L. L. FITUNI

Doctor of Economics

I. O. ABRAMOVA

Doctor of Economics

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: international security, non-state actors, world politics, jihadism, "Islamic Africa"

The events of the "Arab Spring" led to significant changes in the geostrategic balance in the regions located near the southern borders of Russia. These developments directly relate to both the strategic interests of the Russian Federation and actual practical issues of the country's security. In addition to the negative geopolitical consequences and the narrowing of opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between the Russian Federation and Asian and African countries, they are manifested in an increase in external and internal threats emanating from international terrorism, political, ethnic, religious and ideological extremism.

As time passes, it becomes increasingly clear that the Arab Spring phenomenon is based, on the one hand, on a complex interweaving of internal local socio-economic and political problems, and, on the other, on a geostrategic competition for influence and dominance between the world's leading powers, regional State and non - State players. The latter are now commonly referred to as non-state actors in international relations.¹ This term is relatively new. He came to Russian science from English-language literature after the collapse of the USSR.

The foreign strategy and tactics of the United States, followed by its junior partners, are based on the concept of "two layers" of modern world politics, which includes, on the one hand, the field of interstate relations, and on the other, the emerging field where the key role belongs to non - state actors.

ANGA IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The range of specific representatives of NGA is quite wide. These include non-governmental organizations, transnational corporations( TNCs), religious groups, dispersed (also called cross-border or transnational) ethnic diasporas, social movements and their network and cellular organizations, etc.).

As a separate subgroup, it is customary to distinguish armed, militant, or "aggressive" NGA (ANGA).

The thesis of two layers of" makers " of international politics is quite thoroughly substantiated by Western theorists of international relations (MO). So, the recently deceased modern classic of political science, MO J.Rosenau argued in his writings that "actors outside of sovereignty" demonstrate an influence comparable to that of traditional (state) actors.²

Soviet science, on the other hand, traditionally placed the "subjectivity" of the MO participant at the forefront, and from this point of view sought to bring to the level of the subject of relations (and, as a consequence, the subject of international law) those individual categories of NGA that, on the basis of a class approach, were perceived by it (or rather, by the authorities) as legitimate, for example, the nationalliberation movements (NODS).

However, certain specific non-state actors that were de facto studied in the Soviet era (such as the NODS of Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, etc.) were studied only from one perspective - the perspective of the problems of "scientific communism" - as one of the "detachments of the international revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement", i.e., in a completely different way compared to today, historical context, and for other purposes.

The issue of subjectivity of the NGA, both from the point of view of international law and from the point of view of modern international relations in a broader sense, has not yet been fully worked out. Mainly, because of its complexity, variety of manifestations and burdened with ideologized approaches.

Western researchers link the" rise " of the NGA with the collapse of the Westphalian state-nation system. It is emphasized that with the expansion of the influence and role of the NGA, the importance of the state as the main antipode of the NGA is devalued, and after that, the importance of such "outdated" categories as national sovereignty, including sovereignty over natural resources, national legislation, the principles of non-interference in internal affairs are undermined, etc.

The article was prepared with the support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation. Project N 14 - 07 - 00028 "Aggressive non-state actors in geostrategic rivalry in 'Islamic Africa' and some aspects of Russia's security after the 'Arab Spring'".

The Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, which are present in a considerable part of the works of left-wing political scientists in the West and in a number of major Asian and Latin American countries (India, Argentina, Mexico) and remain fundamental among Chinese researchers, recognize the growing role of the NGA in modern MO, but question their completely independent role in formulating tasks and achieving foreign policy goals.

This approach, recognizing the existence of local self-interests of specific NGA, sees them mainly as tools for the implementation of more significant strategic tasks by real actors, primarily state ones. In fairness, it should be noted that there are nuances here as well. For example, such a group of non-state actors as TNCs (more often, however, using the formula financial and industrial capital/top/oligarchy), left-wing political science often gives priority in determining external goals and objectives, even in comparison with the sovereign state power.

The subject of this article is a specific group of NGA, whose activities are concentrated in the area of greater "Islamic Africa" (including North Africa). Africa, the Sahel zone, the Horn of Africa and a significant part of the Indian Ocean coast), namely, the "aggressive" NGA (ANGA).

