for relations with religious organizations do not play a significant role in determining the position of the regional authorities on religious issues. For example, over the past two decades, Communists in some regions opposed proselytism and increased influence of the Russian Orthodox Church (Kaluga and Kirov regions), while in others they supported the Russian Orthodox Church (Amur and Kamchatka Regions). Third, they fought against less powerful religious groups (the Republic of Karelia), and fourth, during their rule, governors and church hierarchs managed to radically reconsider their attitude to religion and to the Soviet government (the Altai Republic, the Bryansk Region). In turn, the "democratic"ones
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forces in some regions supported the neutrality of the authorities on religious issues (Kaliningrad region), while in others they supported the Russian Orthodox Church (Astrakhan, Volgograd Region, Krasnodar Territory, Republic of Karelia).
4. Based on the examples described on the pages of the publication, the religious policy of representatives of regional authorities can be divided into two types: Orthodox-patriotic and balanced pro-Orthodox.
The Orthodox-patriotic type provides for conducting a pro-Orthodox policy, allocating financial resources for the needs of the Russian Orthodox Church, promoting the development of Orthodox organizations and amateur organizations, actively introducing representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church into the ranks of the armed forces and educational institutions, persecuting other religious groups (especially NSD and Protestant communities), etc. (Belgorod region). At the same time, the implementation of this policy does not require the governor of the Orthodox faith or the separation of pro-Orthodox views (Voronezh Region under Vladimir Kulakov, Kemerovo Region, Komi Republic under Yuri Spiridonov, Krasnodar Territory under the second term of governor Nikolai Kondratenko).
A balanced pro-Orthodox policy is characterized by a generally positive attitude towards Orthodoxy, which is accompanied by a loyal or neutral attitude towards other religious groups in the region, and restrained financial support for the initiatives of the Russian Orthodox Church (the Altai Republic, the Volgograd Region, the Republic of Kalmykia, the Kirov Region, and the Krasnoyarsk Territory under Alexander Khloponin). As a litmus test of the religious policy pursued by the regional authorities, the attitude towards Protestant communities operating in the region can be used: if Protestants are persecuted, then Orthodox-patriotic rhetoric is carried out, if Protestants are "not noticed" by the authorities, then, most likely, a pro-Orthodox position is reserved.
5. The main directions for work in the dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church are: building an effective financial and economic system, improving the educational level of the clergy, and organizing active social work with various categories of the population. Over the past decade, the greatest success of the ROC to-
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It was in these directions that the Church struggled, although the intensity and quality of social service of Orthodox Christians in Russia is still much lower than that of similar activities of Protestant churches.
Separately, it is worth noting the thoroughness and detail of the information provided in the blocks about Protestant churches in the regions of Russia. The authors ' team worked hard on this part of the publication, structuring numerous Protestant groups and describing in sufficient detail the specifics of their existence and building relationships with regional authorities in Russia. Familiarization with this part of the publication will be interesting and useful for specialists in the field of state-confessional relations and the sociology of religion, as well as for those interested in Protestantism in general and Russian Protestantism in particular. The main thesis of the sections devoted to the situation of representatives of this denomination in Russia was voiced by Roman Lunkin at the presentation of the second volume of the publication at the IE RAS: "Protestantism in Russia has taken a strong position, although this has not yet been fully realized either in religious or political terms."
Power and the Russian Orthodox Church
The significance of this book for the academic community also lies in the fact that it uses materials from the religious and political life of Russian regions to provide numerous proofs of the failure of the widespread opinion about the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church and state power. A retrospective analysis of the state-confessional policy "on the ground" shows that the secular authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church are not so much allies as temporary traveling companions, who, being in constant expectation of a violation of agreements on the part of their counterparty, try to maximize each of their benefits at the expense of the other.
