A. B. LIKHACHEVA

Graduate student at the National Research University Higher School of Economics

Keywords: water and energy problem of Central Asia, hydrohegemony, Rogun hydroelectric power station, hydroelectric power industry, Russia, China, Iran

The object of research in this article is relations between Russia, China, Iran and the countries of post - Soviet Central Asia (CA) on the key issue for the region-building a water and energy balance. The article does not cover the China-Kazakhstan-Russia water axis, since in this case we are talking about a single international basin (whose problems are interesting in themselves and deserve a separate study).

In the autumn of 2012, for the first time in the entire post-Soviet period, the water and energy balance in Central Asia was being developed intensively. Of course, a number of steps have been taken to solve the region's water problem over the past 20 years. But only now has the dialogue on this topic moved beyond the borders of the five Central Asian republics-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Why did this happen and why exactly in 2012?

There are several reasons.

First, the international community is increasingly concerned about the situation in Afghanistan and how it may develop after the upcoming withdrawal of the NATO contingent from this country. This increases attention to the situation in Central Asia as a whole, as a buffer region, in fact.¹ And building a water and energy balance is a key issue that determines the sustainability of the internal situation in the region.

Secondly, the need for cheap hydropower for both Russia and China has now become clear. Iran needs large volumes of water for the development of nuclear power ², since this industry is the leader in water consumption, because it requires huge water reserves to cool its facilities.

Over the past 20 years, all attempts to resolve the "water" issue at the intraregional level, or with the involvement of a third party not directly interested in resolving the problem, inevitably failed (in the 2000s, German structures headed by GIZ, the German Agency for International Cooperation, tried to participate very actively in the process). But in the absence of a hegemon within the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river basins, it was simply impossible to reach a consensus.

What is the content of the terms "hegemon " and"hydrogegemon"? The main developer of the concept, British scientist Mark Zeitoun, answers this question: "As Geron Warner reminds us, in Greece ,a 'hegemon' is someone who shows the way, a torchbearer in an unfamiliar area. "Dominance" is defined as leadership backed by compulsion. By comparison, "hegemony" is leadership backed by authority. A successful hegemonic strategy is built on consent and submission, not so much through intimidation as through an effective mix of the former and the latter."³. Moreover, it should be noted that the hegemon can be either non-dangerous, exercising "positive" leadership ⁴, or coercive, forming a regime "for itself" ⁵.

The role of the hegemon in the water basin is perceived in two ways. A number of experts are convinced that its presence a priori leads to an uneven distribution of water in the basin, negatively affects the creation of regional water use regimes and has a very negative impact on the design of contractual relations between the basin countries. At the same time, the absence of a hegemon usually leads only to the maintenance of the status quo or predatory use of water by all participants (for example, Lake Chad), and does not create a platform for cooperative interactions.

In today's conditions, we can confidently say that the special role of Russia and China in resolving the water problem in Central Asia in the implementation of any major hydropower project is explained by the likely financing of such projects by Russia and/or China, the participation of their contractor companies, and the availability of broad political and economic tools to influence all countries in the region. Among other things, these two countries are:-

New power plants have a steady demand for cheap energy, and they can ultimately become the guarantors of their safety.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, located in the upper reaches of the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers of the Aral Sea basin, are incomparably weaker than their neighboring countries from an economic and demographic point of view. Moreover, Tajikistan's rich water resources are practically the only foreign policy asset in its relations with lowland Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which lie in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. Nor can one speak definitively of a hegemon in the lower Syr Darya: the struggle for leadership between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is far from over.

THE CONCEPT OF HYDRO-HEGEMONY

As the concept of hydro-hegemony develops, a number of experts directly point out the need to replace the traditional dilemma "conflict - cooperation" in water relations with the term "interaction", since such a dichotomy leads to a distorted perception of any conflict as a negative phenomenon, and any cooperation as a positive one.⁶ The study of water relations in a number of basins has confirmed that they usually show both conflict manifestations and actions that can be regarded as elements of cooperation. It is not uncommon for an act of cooperation (the signing of a treaty) to conceal the unfriendly imposition of the hegemon's will, and thus the underlying contradictions are only reinforced and preserved by international law.

