V. R. FILIPPOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Guinea Keywords: political conflict, tribal feuds, presidential elections, sociolinguistic groups

There are many countries in Africa that are torn apart by tribal strife, and many are embroiled in regional conflicts. There are countries where people have suffered for years under the despotism of corrupt leaders. African States, which have a lot of weapons but little bread, over the past half century still strive to create effective political systems and build a civil society.

Tribalism, like a cancer, affects the bodies of these countries, giving rise to endless bloody conflicts, sharp power struggles, cronyism, nepotism, kleptocracy. Archaic consciousness, illusions of "community of blood and soil", heavy legacy of the past retain their power over the minds and souls of Africans. Tribal identity turns out to be more important and significant than national solidarity and citizenship, and the state is conceived not as a "common home", but as a barrack in which an armed clientele retains the power of "its own". Formal democratic procedures acquire only a form, which, like a uniform embroidered with gold braid, is tried on by more and more dictators. And those deprived of power again take up arms, because only they can give the illusion of security on the Black Continent.

War becomes a way of life, and a mobilized tribal identity becomes a unifying symbol of group interests, which most often lie in the material sphere. The lack of political culture does not allow us to understand these interests as class, social and professional, and does not allow us to give the struggle for them a civilized character. As a result, the confrontation turns into a bloody fight between "imaginary communities".

Guinea, as soon as it gained independence (1958), followed this path. However, for many years its first president, Seku Toure, managed to contain the "war of all against all", and the country gave the impression of an island of relative stability, which, however, was illusory: the appearance was created by ensuring the social mobility of one group at the expense of suppression and discrimination of all others. But tribal discord spilled out and plunged the country into a bloody conflict as soon as the authoritarian ruler passed away (1984).

SOCIOLINGUISTIC COMPOSITION

Guinea, which has a population of about 10 million people1, is home to two dozen different sociolinguistic groups. Fulbe dominates, the share of which, according to various estimates, ranges from 30% to 40%, Malinke (25% -30%), Sousse (15% -20%), and other communities (they are called "forestier" - "forest people") - about 10% ².

The Fulbe and their genetically related communities (Kisei, Baga, Tenda, landuma, tyapi, bullom, Nalu, Diula) are mainly settled in the Futa-Jallon region. Malinke (in other regions of West Africa they are called Mandingos) and related cultural and linguistic groups (kpelle, Loma, Kono, Bambara, Mano, Bandi)³ are concentrated in Eastern Guinea and around the cities of Cancana, Bale and Kurussa. The Susu live on the coast in the Conakry, Forekaryi and Kindia regions, historically associated with the Dyalonke in Central and Upper Guinea. Finally, Kru, Kisei and Koranko^. 4

The territorial settlement of the main sociolinguistic groups, which was formed already in the XVIII century, is actually fixed in the division of Guinea into four regions (the capital Conakry has a special status), each of which is dominated by one community. Thus, in Guinea-Maritimes, Susu (19% of the total electorate of the country), in Middle Guinea - fulbe (23%), in Upper Guinea - Malinka (20%), in Forest Guinea - "forestier" (20%). In addition, tribal communities are also formed in certain areas of large cities. In Conakry, for example, Susu is predominant in the communes of Kalum and Dixin, while Fulbe is the majority in Ratoma and Matoto.

Fulbe is one of the most numerically (but not socially!) According to experts, the dominant population groups in Guinea are most closely related to representatives of small sociolinguistic formations living in the present century in the south of the country, in the Forest Region ⁵.

This circumstance is important to take into account when analyzing the current "conflict map", just as it is necessary to take into account the historical background of the current socio-political confrontation in this previously relatively stable country.

Today's socio-political conflict, with its tribalist connotations, has long historical roots. In the Middle Ages, some parts of present-day Guinea were part of the Ghana Empire (VIII-IX centuries) and

Mali (XH-XV centuries). At that time, the territory of Guinea was inhabited by various tribes, but the most numerous were the Mandinka, Dyalonke and Susu. In the minds of Guineans, there is an idea of the historical continuity of the statehood of Guinea with these ancient empires. In the 16th century, Fulbe nomadic pastoralists settled on the Futa Jallon plateau. The Islamized Fulbe elite started a war against the Dyalonke and Fulbe pagans, which ended only in the late 1770s. As a result, the feudal state of fulbe - Futa-Jallon was created. The tribalist conflict has acquired a confessional connotation, and Fulbe Muslims have linked the traditions of Guinean statehood with the state of Futa Jallon.