This category is broader than the terms common in the scientific literature - "Armed Non-State Actors" (ANSA) and "Violent Non-State Actors" (VNSA).

The ANGAS studied include network terrorist formations, armed groups and criminal clans that have become more active since the beginning of the "Arab Spring" events, many "liberation armies" and "movements" that have emerged, revived or intensified their activities, old and new religious brotherhoods, secret societies and extremist political structures that are engaged in aggressive expansion, as well as (This is what significantly distinguishes the ANAS we study from VNSA) formally "peaceful" structures that adhere, however, to extremist ideology or preach discord and hatred.

Our conclusions are largely based on the results of the authors ' field research in North Africa and the Horn of Africa in 2011-2014, as well as numerous interviews we received in Egypt, Tunisia, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Morocco.

All this time, a group of researchers from the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been studying the features of the ANGA, the stages and trends of their formation, connections and directions of expansion. On the basis of the conducted monitoring, their scientific classification was carried out, ranking according to the degree of relevance for foreign policy, foreign economic interests and security threats emanating from them.

Of Russia. A number of critical field studies have been conducted, providing unique first-hand results³. In particular, by systematizing the obtained materials, the authors managed to build a formalized scheme for managing the resources of the ANGA and planning terrorist attacks in the countries of "Islamic Africa" (North Africa, Sahel, Sudan zone) (see Fig.).

Our research confirmed the existing intuitive assessment that the period that has passed since the beginning of the "Arab Spring" was a time of not only quantitative, but also qualitative growth of ANAS, which was expressed in an increase in their operational capabilities, financial and propaganda power, as well as their integration with the interests of traditional state participants in the Ministry of Defense and other NGAS, traditionally considered as "independent and peaceful" organizations (for example, TNCs, legitimate religious entities, human rights movements, etc.).

Rampant violence in Livia4, Mali, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Somalia, Kenya, and particularly vivid examples outside the study region - in Syria and Iraq - indicate that the activities of the ANGA are not an intra-but a transnational (at least cross-border) threat, which must be addressed by systemic measures and international organizations. by effort.

Monitoring has also shown that the impact of the militant expansion of ANGA on the economic, political and other interests of the Russian state and business in those African countries where the level of dependence on imported raw materials is strategically (and in some cases critically) important for domestic production (bauxite, manganese, uranium, rare and rare earth metals, etc.) is very significant. hydrocarbons, etc.).

In addition, it should not be forgotten that at present, various links between the terrorist underground in North Africa and certain regions of the Russian Federation, including in the North, have already been recorded. The Caucasus, the Volga region, and major urban agglomerations in Central Russia (including Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg).

The study of the above-mentioned issues could contribute to a scientifically based determination of the levels of terrorist and extremist threats emanating from the studied area, identification of existing, developing and possible international relations of the extremist underground, methods and vectors of spreading influence, recruiting, and financing terrorist and extremist activities in the territory of the Russian Federation.

ANGA'S AFRICAN EXPANSION

At the turn of the millennium, the expansion of the NGA expanded geographically. An increasing number of people are being drawn into their" African orbit". The variety of activities of these actors and, as a result, the forms of organization and paradigms of their activity is growing, and their resource base is expanding. NGA here began to actively use military and information and analytical resources for the implementation of their tasks. Today, we analyze the current problems of international relations and develop the political line of states (including Russia) in Africa, and especially in the part of it that is located in the Middle East.-

Map. The share of the Muslim population in the sub-region considered in the article.

Источник: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21570720-terrorism-algeria-and-war-mali-dem onstrate-increasing -reach-islamist-extremism

north of the equator, are not possible without taking into account the factor impact or the attitude of the NGA to them.

After the systematic change of the majority of secularist ruling regimes in North Africa, which became known as the "Arab Spring", the influence of aggressive, militant NGAS in this region has increased on a number of areas of geostrategic interests and, in part, on issues of internal state security of Russia.