In part, the role of a third party in resolving water disputes is related to the special role of the hegemon State: it is both a hegemon within the basin and a regional power. It is not yet possible to talk about global hegemons regulating water issues.

Especially characteristic is the absence of a hegemon in basins where one or more new States are located. The situation in such basins should always be checked for the presence of an external hegemon, which may not be directly related to the basin. The most striking example of such a hegemon in the nineteenth century was the British Empire, which directly influenced the distribution of the Nile's waters between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Such an external hegemon must be distinguished from an interested intermediary. His work can be very successful, but it is completely different.

The experience of the World Bank (WB) in drafting the Indus River Agreement (between India and Pakistan) has been considered a classic example of successful third-party involvement for several decades. However, recently, amid the aggravation of Indo-Pakistani contradictions, concerns about the fragility of this treaty have been renewed.

Saudi Arabia's mediation in resolving the serious conflict between Syria and Iraq in 1975 was objectively successful.

The UN stands apart, and its role is more in lawmaking and humanitarian actions, and therefore modern practice in mediation of water disputes is more focused on intermediary states or international structures (financial or non-governmental organizations).

The analysis of the water problem from the point of view of structural realism assumes the following matrix of solutions. If the hegemon state is located upstream, there is no conflict, however, there is also, in fact, no dialogue. In a situation where the hegemon state is located downstream, it is very likely that international treaties will form a regime, divide quotas, and fix norms that are beneficial to the hegemon. In the absence of a hegemon, it is either the status quo or an escalation of conflicts. That is why most experts attribute the success of water cooperation, for example, in Latin America, to the defining role of Brazil as a regional hegemon: while Brazil and Argentina were contesting leadership positions, the region was not distinguished either by cooperation or even respect for the rights of neighbors in solving water use issues.

CENTRAL ASIA'S "WATER AND ENERGY IMPASSE"

It is currently impossible to name a hegemon among the five Central Asian republics. And even highlight the dominant force, since each country has certain resources to contain its neighbors.

Comparison of quantitative indicators does not bring any clarity to the analysis of the situation. The"lower" regions were and still are the largest in terms of economic indicators and population -

Table 1

Dynamics and forecast of the population of the five Central Asian republics in 1992-2050 (million people)

Source: worldbank.data.org

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (see Table 1). At the same time, the economically backward and sparsely populated Central Asian republics with significant labor migration to Russia - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan-are in a geographically more favorable position. Against the background of China's growing interest in the region as a transit block on the way to Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics ' opportunities for political maneuvers are increasing.

The issue of water conflicts has been widely discussed in the scientific and public literature since the late 90s of the last century, but experts today speak with great doubt about the possibility of international water wars in the future. And perhaps one of the few regions in the world where the possibility of a war over water is not only allowed, but also considered as a "working option" is Central Asia. There are several reasons, and the main one is not so much the absolute shortage of water, but the uneven distribution of its and hydrocarbon resources between the countries of the region, which have never faced such a problem before.

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan first faced the need to manage sovereign energy networks and national water management after the collapse of the USSR: previously, the entire economy of the region was built and operated on the basis of the Unified Energy System of the USSR. And then the countries of the region were divided: those that are rich in energy resources (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), but are located on a plain in the lower reaches of rivers, and those that are rich in water (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan with their huge reserves of glacial water), but have virtually no hydrocarbon resources ^of their own7.

It would seem that this division was supposed to promote regional trade, economic development and integration of the Central Asian countries. However, it brought the water problem to a dead end, where it is now.