Currently, more than 90% of the population professes one religion - Islam (often along with traditional African cults), Christians in the country are less than 8%.

A special role in the emergence and development of the conflict situation in Guinea is played by the Forest Region in the south-east of the country.

Malincke settled the area in the late 19th century with the active assistance of the French colonial authorities. The French considered the merchants belonging to this sociolinguistic community as allies and used them in their colonial projects, giving them considerable benefits and advantages. This, of course, caused acute discontent among representatives of other groups, primarily the Kpelle and Guerze, the original "inhabitants of the forest" ^.6

There have always been problems between the Malinke and the forest tribes, but this conflict entered the stage of acute confrontation associated with bloodshed only in the 1990s. and was associated with the general destabilization of the situation in Guinea and neighboring states-Liberia and Ivory Coast.

The forest area turned out to be a crossroads for militants and arms dealers. The government's attempts to stabilize the situation in the region and stop smuggling ended in bloodshed. Among the combatants, there were particularly many Liberian Malinke, many of whom were killed or arrested in the course of army operations. This has had a negative impact on the relationship of local Malinke with Sousse and the "forest dwellers".

The outbreak of the Ivorian civil war in September 2002 significantly worsened the economic and social situation in the Forest Region, which has always been heavily dependent on commercial ties between entrepreneurs and farmers on both sides of the border. Although the border was officially closed, traders still broke through in trucks loaded with barrels of palm oil from Ivory Coast, food and soap from Liberia.

Thousands of Guinean citizens who had previously lived in Ivory Coast have returned home, and their families have lost their regular income. The influx of these refugees has caused unemployment in the region. Under these circumstances, most local residents and migrants were unable to find a living, and there was a steady increase in banditry and prostitution in the region. To make matters worse, French aid programs have been suspended due to "poor management of funds."

Relations between various socio-cultural communities in this region were getting worse, and the Forest area was causing more and more irritation in the capital.

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Guinea's independence was proclaimed on October 2, 1958. Its first president was Ahmed Sekou Toure, who established a one-party system in the country and created a powerful repressive apparatus. In the field of foreign policy, he adhered to a moderately pro-Soviet course, and in domestic policy, he was an adherent of"scientific socialism with African characteristics." The result of this strategy was the total socialization of property and the impoverishment of the country's population. During the reign of A. S. Toure, the tradition of absolute dominance of one sociolinguistic community in the structures of public administration and in law enforcement agencies was laid: all responsible posts in the state were occupied by representatives of the Malinke community. (Toure himself was born in marriage to parents who are considered malinka and sousse ⁷.) In relation to other groups, the implicit doctrine of displacement was implemented in political and social practice. As a result, about one million Guineans emigrated abroad by the end of the 1970s.⁸

After the death of A. S. Toure in 1984, the military came to power. Two high-ranking representatives of the armed forces competed for leadership in Guinea: Colonels Lansana Conte (sousse) and Diarra Traore (malinke). For a short time, dual power was established in the country. But already in July 1985, D. Traore, taking advantage of L. Conte's visit to Togo, attempted a military coup. However, troops loyal to L. Conte suppressed the mutiny, after which more than a hundred Malinke officers were executed, and sus-initiated pogroms took place throughout the country, during which the property of many members of the Malinke community was looted or destroyed.

It is not surprising that as a result of these events, almost all officer positions in the Guinean army were replaced

while the rank - and-file personnel were recruited from representatives of different tribal communities, including the Malinka and Fulbe.

Tribalism in the personnel policy could not but cause discontent, which resulted in open conflict and armed confrontation. On February 2, 1996, a new military mutiny occurred. The head of the military junta, L. Conte, and his Susu associates narrowly escaped death when his palace was shelled by artillery. However, the loyalists (supporters of L. Conte) again won. According to various sources, 20 to 30 people were killed during the suppression of the rebellion, and most of them were civilians. The court sentenced 38 ringleaders to various terms of imprisonment - from 7 months in prison to 20 years of hard labor. It is noteworthy that among those sentenced there were only 5 people belonging to the Sousse community and they received the minimum terms of imprisonment.

