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This article describes the "beginning of science", that initial act of thought, through which scientific research begins. It is also demonstrated that the experience of the subject accompanying this act of thought is close to the religious experience. The specific scientific use of language and related ontological assumptions are analyzed. A comparison of language and the ontology of science with language and the ontology of utilitarian practices is made. Description is considered as the language typically used for science. Description is opposed to instruction. The latter is a basic form of the use of language in utilitarian practices. The most important form of expression in instruction is narrative. This form of language is considered especially. It is demonstrated that certain transformations of the narrative cause descriptions. When this occurs, the constitution of object takes place, which is the establishing act (or the origin) of science. In conclusion, certain common features of scientific and religious language associated with the use of motivations are demonstrated. By contrast, the fundamental difference between religion and science in language and in adopted ontological assumptions are shown.

Keywords: origin of science, religious experience, utilitarian practices, narrative, description, object.

There are many studies that identify the common roots of religion and science. Most often, they consider the scientific revolution of the XVII century. The fact that this grandiose event in its essential features has a Christian character.-

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Evidently, the Russian origins do not need to be proved now1. But I intend here to speak not only of the science of Modern times, but of science in general, as a very ancient enterprise, which apparently began in ancient Greece. I will show that the experience that engages a person in scientific knowledge is, in a certain sense, religious. To do this, we need to try to "catch" the moment of the birth of scientific interest, the initial action of thought, from which scientific knowledge begins. At the same time, it is inevitable to turn to antique material. However, the presence of a religious motif is well known to Modern scholars. Let me remind you of Einstein's provocative statement that "only deeply religious people can be serious scientists"2. He calls religious the state of a person who is struck by the amazing and majestic spectacle of a reasonably arranged universe. Also noteworthy is the testimony of Heisenberg, who, discussing the state of the researcher, recalls Plato's statement: "In one place of the Phaedrus, it is said that the soul is horrified and trembles at the sight of beauty"3. In other words, completely religious experiences-surprise, awe, awe-are not alien to a person who studies nature.

However, this closeness of religion and science should not be overestimated. At the end of the article, I will try to show such features of religious discourse (more precisely, we will talk about Christian discourse) that fundamentally distinguish it from scientific discourse. I note that it is these features that are usually ignored when discussing the various interrelationships and conflicts between religion and science.

The task of this work is in many respects close to that set by Edmund Husserl, speaking about the beginning of geometry 4. It consists in trying to find an event in the history of thought that can be considered an act of establishing science. It is clear that we are not talking about a chronologically determined action committed by a person.

1. Various aspects of the relationship between Christianity and the scientific revolution were revealed, for example, by the authors of the collection "Philosophical and Religious Sources of Science", Moscow, 1997. See, first of all, the articles by P. Gaidenko, V. Katasonov, M. Kissel.

2. Einstein A. Religion and science. Sobranie nauchnykh trudov v chetyreh tomakh [Collection of scientific works in four volumes], vol. 4, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1967, p. 128.

3. Geisenberg V. Znachenie krasoty v tochnoy nauke [The meaning of beauty in exact science]. Steps beyond the Horizon, Moscow: Progress, 1987, p. 272. See also Platon Phaedrus. Collected works in 4 volumes. Vol. 2. Moscow: Mysl, 1993. pp. 135-191. 251 a.

4. Husserl / Derrida Nachalo geometrii [The Beginning of Geometry], Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1996.

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a specific person. It is an action that, once performed (no matter by whom or when), is reproduced as long as science exists.

Scientific cognition against the background of utilitarian activity. Introductory remarks

To determine the nature of the founding act of science, it is necessary to indicate, first of all, the context in which it is carried out. Science has always been only a part of the life practices carried out by people. This was very shrewdly pointed out by Husserl when discussing the concept of the life world.5 Scientific knowledge is not something primary that a person is engaged in and involved in. For some reason, it is born against the background of other practices.

It seems that most of our practices should be characterized as utilitarian or productive. We do something based on some useful experience (in one sense or another) result. This type of practice is exceptionally broad. It includes, first of all, the most natural everyday actions. It also includes economic or commercial activity, political activity, as well as almost all actions carried out in the military, legal, technical spheres, in the field of education, medicine. It seems that the list can go on for a long time. It may seem that our entire life is covered by this type of practice. After all, it is as if we are always striving for some useful result.

This type of practice involves treating everything that exists as a means. The latter is always evaluated in terms of its usefulness, that is, the opportunities it provides. This is what Heidegger describes as an improvised. 6 Note that this category includes not only tools and consumer goods, but also natural phenomena, such as wind, river, and sun.7 It is the helper that makes up the primary environment of a person 8.

5. See Husserl E. The Crisis of European Sciences and transcendental phenomenology. Part II, § 9. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dahl Publishing House, 2004.

