D. A. NECHITAILO, Candidate of Political Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

jihad on the Internet "Al-Qaeda", Keywords:, online propaganda

In the psychological war for influence on society, terrorists rely mainly on the Internet. Through their information portals, they not only come into contact with the audience, but also form an image of the enemy in their minds. Regardless of their ideological views and goals, terrorists present information in such a way that it is perceived by different groups of potential audiences. In fact, a large-scale information war is being waged against the liberal civilizational world order, which, we must admit, is in a state of deep crisis.

For radical movements of various kinds, violence has a religious and legal justification and is a primary tool in the strategy of the struggle for power. And when this is said openly every day and every hour, it impresses and affects the minds of millions of people: one scares, another worries, and someone makes you think, but leaves no one indifferent.

Most actively, Al-Qaeda began to use the Internet when its military training camps were destroyed after the entry of American troops into Afghanistan. The World Wide Web serves as a vehicle for radical Islamists to exchange ideas and grow ideologically.

In the absence of free information resources that are equally accessible to everyone, the global jihad movement would not have been able to develop at such a rapid pace. The Internet allows radical Islamists to find people who share their views in the global information space. They actively use the World Wide Web not only for the purpose of finding like-minded people: the information network is now becoming the main source of "self-radicalization"for them. The intellectual level of perpetrators of terrorist attacks is growing. The active use of the global information space by radical Islamists in their struggle can be called "media jihad".

Changes in the transnational space, which have a fateful impact on the state and society, are happening too quickly. A kaleidoscope of events, streams of video and audio information leave a person little time for reflection and choice, he can only take note of what he saw and heard or reject it. In essence, the world is being zombified, a person ceases to navigate in the abundance of constantly updated information.

One of the consequences of globalization is the erasure of national identity. This is most evident among the second and third generations of immigrants who grew up in Western countries. The ideology of global jihad offers an alternative to the lost identity for those who seek to find a new identity. For example, in the past, immigrants were isolated from their countries of origin and thus were more influenced by the adaptive mechanisms of Western society. The Internet has eased the effects of migrant isolation and eased assimilating information and social pressures.

GLOBAL JIHAD ON THE INTERNET

Al-Qaeda is a decentralized network, an ideological alliance of autonomous radical groups and organizations. International cooperation in the fight against extremism makes it more difficult for members of radical structures to conduct operations, pushes them to go into the shadows and carry out propaganda and recruitment work. In such conditions, it is impossible to manage disparate groups as a single mechanism, but they can be set a certain vector of action. Activists hiding from the persecution of special services-

representatives of radical Islamist organizations who lack the means to communicate with their like-minded people quickly appreciated all the advantages that the World Wide Web offers them. Thus, in modern conditions, it is the Internet that has become the main means of communication, propaganda, and recruitment.

About 5,600 websites operate for the global jihad movement, and about 900 new ^ones are opened every year1. About a decade ago, Al-Qaeda had only one website, An - Neda, registered in Singapore.² Al-Sahab now operates a media division that creates video materials in Eastern and Western languages. ³ Al-Qaeda is becoming increasingly virtual, and many websites are one of the main activators of radical Islamist structures.

The Internet plays a crucial role in the strategy of the global jihad movement. It is both propaganda and a method of armed struggle, broadcasting tactics and methods of warfare.

The Mujahideen of Iraq actively share their experience of fighting against coalition forces. One of the forum participants, an" Iraqi veteran " under the pseudonym Jil al-Aqida, in the article "The bait on which the enemy is caught", says that " the soldiers of Allah in Iraq began to use new methods of fighting against the Americans, to show great ingenuity. Recently, they have been luring Americans into well-prepared ambushes. For example, coalition soldiers chasing supposedly retreating Mujahideen enter a booby-trapped building, which is then detonated using a cell phone.⁴ Jil al-Aqida writes that this method has worked more than a dozen times in Iraq. He also believes that the method of traps is useful for jihadists in different countries, including in Europe.⁵

Another regular visitor to the forum, under the pseudonym Lbu Hijja al-Maghribi, shares his experience of participating in combat operations in Iraq, in particular, talks about some of the proven methods of dealing with American Apache helicopters. He lists all his aliases that he uses to participate in various forums and asks everyone to pray for him to become a shaheed. An ordinary young man, whom many, albeit virtually, know, is fighting against the "enemies of Islam". Such stories have a powerful propaganda effect.