It should be noted that L. Conte enjoyed the active support of his tribal clientele and won the presidential election three times (in 1993, 1998 and 2003), while his Unity and Progress Party (PEP, Parti de V Unite et du Progres) won the parliamentary elections. During the election campaigns, Conte put forward slogans to overcome tribalism and achieve national (civil) unity, he tried to give his party the status of a national political structure. As a result, in a number of regions in which L. Conte was defeated in the 1993 elections, in 1998 he won. The PEP has moved beyond the" mother " region (Guinea-Maritimes) and has begun to take on the features of the ruling party of officials.

The 1990 Constitution formally prohibited the formation of political parties on a tribal or territorial basis. However, the Basic Law did not create an effective mechanism for blocking tribalism in politics in conditions when the factor of territorial unity and "blood kinship" had a more powerful impact than other unifying factors. In practice, most of the 44 parties officially registered in Guinea during the Conte administration were created on a tribalist basis. Some exceptions were PEP.

Along with the state authorities and self-government bodies, the councils of elders continued to operate in the country, which enjoyed a fairly high authority in resolving local disputes and conflicts. The participation of the "ancestral aristocracy" (descendants of local leaders) in the management of social processes at the regional level is noticeable. All this gave a peculiar flavor to the political life of Guinea, and the elections were always accompanied by a strong protest of the opposition, to which the security ministries traditionally react very harshly.

L. Conte sought to create the appearance of national unity, forming the highest echelon of state power. For example, L. Sidime (Malinke) was Prime Minister for many years, B. B. Diadlo (Fulbe) was President of the National Assembly, and M. Camano (forestier)was President of the Economic and Social Council⁹. However, this can be attributed more to political demonstrations than to the implementation of real policies aimed at overcoming tribalism.

Despite the political rhetoric, during the entire period of Conte's rule (1993-2008), the country was politically and socially dominated by the Susu tribal communities, and the demographic (statistical) majority belonging to the Malinke and Fulbe groups were more or less subjected to social discrimination. ¹⁰ This was especially evident in the mayoral elections in 1991. Tribal clashes then took the form of open conflict: in total, more than a thousand people were killed.

In early 2007, the country entered a prolonged socio-economic crisis, accompanied by a crisis of power. On January 22, a strike and mass demonstrations began in Conakry. Soldiers fired live ammunition during the dispersal of demonstrators, 17 people were killed. A wave of protest swept the entire country: rallies and demonstrations were held in Kankana, Nzerekor, Laba, Pita, Dabola, Kissidougou, and everywhere the security forces returned fire to kill, despite the fact that among the demonstrators were children and women. The military arrested opposition activists and smashed the headquarters of trade union organizations. (Note that the main demand of the political opposition was to appoint a new prime minister who could carry out reforms in the country and bring it out of the crisis.)

In an effort to reduce the heat of political confrontation, in early February 2007, Conte appointed him to the post of Prime Minister.

Chief of Staff Eugen Camaru, his friend and associate. But this caused a new surge of indignation in the country. In cities, police stations were smashed, shops were looted, and barricades of burning tires were set up. In Conakry, the president's car was pelted with stones, and security responded by shooting at the crowd. A curfew was imposed in the capital, and the army patrolled the streets, opening fire without warning.

In a situation of acute crisis, the President agreed to appoint a Prime Minister from among the candidates represented by the opposition trade unions. On February 27, diplomat Lansana Koyate was appointed to this post. However, this did not lead to radical changes in the socio-political situation, since virtually all power was still concentrated in the hands of L. Copte. The prime Minister's achievements can only be attributed to the creation of an Audit Commission, which (despite the opposition of the presidential administration) revealed signs of total corruption in the country.

In May 2008, when disillusionment with the government's actions again led to an increase in protest relations, the President dismissed L. Koyata and announced the appointment of a new head of the cabinet.