6. See Heidegger M. Genesis and Time. 15. Kharkiv: "Folio" Publ., 2003.

7. Ibid.

8. Note that the totality of the henchman in Heidegger is quite correlated with what Husserl called the world of life.

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It is clear that science also deals with improvised tools. But that's not what defines her being. Science exists when there is an object. Something in the surrounding variety (for example, in the handy variety) is singled out as an object of special interest. This subject is then subjected to special study and possibly exposure. With such an act begins an activity that is appropriately called cognition. It not only initiates cognition, but constantly directs it. The object must be held as an object. The named act, therefore, must be constantly reproduced. It is important to add that the interest in the item is selfless. It is interesting in itself, and not for further use.

It can be argued that a significant part of scientific research is directly focused on practical applications, and almost all of them somehow imply the possibility of useful use. However, science will cease to be a science if practices motivated by a purely research interest disappear altogether. I'm not even saying that this interest should dominate. It is enough that he is somehow present. The complete absence of such interest will turn science into an industry for extracting useful information, and the activity of a scientist will be impossible to distinguish from the activity of an engineer, technologist, expert, etc.Of course, a scientist often has to act in these roles. But these are precisely social roles, the form of a scientist's response to the request of society.

So, scientific knowledge, most likely, appears against the background of utilitarian practices, which are primary, vital and constantly implemented. What can be the reason for this appearance? This is exactly what we will discuss next. But the main thesis can be stated immediately: fortunately, it was expressed in ancient Greece, that is, where science first declared itself. I am referring to the passage in Metaphysics that says that the beginning of philosophy is wonder.9 From the context of the statement, it is clear that it is not only about philosophy in the proper sense of the word ("first philosophy" in Aristotle's terms), but about science in general. So, the subject that first causes surprise, Aristotle calls the movement of celestial bodies. Aristotle, however, as is well known, reproduced here Plato's statement from the dialogue

9. Aristotle Metaphysics // Collected works in 4 volumes. Vol. 1. Moscow: Mysl, 1983. pp. 982 b 11-20.

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"Theaetetus" 10, which also speaks of surprise. It is this human condition that I intend to consider.

However, first I will say a few words about the main methodological assumptions that I intend to build on in the future. The question of the beginning of science, as can be seen from what was said earlier, will be discussed by comparing scientific knowledge with utilitarian activity. At the same time, I will highlight three aspects of matching. First, we will talk about the language, or rather about the way it is used, which is peculiar to each of these methods of activity. Secondly, we will have to specify the basic ontological assumptions inherent in both utilitarian practices and scientific knowledge. Each of these activities corresponds to a certain type of objectivity or, in other words, is based on certain ideas about the structure of reality. It is essential that these ideas are closely correlated with the way language is used, and this correlation will be revealed 11. Third, and finally, we will need to describe the pragmatic side of both activities. By this I mean, first of all, the state and intentions of the entities that carry out this activity. Here, you will also need to establish a correlation with the two points already mentioned, that is, with the language and ontology.

It is easy to see, however,that the second and third aspects have already been sketched out. The ontological assumptions on which utilitarian practices are based consist in interpreting the surrounding objectivity as a means or, to use Heidegger's term, as a tool. Scientific knowledge is also associated with the interpretation of some part of the environment as a means, but the main thing for it is the existence of an object that is not a means. The subject's interest is also indicated in both of these cases. For utilitarian practices, this means achieving a useful result. Scientific knowledge is defined by besko-

10. Platon Theaetetus / / Platon. Collected Works in 4 volumes, vol. 2. Moscow: Mysl, 1993, pp. 155 p-d.

11. I believe that there is no need to prove the close relationship between language and ontology. This topic is well studied, first of all, thanks to analytical philosophy. The starting point of these studies is, apparently, the hypothesis of linguistic relativity (See, for example, Sepir E. Grammatist and his Language / / Sepir E. Selected Works on Linguistics and Cultural Studies, Moscow: Progress Publishing Group, 1993), as well as the concept of ontological relativity developed by Willard Quine (Quine U. V. O. Word and Object, Moscow: Praxis; Logos, 2000).

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interest in the object caused by surprise. Our task now is to consider the language inherent in each of these activities. This review will reveal many important details concerning the second and third aspects.

Scientific and utilitarian use of language. Descriptions and instructions

Let us first consider the use of language that is characteristic of scientific knowledge. To do this, it is interesting to draw attention to an important idea expressed by Karl Popper in his attempts to discover the birth of science in the course of biological evolution. To understand how the evolution of living organisms led to the emergence of human knowledge, he, referring to Buhler's research12, suggests looking at the evolution of language. Initially, language, like the sign systems of animals, performed only an expressive and signaling function. The signs produced by living beings served only to express the inner state or encourage another to act (escape, mate, search for food). However, at some point, the evolution of the language led to the appearance of a third function, which Popper calls descriptive. He describes it as follows: human language can convey information about the state of affairs, about a situation that may or may not take place, or may or may not be biologically relevant. It may not even exist 13.