Islamists are well aware that they have to operate in a world that is developing rapidly in terms of technology and technology, where weapons are becoming more and more complex. And among them there are new theorists who place professionally created materials and methods of fighting in modern conditions.

So, in the spring of 2007, a work on this topic was published, where, for example, in the section "Smart weapons - short-range missiles", comparative characteristics of the Stinger and Strela MANPADS are given: "... the Strela manufactured in Russia does not respond to fired thermal missiles, but looks for a real target among the targets"baits."

The author of this section, Abu Harris al-Dilaini, has posted a detailed guide with illustrations. It covers operations against American Apache helicopters, Black Hawks, and F-16s (a total of 10 air targets that were shot down by the Mujahideen of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) ^.6 Ad-Dilaini talks in detail about the specifics of modern types of military aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as the maneuvers they undertake against MANPADS ⁷ attacks.

The World Wide Web allows even a small radical group to exaggerate its importance and threat to the interests of Western countries; with the help of the Internet, jihadist groups create a sense of universal insecurity among Western audiences. The websites call for a psychological struggle against the United States and its allies, and the main target here is the broad population of these countries, which should put pressure on their governments.

Various groups not only exchange ideas via the Internet, but also share practical recommendations on how to make an explosive device, create a cell, and conduct attacks. After the loss of Afghanistan, the global Jihad Movement, with its network of military training bases, began to distribute a lot of extremist materials. The focus is on the mass scale of the terrorist attacks being committed. At the same time, lists of potential targets (nuclear facilities, airports), even train schedules (peak hours), and information about counterintelligence measures taken by special services of different countries are posted. One of the Arabic-language radical forums indicates that by accessing jihad sites, you can get up to 80% of information about the enemy.⁸ Recently, a diagram of several dams was placed, the undermining of which can lead to disastrous consequences in some countries.

It should be noted that the growing popularity of radical Islamist forums is reflected in practice. For example, a report published by the special services of some European states notes that the level of training of so-called homegrown radicals from Islam is growing, which, according to representatives of anti-terrorist agencies, is largely the result of the active work of Islamist Internet forums. The number of sites for English-, Italian-, French-, and German-speaking audiences that target the second and third generation of Muslims who grew up on the European continent is increasing. Radical Islamists who have acquired the necessary knowledge from the Internet are increasingly referred to in Western literature as the "new generation of Islamists".

Due to the spread of information technologies, terrorist organizations have the opportunity to quickly coordinate their actions. At the same time, the ideological center may not be directly involved in the preparation of operations in a particular location, but is limited to general management and setting tasks. All this inevitably creates the impression of a phantom organization as a whole. It is no coincidence that some authors express doubts even about the very existence of Al-Qaeda, preferring to refer to the myth about it, thereby increasing the information and psychological pressure of terrorists on public opinion.

The advent of the Internet has allowed radical Islamist cells to operate without the direct support of major terrorist organizations. Terrorists use the World Wide Web for the same reasons as modern multinational companies: for communication, control, marketing, and collecting the necessary information. We can confidently say that without the Internet, Al-Qaeda as a world organization could not exist, the world jihad movement appeared as a result of the rapid development of modern communications.

CYBER JIHAD

Radical Islamists in the confrontation with the West practice not only methods of armed struggle - they also conduct the so-called electronic jihad. In recent years, websites have appeared that specialize in conducting and coordinating cyber attacks against Israeli, American, and European websites, as well as electronic resources of various Catholic organizations. Among the most well-known cyber attacks is the attack on the website of the Danish newspaper "Yulands-Posten", which published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.

Jean-Pierre Filu, author of the book "Frontiers of Jihad" from the Institute for Political Studies (Paris), talks about the evolution of the information space: "Ten years ago, you could find bloody videos from Chechnya and Algeria, but now materials on conducting electronic attacks that do not contain military terms are becoming more widespread." ⁹ Established in 2003, the World Islamic Media Front has approximately 500 reports on the manufacture of explosives, recommendations on how to set up ambushes, and so on.¹⁰ However, in this case, we are talking about a different category of jihadist warriors. After the statements of Pope Benedict XVI in September 2006, the Vatican website was subjected to a massive attack by Islamist hackers, which ended in failure, because it had a high degree of protection.