But by this time, a wave of discontent had swept over the army. In 2007 and 2008, hotbeds of protest repeatedly broke out among the army, officers demanded all sorts of benefits and privileges, and the president was forced to satisfy their ambitions to one degree or another. L. Conte died suddenly on December 22, 2008. According to the Constitution, his duties were transferred to the Chairman of the National Assembly, Abubakar Sompara, who was to hold the election of a new President of the republic within 60 days. But just a few hours after the death of L. Conte, a group of military personnel acting on behalf of the National Council for Democracy and Development carried out a coup d'etat. By agreement between the Government of Prime Minister A. T. Suare and the military, the duties of the President of Guinea were transferred to Captain Moussa Dadi Kamara (sousse), a former chief of the army depot. Once at the head of state, he promised to root out corruption and improve the lives of his compatriots. The citizens of the country met these events quite calmly. BesidesMoreover, they aroused enthusiasm among representatives of the small tribal communities of the country's Forest region ("forestier"), who believed that their region was underrepresented in power structures.¹¹

In August of the same year, the military regime announced the creation of a National Transitional Council to replace the junta-abolished Parliament. All this time, the opposition, as well as trade unions and public organizations, accused the military of seeking to usurp power.

D. Kamara has scheduled the election of a new president for January 2010.-

He refused to participate in the fight for the presidency, but then changed his mind, which caused outrage in the opposition. On September 28, 2009, on the occasion of Guinea's Independence Day, a rally of thousands was held in the capital's stadium. People demanded democratic changes and the removal of D. Kamara from power. Army units were sent to disperse the protesters. Especially distinguished were the so-called "red berets" - the elite of the presidential guard12. As a result, at least 150 civilians were killed and about 1 thousand demonstrators were injured. Dozens of women of all ages were brutally raped and abused, accompanied by torture and abuse.¹³ Among the victims were mostly fulbe¹⁴. One of the raped women said that men in red berets repeatedly repeated the threat: "We are tired of your tricks ... we will end fulbe." Independent observers also drew attention to the fact that most of the commanders at the stadium, as well as among the military, held key positions in the state during the reign of D. The Kamars were proselytes of Christianity or adherents of traditional African cults (animism)and belonged to the su-su communities or "forest" tribes. ¹⁵

The international community strongly condemned the actions of the ruling junta, and human rights organizations demanded an immediate investigation and the transfer of those responsible to justice. In this situation, D. Kamara tried to rehabilitate himself, blaming the military for the incident, who allegedly exceeded their authority. Rather than rely on his army, he recruited mercenaries from South Africa and Israel and deployed them in Forekaryi, an area in the west of the country populated mainly by the Susu tribal community, whose members made up his armed clientele. The "militia" created in this way numbered about 3 thousand combatants.

The bloodshed at the Conakry stadium had the most unpleasant consequences for D. Kamara and his entourage: in December 2009, an attempt was made on his life. The head of the junta was shot by his confidant, Lieutenant A. Diakite. D. Kamara was wounded in the head and after a while was sent for treatment in Morocco. The Minister of Information of Guinea, I. Cherif, assured that "all those responsible for organizing the attempt will be punished," and confirmed that D. Camara continues to remain president.

Doctors at the military hospital in Rabat announced that they could not guarantee the dictator's full recovery. According to information published by Wikileaks, on December 16, 2009, Moroccan Foreign Minister Tayeb Fassi Fihri, in an interview with an unnamed source, stated that the Moroccan government considers medical assistance to D. Kamara a humanitarian gesture, and outlined the reasons why he should not return to Guinea and try to restore his power. Free and fair elections in Guinea, and an "end to ethnic politics". Fihri also noted that the elections will not solve this problem, because the army creates a significant split in Guinean society, and tribalist conflicts have a long history in the country.