For the authorities in power, the turn to Orthodoxy was largely due to the opportunistic orientation towards the "pro-Orthodox consensus" established in society, the pragmatic bet on Orthodoxy as a "spiritual bond" - a factor that consolidates society and minimizes the consequences of the post-Soviet anomie in it. Interesting examples of constructing a new Orthodox identity that binds together a regional community are the cases of the Belgorod region.-
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Krasnodar Territory under Alexander Tkachev, Krasnoyarsk Territory under Alexander Lebed, Kaliningrad region.
In the Russian Orthodox Church, the warming of relations with the authorities was perceived as a means to increase the role of the church in society, to return to it the position and property lost as a result of the revolution, which should later contribute to the soul-saving activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the first stages of the proselytizing activity of the Russian Orthodox Church, the emphasis is placed on strengthening the processes of desecularization and penetration of the Church into various spheres and institutions of society, getting used to the proximity of priests and the presence of the church's opinion in the information space.
However, the unidirectional movement of the secular authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church, which has been recorded over the past decades, drapes the fundamental divergence of the goals and values of the participants in this tandem. The secular authorities consider the religious resource as an aid to increase the manageability of society, improve its moral and psychological situation, and minimize funds spent on social services. The authorities do not need an independent and strong church, they need a healthy and controlled society, and therefore the strengthening of the Russian Orthodox Church is seen as a necessary measure. This idea can be clearly traced in the statements of many statesmen, for example, the head of the Department for Relations with Public and Religious Organizations of the Internal Policy Department of the Voronezh Region Government, Alexander Zaitsev, reported during the governorship of Vladimir Kulakov: "it is difficult to say that Kulakov is a devout believer, since he is still a lieutenant general of the KGB. Kulakov, first of all, is a statesman who understands perfectly well that only religion can restore moral values to society. This religion should not be alien to the people, but should be exactly the one on which the entire culture was built, and the people were genetically raised." For this reason, from Zaitsev's point of view, the priority of the Russian Orthodox Church is recognized in the region. However, the regional authorities were convinced that "Orthodox churches should be built at the expense of parishioners and sponsors, and not with budget money" (Vol. I, p. 497). Another example of the position of the authorities regarding the support of the Russian Orthodox Church is a quote attributed by the authors of the publication to the Governor of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Valery
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To Zubov. As the book notes: "Zubov had no sympathy for the diocese, believing that it" constantly demands something from the authorities, but does not give anything to society." In private conversations, Zubov expressed great sympathy for Protestants and Catholics, "who do a lot in the field of charity and demand almost nothing" (Vol. II, p. 478).
In turn, the goal of the Church is to achieve the independence and self-sufficiency that it needs to guide society on the right path and save human souls. The Russian Orthodox Church is forced to participate in the exchange of resources and legitimation with the authorities at both the federal and regional levels, but the clergy are not unreasonably afraid of the transformation of the unstable symphonic model of state-confessional relations into a Caesar-papist one. The development of events exactly in this way occurred, in particular, in the Kostroma region under Igor Slyunyaev, where the governor " actively interfered in the life of the diocese, came to diocesan meetings, and came into conflict with the archbishop. Alexander" (Vol. II, p. 412) and "achieved" a change of bishop, as well as in the Krasnodar Territory under Alexander Tkachev, where " cooperation with the Kuban Archdiocese of the Russian Orthodox Church is carried out in a variety of areas, officials themselves try to attract clergy representatives to many projects, encouraging the Church to active public service. < ... > This cooperation in some cases, it goes beyond what can be called "help" and can rather be called leadership by the church. At the direct insistence of the administration, for example, priests are sent to kindergartens, forced to participate in various public events" (Vol. II, p. 439).