It is this function of language that makes knowledge possible in the proper sense of the word. Its appearance in the course of evolution was a crucial step in the evolutionary development of "from amoeba to Einstein", which is devoted to the cited article.

This cursory definition of a description is enough to understand what is the main use of language for scientific discourse. It is enough to take any scientific text to convince-

12. Popper K. Evolutionary epistemology // Evolyutsionnaya epistemologiya i logika sotsial'nykh nauk: Karl Popper i ego kritiki [Evolutionary Epistemology and Logic of Social Sciences: Karl Popper and his Critics].

13. Ibid., p. 66.

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I believe in what has been said. But Popper is hardly right when he says that it is descriptions that constitute human language in general and determine its difference from the expressive and signal signs of animals. In particular, he is wrong to believe that descriptions are the basis of myths and stories that people have been telling since ancient times. 14 Here, Popper's observations need to be significantly clarified. The fact is that human language has not only a descriptive function, and it is precisely myths and stories that are not descriptions at all.

Before proceeding to these clarifications, let me remind you of the founding act of science, which, according to our assumption, consists in identifying an object. This assumption is quite consistent with the idea of a descriptive function of a language. The very presence of a description indicates that the object has already been identified. What is described is the object. If there is a description, then there is also something worthy of description, something isolated from the general environment and opposed to the one who describes it. We see, among other things, that the use of language under consideration presupposes special ontological assumptions. They just consist in assumptions about such subjects. These objects already (so far as they are described) have a non-utilitarian (or at least not only utilitarian) meaning. For something that has only a utilitarian meaning, you don't need a description, but instructions on how to use it.

We will further develop this idea in sufficient detail. But now we have already come across a use of language that is not descriptive. These are instructions, regulations, and requirements. Popper mentions them, but doesn't seem to attach much importance to them.

The use of language inherent in utilitarian practices is somewhat closer to the signal function mentioned by Popper than to the descriptive one. It is closer, first of all, in that it has, in the final analysis, an instrumental character. Here we will deal with the use of language that focuses on the achievement of goals and indicates the means corresponding to them. In other words, they will be just instructions, prescriptions, requirements, but not descriptions.

This use of language implies a different ontology: not objects, but tools and tools are referents

14. Ibid., p. 67.

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instructive and prescriptive statements. Their difference from objects is precisely captured by the Aristotelian concepts of possibility and reality. The instructions and regulations refer to the existing one for another15. They always imply some possibility. The object, on the other hand, exists by itself. The subject of the description is reality.

This observation reveals the temporal characteristics of both discourses. The research discourse is directed to the present. It deals with what it is now. Even if the object of the description existed in the past or will exist in the future, the description represents it as something present, given at the same time. The use of language in utilitarian discourse conveys a focus on the future. It draws us into becoming, changing, changing events.

Let us now recall the stories and myths that Popper, in my opinion, mistakenly associated with the descriptive function of language. There is at least one circumstance that makes it possible to bring them closer to utilitarian discourses: they also deal with becoming. They present a sequence of events, a transition from the past to the future, and, as a rule, involving movement towards the goal.

Description and narrative

The connection of myths and stories with utilitarian practices is clarified within the framework of the concept of narrative, which has for some time become as frequent in humanitarian studies as the concept of discourse. Keeping in mind the notion of discourse that is briefly presented above, I now want to clarify the concepts of narrative, myth, and description, which will allow us to better understand the features of utilitarian and research practices.

The concept of narrative was originally developed in literary criticism 16. Its transfer from philological studies to philosophical ones allowed us to see the role of narrative in the organization of human life. However, it was when considering literary texts that the most accurate oppositions were revealed,

15. See Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics // Collected works in 4 volumes. Vol. 4. Moscow: Mysl, 1983. pp. 1097 a 15-b 20. Cf. also with the concept of "being-for" in Heidegger, which determines the meaning of the helper (Heidegger M. Being and time, § 12-15).

16. See Brockmeyer J., Harre R. Narrative: problems and promises of one alternative paradigm. 2000. N3 p. 29-42.

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in particular, the boundary between narrative and description is drawn, which is essential for our further consideration.

Let's take a closer look at these contrasts in order to understand the significance of the narrative for human practices.

