Libmonster ID: UK-1544

The article attempts to characterize the modern Iranian elite and consider the features of its formation in comparison with the political and economic elite of the Shah's period. The article describes some religious and political clans that have the greatest influence on the policy of the Islamic state.

Key words: Iran, Shiite clergy, power structure, Islamic foundations, clan-bureaucratic economy.

THE FEATURES OF FORMATION OF POLITICAL ELITE IN IRAN

Nina MAMEDOVA

The paper aims to determine the characteristics of the contemporary Iranian elite and examine the particularities of its formation in comparison to the country's elite of the Shah period. A number of religio-political clans that exert a high degree of influence on the Islamic-Republic are described and analyzed in detail.

Keywords: Iran, Shiite clergy, power structure, Islamic funds, clan-bureaucratic economy.

Relations between secular and religious elites are an important factor in the political development of Islamic States. In Iran, where secular politicians have squeezed out the clergy in all spheres of public and political life since the reign of Reza Shah, these relations have been extremely tense and contradictory. The clergy who initiated the proclamation of Reza Khan as Shah expected that they would have a strong influence on the country's politics, since at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century they led almost all significant social and protest movements (for example, the uprising in Tabriz in 1920 under the leadership of Sheikh Khiyabani). Even the outbreak of wars, in particular with Russia in 1826-1928, required the publication of relevant fatwas by the highest Shiite clergy (ayatollahs), i.e. religious justification.

The practice of ijtihad (the elaboration of legal norms based on the interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah) in Shiism has never been interrupted, while a significant role in the power structure in Iran and in Shiite communities in other countries was played by Mujahideen, endowed with the right to interpret Islamic norms and who had a high status - Marja at-taqlid (role model). They had their own students, madrasas, and offices. In the form of

Nina M. MAMEDOVA-Candidate of Economic Sciences, Leading Researcher at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. mamedovan@mail.ru.

Nina MAMEDOVA - PhD (in Economy), Senior Research Fellow. Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, mamedovan@mail.ru.

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waqfs (property transferred by private individuals for charitable purposes), they were given property and paid khums (income tax).

Unlike the Sunni clergy, the Shiite clergy had the right, in the absence of the 13th Imam, to determine whether the policy of the Shah's power corresponds to the interests of the Ummah (Muslim community), i.e., to raise the question of the legitimacy of the Shah's power. It also increased the social significance of the Shiite clergy. After the military coup of 1921, which brought Reza Khan to power first as war minister, then as prime Minister, and in 1925 as Shah, one of the secular ideologues, M. Kazemi, wrote that " 99% of the country's population is under the rule of reactionary mullahs, and our hopes are connected with the fact that that some Mussolini will come, break the traditional authorities and create them in this way... a modern nation... only a dictator can initiate such transformations" [Discourse, 2000, p. 106].

Shah Reza Pahlavi became such a dictator in the first half of the 20th century. By deposing the Qajar dynasty and strengthening the army, bureaucracy, and public sector positions, he, like Ataturk in neighboring Turkey, managed to reduce the influence of the clergy on political decision-making and the formation of the Iranian elite. As a result, the economic positions of Islamic institutions were undermined, and not only the education system was under state control, but also the activities of the traditional Muslim institute - the waqf. However, after the abdication in 1941. Reza Shah (as a result of the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran), the liberalization of domestic political life that began under his son, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, led to the emergence of religious parties and to the weakening of control over the activities of waqfs.

Meanwhile, in 1951-1953, the clergy participated in the nationalization of the country's oil industry. One of the leaders of this process was Ayatollah Abol-Qasem Kashani, the direct heir of the Islamic philosopher Jemal al-Din Afghani. In the 1940s, Kashani became one of the founders of the Mujahideen Islam party, which was banned after the assassination attempt on Shah Mohammad in 1949, but which had a great influence on the formation of political organizations of the Shiite clergy. In the 1950s, he became the head of the Mejlis.

After the removal of the Prime Minister from power in 1953. After the Mossadegh government passed a law on the nationalization of oil and the dissolution of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Shah Mohammad initiated reforms aimed at modernizing Iranian society and reducing the level of interference of the clergy in politics. During the agrarian reform of the 1960s, the institution of waqfs was virtually eliminated, and the waqf lands were given to farmers for long-term lease [Dyomin, 1977, p. 141].

The clergy openly opposed the reforms, and the leader of the religious elite that opposed the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini, was expelled from the country. Although under the Shah's regime the families of large landlords and entrepreneurs were usually closely connected with the religious circles of the country, the political elite in the 1960s and 1970s. It was mainly formed from representatives of the business community.