Particularly high is the dynamics of the growth of influence and, as a result, the danger of "aggressive" NGA, actively using violent methods, extremist ideology and included in the network structures of international terrorism. Such ANGAS have been greatly strengthened by extending their base to Muslim countries in Africa or countries where there is a significant proportion of people who profess Islam in the population (see map). At the expense of these people, in addition to the huge financial and information resources available, the ANGA acquire almost inexhaustible sources of replenishment of its personnel and strategic depth of maneuver and defense in the event of an armed confrontation.

THE LARGEST ANGA IN THE REGION

The largest and, as it is considered, the most powerful ANGA in the geographical area considered in this article is the structure of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which is, in fact, a network of interconnected, but rather autonomous cells scattered throughout West Africa - west of Egypt and Sudan, where there are Muslim communities. However, the areas of greatest operational activity of AQIM are north-eastern Algeria (primarily Kabylia), south-western Libya, northern Mali and Niger.

At the beginning of autumn 2014, the activity of its structures in Mauritania, Tunisia, Chad and Nigeria was less noticeable. However, in the last two countries, the activity of Boko Haram (Boko Haram), a group that is not formally part of AQIM, but is believed to have established various ties with Maghrebians, has grown significantly.

AQIM has been known under its current name since 2006. It was then that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda, first appeared in a video message announcing that the "Salafist group of Sermons and Battles" (the backbone of the future AQIM) had joined Al-Qaeda. By that time, since 2002, the United States had already included the "Salafist Group" in the list of international terrorist organizations.

The original" mother "of the group is one of the most radical factions of the Algerian "Armed Islamic Group", which refused to sign a truce agreement with the government after the" black decade " in Algeria (the civil war of 1991 - 2002, which followed the attempt to liberalize and hold free elections in the country, which ended with the victory of the Islamists). AQIM is included in the UN sanctions list of terrorist organizations.

AQIM declares its goal to create an Islamic Caliphate. He considers the governments of North Africa and the Sahel countries "near enemies", and Spain and France - "distant". Accordingly, their deposition - short and long-range goals.

Although AQIM is considered a single network, in fact its substructures are very dispersed geographically and, as a result, operate locally. According to publicly available estimates by Western intelligence agencies, the group had about 400 fighters in the mountains of Kabyliya in 2013 (including 280 in the Buira vilayet, 73 in the Boumerdes district, and 50 in the Tizi Ouzu vilayet)^.5

AQIM is financed from the proceeds of criminal activities (kidnappings for ransom, financial crimes, etc.). Some of the funds are voluntarily and forcibly received by AQIM from the local population. A significant contribution comes from sympathetic Africans working in Europe.

At the beginning of August 2014, according to the Le Figaro newspaper in Paris, about 700 AQIM⁶. A year earlier, during a military operation in northern Mali, the group's forces exceeded one and a half thousand fighters united in katibs (formally-battalions, but in terms of manpower-companies). Often, katiba* is a separate group (in fact, an organized criminal group) operating in a certain area.

During and as a result of Operation Serval in Mali, which was conducted with the participation of the armed forces of France and the ECOWAS countries, * * some of the kataib became famous and in 2013-2014 were included in the UN sanctions list as separate organizations, which significantly raised the authority of the latter in the eyes of other ANGA and local residents.

"SIGNED IN BLOOD" AND OTHERS

Among these katibs, now considered "organizations that are part of the AQIM structures", are Al Mouakaoune Biddam ("Blood Signers" operating throughout the western Sahel); Al Moulathamoun ("Face Concealers", more precisely "Katiba Mulatamin" - "Face Concealer Battalion" ⁷). On August 20, 2013, it merged with the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pour l'unicite et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest/MUJAO), resulting in a new organization - Al Mourabitoun (official UN translation - "Standing Guard". The same word in Arabic refers to the Marabout-members of the religious brotherhood, the dynasty and the state of the Almoravids (⁸).

The "blood signers" became world-famous after an attack on a gas company in southeastern Algeria, which was widely covered by the world media. The terrorists who carried out the attack on the Tigen-Turin complex took more than 800 hostages, of whom they killed 39 people from 8 countries, before they were themselves destroyed by Algerian special forces.

* Kataib - plural in Arabic (approx. ed.).