Radical Islamist forums are increasingly focusing on how to conduct cyber attacks, and the number of such instructions is becoming comparable to the number of recommendations for creating explosives. French cyberterrorism expert A. Gudicelli says that "... we are talking about an Internet version of jihad, users get viruses that will be activated at a certain time " ¹¹. Sites are being created to organize large-scale electronic actions against Internet targets, where special programs are offered that can be written to a computer. As the number of people who wrote the program increases, the date of the attack on a particular site is set, and it is carried out simultaneously by a large number of users.

The main goals that the "warriors of Islam" set for themselves in cyberspace were posted on one of the sites: "Followers of the Cross should know that their sites can be disabled, we should not forget our leaders, Mujahideen, people, children who died in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, etc. elsewhere, we must avenge them. " ¹²

The author of the call to electronic jihad writes that he has researched numerous materials on how to disable electronic networks, open e-mail, obstruct the operation of servers, etc. However, in his opinion, now it is necessary to set a more serious global task - blocking the operation of electronic systems around the world. Such actions will lead to a collapse. At the same time, he calls for paralyzing the operation of not only individual websites, but also military electronic networks, radars, missile control systems, etc.: "Stopping the operation of these systems for at least one day will cause general chaos in the West, may lead to a collapse of stock markets, payment systems, and the economies of individual states."¹³

Experts in the study of so-called cyber jihad agree that the problem is exacerbated by the fact that many organizations do not even suspect that someone may suddenly need to obstruct the operation of their sites. One of the radical Islamist forums conducted a survey among participants about which organizations ' websites are most preferred for attacks. Potential targets included financial organizations, websites of organizations associated with the FBI, and the CIA. In September 2006, IP addresses of institutions related to the defense system in the West were posted, including the Ballistics Research Laboratory, the Center for Army Weapons Research and Development, the National Space Agency of Japan, etc. In December 2006, an appeal was published - "Electronic raid against American banks", but the planned attack was canceled, because the" targets " were warned by the special services about the upcoming action. The author further writes that "blocking the operation of websites of organizations associated with banks, exchanges, for several days or even hours will cause multimillion-dollar losses."¹⁴. He calls on co-workers to-

focus on attacks on the websites of American financial institutions to block them for other users.

Another strategy is to use special programs to send thousands of e-mails to the site, sometimes containing viruses. However, according to the participants of such attacks, such actions are ineffective so far, and the servers restore normal operation in a few minutes. One of the hackers shares the methods used by his group to eliminate sites: "We contact the server before and after the attack and threaten its administration until they turn off the site."

Currently, there are several groups that conduct electronic jihad. Among them - "Ansar al-jihad li-l-jihad al-iliktruni", "Al-Muhajiroun", "Munazamat fursan al-jihad al-iliktruni", "Majmuat al-jihad al-Iliktruni", "Inhiyar ad-dular", "Haqboy". Most of them have their own Internet sites, through which these organizations attract volunteers to conduct electronic campaigns.

For example, the website of Majmuat al-Jihad al-Iliktruni contains recommendations for preparing a cyber attack: "Download the program used for the email attack... If you get a warning about a virus, don't worry... click quickly on the program to start the attack, then exit the program by running it once. Don't rush to make quick progress if you have high-speed Internet. Run the program several times. Attacking sites requires the joint efforts of the participants... Calculate the time, the attack should be carried out for at least two hours..."¹⁵ The site contains information about the essence of electronic jihad, its strategy, and the results of previous attacks.

In January 2007, Al-Muhajiroun invited all "Mujahideen fighting on the Internet" to sign the so-called Immigrants ' Pact and join the banner of the Muhajiroun brigades. The document states that"they are obliged to obey the leader in all matters, not challenge his authority, make efforts for media jihad and attack those sites that harm Islam and Muslims." ¹⁶ Thus, by signing this Pact, individual hackers turn from lone fighters into a virtually organized group.

Participants in the attack from different countries who have never seen each other, united in a certain conditional group, use certain programs to overload the site with a huge number of requests and complicate or stop its operation for several hours. The point is to have as many requests as possible. The number of users is recorded, and when a certain critical mass appears and an Internet goal is set, the site displays the goal's address and time of the promotion.