A narrative, which no one seems to argue with, is a narrative of events. Wolf Schmid calls the event "the core of the narrative text"17. The definition of a narrative is thus closely linked to the definition of an event. As for the latter, a fairly wide range of authors 18 associate it with the change. An event is, first of all, a change that occurs with a character. The cited author very expressively describes the meaning of eventfulness, paying attention, in particular,to the unpredictability, irreversibility and non-repeatability of events 19. The narrative of events, therefore, draws us into the flow of time, into becoming. All works can be narrative "because what is depicted in them has a temporal structure and contains a certain change in the situation" 20. Noticing this property of the narrative, Schmid quite logically contrasts its descriptions. Here's what he writes next:

Consequently, all works that describe a predominantly static state, draw a picture, give a portrait, summarize repetitive, cyclical processes, depict the social environment, or classify a natural or social phenomenon by type, class, etc. are excluded from the field of narrative. 21

There are two essential circumstances in this contrast. First, the referent of the description is the unchangeable, which has become, as it were, withdrawn from time. Recalling again the Aristotelian categories, we note that we are talking about the real, about what is, and not about what changes, arises and disappears. The latter is the referent of the narrative work. Second, it is interesting that the examples of descriptions given by Schmid are

17. Schmid V. Narratologiya [Narratology], Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoi kul'tury, 2003, p. 14.

18. Relevant references can be found in Schmid, p. 14_19.

19. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

20. Ibid., p. 20.

21. Ibid.

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they relate mainly to science. Further, he tries to find descriptive texts in the literature, but these examples are not so expressive.

Narrative transformations

It is important for us to keep this distinction between narrative and description in mind, since it is not always clear enough in all studies. In particular, it is practically absent in the very important work of Olga Freudenberg "The Birth of narrative"22. However, we need to refer to this classic study in order to identify another important difference-narrative and myth.

Studying the ancient literature, Freudenberg traces how some double formations arise from myth, as an initial unity: comparison, metaphor, ecphrase. The narrative is one of them. A myth is actually a story. But it is told in such a way that the narrator and listeners are identical to the characters of the myth. Narration, on the other hand, occurs when the narrator is isolated. He's different now from the people he's talking about. The situation in which the story is being told is different from the one that is being told. Freudenberg even writes about the difference between the two realms of existence. One belongs to the narrator and is characterized as the area of the present, the real, what is happening now. The other is what the story is about. It most often belongs to the past, already completed. It is more accurate, however, to say that it belongs to a different time. This is something that does not exist now and it is, in a certain sense, fictitious.

Understood in this way, narrative is closely related to vision, prophetic insight, and the revelation of the deity. The vision will fall out of the general course of events related to the hero. The hero exists in the present. What is revealed in the vision, there is no clear when, in another time.

The fundamental difference from a myth is that the subject of the show or story is distanced from the narrator and listener, from their actual situation. They are not participants, but viewers. Myth does not distinguish between the present, past, and future. A narrative contrasts what the story is about with what is happening here

22. Freidenberg O. M. Mifi i literatura drevnosti [Myth and Literature of Antiquity], Moscow: Publishing House of the Eastern Lit. Company of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1998, pp. 262-286.

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and now. The present of the narrator (the hero who tells a story or has a vision) is an ongoing, incomplete present. The narrator in the examples given by Freudenberg, as a rule, is himself a participant in some events. But these are not the events that he tells us about. Therefore, the characteristics that we have assigned to the description referent may belong here to the narrative referent.

In drawing attention to the difference between narrative and myth, Freudenberg does not make another important distinction: between a sequence of events and a situation that has become unchangeable. The subject of a narrative can be both. It is important that it allows you to fall out of the ongoing (eventful) present. For the problems that Freudenberg solves, this difference may not matter. However, it is significant in itself.

This falling out of the present, as we have seen, can have the character of a vision, a wonderful sight. It is also fictitious in the sense that it does not exist now. It can be never and nowhere, in the other world, in eternity. But then we are not dealing with a narrative, but with a description. This is not a story about events, but a description of the spectacle. It turns out to be completed, made, that is, valid in the Aristotelian sense. What is described in this way is interesting in itself. It contains no change, does not lead to anything, does not imply any other result, nothing but the described one.

Let's pay attention to the storyteller's (and also the viewer's) preoccupation with the subject of the story. In the examples described by Freudenberg, it is often mentioned about a miracle, about a diva. Accordingly, the state of the narrator-viewer can be described as surprise. We will return to this topic later.

You should pay attention to the blurring of the narrative boundary. What Freudenberg calls a narrative is not the same as a narrative, if we understand it, for example, as Schmid understands it. However, it does not exclude it. It can also be a narrative of events. In the proposed understanding, it is important that events should be special, bright, and attract attention. Apparently, they should be different from the events in which the narrator is involved. In this case, the narrative can be transformed in two opposite directions. One transformation is that events involve the narrator and the listener. Both, at least mentally, transport themselves to the time when these events unfold, become-

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their participants. The situation is quite familiar, I believe, to anyone who read exciting adventure stories as a child. But then the narrative in the limit becomes a myth. The distance disappears and the story about others turns into its own story. This seems to be a property of any eventfulness. It can always involve you. This is the basis of one important function of the narrative, which many modern authors write about - the narrative turns into a kind of instruction. Let's take a closer look at this.