** Economic Community of West African Countries.

Before that, in May 2013, together with MUJAO militants, they organized terrorist attacks in Niger. In the summer and autumn of 2014, the organization consistently announced its support for the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, then stated its disagreement with its too harsh actions.

In the battles in Mali, along with the AQIM katibs, the Ansar ad-Din group (AAD-"Defenders of the Faith") provided serious resistance to the Franco - African interventionist contingent during Operation Serval. It was founded in 2011 by Iyad Ag Ghali, an ideologue of the Tuareg national movement, who is still its leader.

This ANGA emerged in the 1990s during an armed conflict between Tuareg separatists fighting for the independence of Azawad, a territory in northern Mali, and the Malian authorities. However, it made its first public statement on March 30, 2012, when it captured the city of Kidal and established its headquarters there, then took control of Timbuktu, driving out the North Malian separatists (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad). At the peak of military operations in Mali, the AAD combat unit was estimated at 1,200 people.

Currently, according to the French press, about 700 AAD fighters are still concentrated in hard-to-reach areas, mainly in Mali, Mauritania and Algeria. In February 2014, there were reports of AAD fighters returning to Mali, where they distributed money to the poor and expelled people with negative views of the AAD from settlements. AAD's own sources of funding are very modest, with the main financial support coming through AQIM channels.

In January 2014, with reference to the French special services, it was reported that Iyad Ag Ghali was hiding, probably in Algeria, in the area of the city of Tin-Zoutin. On July 29, 2014, a video appeared on jihadist websites in which Iyad Ag Ghali, without going into specifics, claimed responsibility for organizing rocket attacks and suicide attacks.

He confirmed that the goals of the AAD are the introduction of Sharia law and " getting rid of the crusaders led by France." He accused France of wanting to establish neo-colonial rule over Mali in order to plunder the country, especially its main riches: gold, copper and uranium. The video did not directly mention AQIM, but did mention AAD's willingness to support the Jihadist brotherhood in Nigeria, Central African Republic, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen, and Egypt.⁹

BROTHERS IN JIHAD

The jihadist brothers in Nigeria should be understood primarily as two Angas: Boko Haram, often mentioned in the media, and the less well-known actor, Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan, ^more to as Ansaru.

Boko Haram's official self-designation is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (Society for the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad). Boko Haram is a " folk name "and translates from the Hausa language as"Western education (upbringing) is a sin (forbidden, shameful)".

Boko Haram originated as a Sunni fundamentalist sect that advocates strict adherence to Sharia law. Gradually, under the influence of Wahhabi ideologues, it transformed into a Salafist organization of the jihadist type. The number of active members is estimated by various analysts from one to several thousand.

The organization is known as the organizer of many terrorist acts, which resulted in numerous human casualties, kidnappings and murders. The main area of activity is northeastern Nigeria, but the ANGA regularly carries out attacks in neighboring countries-Chad and North Africa. Cameroon. On April 14, 2014, the group abducted more than 270 schoolgirls from a high school in Chibok, Nigeria.

The leader of the organization, Abubakar Shekau, explained the attack on the school by saying that " girls should leave school and get married." On May 20, 2014, a double terrorist attack took place in the city of Jos, killing more than 160 people and injuring 55 others.

Boko Haram gets most of its funding from bank robberies, extortion, and kidnappings for ransom. The Group also received funding from AQIM.

Ansaru is a relatively small group that broke away from Boko Haram in 2012, but has closer ties to A QIM than the latter.

This ANGA operates primarily in northern Nigeria. Unlike Boka Haram, Ansaru attacks mainly Nigerian government facilities, police and military personnel. They condemn Boka Haram for shedding the blood of innocent Muslims. At the beginning of hostilities in Mali in 2012, French citizens were abducted in retaliation for France's active participation in the military operations on the side of the Government.

In Somalia, the largest ANGA is Al - Shabaab (Somali: Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin, "Mujahideen Youth Movement"), which unites Somali Islamists operating not only in this country, but also in neighboring states. ¹¹

The group emerged from the wreckage of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), when the Interim Federal Government and its patrons, primarily the Ethiopian Armed Forces with U.S. support, took power in Somalia. On February 10, 2012, Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the inclusion of Al-Shabaab in the organization he led. a network of cells.