The nature of this impasse is multi-layered, and each of these "layers" is itself a complex problem of international relations:

- conflict between the " lower "countries, which require water primarily for irrigation in the spring and summer period, and the" upper " countries, which accumulate it in reservoirs during this period in order to discharge it in winter for electricity generation^.;

- conflict of "independencies". Having emerged as sovereign states less than 20 years ago, the Central Asian countries are jealous of their sovereignty, trying to neutralize the influence of their neighbors and at the same time influence them as much as possible - in this case, water and gas are suitable political tools;

- conflict of modes. The settlement of the problem clearly requires the formation of a centralized water and energy system in the region. But the creation of such a structure means delegating some of the national powers, which is not possible for the Central Asian regimes today;

- severe interethnic contradictions between almost all the peoples of the region. Multidirectional flows of ethnic and economic migrants, the presence of ethnic enclaves bring the situation to the point that countries mine the borders on both sides. This effectively blocks the dialogue on the issue that has become crucial for the development of the region today.;

- "growth disorder". Today, the economies of Central Asia are at the agricultural and industrial level of development. In general, the region is characterized by economic backwardness. This means that economic growth in the countries of the region will be accompanied by an increase in water and energy consumption.-

Table 2

Central Asian countries ' foreign trade with Russia and China in 2012 ($bn)

Source: UNCTAD.

consumption. As rural residents move to cities, the demand for water will also increase - that is, the development of the region will inevitably lead to a worsening of the water and energy problem.

As a result, there is an absolutely dead end situation: on the one hand, there are ideal conditions for the development of the market, barter exchange, on the other - none of the parties wants to do this. The problem is compounded by the general tension between countries, their unwillingness to become dependent on neighboring countries, and their inability to negotiate.

In addition to the political and economic facets of the conflict, there is also an environmental component: the Aral Sea disaster continues to affect the region. Degradation of the marine ecosystem is shown in Fig.

In addition to the direct effect of this process on coastal areas, there is an increasing salinization of large areas - the wind carries salt all the way to the Pamir glaciers, which accelerates their melting. Glaciologists estimate that the volume of glaciers decreased by a quarter in the second half of the 20th century, and by 2025 the area of Tajikistan's glaciers will decrease by another 20%, which will lead to a 25% reduction in glacial runoff.⁹ Already, the flow of Tajik rivers has decreased by 7%. At the same time, the anthropogenic catastrophe unfolds against the background of global climate change, the main confirmed effect of which is the tendency to longer and colder winters and hotter and drier summers.

EXTERNAL PLAYERS

The obvious external players for the Central Asian region are Russia and China.¹⁰ A less obvious player is Iran. It extends its influence so far only to two countries in the region - Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. However, when all these three players are included in the process of solving the water and energy problem of Central Asia, new facets of the problem open up.

If you think of the problem as a model, you can distinguish three levels of it.

The first and most studied is the relations between the five republics. It is at this level that the problem has been preserved for the last 20 years.

The second level includes the republics ' bilateral relations with their neighbors - Russia, China and Iran. If our research goes beyond the boundaries of water and energy discourse, it is necessary to take into account the United States, the European Union (EU), and in the near future-to add India and Afghanistan. This level of problem has been considered only in recent years, as bilateral relations have intensified.

The third level is relations between external hegemons around Central Asia: in this case, the problem region is no longer a subject, but an object of international relations.

Today, these three levels can also be distinguished in time. Inter-republican discussions have been the focus of attention in the past, and they continue to play a role. But all five republics quickly reoriented themselves to a multi-vector policy aimed at relations with external players and solving water and energy problems by their own hands or at least under their guarantees.

The second level is what is in the spotlight today and will prevail in the medium term. There is still enough room in Central Asia for the deployment of different interest groups, and at the same time, Russia, China and Iran do not individually have the full external resources to implement their intentions in the region in a comprehensive manner.

The third level is the question of the future, which is already being outlined (in a much broader context than the water and energy problem)¹¹.

The problem seems to have been that none of the three external players intended to actively engage in this Central Asian problem, although their participation in the region's economy gradually increased throughout the 2000s (see Table 2).