Myth, narrative, and instructions

To find out what causes the narrative to slide into myth, we need to clarify the concept of myth. It also turns out to be very blurry due to the abundance of interpretations. My plans do not include a review of the literature on this subject, especially since I do not intend to say anything new here. Therefore, I will appeal to the classical research of well-known authorities. However, I will start by referring not to academic research, but to Thomas Mann's novel Joseph and His Brothers, which provides an excellent literary explication of the myth. One example is the story of Eliezer, an old slave who nurses Jacob's younger children. He keeps telling them the same story. And although the events it tells us took place long before the narrator was born, listeners are convinced that he is telling us about himself. It's amazing that the narrator thinks the same way. Knowing the time distance that separates him from the hero of the story does not prevent Eliezer from identifying with him. The whole novel is based on this identification. Its main character constantly recognizes in the events in which he is involved, something that has already come true. His story has already been told. What is happening to him has already happened many times, but it happens once. This is not imitation or reproduction. What is happening now is exactly what happened in the past. Therefore, there is no distance between the past and the present. The hero of the story fulfills the prescribed task.

Just such a story, which, on the one hand, has already been told, and on the other - your own life, is a myth. From this circumstance follows the connection of the myth with utilitarian practices. To show it, you can rely on more academic sources than Mann's novel. I will refer first of all to M. Elia-

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de, whose research provides an understanding of the myth that is very similar to the one just presented. In short, the myth is also based on the identity of the events taking place with what has already been told for a long time.

In his conscious actions ,the" primitive", archaic person does nothing that has not already been done and experienced by someone else before him, someone who was not a person. What he's doing now has already been done. His life is a continuous repetition of deeds that were once committed by others (italics by M. Eliade - G. G.)23.

But Eliade refines this notion. A myth is a story about the first event that sets all subsequent events. This event establishes everything that happens in the world, in particular, all human actions. Thus the cosmogonic union of heaven and earth establishes marital relations. But there is also a mythical prototype for any other action. No matter what a person does, he only repeats the actions of a mythical hero. The hunter who pursues the beast is identical at this moment with the hero who first began to hunt. Also any craftsman, shaman, warrior. No one does anything of their own accord or arbitrariness. Everyone fulfills what is prescribed. Only by following these instructions once and for all, a person achieves the desired result. After all, in the story told, this result has already been achieved 24.

Therefore, myth is closely related to utilitarian practices. This is evident from the mythology itself. It often tells about things that are necessary or unavoidable in human life, about those that somehow bring useful results. And the very telling of myths is a very practical activity. It gives instructions and sets patterns of actions.

Connecting the myth with utilitarian practices, we need to solve one perplexity. The myth, as it follows from the above, refers us to eternity. He is always something already accomplished. Myth, as many researchers write, places us in the eternal present, in which there is neither past nor future 25. Earlier, however, we found out that

23. Eliade M. The myth of eternal return. SPb.: "Alethea". 1998. p. 15.

24. Eliade M. Aspekty mifa [Aspects of Myth], Moscow: Invest-PPP, 1995.

25. The aforementioned book "The Myth of Eternal Return" by Mircea Eliade is devoted to substantiating this thesis.

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utilitarian practices are future-oriented. They are related to a change, and they are aimed at a result that has not yet been achieved, but only a possible one.

However, the eternity of a myth does not mean complete immutability. A myth is a story about events, and therefore involves time and change. The myth is always already told, and therefore completed. The result that the actions are aimed at has already been achieved. But a myth, on the other hand, is always being told, and the events it tells us are still happening. Myth, therefore, is an ever-recurring process, not an immutability. 26 Therefore, the result is always presented as both achieved and possible.

Let us now return to the narrative. We have seen that events can involve and the narrative can shift towards myth. We tend to distinguish between the narrator and the listener, on the one hand, and the characters in the story, on the other. However, this difference is often hidden, the distance is reduced, even disappears. Most often, we believe that we are doing our own things and making our own decisions. We do not identify with any characters and confidently maintain our identity. But at the same time, we are constantly being told different stories, and we do not even notice that we are taking any action and expecting some result precisely because such a story has already been told. When choosing a job, we have already heard about how to make a career and earn money. When making a visit to the doctor, we know the history of those who are ill and are being treated. There are stories waiting for us at every turn, and we feel more confident if we are participants in a story with a known favorable outcome. So the narrative often harbors a myth.

26. This idea was perfectly expressed by Kurt Huebner: "Arche (mythical primordial existence) is not an event in time and does not contain objects that are assigned a certain place at a given time by means of laws or rules, for example, "earlier" or "later"; it is not reduced, as it was already It refers to such elements, laws, rules, or temporal context, and is not explained at all; it is, as a complete gestalt, a story. However, since it, on the other hand, draws a passage of time from which the time element cannot be isolated, it must be called a temporal gestalt. The arche is therefore not only a scheme for explaining a process, since it determines and creates it, but also constitutes its temporal course: the temporal sequence of events that appears in the arche fills its content. The Arche is, so to speak, the paradigm of this sequence, repeated in innumerable and identical ways." Huebner K. Istina mifa [The Truth of Myth], Moscow: Respublika Publ., 1996, pp. 132-133.