The value difference between the parties is that the secular authorities act as a pragmatic conservative force, while the clergy position themselves as ideological traditionalists. The conservative position of the authorities consists in the desire to preserve the existing order and balance of power unchanged in society for as long as possible, to protect the interests of groups that have gained a foothold in power, and to be ready to apply innovations only in extreme cases, when the lack of reforms can lead to the imminent death of the existing system. In the last point, the powers that be are as close as possible to the beliefs of the ancestor
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the conservatism of Edmund Burke, who bequeathed to resort to "medicine only when the patient is very ill"2. As one feature film about the Russian government put it: "he [the governor. - M. B.], of course, did not do anything good, but he did not do anything bad either... And this, by the way, rarely happens."
At the same time, the authorities do not care what methods are used to preserve the status quo and save the political organism from the death of reform-liberalizing culture, democratic procedures, allowing abortions, juvenile justice, using the help of non - Orthodox people, etc.The moral component and religious approval of the methods used are not important for secular authorities. The same cannot be said about the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, for whom morality and consistency with the theological norm are key points in making political decisions.
For the traditionalist-oriented hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church, the existing order and balance of power in society are unacceptable. They seek to change it and unbalance it in favor of church structures. Many methods used by secular authorities, from the point of view of the clergy, are unacceptable and contribute to the moral decomposition of society, the authorities are accused of insincerity, dishonesty, lack of piety and their own interpretations of the faith. Thus, the hierarchs of the Voronezh Diocese complained to researchers about the local authorities, saying that " there are officials in the administration who call themselves responsible people, but they are not. We come up with initiatives, but the administration ignores us, takes away our ideas and conducts social actions regardless of the diocese " (Vol. I, p. 496). In turn, the head of the missionary department of the Ekaterinodar and Kuban Diocese, Archpriest. Alexy Kasatikov, speaking about the phenomenon of "Cossack Orthodoxy" actively introduced by the Krasnodar authorities, notes: "it is impossible to single out a certain special Cossack Orthodoxy, since the Cossacks are not a separate ethnic group, like Vyatichi or Krivichi, and besides, "they are so afraid of God that they do not go to church"" (Vol.II, p. 433).
Thus, between the secular authorities and the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church
2. Burke E. Reflections on the Revolution in France [http://helpiks.org/657493.html, accessed from 10.04.2016].
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there are numerous disagreements, not only at the federal level, but also at the regional level. The situation with relations between the secular and religious authorities is also complicated by the presence of many internal conflicts in both verticals, both of a systemic and personal nature. It is noteworthy that the Patriarchate's focus on lobbying the interests of the Russian Orthodox Church locally through practicing Orthodox governors does not always give the expected results; it happens that nominally believing or generally non-believing governors are more loyal to the Russian Orthodox Church than the ecclesiastical rulers of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation.
The fact that representatives of secular and religious authorities often join forces and form coalitions cannot be ignored. By joining the alliance, the secular and ecclesiastical rulers of the Russian regions are making rather bold attempts to lobby for their consolidated interests, including in higher instances of both the religious and secular power verticals. Thus, in some cases, the governors lobbied for the interests of diocesan elites in the Synod (the Republic of Adygea, the Lipetsk Region, the Republic of Buryatia). In particular, "in July 2009, President of Buryatia Nagovitsin asked Patriarch Kirill to establish an Orthodox diocese in the republic, which was largely the result of lobbying by the Orthodox clergy of Buryatia" (Vol. I, p. 337). In other cases, secular rulers (the governor/mayor) have enlisted the public support of church hierarchs in their candidacies for the next election and actively (and until now successfully)joined forces They resisted the decisions of the federal center, which explicitly opposed the re-election of old bureaucrats (the Nenets Autonomous District under Alexey Barinov, the Bryansk Region under Yuri Lodkin, Volgograd under Evgeny Ishchenko). At the same time, clerics continued to support their counterparts even after the political "reprisal" (initiation of criminal cases and court convictions) was carried out against ex-rulers. In third cases, religious and secular leaders organized joint economic and" sponsorship " projects, for example, forced expulsions by drunk drivers, detained persons, etc.
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traffic police officers, money for the construction of the temple (Volgograd region).