Chart. Dynamics of Russia's and China's trade turnover with Central Asia in 2000-2012, $ bn

Source: UNCTAD.

Since the beginning of 2012, several events have confirmed the beginning of a new stage in the development of the water problem in Central Asia.

In 2012, the new economic role of China for the region was finally formed, both in the "upper" and "lower" republics.

In 2010, China for the first time surpassed the EU and became the main trading partner of the Central Asian countries (with a turnover of $30 billion).*. In 2012, China's trade turnover with Central Asia reached a record value for the entire post-Soviet period - $45.9 billion, surpassing even the pre-crisis maximum (by the end of 2008, the turnover was $30.8 billion).

At the same time, China's negative trade balance with Central Asian countries continues to grow: record imports - $24.6 billion-exceed exports to the region - $21.3 billion, although in 2010 imports did not exceed $13.5 billion, noticeably inferior to exports of $16.5 billion.

The main part of this jump is accounted for by Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: imports from these countries to China increased by $3.6 and $7.6 billion, respectively, over 2 years (reaching $14.7 and $8.7 billion, see Table 2). It is worth noting that if trade flows from Kazakhstan have previously played a major role in trade China and Central Asia (in 2010, Kazakhstan accounted for 82% of all imports from the region), while fuel imports from Turkmenistan increased 8.6 times in 2 years.

As for exports from China, Kazakhstan remains the main buyer of Chinese goods (since 2012, we need to talk about exports to the Eurasian Economic Community), out of $21.3 billion. it accounts for $11.1, or 52%. The second partner for many years remains Kyrgyzstan ($5.07 billion), and Turkmenistan closed the top three in 2012, with an indicator of $1.78 billion.

Until 2008, Russia surpassed China in terms of trade turnover with Central Asia, but since 2008 (when China overtook Russia by $3 billion), the situation has changed. The growing gap between turnover with Russia and China (in 2012, this figure reached $18.3 billion) is almost entirely due to the increase in Chinese fuel imports.

Throughout the entire post-crisis period, Russia increased its exports to Central Asia (Kazakhstan accounted for the main increase in absolute terms), and at the end of 2012 ($18.8 billion) managed to surpass the pre-crisis level in this indicator. At the same time, the volume of Chinese exports began to grow only in 2011, and the PRC never managed to compensate for the crisis failure (in 2009, exports fell from $22.6 billion). up to $16.6 billion). The dynamics of these indicators is shown in the diagram.

If we compare the participation of Russia and China in the economies of the "upper" and "lower" Central Asian republics in 2012, we can schematically represent this as follows. In terms of exports to the region, Russia consistently surpasses China in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while China gets Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan usually purchased more Russian goods, but in 2012 China sold $600 million more (for more details, see Table 2).

In terms of imports, the situation is almost reversed: China leads in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, while Russia leads in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. If we compare the volume of imports by zones of influence, then China buys $23.4 billion from "home countries", of which $14.7 billion. Kazakhstan accounts for $8.7 billion, Turkmenistan for $0.1 billion, and Tajikistan for $0.1 billion (Russia imports $7.7 billion worth of goods from these three countries), while Russia imports $1.4 billion in its own countries, of which $ 1.1 billion. It is imported from Uzbekistan and $0.2-from Kyrgyzstan (China is slightly inferior and buys goods worth $1.2 billion in these countries). Accordingly, we can say that in terms of imports, China leads in large-capacity markets by a large margin, while in the unattractive markets of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the positions of Russia and China are comparable.

In other words, in terms of imports, China is the undisputed leader in the most "valuable" countries. In terms of exports, the situation is closer to parity: Russia and China supply a lot to the capacious markets of the "lower" countries, but in the" upper "countries, China's leadership is more pronounced than Russia's leadership in the" lower " countries.

On the direct investment market-

* Hereinafter referred to as UNCTAD data, unless otherwise specified.

