T. V. LAZAREVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Keywords: interethnic relations, interethnic conflicts, labor migration

China is one of the largest multinational countries in the world. In the early 1950s, the total number of non-Han nationalities was still very roughly estimated. In addition to the Han Chinese themselves, according to some estimates, there were more than 60 Han people in the country, according to others - more than 70 non - Han nationalities. Later, the official list of the country's peoples was established, which included 55 (with Han - 56) names of non-Han nationalities.

NO TO NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS

The Chinese Communist Party's approach to the national problem has repeatedly changed. Thus, before the formation of the PRC, the slogan of self-determination of nations (up to secession) was defended, which was due to the desire to attract non-Han peoples to the side of the revolution. For example, this slogan was widely used in 1947, during the formation of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region1. At the same time, it was assumed that the national-state

The structure of China will be federal.

On the eve of the formation of the PRC, the slogan of self-determination of nations was removed. The CCP was fundamentally opposed not only to" broad autonomy " (gaodu zizhi), but also to any hint of the statehood of national autonomy areas within the framework of a single PRC. This was the position of the CCP at the time of the founding of the PRC, and it remains so today. This is due to the fear of a split in the country and possible attempts by some peoples to take advantage of the higher status of autonomy to secede from China. ² On this occasion, Deng Xiaoping remarked: "Mao Zedong showed wisdom when he rejected all national autonomous republics"³. At present, the Chinese leadership strictly follows the line of preserving and strengthening the country's territorial integrity, does not accept any interference in internal affairs from outside, and does not allow and will not allow any national entity to secede from the country.

As a way to solve the national problem, regional national autonomy was proclaimed as an administrative unit of "self-government" of non-Chinese nationalities within the framework of a unitary state. Thus, China is recognized as a unitary state primarily because of its ethnopolitical solidity. The latter statement is based on the CCP-supported doctrine of a single "Chinese nation" (Zhonghua minzu), which includes all ethnic groups of the PRC, including the Chinese themselves (Han Minzu). The scientific validity of the doctrine of the "Chinese nation" in this form in recent years causes some doubts in the PRC, but its very idea is by no means rejected. Regional national autonomy is still at the heart of national policy in China*.

Since the 80s of the last century, the Chinese leadership has done much to regulate and stabilize national relations in the PRC and correct the mistakes made earlier. An important factor contributing to the positive development of interethnic relations in the PRC in recent years was the fact that the CCP managed to free itself from the erroneous concepts and attitudes of the past years, which manifested themselves in underestimating and even ignoring the national issue, which actually led to an aggravation of interethnic tensions.

For more than 60 years of the PRC's existence, the national situation in the country has undergone major changes. They primarily concerned the national composition of a number of national regions, which created a new context for the implementation of national policies in the country.

LEADING ROLE OF THE HAN CHINESE

The People's Republic of China refers to countries where one nationality is numerically dominant. According to the 5th Census (2000), the Han Chinese themselves account for more than 91% of the population, while the non-Han population is 8.41% of the total population of the PRC.

Although the Han Chinese make up the vast majority and live throughout the territory, the bulk of them are concentrated within the provinces of the so-called China Proper (Zhongguo Benbu).

As for the national regions, the proportion of Han Chinese varies quite a bit. Thus, in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) at the time of the formation of the PRC, the indigenous population was 94%, the Chinese-no more than 5-6%. In Tibet, there were almost no Han people at all. A fairly significant proportion of Han Chinese lived in the provinces of Southern and Southwestern China. Currently, in Xinjiang, Han people make up more than 40% (and according to some recent data, more than half), in Tibet they now number about 5-6%, and in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, in the Guangxi Zhuang and Ningxia Hui autonomous regions, their number already exceeds the number of non-Han people.

Han Chinese are not only a numerically predominant part of the Chinese community of peoples, but also play a dominant role in the country's political, economic, and cultural life. They are the force that determines both the nature of relations between national groups and nationalities, and the directions in which these relations can develop. The leading role of the Han Chinese is one of the most important factors determining the specifics of the national situation in China as a whole. The relationship between Han and non-Han peoples is the main component of national relations in China.

MIGRATION OF THE NON-HAN POPULATION

Another equally important factor is the significant influx of non-Han people to major cities in the interior of China in recent years.