Al-Shabaab has Wahhabi roots. As a result, this ANGA is hostile to the Sufi tradition, which often leads to clashes with the militants of the Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a (yaz. Somalia-Ahlu Suna Waljamaaca).

The number of" Al-Shabab " initially (i.e. on the basis of SIS) exceeded 3 thousand people. After the fall of the ICU, many went to the underground-

polye, to train insurgency and armed cells in Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. They carry out attacks on the Government and AMISOM (African Union military contingent) peacekeepers. There are quite a few foreign members of this ANGA, including Western Europeans. Some of the foreigners hold high command positions in the organization. Among others, Al-Sha-Bab stands out for its effective use of modern propaganda tools and the involvement of young people in its ranks.

We are talking not only about using the Internet and social networks, but also broadcasting and music competitions. Members of the group write Western-style music with captions calling for jihad and joining the " rebel forces." According to 2010 data, 8 out of 10 Al-Shabaab soldiers are minors. To limit the influence of Western counter-propaganda on Somalis, especially young people, Al-Shabaab has outlawed cable and mobile Internet, with the exception of special Internet cafes. Providers in the controlled territories pledged to disable their services within 15 days under the threat of reprisal ¹². According to Washington, on September 1, 2014, the leader of this ANGA, Moktar Ali Zubayr ("Godan"), was killed in a US drone strike¹³.

As for the sources of funding, Al-Shabaab, unlike many other African organizations, received the bulk of it in the form of the usual "mandatory payments" inherent in the state: taxes, duties, various fees. A large proportion of Somali migrant transfers also end up in Al-Shabaab's coffers. ¹⁴ Naturally, traditional sources of money - donations, expropriations, etc. - also played an important role.

Since 2012, revenues have declined significantly due to the loss of control over the strategically important ports of Kismayo and Merca. In addition, a series of military defeats has made it impossible to collect taxes in some urban areas in southern and central Somalia. However, until 2014, Al-Shabaab had sufficient funding, including from the illegal production of charcoal and export through small ports on the coast. However, these " sources "were also attacked in August 2014 by government forces and AMISOM forces during the" Operation Indian Ocean", as a result of which Al-Shabab had to leave some coastal settlements. However, taxation of the population of the remaining areas under ANGA control is still an important source of income. The role of foreign donations is growing.

There are a significant number of lesser-known ANGAS operating in Africa. The situation became particularly complicated after the disappearance of one of the" stabilizers " of the status quo and the support of secular regimes in this part of the continent in the person of the Gaddafi regime. Through generous financial injections and the threat of military intervention, Gaddafi has long deterred some of the local State and non-State actors from taking harsh actions or turning to extremist positions. Moreover, the jihadist forces that opposed Gaddafi are now partially represented in the Libyan leadership.

SECRET CONNECTIONS...

Some analysts believe that there are deep secret links between the intelligence services of some global state actors, both in the West and in the East, who are interested in influencing the geostrategic situation in Africa, and the ANAS under consideration, including AQIM and Al-Shabaab. Such links are believed to include, but are not limited to, technological support and financial support. Moreover, to ensure both, there is no need for direct (and even more visible) financing or transfer of equipment and technical capabilities, since this function can be delegated to other NGA, private structures or representatives of civil society (in the form in which the latter has developed today in the countries of the continent).

One of the most important but little - publicized areas of activity of Western special services after the fall of the USSR is the introduction and, if possible, management of the confessional situation in key countries. This work is carried out through a thorough analysis of the current situation, the introduction of its agents or controlled leaders among the clergy, or the formation of new leaders from the mass of believers.

In the future, the most commonly used method is resuscitation and artificial aggravation of historical confrontations, discrepancies, and prejudices that have subsided in the previous decades, but objectively exist (for example, between Shiites and Sunnis in the Greater Middle East, Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims in the Balkans, Uniates and Orthodox in Ukraine, etc.).

Protestant proselytism is also used for this purpose, when local adherents of various Protestant movements and sects, trained by Western "preachers", try to lead political trends. For the same purposes, external information and propaganda support is actively used, as well as constant discussion in the international media, regardless of (and often contrary to) the real situation, of the topic of the most severe oppression of some by others: Sunni Shiites (and recently the opposite) in Iraq, Sunni Shiites in Syria, etc.