ISLAMIST HACKERS

The groups performing these attacks are virtual. The consequences of their actions can lead, first of all, to economic losses for organizations whose sites have been subjected to cyber attacks, for example, by advertising companies, and to an increase in the cost of installing higher-level protection. Recently, a visitor to an Islamist Internet forum posted instructions on how to break through the database protection of a British financial institution in order to steal confidential information about credit card users and cause financial damage. In October 2006, a radical Internet site broadcast real-time images from the security cameras of the Anchorage International Airport (Alaska). They also demonstrated how to access the airport's video surveillance monitoring program. Islamist hackers posted a message calling it "You can monitor an enemy airport by controlling the direction of the cameras." ¹⁷

In 2005 Scotland Yard has arrested Younis Tsouli, better known by the pseudonym Irhabi-007 (Terrorist-007), who created several programs to break into other people's servers and get information from there. Interestingly, Irhabi-007 was arrested on suspicion of preparing a terrorist attack. Only during a search of his home was confidential information stolen from the servers of US financial institutions discovered.

11 According to Western experts in the field of cyberterrorism, there are no more than four cyber-Islamists of the same level as Irhabi-00718. He not only infiltrated various Western news networks, but also created a large number of Islamist websites; he did not belong to any of the radical Internet groups, but collaborated with various extremist forums. For a long time, he managed to put the special services on the wrong track: they were looking for him in the United States, and he was in Europe.

It is worth noting that there is already a war going on between hackers on the Internet. In 2000, a group of Israeli hackers stopped the operation of the Hezbollah website, overloading it with a huge number of electronic messages.¹⁹ In response, Hezbollah called on Arab users to retaliate, and soon the websites of the Israeli Government and Defense Ministry were blocked.

Ehud Tenenbaum, the head of an Israeli company that installs security systems for websites, speaks about the intensity of the Arab-Israeli cyber confrontation. E. Tenenbaum gained fame in 1998 when he managed to penetrate the Pentagon's computer system. He believes that the threat of cyberterrorism is particularly relevant for

Israel is one of the most "internetized" countries in the world. "So," says Ye. Tenenbaum, - im (to the Arabs. There is almost nothing to lose in this war, while we have much to lose, since the Israeli economy is largely dependent on Internet companies. " ²⁰

The activity of cyber-Islamists has caused serious concerns on the part of US intelligence agencies. In October 2003, a document signed by Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld was published, which noted that many American electronic networks are vulnerable to hacker attacks and require additional security measures.²¹

The Al-Farooq website offers software that can be used to distort the user's IP address (the IP address can be used to identify the user.): a false IP address is transmitted when accessing the Internet. With this program, it is impossible to determine even the country from which access to the World Wide Web occurred.

Islamist specialized journals for programmers are published in electronic form. They provide countries and even a list of organizations that have wireless Internet (Wi-Fi Network), as well as instructions on how, for example, in a car or bar in front of such an office or Internet cafe, to connect to the network, i.e. via IP they will determine not the hacker, but the location located in the Internet. there is an organization nearby.

The actions of Islamist hackers are becoming increasingly coordinated. For example, the website of the Majmuat al-Jihad group publishes a notification about an imminent attack, then - the time of the action, and approximately half an hour before that-the email address of the planned target. Participants in the upcoming attack, in turn, send a response about readiness. Recently, about 3,000 people participated in a protest against one of the Shiite sites.²²

In December 2006, the website of the radical Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun informed visitors about the upcoming action: "Our attack (hajma) is planned for this Friday... The name of the program used for the promotion will be posted half an hour before the start. Coordinators, you worked hard last week, show the same diligence during the upcoming attack... " The campaign manager is responsible for mobilizing a certain group of participants; it is he who receives the target's email address in an hour and then transmits it to his group.

The methods used by Internet Mujahideen are constantly being improved: the level of security and effectiveness of the programs used are increasing. In November 2006, Majmuat al-Jihad reported on its website that participants in the cyber attack had made progress in developing new programs:"...We were able to create a better version of the program and save participants from the problems they faced in the past, the new version is easier to use and more effective for attacking... " ²³.