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These arguments are quite consistent with the characteristics that many modern researchers give to the narrative. It is presented as a prescription or instruction. Here is a characteristic passage from the work of Jens Brockmeyer and Rom Harre:

Narrative, as we have already noted, is too often used as if it were just a word for some ontology. However, this concept should be used rather as an expression of a series of instructions and norms in various communication practices, ordering, making sense of experiences, becoming knowledge, procedures for apologizing and justifying, etc. Although the narrative seems to be some well-defined linguistic and cognitive entity, it should be considered rather as a condensed series of rules that include what is necessary for the development of the what is consistent and successful within a given culture.27

A similar understanding can be found in Lyotard, who makes an important comparison between narrative and scientific language games. It is this Wittgenstein term that Lyotard uses when considering two different ways of using language. Narrative language games consist of storytelling. But this storytelling relies on two types of utterances: prescriptive and evaluative. Lyotard here starts from archaic or traditional language games: ...folk stories themselves tell what can be called positive or negative formations (Bildungen), i.e. successes or failures that crown heroes and either give their legitimacy to public institutions (a function of myths), or offer positive or negative models (happy or unhappy heroes) of integration into established institutions (legends, fairy tales)28.

Let's pay attention to the combination of prescriptions and assessment. Stories tell you to do "good" and forbid you to do "bad." These assessments are purely utilitarian in nature, they are about the achieved result, which can be useful or harmful.

27. Brockmeyer J., Harre R. Narrative: problems and promises of one alternative paradigm. p. 36.

28. Lyotard J.-F. Sostoyanie postmoderna [The state of postmodernism], St. Petersburg: "ALETHEA", 1998, p. 66.

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Scientific language games, according to Lyotard, rely on denotative utterances. What is relevant here is not utility, but truth. Their task is to describe the item.

Cognition can be interpreted as a set of statements that indicate objects or describe them (with the exception of all other statements), and in relation to which they can be said to be true or false. Science in this sense is a field of cognition 29.

Although scientific language games include other types of utterances, denotative games clearly dominate them.30
Let us now look at the possible connection of denotative statements and descriptions with the narrative. Here we turn again to the research of Olga Freudenberg. Earlier, I mentioned the two opposite potentials of narrative (or narrative, to use Freudenberg's terminology). His approach to the myth actualizes it as an instruction. The opposite transformation is the transformation of a narrative into a description. This situation has already been briefly discussed. The subject of the description does not involve, but rather amazes, causes delight or fear. The distance is insurmountable. Even if the subject of the story is a sequence of events, this sequence is like a spectacle. Freudenberg does not accidentally point out completeness as opposed to the current present of the narrator. The Greeks, the people who invented the theater, probably know this state very well. Events become objects of contemplation. They don't let you in. A theatrical spectacle unfolds before our eyes, but it does not take place in our time. We came to the theater and left it, and the presented events remain inside the completed plot of the performance. And it was completed before we arrived at the theater.

You can find many examples where a narrative, as a story about a sequence of events, approaches a description. Such are, for example, visions that reveal the future, or images of another world 31. The main thing here is precisely in distance, in detachment-

29. Ibid., p. 52.

30. I do not discuss Lyotard's main theme here - the emergence and disappearance of the metanarrative - but confine myself to the initial opposition with which he begins his research.

31. I will point out the characteristic examples given by Freudenberg (Freudenberg O. M. Myth and literature of antiquity, pp. 275-276). This is the vision of Theoklimenos at Zhenya's feast-

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and completeness. Reading a novel can involve you in the course of events, but it can also unfold a certain spectacle, when events, although they follow each other, appear, in the end, as a complete whole. It does not involve participation. It is something else that can, for example, delight or cause aesthetic pleasure. Then the narrative is like a painting. You can also approach historical research: its task is to reveal the picture of the past, which develops as a whole from a series of successive events. The very eventfulness in this case seems to fade. Events appear as if on a single canvas in a seemingly simultaneous way. In the foreground are not so much events as their connection, organizing a historically complete whole. It is clear that this approach to history is not exhaustive. I am talking only about one aspect of historical research, which is certainly complemented by others. But it is this aspect that turns the narrative into a description and makes the past an object of study.

Freudenberg often points out something static as the subject of a narrative, which is presented to the narrator as an object of contemplation. The narrator, then, does not narrate, but describes, and the subject of the description is a wonderful spectacle. This sight is fascinating, as if it pulls the narrator and listeners out of their present, makes them stop and contemplate. The object of contemplation and description is isolated from space and time. He, as I have already mentioned, is a kind of miracle. In this regard, Freudenberg draws attention to the etymological proximity of contemplation and miracle.