Relations between Han and non-Han people in this case often acquire a new color, which does not contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the national sphere. Sending non-Han people to work from the autonomous and outlying regions of China is part of the Government's program to combat unemployment and help poor families. According to the Chinese press, the number of non-Han people who have come to work in some cities now exceeds the number of non-Han people who originally lived in these cities. Of course, this creates new additional problems that require serious efforts from the municipal authorities to resolve them.

This is especially true for migration from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, which has the highest percentage of unemployed people. Only from this region to the interior of China annually sent to work-

* For more information, see: Lebedeva T. V. Zigzags of China's National Policy / / Asia and Africa Today, 2010, N 3-4.

tu is more than 100 thousand people. Moreover, their number is constantly increasing.

Explaining the government's position on this issue, Chairman of the People's Government SUAR Nur Bekri stressed that the migration of Uighurs is not violent. In each individual case, it is agreed not only with the migrant himself, but also without fail with his parents. He also said that Uighur migrants work under one-to two-year contracts. At the end of the term, they return to their native places, and others come to take their place. The monthly salary of migrants is between 980 and 1,400 yuan*, which is a good monetary support and allows them to help their families. Nur Bekri noted that this government program is an important component of the policy aimed at combating poverty and unemployment. The fact that the recruitment of people who want to go to other parts of China is carried out in an organized manner, under contracts, hinders the mass spontaneous movement of non-Han people across the country in search of work.

The problem of ethnic relations in China's large and medium-sized cities has been making itself felt since the introduction of reform and opening-up policies in 1978. This policy encourages the dispersion of the non-Han population and the movement of a certain part of non-Han nationalities to large and medium-sized cities in a number of eastern provinces of the PRC. Currently, approximately 8% of all dispersed non-Han ethnic groups in China are urban residents. At the same time, a large proportion of some nationalities (up to 20-30%) live exclusively in cities, and among such nationalities as Hui and Manchu, their number reaches 40% ⁴.

The publication in 2003 of the results of the 5th Population Census (2000) allowed Chinese researchers to clarify the nature of non-Han population movements both within and outside national regions, determine the scale of these movements, and find out about changes in the territorial distribution of non-Han citizens.

According to the forecasts of Chinese researchers, the movement of non-Han people in the future, both for permanent residence and for temporary residence in the interior of the PRC, will become an important trend in the development of the ethno-national situation in China. This is due to the process of urbanization, which also covers national areas, which will mean a new round of movement of significant masses of non-Han population from rural areas and pastoral regions to cities.

Thus, now non-Han nationalities are also becoming participants in the process of urbanization that has engulfed China in recent years. In other words, a certain part of the non-Han population is involved in the country's development processes on a national scale. According to the national question theorist Wang Xien, the manifestations of this trend will be mostly positive, but new problems will also arise, and new additional methods will have to be found to solve them.

Moving non-Han people to the eastern regions will certainly speed up the government's efforts to combat the poverty of non-Han people living in places with unfavorable natural conditions, where it is extremely difficult to solve this problem. According to Chinese scientists, the migration of non-Han people to the eastern regions should also contribute to strengthening contacts between nationalities, better understanding and interaction of cultures. Moreover, the scale and speed of movement of non-Han people in the eastern direction will constantly increase. So, in 2008 alone, 162.5 thousand unemployed people from the XUAR were employed in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Zhejiang and Guangdong. In the following years, this figure increased significantly.

MOTIVES AND DIRECTIONS OF MIGRATION

According to Chinese political scientists, the migration of non-Han people has caused large and medium-sized cities to become the scene of all sorts of ethnic tensions and contradictions. At the same time, they draw attention to the positive side of the polyethnization of cities and their cultural pluralization, which are designed to promote urban development.⁵

But these are theoretical calculations; in practice, the migration of non-Han Chinese, especially Muslims, creates new factors of national instability in cities, which the Chinese leadership and local authorities have to reckon with and search for ways to overcome emerging conflicts.

One way or another, but the migration of non-Han people, as the Chinese scientist Tang Doxian emphasizes, has become an important socio-economic phenomenon in the life of the country. In his opinion, there are three main areas of non-Han population movement: moving to cities within the national regions themselves; moving to major cities in the Northeast and coastal belt (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou and other cities and regions); and moving outside of China.⁶

Another Chinese researcher, Wang Xien, offers his own classification of displacement, which is based on taking into account the motivations and circumstances of relocation. At the same time, he identifies the following types of non-Han migration::

- organized movement of certain groups of the non-Han population;

- movement of non-Han people to cities in the process of urbanization;

- disorganized movement of non-Han people, due to various reasons, but generally due to the desire to move from poor areas to developed provinces and cities.⁷

Movements of the first category (organized) are provided for by government regulations.