At the same time, the project participants themselves note that compared to what was recorded a decade ago, the situation with the implementation of state-confessional dialogue and regulation of religious and public life in the regions of Russia is improving. So the editor of the presented publication Sergey Filatov at the presentation of the second volume of "Religious and social life of Russian regions" emphasized: "There is a slow process of recovery, improvement of religious life, and this is not related to politics. Savagery is becoming less and less, people read more, learn about other (confessions. The Church is gradually changing for the better."
Remarks
Along with the obvious advantages of the first editions of the project "Religious and Social Life of Russian Regions", it is necessary to note some controversial points. So questions are caused by the absence of parts in the works indicating the procedure for finding respondents and the methodology for selecting secondary sources of information.
The project participants in the academic field have long been well known for their research achievements, their authority is high and generally recognized, but this fact does not eliminate the need to describe the methodological part of the study. After reading the books, it becomes clear that the authors used interviews conducted by the authors with representatives of the authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, heads of religious organizations and communities, members of the expert community, as well as materials from the print and electronic press. But the books do not disclose the mechanisms for finding and selecting respondents: How was the list of people to be interviewed compiled? What problems were encountered when compiling the list? How did the researchers find out about this or that state person? What problems did you encounter when communicating with government officials? Did everyone agree to talk? What was the bounce rate? In which regions were you unable to communicate with the authorities? Only conditionally "liberal" bureaucrats came into contact, or was it possible to avoid a bias in the "sample"? Similar questions arise in relation to interviews conducted by-
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contact with representatives of the clergy and experts.
Equally relevant are questions about the methodology for selecting secondary sources of information and links to them. How was the reliability of a particular source determined? How was one resource prioritized over another? And what resources were used in the search for information? The texts of the reviewed works do not always contain references to sources, so on the pages of the second volume you can meet with the wording "according to some Internet resources", after which there is no indication of specific resources. In addition, bibliographic lists are not always provided at the end of chapters, and this is despite the fact that the analysis of religious and social trends in each article is preceded by a historical excursion into the development of religion in the region.
Also, among the shortcomings of the work, it should be noted that the sections on neo-pagan communities are relatively poorly developed. Thus, the article on Slavic neo-paganism (rodnoveriya) in the Kaluga region is a reference to the 1999 event and a reminiscence to the 2005 work. While the Kaluga region can be called one of the centers of Russian rodnoveriya. It is on the Kaluga land that the "All-Slavic veche" is held annually, at which the head of one of the largest neo-pagan associations in Russia, the Union of Slavic Communities of the Slavic Native Faith (SSO SRV), is elected. The publication does not indicate that several important changes have taken place in the Kaluga Rodnover movement during this period. In 2011, the head of the SRV MTR was replaced. In 2014, SSO SRV passed state registration as an Interregional Public Organization for the Support and Development of Slavic Culture. In 2015, a large ceremonial structure - the Svarozhich Fire Temple-was created on the land of the Northern Soviet Socialist Republic in the Kaluga Region. In addition, the authors limited themselves to listing the presence in the Kemerovo region of communities of followers of such neo-pagan movements as "Radosteya", " Anastasia (Ringing Cedars of Russia)"," City of the Sun", without disclosing any information about the peculiarities of their existence in this region. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that information on the communities of these movements is given in the descriptions of other regions, in particular the Kirov Region and the Krasnoyarsk Territory.-
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However, the thesis about the similarity of the situation of communities in different regions is not included in the text.
Conclusion
Despite some comments, the first volumes of the information and analytical project "Religious and Social Life of Russian Regions" are an example of a colossal work in terms of volume and fundamental scope (7 volumes are planned to be published), qualitatively performed by a team of dedicated authors. This work deserves the attention of specialists of various profiles and will take its rightful place on the shelf of not only specialists in state and confessional issues, religious scholars, sociologists and political scientists, but also citizens who are not uninterested in the religious and socio-political situation in the Russian regions.
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