Keywords: Somalia, pirates, failed state, nation restoration

E. A. ELKINA

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Mohammed Abdi Hassan, the" famous "captain of the Somali sea robbers, nicknamed" Big Mouth", said that he was stopping piracy and called on others to abandon this "dirty" fishing.¹ For several years, his name inspired fear on the crews of merchant ships, and his wallet swelled from multimillion-dollar ransoms.

But the pirate business has recently become too dangerous and unprofitable. "Big Mouth" and similar organizers of criminal business paid regular members of their teams up to $40 thousand a year each, bribed officials, and had to share the income with the tribal sheikhs. Hundreds of Somalis have not returned from their dangerous fishing trip, and their fate is unknown. The ocean can keep secrets.

Many organizers of sea robbery followed the example of the "Big Mouth". They have already invested in real estate in Kenya and other African countries, opened accounts for front persons in the Persian Gulf and even Europe, and have decided to refrain from risky "investments" in this criminal business. The " Big Horn "itself lost its vigilance: having gone to Europe on business, it was arrested on October 12 last year at Brussels Airport ². Now he will have to pay for the organization of sea robbery.

As of August 31, 2013, a total of 176 pirate attacks were recorded worldwide, 10 of which resulted in hijackings of ships. In Somali waters-out of 10 pirate attacks, 2 were successful, 57 crew members were held captive.³

For five years, since 2007, Somali pirates have been rampant in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. In 2008, these sea robbers attacked 111 vessels, and 42 attacks were successful. Both ships and their crews were traded for ransom. For each captured vessel, the ransom, on average, was $3 million. Piracy peaked in 2011, when there were 176 pirate attacks. That year, they received a ransom of $146 million for 25 stolen ships. These data were provided by the UAE Center for Strategic Studies ⁴.

In 2012, the number of attacks steadily declined, and only 5 out of 35 pirate attacks were successful. In total, between 2005 and 2012, pirates captured 3,740 crew members from 125 countries, 97 of whom died. The buyout received during this period reached $385 million.⁵ It is worth noting that this figure is questionable, since many transactions were carried out outside the control of anyone. In general, any statistics concerning the financial damage caused by piracy can be challenged.⁶

Somalis considered and still consider piracy a legitimate occupation worthy of respect. They are opposed to anti-piracy activities, which, in their opinion, are carried out with the aim of robbing the Somalis themselves and seizing their wealth. Somalis believe in myths that helicopter gunships attack their herds, capture camels and other livestock, and that ships poach their territorial waters for fish and seafood.⁷ Therefore, piracy is seen as a response to the ongoing covert war. According to Somali customs, it is necessary to share the income, and some of the money went to local residents, which, of course, contributed to the emergence of sympathy on their part for the pirates.

Since 2009, an international armada consisting of warships from some countries of the European Union, China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Russia has been used to protect against pirates. Cooperation was established between them. The UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1851 (6), which allowed all States to use force - both on land and at sea. But the resolution stipulated the need to obtain permission from the Somali Government, although it remained unclear what could be considered a Government in Somalia.

The use of naval forces from different countries, including when escorting merchant ships, was probably the most effective method of combating piracy. Much has been written about naval operations (of particular interest, in my opinion, is a recent publication by S. V. Mezentsev, Ph. D., Senior Researcher at the IAfr RAS, published ⁱⁿ this journal8). However, the main disadvantage of naval patrolling by warships is its extremely high cost.

The anti-piracy operations of warships were effective, but the importance of private security on civilian ships cannot be underestimated. There is still a debate about how to get it legal, because the presence of armed guards increases the risk of using weapons and pirates.

Hiring private security firms has become commonplace for shipping companies. According to some reports, 65-70% of ships have armed guards on board, which deters pirates. However, in some cases, the guards "exceed their authority" and shoot at peaceful fishermen.

Passive protection measures: the use of radar to detect pirate boats, video surveillance, technical protection measures (barbed wire, water cannons, battened down hatches) - all this complicated the actions of pirates.⁹ Instructions were developed on how to behave for merchant ships when passing through the zones

how to distinguish fishermen from pirates in nearby boats; how the crew should behave in the event of an attack; how to transmit certain information on the radio; how long to expect help, etc. ¹⁰

What about the captured pirates? By what laws to judge? Only relatively recently, the authorities of Kenya, a neighbor of Somalia, resorted to harassment and organizing trials of pirates. And on the territory of Somalia itself, they often escaped when they were jailed.

Western navies have stopped the practice of transferring detained pirates to prisons in the Seychelles. These prisons are recognized as one of the worst in the world - from 2007 to 2012, out of 47 Somali pirates there, 19 died from various causes. The United States allocated $1.5 million for a new prison in Hargeisa, the largest city in the north-west of the country, the capital of the unrecognized state of Somaliland. The UN has built two more prisons in Somalia, each with a capacity of 500 people. But the pirates themselves prefer to be sent to serve their sentences in prisons in Western countries, for example, in Holland, England or Germany. The conditions there are quite tolerable for them, and after they are released, they expect to apply for a residence permit and stay in these countries.