This "wonder" or" miracle "must be understood in a visual sense (cf. here "chuditsya", "to marvel" = to look); in Greek, "miracle" and" gaze"," spectacle "sound almost the same, which, apparently, gave rise to the epic standing expression "miracle for all". vzora", literally "a miracle to see", is essentially tautological 32.

Explaining this idea, Freudenberg gives a corresponding translation in the comments.:

hov: He suddenly sees a vision of future retribution: a blood-drenched hall, the shadows of the slain fleeing to Erebus, the darkening land (Odyssey, Canto XX, 345-360). A slightly different, but structurally similar example is the story of Er about the transmigration of souls, given in the X book of Plato's "States" (The State / / Plato. Collected Works in 4 volumes, vol. 3. Moscow: Mysl, 1993, pp. 614 p-621 b). In the latter case, it should be noted that in the dialogue, the story of Er itself is the subject of another story (narrative). Neither the narrator (Socrates) nor the listeners are participants in the events described.

32. Freidenberg O. M. Myth and literature of antiquity. p. 252.

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- "miracle",- "spectacle", "sight", - "spectacle" 33.

This explanation reveals (or at least suggests) an important relationship between contemplation and surprise. It is clear that (contemplation) is derived from a and also means surprise. Derived from it is the verb - be surprised. This is the word used by Plato in Theaetetus (155 c-d) and Aristotle in Metaphysics (982 b 11-20) when they say that surprise is the beginning of philosophy or the beginning of knowledge. It turns out that the object of knowledge appears as an amazing sight, as a miracle. Its description is the first act of knowledge. The object is fundamentally different from the means, from the tool, which belong to a person and are subordinate to him. It is always something else, it is revealed and mysterious at the same time, it is a riddle that needs to be solved, but can hardly be solved completely. The birth of science in ancient Greece can be attributed to this ability to see in some things (for example, moving stars or geometric shapes) just such a wonderful sight, forcing you to distract yourself from various useful things and do their research. The surprise generated by such a sight is largely a religious experience. It clearly borders on awe.

One should not, of course, think that such experiences necessarily accompany everyone who is engaged in scientific activities. Over the centuries (or millennia) of the existence of science, it has been studied by different people, guided by different motivations. However, surprise bordering on awe is not unique to antiquity. Within the scope of this article, I cannot analyze in detail the texts of scientists of later times. Let me just remind you of the statements of Einstein and Heisenberg quoted at the beginning of the article.

Remarks on religious discourse

Here we should identify some features of religious discourse that will allow us to more accurately determine the relationship between different practices. Of course, I don't intend to write about religion at all. Confining myself to the Judeo-Christian tradition, I will try to consider the use of language that follows:-

33. Ibid., p. 698.

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it should be considered religious. However, I do not undertake to solve this problem in full. Speeches and texts that are produced within the framework of religious practices are extremely diverse. Although there are very few descriptions among them, they play an important role here, which, as we have already noted, consists in describing visions. Not only ancient literature describes miraculous phenomena. Let us recall the descriptions of theophanies in the prophecies of Daniel and Ezekiel, or in the Revelation of John the Evangelist. Of course, the narrative form is very common. I will not now discuss the specific descriptions and narratives of Jewish and Christian sacred texts. They are very different, for example, from the ancient ones. But still, I think the properties of these forms that we discovered earlier are also inherent in them. However, now I would like to draw attention to a special way of using the language, which, of course, is at the very center of religious practices. It is appropriate to call it a confession. A classic text of this kind is the Confessional of St. Augustine. But it sets a kind of pattern. The features of confession are typical, for example, of medieval theological treatises. On the other hand, they are also present in liturgical practices, usually associated with repentance. A very striking example is the canon of Andrew of Crete.

Confession is a speech about oneself addressed to God. Such an appeal requires the most open and accurate testimony about your life, your sins, and your beliefs... Therefore, both narrative and descriptive episodes often occur in confession. But in general, this is neither one nor the other. This is speaking in the first person, suggesting an attitude aptly described by Martin Buber as I-You. It is interesting to read how, when undertaking an abstract philosophical discussion (for example, on the nature of time), Augustine constantly keeps this inversion in mind. For example, " However, Lord, we understand what time intervals are, compare them with each other, and say that some are longer and others are shorter."34
In this famous XI book of Confessions, a study is also presented. But the focus is not on the subject of research, but on the Person to whom the author refers. This has something in common with the narrative that Freudenberg wrote about. To understand this problem-

34. Augustine. Confession XI. 21.

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Therefore, it is appropriate to recall again the myth in which the speaker and the hero of the story are identical. We have seen that the transformation of a myth into a narrative establishes a distance between the narrator (in the potency of the narrator, researcher) and his subject. Confession also involves distance. But this distance is not from the object, but from the person (or Person). The subject is also present in the confession, but it is, first of all, the speaker himself, who performs an act of reflection in his speaking. Even if, as in the above-mentioned fragment of "Confession", there is another subject (time), it seems to be interiorized by the speaker. In Augustine, this is generally a principled position. Time exists in the soul, so the study of time is the study of one's own soul.