By the end of the Shah's rule, Iran was one of the most dynamically developing economies in the world, and great importance was attached to the social security of those employed in the modern sector of the national economy. At the same time, the composition of the Mejlis and the Senate radically changed, and representatives of the new intelligentsia and large business families, such as the Khosrowshahs, Lajevardi, and Arjomand, began to play a leading role in them. When, after the 1979 revolution, large-scale property owned by supporters of the Shah's regime was nationalized and, according to various estimates, reached 75% of the industrial infrastructure, it turned out that all of it belonged to a little more than 50 entrepreneurs who were not connected with traditional religious clans [Mammadova, 1997, pp. 70-71].

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Moreover, among the new entrepreneurs and political elite, the Baha'is, representatives of a religious movement that was officially banned, were gaining more and more influence. For example, Abbas Hoveida, who headed the country's cabinet of Ministers in the 1960s and 1970s, was executed after the revolution precisely for belonging to the Baha'is. The Shiite clergy, who were losing their political and economic influence, began to actively use Islam and mosques to form a movement opposed to the Shah's power. The task of overthrowing the Shah's regime was successfully solved by him, and the process of forming the Iranian elite radically changed.

The new state structure assumed the participation of Shiite clerics in the governing bodies. Political power was in the hands of traditional religious clans representing separate Shiite centers-Qom, Nejef, Mashhad. If Qom (in Iran) and Nejef (in Iraq) were the centers of formation of the Iranian religious elite during the Shah's period, then after the revolution, Qom became the center of attraction for Shiites from other Islamic states.

The supreme leader of Iran-Rahbar (or Wali faqih-chief faqih) may have the highest spiritual title of Shiite religious leaders-Marja-at-taqlid. The first rakhbar of the new state, Imam Khomeini, had a similar status. After his death, Ali Khamenei became Rahbar, who had not previously held the title of marja-at-taqlid, but also the title of ayatollah. After the election of Rahbar, he acquired the status of Ayatollah and is now considered Marja al-taqlid.

A representative of the higher clergy heads the 12 - member Supervisory Council (NA), which includes six faqihs who are experts in Islamic law. The National Assembly, sometimes referred to in the press as the Constitutional Guardian Council, is one of the most influential state bodies that votes on laws passed by the Mejlis and approves candidates for the post of President and members of Parliament. A representative of the higher clergy heads the judiciary and is usually the Minister of the Interior.

The clergy, to whom a significant part of the nationalized property passed, became an integral part not only of the political, but also of the economic elite. Of course, nationalized property was not transferred to individual religious figures: the clergy received it through specially created Islamic funds. In addition, the de facto ban on the creation of new waqfs was lifted, and existing waqfs were expanded through donations. The largest waqf in the Middle East "Astana Gods" in Mashhad received the right to create a free economic zone "Serakhs", built its own airport, acquired a number of industrial companies and educational institutions.

After 1990, when the government began to form a liberal economic model, the influence of new business groups with the participation of private entrepreneurs-representatives of the clergy - increased markedly. Privatization was carried out taking into account the interests of those individuals who were closely connected with the administrative and religious elite by family and other ties, which, in turn, led to the strengthening of the positions of individual family clans.

In the 2000s, the role of the military elite grew, primarily representatives of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). During the years of Ahmadinejad's rule, when the IRGC was granted (in 2006-2013) the opportunity to participate in a large number of projects (about 11 thousand) in the construction, oil and gas, aerospace and other areas, the Khatam al-Anbiya company owned by the Corps became one of the largest in the country [http://www.farsnews.com].

Although Iran has been under Islamic rule for more than 35 years, the problems of forming a political and economic elite and the relations between its various factions have a significant impact on the development of the country and on the development of domestic and foreign policy directions. Disagreements between ots-

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political elites are becoming increasingly active and weak, leading to changes in governments, changes in economic policies, and changes in relations with the outside world. The extent to which these contradictions can reach can be seen in the example of the most powerful Iranian family, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who, on the eve of a possible change in the country's leadership, was subjected to various kinds of repression: his daughter, grandson and son were imprisoned, although the family is closely connected with well-known religious and commercial clans, and most importantly, Rafsanjani himself remains a little Lee is not the only living associate of Imam Khomeini.

THE KHOMEINI CLAN

Ayatollah Ruhallah Mousavi Khomeini comes from a family of prominent theologians descended from the Prophet's daughter Fatima. His father, Sayyid Mustafa Mousavi of Khomein, studied in Nejef, held the title of Ayatollah and, according to one version, was killed on the orders of Shah Mohammad Reza. Her mother, Banu Hajar, was the granddaughter of Ayatollah Khansari. Of course, the death of his father, and then of his eldest son Mustafa, influenced the formation of anti-Shah views of R. M. Khomeini. His wife was the daughter of Ayatollah Sagafi of Rey, Khadija Sagafi. Khomeini's children and grandchildren are part of the political and religious elite, and his daughter Zohra Mostafavi and grandson Hassan Khomeini are actively involved in the country's political life. Thanks to the marriage of Khomeini's son Ahmad to Musa Sadr's niece, 1 the family became related to Ayatollah Sadr-ed-Din Sadr, from whom some major political and religious figures of Lebanon, Iraq and Iran emerged in the twentieth century.