Although the Gulf of Aden has been the main focus of international attention in recent years, it should not be forgotten that piracy has affected not only this region, but also the west coast of Africa.

As of August 31, 2013, 28 pirate attacks were recorded in the Gulf of Guinea, of which 2 resulted in ¹¹ hijackings. In some ways, the "models" of sea robbery coincided. For example, the use of floating bases for speedboats. But while Somalis seized ships and crews for ransom, in the Gulf of Guinea, tankers and other commercial vessels were targeted, and pirates sought to resell oil, petroleum products and other cargo on the black market.¹²

Now there is a new area of piracy - the eastern Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. In 2009 - 2012, there were 130 cases of pirate attacks annually. Piracy in this region seriously threatens the global economy, as 20% of world trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and millions of barrels of oil are transported through the Strait of Malacca every day.

The trigger was the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which put many thousands of people on the brink of survival. Some residents of Malaysia and Indonesia began to look for a way out of their plight in sea robbery. At the first stage, Malaysia and Indonesia considered piracy only as an internal problem - sea robbers operated mainly in territorial waters. Only Singapore has sought to give the fight against piracy an international dimension. But the difference between Southeast Asia (SE) and Somalia was real. The Southeast Asian countries have stable governments that have managed to find a way out of the economic crisis. Since 2004, joint patrolling of the sea area by ships of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore has begun. In 2006, China, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka joined them. ¹³ Piracy has declined, but not disappeared.

Piracy off the coast of South and Central America is also noteworthy. Near Venezuela, there were attacks on private ships and yachts, on citizens of the United States and the European Union. Therefore, yachts, especially sailing yachts, are advised to be especially careful.

Looking ahead, optimism about Somali pirates is dangerous. Reducing efforts to combat pirates even in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea is fraught with the revival of this criminal trade.

In this regard, here are excerpts from the report of Ki Tuan Do, senior economist at the World Bank's Research Department, "Pirates of Somalia: end the threat, rebuild the country". The report states that "piracy is one of the manifestations of the collapse of the political system in the country, and it is necessary to fight the system as a whole, and not just with pirates", for whom "capture for ransom" is a desire to survive.

Piracy was based on the disintegration of Somalia, de facto civil war and anarchy, instability combined with famine, low-profit fishing, which was also disrupted in Somali territorial waters by poaching vessels from Asia,and the presence of unemployed youth. ¹⁴

The massive famine that hit Somalia as a result of the drought from October 2010 to April 2012 killed approximately 260,000 people.¹⁵ Even if this figure is somewhat exaggerated, in relation to the number of the country's population (approximately 10 million people) it is one of the worst indicators in the last 100 years.

It is during this period that a new surge in piracy occurs. It was fueled by desperate young people who had lost hope of finding another source of food for themselves and their loved ones. Hunger and insecurity have caused mass flight abroad and forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. The consequences of this are still being felt.

Many parts of Somalia still lack functioning institutions of government. But the country has human and financial resources, which made it possible to attract young people to sea robbery, buy weapons, fast boats, and get at their disposal coastal parking lots where you can keep captured vessels for a long time. Therefore, it seems that the main task is to restore the unity of the country, which was torn apart as a result of the war.

Map of Somalia. Al-Shabaab-controlled areas were reduced by almost half in 2013.

wars between clans, tribes, and Islamist groups (see the map). Only then will economic development be possible, which would also help solve Somalia's internal social problems.

In September 2012, the Somali Parliament, made up of representatives of the most influential tribal groups, elected a new President of the country. It was Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, founder of the University of Mogadishu, a moderate Islamist and civil rights activist. His real support inside the country is the Hawiye. He is a favorite of Western governments.

The new president declares his intention to create a" new Somalia " based on broad federalism, counting on multimillion-dollar external assistance. But its authority extends only to areas that are held by military contingents of member countries of the African Union.

International sponsors, primarily the United States and the United Kingdom, decided that it was impossible to create a centralized state in Somalia - Somalis should agree on a structure similar to a confederation. Is it real?

The phenomenon of piracy has further deepened the country's division. Somaliland, dominated by the Isaac tribe and a de facto independent State, is growing stronger through its international contacts. At least some economic development is being observed on its territory. This region of Somalia has been closely linked to the UK since it was under its protectorate. Ethiopia also conducts foreign trade operations through the port of Berbera located here.

Somaliland, seeking to gain international recognition, conducts a number of anti-piracy measures: there are no pirate bases on its coast, and there are prisons for pirates.

Puntland, in northeastern Somalia, is another" independent " entity that is also striving for international recognition, but the development of its state structures is 10 to 12 years behind Somaliland. The" President " of this quasi-State, Mohammed Fa'rol, is supported by the Somali diaspora in Australia. The Puntland coast, from Eyle in the north to Haradhire in the center, remains in the hands of pirate clans and is reportedly home to the main pirate bases.¹⁷

Of all the "Somali calamities", one is perhaps the most worrisome - the Islamist group Al-Shabaab. ¹⁸ By pushing the ideas of the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda to the extreme, Al-Shabaab extremists were able to mobilize unemployed and illiterate youth into their ranks, and for a time made significant progress. military success. They controlled the southern and central parts of the country, including the capital city of Mogadishu.