A similar line can be seen in the Proslogion of Anselm of Canterbury, who, like Augustine, presents his reasoning as a prayerful appeal to God. It may seem strange that in proving the existence of God, this theologian turns to Him. Let us remember, however, that the starting point of the proof is faith, by which he discovers the thought of God in his own soul. It turns out that the theologian says to God about himself and at the same time about Himself: "we believe that You are something more than which nothing can be imagined."35
So, the difference between the description that is the basis of research and the confession that is part of religious practice is determined by the way of attitude to what/who is in the center of speaking. The subject in question, or the person (s) being addressed. It is clear that this does not yet fully determine the scientific or religious nature of the discourse. However, the act of addressing God, in which He first reveals Himself, and the person addressed responds and testifies to himself, may be the original act of religious confession, just as the act of constituting an object establishes science. Both of these actions have something similar in their origin: surprise, awe, admiration, or fear.

To conclude our conversation, the differences found here between scientific and Christian (perhaps even Abrahamic) discourses are useful to keep in mind when discussing the relationship between religion and science. These relationships are often represented by

35. Anselm of Canterbury. Proslogion. II

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either hopelessly conflicted, or, on the contrary, very friendly. Authors who insist on the conflict usually point out the fundamental incompatibility of the scientific picture of the world with the religious one. Their opponents, on the contrary, persistently seek opportunities to combine these pictures, construct a certain synthesis, or demonstrate their complementarity. Many theories have already been developed within these models. 36 Proponents of both approaches engage in a long and, in my opinion, unproductive discussion, constantly discovering either new points of divergence or additional similarities. I think that both sides make the same mistake, because they do not notice the fundamental difference between the two discourses. The main thing they pay attention to in religion is an attempt to describe reality that claims to be true. In other words, they interpret religion as a kind of science and completely ignore both the religious use of language and the ontology associated with it.

Religious texts are often subject to distorting interpretations. They seem to be translated into the language of descriptions. The interpreter distills the description from the text and ignores the main thing-speaking in the first person, facing the Other. With this reinterpretation, the speaker completely disappears from consideration, and the Other turns into an object. This creates a "religious picture of the world" that either corresponds or does not correspond to the scientific theory. For example, in the speech of Augustine from the XI book of Confessions, one can see the theory of time, which can be quite compared with later psychological theories. It is clear that in the Augustinian theory such objects as God, eternity, and the created world will play a certain role. Most likely, there will be no such objects in modern psychological descriptions of time, although there may be some analogues of them. After that, one can argue for a long time whether Augustine is right from the point of view of modern science.

I do not deny the meaningfulness of such comparisons. You just need to understand their limitations. Do not forget, for example, that the book is not accidentally called "Confession". If we decide to ignore this fact, we must understand that we are not comparing religion and science at all. We compare the scientific theory

36. See Denis R. A. Modeli vzaimosheniyakh mezhdu religii i nauku [Models of relations between religion and Science]. Pages: bogoslovie, kul'tura, obrazovanie [Pages: theology, culture, education]. 14: 2 (2010). pp. 274-286.

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with a system of views implicitly inherent in the religious author. These views are often not even expressed directly. However they may be expressed, their comparison with scientific views requires a special hermeneutic procedure, an important part of which, as I have just said, is the translation into descriptive language. Of course, every religious author has something that could be called a picture of the world, a worldview or views. But the way or form of this presence must not be overlooked. The description of these forms is the task of a special study, and I am not ready to talk about them now. But, most likely, these views "work" within the discourse not as independent descriptions, but as a certain background on which the confession unfolds.

Finally, I would like to point out that a similar argument probably applies to archaic religions. They also do not represent a system of views or a picture of the world. My guess is that they are mostly utilitarian in nature, and therefore represent systems of prescriptions. The latter, as I tried to show in the article, are naturally expressed in the form of myths. Therefore, the "picture of the world of archaic religion" can also only be the result of a special translation, an artificial reconstruction that requires special hermeneutics. However, our scientifically trained minds seem to produce such hermeneutical procedures quite easily. The problem, rather, is to be able to refrain from them 37.

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37. There are few but very vivid precedents for such abstinence. They represent an unexpected and very vivid experience of the convergence of scientific and religious discourses, where there is no attempt to synthesize or contrast them. As an example, I will point out the article by psychiatrist Boris Voskresensky " The doctor as a wounded Aesculapius "(Almanac The Light of Christ enlightens everyone. 2014, No. 10, pp. 63-76).

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