The Khomeini family is related to Khojat-ol-eslam2 Mohammad Khatami (President of Iran in 1997-2005), as the former president's brother-in-law, reformist politician Reza Khatami, is married to Zohra Eshraki, the granddaughter of Imam Khomeini. Actively participating in political life, family members do not hold conservative, but rather pragmatic and even reformist views. For example, the Imam's grandson Hassan Khomeini and daughter Zohra sent open letters of protest against the exclusion of Rafsanjani's candidacy from the list of presidential candidates by the Supervisory Board in 2012. The economic positions of family members do not allow them to be attributed to the economic elite, but their political authority remains high.

THE ALI KHAMENEI CLAN

Ali Khamenei became Rahbar after Khomeini's death in 1989. Little information is available about the economic situation of his family, but it is known that he is related to a number of very influential families. At the end of 2013, Reuters published an article about Setad as Khamenei's "empire", estimated at $ 95 billion. Setad was created after the 1979 revolution. as a small firm that manages businesses whose owners have fled the country. Of course, it does not belong to Khamenei personally. But it is he who is the trustee of the main Islamic funds and does this through Setad. Khamenei manages the income received in the form of khums-a religious income tax (20%). Therefore, not only the highest political power is concentrated in his hands, but also real economic power.

The Ali Khamenei clan is an ancient Azerbaijani clan closely associated with big business and the clergy. Rahbar's father is Ayatollah Seyyed Javad Hosseini Khamenei, a figure with the highest religious title. Rahbar's paternal aunt-wife

1 Musa Sadr, who was educated in Qom and Tehran, was a major influence on Khomeini's development of the concept of dividing society into the "disadvantaged" and "arrogant" and the development of methods of armed struggle.

2 One of the highest religious titles in Shiism, ranked below the Ayatollah.

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Sheikha Khiabani, the legendary leader of the Tabriz uprising (1920). She is also the grandmother of Mir Hossein Mousavi, the former Prime Minister of the country.

Khamenei's son, Mojtab Khamenei, is married to the daughter of Khoddad Adel, a former parliament speaker, scholar and politician. In 2009, Mujtaba Khamenei's $ 1.6 billion accounts were frozen in the UK, making the family one of the wealthiest in Iran. Members of the clan are actively involved in political life, although they are not always politically like-minded. Khamenei's younger brother, Khojat-ol-eslam Hadi, was a member of parliament and published the newspapers Jahan Islam and Hayate Nou, which were closed down because they opposed the principle of Velayate faqih, which represents the position of Rahbar.

RAFSANJANI CLAN

Strong economic positions are held by groups controlled by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. Coming from a wealthy Bahramani family with pistachio plantations near Rafsanj, he studied under Khomeini in Qom and established close contacts with the country's religious elite, which played a leading role in the revolutionary movement. He later became related to Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri and Ayatollah Hassan Lahuti, after whom Rafsanjani's grandson, the son of his daughter Faezeh, was named. (Hassan Lahuti and his mother Faeze Rafsanjani were arrested for denying the results of the 2009 presidential election.) In Qom, Rafsanjani married Efat Marashi, the granddaughter of Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Tabatabai Yazdi. Rafsanjani's sons - in-law were Ayatollah Montazeri and Hossein Marashi (his wife's brother), vice - president under Mohammad Khatami and leader of the Kargozaran Sazandegi party of Rafsanjani's supporters. All of them fell out of favor during Ahmadinejad's rule. Hossein Marashi was arrested.

Already under the new president Hassan Rouhani, who was supported by the entire Rafsanjani family, in the midst of an anti - corruption campaign, on March 15, 2015, Rafsanjani's son Mehdi (married to Kazem Hashemi Bahramani's daughter) was arrested for accepting a bribe from the French oil and gas company Total in the amount of $ 80 million. for the right to offshore oil development near Assaluye. From 1997, when the contract was signed with Total, until 2003, Mehdi Rafsanjani was the head of the Iranian National Gas Company. It should be noted that his arrest was more demonstrative than a real punishment.

In general, the clan retains a great influence on the political life of Iran, controlling a number of public organizations and some major newspapers. Behind it are many IRGC officers, some of the parliamentary factions, groups of moderate clergy, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. One of Rafsanjani's sons, Yasser, has large estates near Tehran.