Only the entry of Afro-Union troops into Somalia* helped oust Al-Shabaab militants from the capital in 2011. Finally, the possibility of a central Government functioning has emerged - it exercises control over Mogadishu and its environs. However, militant attacks and suicide attacks against government institutions and foreign missions continue.

The success of the Kenyan armed forces in September 2012, which occupied a strip tens of kilometers deep along the Kenyan-Somali border and drove Al-Shabaab out of Somalia's second - largest city, the port of Kismayo, was mixed with a lot of bitterness. In Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, in late September 2013, al-Shabaab militants seized a shopping mall and held hostages for several days. About 70 people were killed.

A ready-made" source " for replenishing the ranks of terrorists: the Somali community in Nairobi (more than 100 thousand people) and refugee camps in Kenya, where about half a million Somali citizens have accumulated.

Located in southern Somalia, the port of Kismayo is in the hands of warlord Sheikh Ahmed Madobe of the Darod tribal group, an ally of the Kenyans. It refuses to recognize the authority of the central Government in Mogadishu and has not allowed its representatives to come to Kismayo.¹⁹

The reaction of Western countries to the terrorist attack in Nairobi was mixed. Along with the natural condemnation of any manifestation of extremism, it is impossible not to understand that Somalis survive not only by exporting livestock and piracy, but also by receiving money from the Somali diaspora. Its size -

* The African Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has been deployed in Somalia under the auspices of the AU. It consists of military contingents of Uganda, partially-Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, their total number is about 17 thousand people.

** The Al-Shabaab phenomenon has attracted the attention of serious researchers. Note, in particular, the book - Hansen Stig Jarle. Al-Shabab in Somalia: the History and Ideology of Militant Islamist Group, 2005 - 2012. Oxford University Press, USA, 2013.

More than 750,000 people (in North America, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the Persian Gulf, not counting Africa). It "sponsors" transfers ($1.2 billion annually) to about half of the Somali population. In Somalia itself, due to the virtual absence of functioning banks, the hawala system has developed - the transfer of money based on code words through trusted persons.²⁰

After the terrorist attack in Kenya, a forgotten truth resurfaced - Al-Shabaab, other organizations associated with Al-Qaeda, and pirates received money through this system. But when American and British banks decided, for example, to ban money transfers to Somalia, it turned out that they were starving a significant part of the population and thereby expanding the base of extremism, terrorism and piracy.

It is believed that most of the foreign aid is stolen, but some reaches ordinary Somalis (the United States through the African Union spent $1.5 billion on attempts to ensure security in this country, the British promised to allocate another 280 million ²¹).

* * *

Without the real help of the international community, the Somali problems cannot be solved. And without ensuring the security and stability of the country's socio-economic development, hopes for the complete eradication of piracy remain only a good wish. Therefore, the weakening of measures taken by the international community to combat piracy may lead to a new outbreak of piracy.

Two attacks by Somali pirates on commercial vessels at the end of October 2013 were a reminder of this threat. The attacks were unsuccessful: the pirates were captured and their boats destroyed. But who can guarantee that there will be no repetitions?..

¹ http://www.vesti.ru (11.01.2013)

² http://ntv.ru (14.10.2013)

³ http://www.icc-ccs.org

^{Jaman S., Altaher N.} 4 Successful piracy attempts decline in Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea - http://www.gulfnews.com (4.06.2013)

⁵ http://www.icc-ccs.org

^{Voitenko M.} 6 Economy of piracy - http://www.novayagazeta. ru (9.06.2011)

⁷ Counter-Piracy options in the Gulf of Aden - http://www.kpmg. com (06.2012)

^{Mezentsev, S. V.,} 8 the Use of foreign military forces in Africa (for example the Horn of Africa) // Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 11.

^{Spong R.} 9 Ante-piracy measures in the Gulf of Aden spark debate - http://www.meed.com (20.11.2012)

¹⁰ http://www.forsvaret.dk

¹¹ http://www.icc-ccs.org

¹² See: Elkina E. A. Piratstvo v Guineiskom zaliveke: novye menazy [Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea: New threats]. 2012, N 12.

^{Kang H.} 13 Gulf of Aden vs Malacca Strait: Piracy and counter-piracy efforts - http://www.ipcs.org

^{Do Qui-Toan.} 14 The pirates of Somalia: ending the threat? Rebuilding a nation - http://www.worldbank.org

¹⁵ A history of global famine deaths - http://www.economist.com (13.05.2013)

^{David Smith.} 16 Somalia chooses new leader in presidential elections - http://www.theguardian.com (10.09.2012)

¹⁷ Somalia's future. A ray of hope - http://www.economist.com (25.02.2012)

¹⁸ For more information, see: Ivanova L. V. Al-Shabab in Somalia: hope for peace or threat to peace? // Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 12.

¹⁹ Somalia. Still dangerous - http://www.economist.com (27.06.2013)

²⁰ See: Elkina E. A. Pirates of the Horn of Africa / / Asia and Africa Today. 2009, N 9.

²¹ Somalia. Of waffle and remittances - http://www.economist.com (20.09.2013)

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