Kazakhstan remains the main pole of capital attraction (its FDI has averaged 80% since 2000), while the main investors in 2012 were the Netherlands (1st place), China (2nd place), France, Belgium and Canada ¹². Russia is not included in the top five, and in terms of total investment since 2005, it ranks only 7th ¹³.

Thus, Russia is less able to exert a strong economic influence on the most capacious markets directly, which, however, does not limit the effectiveness of alternative instruments: the creation of the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space (CES), control through the labor market, etc.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYDROPOWER POTENTIAL OF THE "UPPER" REPUBLICS

While China has already managed to establish the import of hydrocarbons from Central Asian countries, and the base for launching new projects has been created, China's interests in the field of cheap hydropower are still practically unrealized.¹⁴ Both its Kyrgyz and Tajik neighbors are ready to offer their services and significant resource potential: during the visits of top officials, such projects are discussed with increased attention.¹⁵ For Russia, the issue of water and energy balance in Central Asia also lies in the sphere of establishing hydropower projects, which is confirmed by the latest steps of the Russian leadership.

Tajikistan was the last Central Asian republic to sign demarcation agreements with China in 2002. According to the agreement, Dushanbe ceded more than 1,000 ^km2 in the Pamir mountains to Beijing. ¹⁶ The republic's Parliament ratified this agreement only in 2011.Since 2010, China has become Tajikistan's main trading partner, accounting for 33% of the country's total foreign trade turnover. At the same time, Russia's share has decreased to 19%. At the same time, Tajikistan accounts for 2/3 of all loans that China issues to Central Asia. More than 80% of Chinese investment comes in the form of loans. One of the results of this policy of "cheap loans" in 2010 was more than $700 million in debt - a third of Tajikistan's total debt was owed to China17.

China sees Tajikistan as the missing link for establishing full-fledged ties with Afghanistan: the direct corridor is too difficult to access. Today, most of the Chinese goods coming to the north of Afghanistan go through Tajikistan. The republic's new transit role makes it possible to attract more and more investment for the construction of infrastructure facilities, mainly roads and railways.¹⁸

In 2012 The World Bank conducted an independent expert review of the Rogun hydroelectric power station, the main "stumbling block" in Tajik - Uzbek relations. The WB expert review has remained one of the few available formats for non-politicized assessment of the prospects and security of the Rogun project, without which it is impossible to reconcile the warring parties.¹⁹ For example, on November 6-7, 2012, the WB representatives met with representatives of the governments of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in Almaty. Representatives of Uzbekistan participated only on the second day of the meeting, at the level of civil organizations and municipal authorities. In September 2013, the first part of the WB ²⁰ reports was published - in fact, they did not recommend construction, nor did they justify the ban on it. The adoption of a set of stabilization measures to ensure soil safety and strengthen barriers will allow construction to continue in a safe mode ²¹. Thus, the discussion remains open.

In the spring of 2012, it became known about Iran's negotiations with Tajikistan on the possibility of importing 1 billion cubic meters of water per year. The presence of a common language and a simple and understandable cooperation program (water in exchange for energy resources and infrastructure) create favorable conditions for Iran's full participation in the Central Asian game. Apart from the political aspects, Iran needs significant amounts of fresh water to develop its nuclear power industry today, and its ability to diversify its water sources is severely limited compared to the ability of China and Russia to diversify their fuel trade.²²

As for Russia, during the post-Soviet period, cooperation with all five Central Asian republics was mainly based on a bilateral format, despite joint work in international organizations. Thus, on September 20, 2012, during his trip to Central Asia, Vladimir Putin signed six agreements with Kyrgyzstan on cooperation in the field of hydropower and announced Russia's intention to build a new water and energy balance in Central Asia.²³ Russia actively imports cheap hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for domestic consumption. A special feature of the Kambaraty-1 HPP, the construction plans of which were prepared in the Soviet Union, is its upper location in the cascade of existing HPPs on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Thus, it will be technically possible to drain water in winter to generate electricity and retain it in reservoirs located downstream - Shamaldy-Say, Uchkurgan and Toktogul. Thanks to this, the downstream states will not suffer from winter floods, and it will be possible to regulate spring runoff during the irrigation period. For Russia, the implementation of this project may also have an image character, since the Rogun hydroelectric power station construction project with the participation of the Russian RUSAL, which has been delayed for decades, creates nega-

a positive image of Russian contractors abroad. In August 2013, during the visit of the President of Tajikistan to Moscow, the republic's interest in building four medium-capacity hydroelectric power plants with the participation of Russia was also confirmed-these projects are significantly smaller than the Rogun project in size and are not associated with international scandals.