Islamist websites inform users about past successes in cyber warfare. For example, Majmuat al-Jihad reported a successful campaign against an Israeli website www.haganah.co.il. According to the administrator of this Internet resource, A. Weisburg, his organization researches and prevents the use of the Internet by Islamist radical groups as a propaganda tool. In October 2003, while working with Internet service providers, A. Weisburg and his colleagues eliminated about 300 radical Islamist websites. Among them are those associated with such well-known groups as Al-Qaeda, Al-Muhajiroun, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad²⁴. One of the most famous sites closed by A. Weisburg was the Arabic-language Maacs.ws and qawim.org related to Al-Qaeda. These forums provided religious and methodological justifications about the legitimacy, from the point of view of Sharia law, of using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Alerhat.com it contained instructions for making cyber attacks on the Internet.

The so-called electronic jihad is in its infancy. While Islamist hackers are unable to carry out large-scale actions against government websites and economic systems, in most cases the targets of Islamist cyber fighters are those sites that, in their view, post information discrediting Islam or promoting vice. However, in the future, cyber jihad can pose a serious danger, because even current attacks cause economic damage. It is worth recalling that in April 2001, Chinese hackers infected about 1 million American servers with the Red Worm virus.²⁵ The damage amounted to $2.6 billion. But this could have been done by Islamist hackers.

INFORMATIONAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIONS

Ideologues of Islamism realize that it is currently impossible to achieve success without broad public support. According to them, terror can be applied precisely to the extent that it resonates with Muslims, so each action should be accompanied by clear comments on the reasons for its implementation. According to radical ideologues, in the modern world, the struggle for the sympathy and support of the Muslim population is just as necessary as a psychological war against the West. ²⁶

Ayman al-Zawahiri, in his book" Knights under the Banner of the Prophet", writes that the jihadist movement cannot act in isolation from the Islamic Ummah: "The vanguard of jihad must be fully integrated into Islamic society and be attentive to those who are involved in it.

²⁷. He also believes that, in general, the jihad movement lost the fight against the so-called near enemy (local apostate regimes), and the Mujahideen alienated the population by numerous terrorist attacks and failed to mobilize it.

Another Islamist ideologue, A. al-Naji, says that the Muslim population is already tired of the excessive violence used by the Mujahideen against their co-religionists, and terror has done more harm than good. Moreover, al-Naji writes, jihadist groups " poorly explained to the masses the reasons for their terror, as a result, local authorities were able to seize the initiative and win the public's favor in their fight against the pure Islam movement²⁸. He also criticizes the radicals for not paying enough attention to propaganda, which resulted in the benefit of mosque imams. Al-Naji cautiously points out the growing popularity of moderate imams among young people and cites the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and their success in ideological work with young people.

Analyzing the mistakes of radical Islamists, the well-known Salafist ideologist Abu Musab al-Suri writes in his book "On the experience of Jihad in Syria" that the Islamic revolution always begins with a small group of people who manage to clearly define and communicate their ideological line to the population. He writes that the people are the source that provides the jihad movement with information, volunteers, necessary help, and shelter: "A revolutionary movement can achieve success only when it unites broad sections of the population around it through propaganda." Referring to the situation in Syria, al-Suri also points out the mistakes of Islamists in this country, the main of which are the lack of support from the general public.²⁹

Al-Zawahiri believes that it is necessary to refine the strategy of fighting precisely against the " distant enemy "(the West) and mobilize the masses against the United States. Al-Qaeda, in his opinion, is the vanguard of this struggle.

A well-known French Islamic scholar, J. Kepel writes that "...terrorism in the West will not distract Al-Qaeda from its main task-waging war for the hearts and minds of Muslims. In the long-term strategy, Al-Qaeda will try to gain more support from its co-religionists in the armed struggle for the Islamic State."³⁰

The above-mentioned ideologist al-Naji believes that a psychological victory can be won, first, when the people will be impressed with the way the Mujahideen are fighting for the supremacy of Islam; second, when they realize the insult that foreign occupation is causing them; and third, when they will get rid of the delusion that the power of the West is unshakable Fourth, when they are filled with hatred for the puppet governments that have become allies of the West.³¹

Al-Naji writes that in a direct military conflict, it is impossible to win over the United States, so you should win, first of all, the information war - this is the minimum program. In his opinion, this strategy worked effectively against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan), whose army, according to al-Naji, is more brutal than the American one. Therefore, the invasion of Iraq in the strategic perspective plays into the hands of the global jihad movement and has a powerful propaganda effect for inciting hostilities and creating Mujahideen cells in neighboring countries.³²

Ayman al-Zawahiri also notes that the psychological effect of terrorist attacks should be carefully calculated. He cites the failed assassination attempt on Egyptian Prime Minister Atif Sidki on November 25, 1993, which resulted in the death of a 12-year-old schoolgirl. The Government then initiated a major campaign to discredit the organizers of the bombing from the Egyptian radical group Islamic Jihad.³³ Thus, the murder of the girl was used by the government to discredit the image of the organization through the media.