* $1 is equal to approximately 6.66 yuan (approx. ed.).

poverty reduction programs, development of certain territories, poor environmental conditions in certain areas, recruitment of labor, etc. Moreover, recruitment of labor associated with the organized movement of certain groups of non-Han population from areas classified as poor is considered one of the most effective ways to combat poverty in national areas. Such measures have been taken and are being taken, for example, in Yunnan Province, Tibet Autonomous Region, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, XUAR.

In recent years, there has been an increasing flow of "unorganized" non-Han migrants to the cities of the eastern and south-eastern provinces of the PRC. The main motive for such relocation is the desire to provide themselves and their families with more acceptable living conditions, and the lack of jobs in their places of original residence. There is a specialization of the activities of non-Han migrants on a national basis.

OLD AND NEW FACTORS OF ETHNIC TENSION

From the very beginning of the existence of the People's Republic of China, relations between Han Chinese and representatives of small ethnic groups have always been tense. In the Chinese press, in the speeches of leading figures, facts of disrespectful attitude of the Han people to other nationalities of the country were highlighted.

There were periods of aggravation of these relations and even open hostility, which then gave way to periods of good neighborliness and calm. Such fluctuations were directly related to changes in the country's national policy at different times. The greatest aggravations in interethnic relations were associated with the manifestations of" Great Han nationalism", which was expressed in disregard for the customs and morals of representatives of non-Han nationalities, in the large-scale relocation of Han people to national areas, in the course of"merging of nationalities".

The situation was no better during the years of the "great leap forward" and then the "cultural revolution", during which there were repressions against national cadres, the use of national languages was prohibited or restricted, control over religious activities was established, a policy of birth control was implemented, etc.-the economic lag of the national regions located on the outskirts of the country from the inner regions with a predominantly Han population.

The following picture of the territorial distribution of nationalities is typical: In fact, the Chinese live mainly in cities and in river valleys - on the best arable land. The non-Han population is mainly concentrated in elevated and mountainous areas. These places are difficult to reach due to geographical features and lack or unsatisfactory state of communications. Many areas where non-Han people live are not connected to other parts of the country, which makes them closed to contacts of the local non-Han population with residents of other regions. At the same time, where close contacts of the indigenous population with the Han Chinese still exist, all sorts of tensions often arise and arise, often turning into interethnic conflicts, as evidenced by publications in the official Chinese press.

The Chinese leadership has taken a number of concrete measures aimed at improving the national situation in the country as a whole. The economy of the national districts is developing at an accelerated pace, transport links have been built and put into operation, social reforms have been carried out to overcome poverty in the national districts, reforms in the field of education, medical care, and the preservation of non-Han languages and scripts. Bilingual education was introduced, religious temples and monasteries were restored, many of them are still being restored, in particular in Tibet and XUAR, freedom of religion was proclaimed, measures were taken to preserve and develop national cultures, a program was adopted for more preferential birth control among small nationalities, etc.

In search of ways to unite all nationalities ideologically, in the early 80-ies of the last century, the slogan "two do not break away" was put forward - "Han people should not break away, i.e., separate themselves from national minorities, the latter should not break away from Han people", which played a certain role in increasing the cohesion of nationalities. According to Chinese authors, this formula means a "brief scientific summary" of the essence of national relations in China8. In the 90s, it was expanded and turned into a "three do not break away" (non-Han nationalities should also not break away from each other). Such a slogan in a broad sense implies the joint development of the economy and social sphere of the autonomous regions and the country as a whole, the mutual enrichment of cultures, science, and customs. In a narrow sense, it refers to the policy of settling interethnic relations.

Later, in May 2005, Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council, a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, made speeches at the 3rd National National Work Conference in order to activate the policy in this area, it was proposed to follow the integrative formula "two together", i.e., all nationalities "unite and unite together". fight, thrive and develop together." At the new stage, Hu said, this formula should become the "main conceptual idea" of the entire national work process.

The measures taken by the Chinese leadership made it possible to somewhat ease tensions

in interethnic relations in the country. At the same time, it is still a long way from solving national problems in general and overcoming all existing and emerging difficulties. And this is clearly understood by the Chinese leadership. As emphasized in official statements, the settlement of the national issue is a time-consuming and slow process, which will take many, many years to complete.