It is obvious that active expansion into Central Asia cannot be cloudless for any of the external players. Russia faces the problem of limited resources - both financial and human. In addition, it is obvious that the countries of the region do not seek to completely reorient their policies to Russia, fully understanding the benefits of cooperation with several partners at once, and Chinese investments and cheap loans only contribute to this.

As for Iran, it is obvious that the most serious international pressure in connection with the implementation of its nuclear program (both political and economic) is tying its hands when trying to actively build new strategic ties with Central Asia.

* * *

The problem of building the water and energy balance in Central Asia is changing the status quo. Third parties have become actively involved, each of which has no mutually exclusive strategies in relations with the five republics. At least at this stage, Russia and China will clearly not go to confrontation for the sake of developing the resources of Central Asia. Moreover, given the understandable desire of the Central Asian republics for a multi-vector policy, it is likely that projects in the region will be implemented on a complementary basis: Russia is building a conventional hydroelectric power station, and China is building a conventional railway.

From the point of view of managing international watercourses, the discussion of transporting large volumes of fresh water from one country (weak, undeveloped) to another is an important precedent. With the implementation of such a project, Iran's connection with Tajikistan will reach a qualitatively different level, and the launch of such a watercourse will require ensuring its security, which will inevitably strengthen Iran's military presence in the region. In principle, given its status as a permanent observer at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, such a scenario does not look unrealistic.

The seemingly dead-end problem of the Rogun hydroelectric power station is also going to change: neither Uzbekistan nor Turkmenistan will be able to ignore the independent expertise of the World Bank when building their international position. And if the monitoring results are satisfactory, we can expect that the Rogun HPP will still be completed.

Further areas of research are related to a more in-depth study of the role of countries that are not geographical neighbors , such as the United States and the European Union. In the future, the influence of the Indian economy will grow in the region, and a number of experts already call Central Asia a test platform for global competition between India and China.²⁴ It is also clear that as 2014 approaches, the Afghan problem will grow louder and louder, both as a challenge and as one that creates new circumstances for the whole of Central Asia.

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⁹ http://enrin.grida.no/htmls/tadjik/vitalgraphics/eng/html/text u3.htm

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¹² http://kazakhstan.nlembassy.org/services/economy-and-trade/ economic-and-commercial-section/economy-of-kazakhstan-general-information.html

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¹⁹ www.worldbank.org/eca/rogun

²⁰ http://www.worldbank.org/en/events/2013/09/30/Fourth-Informat ion-Sharing-Meeting-on-the Assessment-Studies-of-the-Proposed-Rogun-Hydropower-Project-HPP

²¹ http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41519&tx_ttnews% 5BbackPid%5D=685&no_cache-1#.UnoWOnC-18G

²² Iran may import lbn cubic meters of potable water from Tajikistan. 27 May 2012 - http://tehrantimes.com/economy-and-business/98283-iran-may-import-lbn-cubic-meters-of-potable-water-from-tajikistan; Uzbekistan stops gas supplies to Tajikistan; Dushanbe agrees with Iran on future gas and water supplies -http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=18380 26.03.2012

²³ http://www.kremlin.ru/news/16509

^{Kavalski E.} 24 India and Central Asia: The Mythmaking and International Relations of a Rising Power. I.B.Tauris, 2010; Laruelle M., Huchet J.F., Peyrouse S. China and India in Central Asia: a New "Great Game". Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

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