In his message to al-Zarqawi, the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ayman al-Zawahiri says:: "I tell you that we are in a war where more than half the space is occupied by a media war for the hearts of our Ummah."³⁴ He criticized al-Zarqawi for not understanding al-Qaeda's long-term goals and plunging Iraq into senseless bloodshed.

Abu Muhammad al-Hilali, a prominent al-Qaeda sympathizer, explained the strategy of "pure Islam" in his "Message to the people of the border Regions of Sinai" as follows: the most important targets for jihad at present are tourists (in Egypt. - author's note), whose murder is aimed more at educating new generations of Mujahideen, and not against the West ³⁵. In his opinion, the acts of terror in the Sinai Peninsula were a successful example of such a strategy, they led to the arrests of hundreds of Bedouins in the north of the peninsula, to armed clashes between Bedouins and Egyptian security services, and to victims on both sides.

At the same time, Abu Muhammad expressed dissatisfaction with the very weak information support for terror actions in the Sinai Peninsula. He believes that it was precisely the lack of proper propaganda that allowed the Egyptian government to present these actions as the activities of a certain marginal group. As a result, they had the opposite effect. "Mujahideen should make a clear case for their actions, explaining that tourists are hostages of the policies pursued by their country's leaders towards Muslims." ³⁶ He criticizes those groups that have weapons and explosives and choose the easiest targets.-

whether without a serious study of the situation, without taking into account the consequences of these actions ³⁷.

RADICAL ISLAMISM IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

Social networks are also actively used by radical Islamists for propaganda and proselytizing purposes. Before the advent of the Internet, Al-Qaeda had to devote an important place to" educational " work in mosques, secular educational institutions, and military training camps.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Washington dealt a serious blow to Al-Qaeda's infrastructure. In a situation of serious pressure on terrorist organizations, radicals from Islam have stepped up their activities on the World Wide Web. They started creating "jihad forums". Along with this, they began to actively use Facebook, YouTube and Twitter to strengthen their positions in the World Wide Web. Gradually, interaction on the Internet became more and more important.

It is through contacts in the virtual space that about 120 well-known extremists have been trained over the past 10 years.

In August 2011, members of the Ansar al-Sharia forum claimed that one of its users, under the pseudonym Hafiz Salahuddin, was killed in Pakistan. He was recruited precisely as a result of communication in a social network. The young man made repeated attempts to join the ranks of extremists in Iraq and Afghanistan, but without success. After communicating with a "Mujahideen veteran" on Twitter, known as "Khat-tab-76," the Islamists decided to send him to the "tribal zone" in Pakistan38.

Explosives specialist X. Hussami left a comment on the Al-Hisba website after reviewing the report on the Haqqani operation in Afghanistan: "Dear brothers, I have some materials on Sharia and military affairs in Russian from Chechnya, I want to translate them into Arabic. If you help me, Allah will reward you. " ³⁹ After that, representatives of Al-Qaeda associated with the Taliban began to correspond with him. After some time, he was transferred to Pakistan, where he met with extremists who were already well informed about him at the time of his arrival, and then he began to fight on the side of the fundamentalists in the "tribal zone".

Al-Qaeda's top echelon also recognizes the importance of using social media for propaganda and recruitment work. In 2010, a video message from M. Yazid, the third most important person in the Al-Qaeda hierarchy, was released: "My brothers, the warriors of the media jihad, are sacrificing themselves in the same trench as the Mujahideen of Iraq and Afghanistan." ⁴⁰

Al-Qaeda forums point out that YouTube has become the most important media platform for supporting Islamists. It is visited by about 70 million users per day. In February 2011, Colleen Larose (also known as Jihad Jane) was found guilty in Pennsylvania (USA) of preparing terrorist attacks. She received all the necessary instructions while communicating with supporters of radical Islamism on YouTube.