As noted above, new problems in national relations have emerged in connection with the ongoing migration process of non-Han nationalities. These include difficulties experienced by newly arrived organized migrants with accommodation, employment, obtaining legal support, lack of funds to finance various resettlement programs (provision of food, all kinds of subsidies, etc.).

State aid alone, as noted by the Chinese media, is not enough. The mere placement of non-Han migrants in cities requires large financial costs. In the coming years, this problem will remain one of the most acute, and to solve it, in addition to state resettlement programs, some other sources of funding will have to be found.

There is another problem that concerns both organized migrants and those who leave their traditional places of residence on an individual basis. It is related to the" quality " of the moving population. The cultural and educational level of non-Han nationalities is low and significantly inferior to the level of education of Han people, which is an obstacle to employment. Many migrants do not have any professional skills, do not know any specialty. Those non-Han who have managed to get a relatively good education can still find more or less prestigious jobs, but those with a low level of education and culture face serious difficulties in finding any job. Therefore, many non-Han migrants are forced to engage mainly in rough physical labor in urban areas, which determines their relatively low standard of living.

PROBLEMS WITH NON-HAN ADAPTATION

The adaptation of non-Han people to urban living conditions is extremely painful. Their situation is compounded by their lack of knowledge or extremely low level of knowledge of the Chinese language. The language barrier also hinders employment in well-paid jobs, which causes migrants to become dissatisfied with their situation.

Often, migrants are presented with unusual requirements, primarily related to everyday problems, behavior in society, and respect for the traditions, customs, and customs of the native population living in cities. Finally, they are required to perform their work duties in a qualified manner.

The difference between the culture of migrants and the culture of the local native population, the lack of sufficient tolerance on both sides give rise to all sorts of contradictions in interethnic relations. On this basis, conflicts often occur between Muslim settlers and old-timers-Han, which contribute to inciting ethnic hatred.

The Chinese leadership views religious hate speech and national separatism as the most politically and socially dangerous phenomena. They are given the same attention as the problem of overcoming the lag of national suburbs from the level of development of the advanced coastal regions of the country. A certain amount of caution is also caused by the strengthening of the national identity of non-Han nationalities.⁹ Qiao Shi, a former member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the National People's Congress Committee, called the fight against national separatism and religious extremism "a priority task today and for the long term."

This was also discussed at the 4th session of the NPC of the 11th convocation, held in March 2011. Thus, describing the overall situation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as "stable, controlled and changing for the better", Chairman of the XUAR People's Government Nur Bekri noted that the mass riots that occurred on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi, the administrative center of XUAR, had a rather serious negative impact on Xinjiang. However, in 2010, the desire for development, stability and harmony became a common aspiration of the Xinjiang population10. At the same time, he said that the basis for ensuring stability in Xinjiang is currently characterized as "fragile, and the situation in terms of maintaining stability remains extremely tense." He noted that it is necessary to focus on the fight against the split of the state, the divisive activities of the "three forces of evil" - terrorism, separatism and extremism.

Zhang Chunxiang, Secretary of the Communist Party of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee, also stressed at a meeting of the Xinjiang delegation held within the framework of the 4th session of the 11th National People's Congress that the actions of terrorists cause deep indignation, as mostly innocent people are their victims. According to him, terrorists can "cover up their criminal activities in Xinjiang with various motives and pretexts, but whatever they are, they are punishable." In his opinion, long-term calm is a prerequisite for the people to truly have the opportunity to "enjoy the results of the policy of reform and openness" ¹¹.

Recall that the most recent ethnic conflicts occurred in July 2009 in Xinjiang, the main region of the Islamic Uyghur population. The main goal of the Uyghur nationalist movement is to secede from China and

creating your own Islamic state. According to official media reports, the violence was carefully instigated and organized by terrorist, separatist and extremist forces operating on Chinese territory and abroad. Such large-scale ethnic conflicts in China in recent years are quite rare, although local clashes between nationalities occur almost regularly.

As noted in recent publications, the majority of non-Han people who have moved to new regions tend to maintain their traditional household "bad habits", which often causes citizens to have a negative attitude towards non-Han people. Non-Han newcomers ' failure to comply with the restrictive rules of childbearing, discipline, and dormitory standards established in cities causes a lot of trouble for municipal authorities. Many hotels refuse to accept people of non-Han nationalities. Entire neighborhoods are being created in cities to accommodate new arrivals.