It is noteworthy that at the same time, Fihri said that the Guinean Minister of Defense, General S. Konate, expressed a desire to meet with D. Camara, presumably to assess his ability to govern the country. The Moroccan Government allowed it, but on December 18, 2009, T. Fihri expressed pessimism about S. Konate himself, who is allegedly prone to excessive alcohol consumption. Wikileaks published a handwritten document of unknown origin that contained a scenario for the further development of the political situation in Guinea. This article, among other things, provides a psychological portrait of D. Kamara as a depraved, mentally unbalanced person who is also prone to alcohol and drug use.¹⁶

In January 2010, D. Camara promised not to return to the country, supported the speedy return of Guinea to civilian rule, and finally agreed to the appointment of opposition leader Jean-Marie Dore as Prime Minister. Since Captain D. Kamara once seized from foreign investors(including the Russian "Rusal") assets acquired under the previous regime and his voluntary resignation from power were enthusiastically received in Moscow: shortly after his statements, Russia announced that it would provide $2 million in humanitarian aid to Guinea through the World Food Organization.

After D. Kamara signed his resignation, control of the ruling junta passed to S. Konata, who later called on the opposition to form a government of national unity, and made J. Konata the head of the cabinet. - M. Dore and scheduled the presidential election for June 2010.

The Electoral Commission has registered 24 candidates for the post of President of Guinea. On 27 July 2010, more than 3 million (77% of the total electorate) eligible Guineans expressed their will in democratic elections. The leaders of the first round were former Prime Minister Selo Dalen Diallo (39.72% of the vote) and long-time opponent of military regimes Alpha Conde - 20.67%.

A. Conde relied on the Association of the Guinean People (OGN, Rassemblement du Peuple Guineen), which he created with the participation of Guinean dissidents who lived in Paris in the 1980s.Formally left-wing (part of the Socintern), the OGN is actually a political organization designed to defend the clan interests of the Malinke sociolinguistic community. In the 1990s, the OGN became one of the most influential organizations in the country.

S. D. Diallo (fulbe) enjoyed the support of the Union des Forces Democratiques Guineenne, founded in October 2002 (then called the Union for Progress and Renewal), whose first president was Mamadou Ba. The media noted the similarity of the electoral rhetoric of the leaders of the UGN and the SSDS, who accused each other of inciting inter-clan hatred. -

wisty. At the same time, independent observers pointed out serious human rights violations by both sides.

After the announcement of the results of the first round of voting, riots broke out again in the country: thousands of supporters of former Prime Minister Sidia Toure held demonstrations to protest against, as they claimed, the manipulation of the Election Commission, as a result of which their candidate was only the third.

On October 18, mass demonstrations were held in Sigiri, a town in the north of the country whose main population is Malinke. They announced that since independence, Guinea had been dominated by Malinke and Sousse, and that it was now the turn to elect a president who would represent the interests of the Fulbe and the "forest peoples"^.17

The conflict escalated into a stage of open confrontation. The clashes were sparked by rumors that Fulbe merchants were distributing poisoned drinks to A. Conde's supporters in the capital and the cities of Kurussa and Sigiri. The Malinke youth, excited by these rumors, began smashing up shops owned by Fulbe merchants in Sigiri and Kissidugu. Eyewitnesses testified that the rioters attacked Fulbe with sticks and iron rods. Hundreds of people fled their homes, leaving their shops and belongings behind. At least one fulbe merchant is known to have been killed in Sigiri. At the same time, the authorities did not react to the pogroms in any way. As a result (according to the Red Cross), more than one and a half thousand people moved from Upper Guinea to the cities of Labu and Mamu in the Futa Jallon region. But even there, riots broke out when local Fulbe, seeing wounded tribesmen, called for revenge and the expulsion of neighbors-malinke¹⁸.

Analysts suggest that the mass exodus of Fulbe from their cities was deliberately provoked. In accordance with this electoral strategy, violence "on ethnic grounds" was organized in order to make it almost impossible for S. D. Diallo's supporters to participate in the voting.¹⁹

On November 1, 2010, UN observers stated that religious and" traditional " leaders (apparently referring to the tribal elite), as well as leaders of youth associations, were having a hard time keeping Guinean society from "ethnic unrest" after clashes between the two main groups - Malinke and Fulbe, who support the main rivals in the upcoming second round of presidential elections. elections ²⁰.

The second round was held on November 7, 2010. According to the results of the first democratic vote in the country's history, A. Conde won 52.5%, his rival S. D. Diallo - 47.5% ²¹. Independent observers from the American Carter Center and the European Union election monitoring group stated that they found no serious violations during the election campaign. ²² However, the Electoral Commission of Guinea recognized numerous violations: the stuffing of unrecorded ballots into ballot boxes, the creation of false polling stations, and the loss of some ballot boxes.