In 2011, Zachary Chesser was sentenced to 25 years in prison in Northern Virginia for providing material support to the Somali Al-Shabaab group. He maintained a YouTube page using the ID "Learn TeachFightDie", where he posted videos and hosted discussions about Western policies in the Middle East and measures to counter its expansion in Muslim countries. His very pseudonym contains the doctrine of the champions of "pure Islam" - " Study Islam, teach Islam, fight for Islam and die in the name of Islam." After his page was closed, he created a new one- "Alquranwaalahadeeth"⁴¹.

You can also find extremist lectures on YouTube by Yemeni-American A. al-Awlaki, who was killed in Yemen in September 2011.

YouTube is not only a site that contains videos, it is also a social network. Forum users can leave their comments regarding the viewed posts. Some of them are contacted by representatives of radical groups specializing in attracting young people to extremist organizations.

The first step into the ranks of Al-Qaeda is provided by the effect of posted video reports on ongoing operations. In December 2009, 5 Washington-based Muslims were arrested in Pakistan on charges of attempting to join an al-Qaeda-affiliated group. A Taliban representative contacted one of these young men, who posted a comment on YouTube after seeing a video of an Islamist sabotage act against American troops. Having become a regular visitor to the pages with video materials about sabotage and leaving his comments, he came to the attention of the Taliban representative Seifullah ⁴².

Despite the measures taken by Facebook and YouTube, it is not yet possible to stop the activities of virtual supporters of radical Islamism. One of them was a call for users to mark extremist materials as "Promoting terrorism" ⁴³. Such steps caused only a slight irony on the part of radicals. Supporters of" pure Islam " registered under new names and continued their virtual struggle. So, users of FallujahlslamicNetwork urge you to re-upload previously deleted scenes of fighting with the participation of "soldiers of Islam", so that even

users who happened to be on the site's page could easily get acquainted with the actions of Islamists in various regions of the world. According to the ideas of extremist supporters, the idea of fighting should accompany visitors to Islamist forums constantly.⁴⁴

This principle is not without meaning, since, for example, up to 24 videos appear on YouTube every minute, the content of which is almost impossible to verify.

At the same time, YouTube intends to adapt the "Content ID" system, which is actively used to detect and block pornographic content, to counter extremists in the near future. The technology allows you to identify the posted video materials and set filters for certain images: photos of the most "popular" terrorists, logos of well-known extremist groups.

The "Content ID" system, which tracks unauthorized file uploads to YouTube, was launched in October 2007, and today it is already used by more than a thousand copyright holders around the world. They transmit compressed samples of their video and audio files to Google, which owns the YouTube service, which are then compared with all the accumulated content on YouTube, as well as with each new file uploaded.

Al-Qaeda leaders seek to impose a common vector of action on disparate groups, using the means of communication available to them. Many of these organizations declare it an unquestionable authority, thereby increasing their significance from the local to the international level, expanding the base of their supporters. In turn, Al-Qaeda, while recording the operations of other groups in its track record, retains a kind of monopoly on conducting universal jihad, setting the ideological tone at the global level. Thus, in the current conditions, the extremist leaders are not able to keep regional terrorist structures under control, and they are interested in providing information support to the ongoing sabotage operations.

^{Weimann G.} 1 Terror on the Internet. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2006, p. 42.

^{Feldman N.} 2 The Pew Global Attitudes Project. Conflicting views in a divided World. Washington, Pew Research Center. 2006, p. 9 - 15.

^{Weimann C.} 3 Al Qacda's extensive use of the Internet. Washington, CTC Centinel. 2008, p. 68.

^{Al-Hilali A. A.} 4 Khutba al-imam ibn Ladin (Ibn Ladin's Iroioisd) / / Al-Aisar. 2007, N 26, p. 24 - http://alanssar.topcities.com

⁵ Saqafa al-jihad (The Culture of jihad). 2007. Сада аль-джихад - http://inembcrs.lycos.со.uk/himiname/vb/printthread.php?threadid = 1881

^{Sharif p} . 6 Tarshid al-amal al-jihad fi mier wa al-alam -www.ansar_net.ws/vb/showlhread.php?t-17381

^{As-Salam M.} 7 39 Wasilah li-khidmati-l-jihad na al-musharakah fi-h (39 ways to serve and participate in jihad). 2009, p. 24.

^{Lahoud N.} 8 The Jihadis path to self-destruction. NY: Columbia University Press. 2010, p. 59.