Migrants account for a significant number of offenses. The most frequent of them are theft, robberies, fights, which not only causes discontent among city residents, but also complicates the work of law enforcement agencies. Due to the fact that representatives of non-Han nationalities do not adapt well to urban life, and their concepts of values, traditions and customs, their religious beliefs are very different from Han ones, all sorts of contradictions and conflicts easily arise between newly arrived non-Han people and urban residents.¹²

Illegal actions and crimes committed by non-Han people in cities contribute to the formation of negative ideas among citizens about non-Han people in general. This creates new and significant problems for city committees on ethnic affairs, and cities are turning into an arena of particularly complex and acute interethnic conflicts.¹³

The Han population also shows cases of disrespect for the national customs and religious beliefs of non-Han residents who have come to live in the cities. This, in turn, causes discontent among non-Han people, which often turns into open incidents. Disrespectful attitude is also noted in some mass media. Such phrases as "Muslim right-wing elements", "Muslim separatists", "Muslim militants", "Muslim extremists", "Muslim terrorists", etc. have become familiar. All this also does not contribute to strengthening the cohesion and mutual respect of nationalities living in the same city and has a very negative impact on ethnic relations in cities. From cities, this negative reaction of non-Han people is usually transmitted very quickly to national areas, adversely affecting the mood of national minorities.¹⁴ As they say in China ," if in the cities [non-Han people] have a cold, then in the border areas - a fever."

Food arrangements for non-Han Muslims are also a factor of instability. In such large cities as Shanghai, Tianjin, Jinan, Zhengzhou, Nanjing, Luoyang, Kaifeng, where representatives of the Hui nationality make up up to 90% of the non-Han population, there are frequent cases of fraud and falsification in the preparation of dishes in special Muslim canteens, restaurants, and all sorts of small catering establishments. Such violations and deviations from the established norms of nutrition of non-Han Muslims in cities are a breeding ground for discontent, which often leads to all kinds of conflicts and negatively affects interethnic relations.¹⁵

Non-Han people living in isolation from their traditional cultural environment almost inevitably leads to the loss of the cultural specificity of their own ethnic group, associated with traditional occupations and familiar surroundings. The problem of how to reduce or compensate for such losses remains relevant both for the displaced persons themselves and for the local administration.

MEASURES TO PRESERVE INTERETHNIC STABILITY

Due to the fact that the migration of non-Han population to cities (first of all, to the cities of coastal provinces) continues to grow, national relations in cities, as already noted above, have become increasingly important in the system of interethnic relations in the country as a whole in recent years. Many Chinese researchers come to this conclusion ¹⁶. It is emphasized that the correct organization of work with nationalities in cities is a direct guarantee of maintaining a stable environment in them. A number of measures are proposed to improve interethnic relations in cities. Among them, such as strengthening work at the "grassroots level", educating cadres and the masses in the spirit of the "national party policy", launching a movement for national unity, training employees of relevant bodies in methods of resolving interethnic conflicts and interethnic contradictions, stimulating the desire of non-Han people to learn and master modern technology, etc. ¹⁷

Accordingly, the role of the city's ethnic and religious affairs committees in addressing the daily life issues of the urban non-Han population is increasing. City party committees and committees for ethnic affairs are charged with the task of fully supporting national equality, maintaining and strengthening the unity of nationalities, and correctly placing senior personnel responsible for working with nationalities. Their duties include working to improve the socio-economic and cultural living conditions of non-Han people, and finally, to develop a legislative framework that provides for the regulation of their work.-

integration and normalization of work with nationalities ¹⁸.

In order to resolve interethnic situations, various by-laws are being prepared, which should contribute to the positive settlement of emerging interethnic conflicts. For example, such documents as "Regulations on Working with Nationalities in cities"¹⁹ and "Regulations on working in the field of religious affairs in Beijing"²⁰ have been developed.

As you can see, in order to maintain calm in the cities and prevent conflicts between ethnic minorities and Han Chinese, the government conducts preventive work in many areas. Migration services are vigilant in monitoring the migration process, preventing the mass gathering of Muslim migrants on national grounds, and creating any mass settlements in cities. According to some reports, there is an instruction not to issue passports to Muslims sent to work in the interior of China. They only have a certificate from their place of residence on hand. This is probably due to the desire to limit the unhindered movement of Muslim migrants around the country, and to control the migrating masses as much as possible.