The second round was accompanied by a marked escalation of the situation in the capital, Conakry, and a number of regions, which forced the authorities to impose a state of emergency and curfew throughout the state on November 17, 2010. After the announcement of the election results, despite the fact that armored vehicles were brought into the capital, there were bloody clashes between the Susu communities living in the districts of Kalum and Dixin (A. Conde electorate), and Fulbe, who make up the majority of the population in Ratoma and Matoto (supporters of S. D. Diallo). The situation was compounded by the fact that the officers of the army, which is designed to serve the breeding of combatants, are mainly represented in the South. That is probably why the intervention of the army is not always impartial. The Fulbe are often victims of pogroms in Conakry. In a communique issued on November 18, 2010, the International Crisis Group (ICG) accused "red beret soldiers of violating human rights, violence against fulba and forcing them out of all market segments."

Only Ratoma, one of Conakry's five communes, voted for S. D. Diallo, and the situation there was the most unstable. The ICG recorded attacks by GSD supporters on members of this commune and the seizure of property belonging to Fulba activists and supporters of the OGN.

Clashes also occurred in provincial towns. After the election results were announced, pogroms began in the city of Laba against A. Conde's supporters. In this city, which has a population of about 350 thousand people, live mainly Fulbe, who here, as in the whole country, form the basis of the electorate of S. D. Diallo. The victims of the pogroms were representatives of the Conde, Camara, Keita, Bakayoko families. On November 19, government troops arrived in the city. However, instead of restoring order, they started beating Fulbe. Seven people were killed, dozens were shot, many supporters of S. D. Diallo were arrested, and women were abused by soldiers.²³

On November 15, 2010, A. Conde gave an interview to the French TV channel "France-24", in which he expressed regret about the excessive attention of the international media to the problems of"interethnic tension in Guinea". He insisted that the election campaign was wrongly portrayed by them as a struggle between Malinke, a group that is identified with his own electoral base, and the Fulbe group, which is often referred to as the base of electoral support for S. D. Diallo and his SSDS. According to Conde, most of the votes were given to him by representatives of Fulbe, Sousse and Forestier, and not by his client, Malinke24. He called on his constituents to abandon tribalist strife and return to rebuilding a united nation.²⁵

At the same time, the military authorities declared a state of emergency until confirmed.

Supreme Court final results of the presidential election ²⁶. The UN Security Council, in a statement, deplored the violence and called on Guinea's political leaders to restrain their supporters.²⁷

Finally, on 3 December 2010, A. Conde was declared the winner of the presidential election in Guinea. This was stated by the Chairman of the Supreme Court Mamadou Sylla after considering all the appeals received.

Unfortunately, the holding of the first democratic elections in the Republic of Guinea and the election of A. Conde, an intellectual and consistent fighter against authoritarian military regimes, to the post of President of the country, did not calm the Guinean society and did not lead to reconciliation between the parties.

In the course of the electoral campaign, something happened that is very difficult to correct: the political confrontation acquired a socio-cultural, tribalistic connotation and provoked bloodshed. Conflicts of this kind are irrational, difficult to institutionalize, and require a long period of time to overcome frustration.

The conflict potential in Guinea will continue and even increase until the situation in West Africa as a whole stabilizes. The sociolinguistic (sociocultural) mosaic of the population of the countries of this region, the conventionality of state borders separating the territories inhabited by groups of the same language, culture and religious affiliation, periodic outbreaks of violence on tribalist grounds, almost uncontrolled migration exchange, the movement of extraordinary refugee flows from one country to another-all this carries the threat of large-scale conflicts throughout the world. West Africa. It seems that the conflict in Guinea will be resolved only if internal and external confrontations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast are overcome. This is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.

On the contrary, an escalation of tension in any of the neighboring States will give a new impetus to the conflict in Guinea, especially in its Forest area. Poverty, hunger, degradation and criminalization of the economy, excessive saturation of the region with small arms, historical memory burdened with bloody tribal battles-all this is fraught with the threat of new confrontations.