⁹ Ibid., p. 26.

^{Hussein F.} 10 Al-jil al-Qaeda al-Sani (The second generation of Al-Qaeda). Deirut, Dar al-khayal, 2005, p. 68.

^Schwartz 11 .S., Waterman .V. Terrorism: An identity theory perspective // Studies on Conflict and Terrorism, Washington. 2009, N 6, p. 36 - 39.

^{Zuhur Sh.} 12 A hundred Osamas: Islamist Threats and the future of Countcrinsurgency. Carlisle Barracks. PA: Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. 2005, p. 59.

^{lllph S.} 13 Internet Mujahideen intensify Internet research on U.S. economic targets // Trends in Terrorism. 2006, N 6, p. 8 - 9.

¹⁴ http://www.al-faroiHi.com/vb/showthread.php?t-2682

^{Pillar P.} 15 Islamic Extremism: Common concern for Muslim and Western publics. Washington, Pew Research Center. 2005, p. 42.

¹⁶ http://www.moonnight9876.com/pages/bushra.html

^{Magourick J., Alran S., Sageman M.} 17 Connecting terrorist networks // Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. Washington. 2008, N 1, p. 1 - 16.

^{Veldman N.} 18 Islam, terror, and the Second nuclear age // The New York Times Magazine. 2006, N 3, p. 78.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 84.

^{Magourick J., Alran} 20 .V., Sageman M. Op. cit., p. 12.

^{Kralev N.} 21 Arabic speakers monitor Net chats // The Washington Times. 9.03.2007 - http://www.washlimcs.com/world/20070308 - 111426 - 4682r.hlin

^{Tuman J.S.} 22 Communicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of Terrorism. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 2003, p. VIA.

²³ Saqafa al-Jihad...

^{Robins G.} 24 Understanding Individual Behaviors within Covert Networks: The Interplay of Individual (Qualities, Psychological Predispositions, and Network Effects. Trends in Organized Crime. New York. 2009, p. 166 - 167.

^{Kleanhis K.} 25 21st Century Terrorism: Wrong Diagnosis. Inadequate Remedy // Masters Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. 2005, p. 54.

^{An-Naji A. B.} 26 Idaratu-t-ta'iakhush (Management of barbarism). Markaz al-dirasati pa-l-bukhusi-l-islamiyya. 2007, p. 48.

^{Al-Zawahiri A.} 27 Knights under the Prophet's Banner. 2002, p. 57 -http://azelin.files.wordpress.com

^{An-Naji A. G.) .28} Edict. soch., p. 93.

^{As-Suri A.M.} Da'apat ad-muqawama al-Islamiyya al-alamiyya (Call to Worldwide Islamic Resistance), p. 201-http://www.alheshah.Org/v/showthread?t-123463

^{Rossmiller S.} 30 My Cyber Counter-Jihad // Middle Hast Quarterly. Summer. 2007, p. 42.

^{An-Naji A. I.} 31 Decree. soch., p. 74.

³² Ibid., p. 43.

³³ Gam same, p. 53.

^{Horgan J} 34.Walking away from terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from Radical and Extremist Movements. NY: Taylor & l-Francis. 2009, p. 56.

^{Ll-Hilali A.M.} 35 Risala idya ahl fi sinai (Message to the People of Sinai). 2004 (p. 11) - www.alhesbah.org.

³⁶ Ibidem.

^{Ll-Umar P.} 37 Al-mawqaf min al-tafjir fi bilad al-mu'limiyyah (Situation from bombings in the Muslim country) http://www.alhesbah.Org/v/showthread?t-89329

^{Rogin H.} 38 Al Qacda's online media strategies - Prom Abu Rculer to Irhabi 007. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. 2012.

^{Gais p} 39 Ibtihaaat al ya tariq al-jihad (Prayers on the path of jihad). 2011 - htlp://www.conrado.net/_vit_inf/?subjeet-2&rec= 1018

⁴⁰ Ibid.

^{Hegghammer T.} 41 The case for chasing al-Awlaki // foreign Policy. 24.11.2011.

^{Ll-Umar II.} 42 Decree. Op.

^{John M.} 43 Venhaus, Special Report: Why Youth Join Al Qaeda. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. 2010, p. 81.

⁴⁴ htlp://www.al-farouq.com/vb/showlhread.php?t-3984

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