Restrictions have also been imposed on the departure of migrants from China, which is reflected in the creation of certain difficulties in obtaining a foreign passport. Not everyone can get an exit visa.

Realizing that inter-ethnic conflicts can pose a threat to stability, the Chinese leadership is taking various measures to prevent a possible escalation of the situation. These include strict monitoring of problem areas, territories and individual citizens, as well as resolute suppression of the activities of separatist organizations.

Other measures taken by the government aimed at stabilizing the situation in cities include the organization of special courses for learning "simplified" Chinese at many enterprises where migrants are sent to work, training in working specialties, and the creation of special canteens for Muslims, where cooks specially prepare Muslim dishes work.

The program of moving non-Han people to the interior of the country is an integral part of the policy of accelerated socio-economic development of the national regions of the country, primarily Tibet and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, cultural development of all ethnic groups living in the country, and radical improvement of the environmental situation. ²¹

It should be emphasized that China does not accept any external interference in its internal affairs, opposes any type of federal structure of the state, and will never allow autonomous entities to secede from China. There is a special program for the development of autonomous regions, autonomous regions, and autonomous counties with mixed populations where two, three, or more non-Han nationalities live. A policy is being implemented that takes into account the specifics of the ethnic groups living there. Special laws are being adopted to protect ethnic groups numbering up to 10 or more thousand people. At the same time, China acts extremely harshly in the implementation of its proclaimed policy in the national sphere.

* * *

As can be seen from the above, the interethnic situation in Chinese cities is similar to that in many cities around the world. It is possible that some aspects of China's experience in regulating interethnic relations may also be of some interest to Russia.

¹ Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China, Moscow, 1980, p. 55.

² Minzu tuanjie. 1958, N 2. P. 3; Minzu zhengze wenjian huibian. T. 3. Peking, 1960. p. 9.

³ Cit. by: Mao Gongning. Guanyu wo guo gongzuo jiben jingyan de tantao [On the main experience of national work in China] / / Zhongguo shaoshu minzu. 1992, N 3. P. 7.

⁴ Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2003, N 1. P. 46.

⁵ Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2002, N 5. P. 39.

⁶ Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2004, N 3. P. 27.

^{Wang Xien.} 7 Zhongguo quanmian xiaokang shehui jianshe zhong de shaoshu minzu renkou liuqian ji indui yuanze [Displacement of the population of national minorities in the course of comprehensive construction of a small-scale society and principles for solving emerging problems] / / Minzu yanjiu. 2005, N 3. pp. 14-17.

⁸ See: Lin Sheng. Lun liange li bu kai de neihan yu weiyan [On the content and scope of the concept of "two do not break away"] / / Zhongguo shaoshu minzu. 1991, N 5. P. 7.

^{Wang Xien.} 9 Zhongguo mingzu lilun fazhan de sangye shengzhang dian [Three areas requiring special attention in the development of the theory of the national question in China] // Mingzu wenti yanjiu. 2002, N 7. P. 3.

¹⁰ People's Daily online, 09.03.2011.

¹¹ People's Daily online, 08.03.2011.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 28-29.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁶ D5 Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2002. N 9. P. 7; D5 Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2002, N 5. P. 39.

^{Zhou Jian.} 17 Zhengque chuli minzu guanxi weihu chengshi wending [Correctly establish national relations, protect stability in cities] / / Minzu wenti yanju. 2004, No. 3. pp. 33-35.

¹⁸ Guojia minwei fu zhuren Jiang Jiafu zai quan guo chengshi mingzu gongzo jiotai hui shai de jianghua [Speech of the Deputy Chairman of the State Committee of Jiang Jiafu at the national meeting on working with nationalities of cities] / / Zhongguo minzu tongji nianjian 2000 [Chinese Statistical Yearbook on Nationalities. 2000]. Peking, pp. 86-91.

^{Huang Fengxiang.} 19 "Chengshi mingzu gongzo tiaoli" chutai de qianqian houhou [On the preparation of the "Regulations on working with nationalities in cities"] / / D5 Mingzu wenti yanji. 2002, N 5. P. 45.

^{Liu Jianglin.} 20 "Beijing shi zongjiao shiu tiaoli" chutai de qianqian houhou [On the preparation of the "Regulations [on work] in the field of religious affairs in Beijing"] / / Zhongguo mingzu. 2003, N 1. P. 51.

²¹ Minzu wenti yanjiu. 2001, No. 1. pp. 61-62.

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