UN experts warn that if the power vacuum in southern Guinea persists, if the security forces continue to be biased in their "ethnic" sympathies, and if political parties are built along tribal, clan, and "ethnic" lines, the country may soon break up into two parts, bloodshed, and a humanitarian catastrophe^..

^{R. Valdmanis} 1, Samba S. Ethnic tensions simmer in Guinea - http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/13/us-guinea-ethnicity-idUSTRE5BC108200 91213

² Guinea - Ethnic groups // The Encyclopedia of the Nations -http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=ru&langpair-enru&u-http://www.natio nsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Guinea-ETHNIC-GROUPS.html; http://www.polpred.com/?ns=6&art-1178&PHPSESSID=ae25d7bkj11i5f3gb s29utjsl0.

³ Africa / / Peoples of the world. Historical and ethnographic reference book. Moscow, 1998, p. 559.

^{Star С.} 4 Ethnic tension and political unrest in Guinea -http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php%3Foption%3Dcom_content%26view %3Darticle%26id%3D618:ethnic-tension-and-political-unrest-in-guinea%26catid%3 D60:conflict-terrorism-discussion-papers%26Itemid%3D265

⁵ Guinea's Forest Region - Living on the edge http://www.irinnews.org/In DepthMain.aspx%3FInDepthId%-3D17%26ReportId%3D62546&rurl

⁶ Kpelle. Modern Encyclopedia - http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enclp/24578

^{Valdmanis R.} 7, Samba S. Ethnic tension...

⁸ Guinea's Forest Region - Living on the edge...

⁹ http://www.polpred.com/?ns-6&art-1178&PHPSESSID=ae25d7bkjlli5f3gbs 29utjs10

^{Star C.} 10 Ethnic tension and political unrest in Guinea...

^{Tran M.} 11 Prepare for the worst in Guinea // Guardian. October 28, 2009.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Gender: "Raped in Guinea, then raped again in Senegal" / / A service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx%3FReportID%3D90974&rurl=translate.go ogie.ru&usg-ALkJrhh8Ak7 Cmc2qV68RO_-Rnik35S31KA

^{Valdmanis R.} 14, Samba S. Ethnic tension...

^{Tran M.} 15 Prepare for the worst in Guinea...

¹⁶ Wikileaks. Ukraine: Kiev sold weapons to Guinea -http://econo.com.ua/2010/12/wikileaks-na-russkom-ukraina-prodavala-v-oruzhie-v-g vineyu/

¹⁷ Guinea: Curbing violence on ethnic grounds / / A service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs -http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx%3FReportID%3D90940&rurl-translate.go ogle.ru&usg=ALkJrhgFPHpImubnPqN5nTxjJm_erlnLCw

¹⁸ Ibid.

^{Fitzgerald W.} 19 Guinean, Mr. Kaba, comes to Washington bearing half-truths, no truths, and innuendo - http://guineaoye.wordpress.com/2010/11/02/guinean-mr-kaba-comes-to-washington-b earing-half-truths-no-truths-and-innuendo/

²⁰ Guinea: Curbing ethnic violence...

²¹ Nouvelles et analyses humanitaires // Un service du Bureau de la Coordination des Affaires Humanitaires des Nations Unies - www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx%3FReportID%3D91136&

²² Conde wins contested Guinea election // World News -http://www.newsy.com/videos/conde-wins-contested-guinea-election/

^{Barbier P} 23 The Guinean city of Laba is affected by ethnic conflict - http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeq M5iBjUqga_TNk30QCtLrxNx6gTvjTA%3FdocId%3DCNG. caa947ebl eflc68668f8ac4bd71f5355. 8f1

²⁴ Nouvelles et analyses humanitaires...

²⁵ Guinea's Conde plays down ethnic strife, urges unity -http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=ru&langpair=enru&u=-http://af.reuter s.com/article/guineaNews/idAFLDE6AH0OW20101118

²⁶ Nouvelles et analyses humanitaires...

²⁷ Conde stands for calm in Guinea-Conakry -http://translate.google.ru/translate?hl=ru&langpair=enru&u=http://www.ups treamonline.com/live/article237220.ece

²⁸ Guinea's Forest Region - Living on the edge...

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