In 2003, Forbes magazine estimated the Rafsanjani family's property at more than $ 1 billion. His siblings are also prominent businessmen and political figures. Mahmoud Hashemi is a diplomat, Mohammad Hashemi was an MP, Director of the Television and Radio Broadcasting Authority, and Vice President. His cousin Hossein Hashemi became the head of the Association of Dried Fruit Producers and Exporters after being elected to Parliament. Her daughter Faeze Hashemi, who was a member of the Mejlis of the fifth convocation, is currently engaged in social and political activities. His son, Mohsen Hashemi, holds the post of head of the Office of the Supreme Council for Determining the appropriateness of decisions taken and at the same time heads the State Metro Organization. The other two sons, Mehdi and Iaser Hashemi, are advisers to ministers. Ali Hashemi's nephew, who previously served as Deputy Minister of Oil Industry, is currently a member of Parliament.

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LARIJANI CLAN

The Larijani brothers 'father, Ayatollah Hashemi Mirza Amoli, returned to Iran from exile in Nejef after the 1979 revolution. The family, often referred to as the" Iraqi group", is related to many prominent clerics and political figures. Hashemi's eldest son, Mohammad Javad, who became one of Iran's leading Muslim ideologues, graduated from the University of Berkeley (California) and has repeatedly held prominent government positions, was an adviser to Rahbar Khamenei, and had a great influence on him; currently works as the director of the Institute for the Study of Theoretical Physics and Mathematics. Another son, Sadeq Larijani, has been the head of the Iranian judiciary since 2009, and before that was the Prosecutor General of Iran, a member of the Mejlis of several convocations and a member of the Supervisory Board.

Another son, Ali Larijani, is currently the Speaker of the Parliament. In addition to the older ones, the younger brothers Bagheer and Fazel Larijani also became famous. Fazel - in connection with the scandal over the arrest of the prosecutor of Tehran, a protege of Ahmadinejad, Said Mortazavi. In an attempt to prevent Saeed's resignation, Ahmadinejad released incriminating material about Fazel. Simultaneously with his entrepreneurial activities, Fazel serves as cultural attache at the Iranian Embassy in Canada, and Bagheer heads the Tehran Medical University.

KASHANI CLAN

Ayatollah Ahmed Kashani was elected to the Majlis after the Islamic Revolution (1980-1986). Since 1986, he spent two years in prison; in 2013, he was nominated for the presidential election, but was rejected by the Supervisory Board. Ahmed's older brother, Mahmoud Kashani, is a prominent scholar and politician. In 1979, he was one of the organizers of the Islamic Republic Party, and from 1979 to 1981, he was its General Secretary. A lawyer by training, in 1981-1986 he headed the Iranian delegation to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and in 2001 he stood as a candidate for the presidential election from the organization "Islamic Society of Engineers".

* * *

The clans and families described above form the backbone of the political and economic elite of Iran, are connected by kinship ties, which are based not so much on a common national identity as on belonging to the highest Shiite clergy. This also explains Iran's support for Shiite movements in neighboring countries, led, as a rule, by students of Qom or Tehran.

In the last decade, a new clan has begun to form, represented by politicians who emerged during the Ahmadinejad administration and are closely associated with the provincial elite - not so much with the religious as with the bureaucratic one. These are primarily related families of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Isfandiyar Moshaei and Khoddad-Adel.

There are also "new Iranians" who are not connected with the traditional and religious elites. For example, Babak Zanjani, whose fortune is estimated at about $ 14 billion, is probably the richest person in Iran. His business empire includes 65 companies in Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Tajikistan (cosmetics, hospitality, transportation, construction, and banking). He owns the Rah Ahan football club and invests in Iranian cinema projects. Mostly lives in Dubai or Turkey.

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I must say that the current leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to reduce the level of corruption, to increase transparency in the economic sphere and openness of political life. And this is possible only if the influence of the religious and political elite that ruled the country for more than 35 years is weakened.

list of literature

Demin L. I. Sovremennaya iranskaya derevnya [Modern Iranian Village], Moscow, 1977.

Lukoyanov A. The Islamic Revolution. Iran is the first experience. 1979-2009. Moscow, 2010.

Mammadova N. M. Iran in the XX century. The role of the state in Economic development, Moscow, 1997.
Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly. 2000. Vol. 2, No. 2.

Elwell-Sutton L.P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. L., 1955.

http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930127000679.

REFERENCES

Demin A.I. Sovremennaia iranskaia derevnia. Moscow, 1977.

Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly. 2000. Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 106.

Elwell-Sutton L.P. Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics. London, 1955.

Lukoianov A. Islamskaia revoliutsiia. Iran - opyt pervyi. 1979-2009. Moscow, 2010.

Mamedova N.M. Iran v XX veke. Rol' gosudarstva v ekonomicheskom razvitii. Moscow, 1997.

http://www.larsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13930127000679.

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