Such activities are widespread in Russia, Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and China. For example, in an interview with the Kyrgyz information resource Tushtuk, a source related to the State Committee for National Security* of Kyrgyzstan noted the following: "The United States intends to take full control and management of the entire religious situation in Kyrgyzstan. Undoubtedly, the religious factor, along with others, taking into account the peculiarities of the region, may well be involved in a certain hour "X", in the mobilization of extremist forces for implementation

* State Committee for National Security.

geopolitical aspirations of the United States, up to a violent change in the constitutional order. Examples include the Arab Spring and the events in Syria." And further:"For the implementation of this plan, the special services of the United States and its satellites - Turkey and Saudi Arabia - use religious extremist organizations that use various charitable foundations, social movements, and higher educational institutions as operational cover." ¹⁵

...AND COUNTERACTION MEASURES

The countries of the part of Africa under consideration are trying to organize a systematic response to the threat posed by ANGA. However, despite international cooperation, they mostly solve local problems.

Algeria remains today the most powerful local player in this respect. The government's main efforts are aimed at combating AQIM, although smaller ANGAS are not overlooked. Despite heavy losses in recent years, AQIM militants have occasionally attacked Algerian security forces, local government structures, and generally terrorized residents. Especially dangerous are the mountainous areas to the east of the capital and the vast desert areas near the southern border of the country.

Algeria has established close security cooperation with the United States and France. Washington and Paris see Algeria as a key partner in the fight against Islamist forces and terrorism in this part of Africa.

EU experts consider the Algerian Intelligence and Security Department to be one of the "most effective intelligence agencies" in the context of the fight against al-Qaeda in the Sahel countries. ¹⁶ This fact is why some analysts are inclined to explain the reasons why, despite the seemingly obvious objective prerequisites in the country, the revolutionary wave of the Arab Spring I never got a ride in Algeria.

While in Algeria there is a clear priority for military solutions to the problem of combating extremists, in neighboring Morocco a more restrained strategy has been chosen.

Field research conducted by the authors in Morocco revealed that since the beginning of the "Arab Spring", the country has taken quite effective steps aimed, on the one hand, at mitigating the severity of objective problems that could serve as an impetus for riots and mass demonstrations, including violence, and on the other hand, at reducing the level of violence in the country. to prevent the radicalization of the part of the population that is particularly susceptible to the effects of extreme religious propaganda.

This is not just about the political reforms carried out in Morocco "hot on the heels" of the events in Tunisia and Egypt, which we have described in sufficient detail in this journal17 and in other publications18.

In this country, a three-pronged strategy of countering aggressive NGA is being implemented, which includes:: a) a set of measures to ensure the rule of law (including repressive measures, the work of special services, cooperation in this area with friendly countries); b) launching a number of initiatives in the field of education and employment (especially for young people), increasing women's participation in public life; c) directly countering "imported" extremist Islamic ideologies (for this purpose, a national strategy has been developed and is being implemented to strengthen and further institutionalize the traditional commitment of Moroccans to orthodox Islam - the Sunni direction of the Maliki madhhab).

During an interview with representatives of the Ministry of Waqfs and Islam, the authors were told about the system of measures to counter the radicalization of young people. For this purpose, new equipped and equipped training centers are being created at mosques. The Ministry is closely monitoring their work and ensuring that the subject of study is true Orthodox Islam, " practiced in this country for the fourteenth century." A lot of money is allocated for the renovation and reconstruction of mosques in poor areas and communities.

The Ministry is systematically working to improve the level of teaching of Islamic subjects in the field. An educational and methodical complex for retraining and advanced training of 50 thousand imams has been prepared. Since a large number of Moroccans live and work abroad, the Ulema Council for the European Region and the Ministry of Moroccan Affairs Abroad have developed similar training programs, taking into account the needs and characteristics of this target population.

Every year during the holy month of Ramadan, a series of religious readings is held under the personal patronage of the King of Morocco. They are attended by authoritative Muslim theologians and scholars who preach and call for a peaceful interpretation of the provisions of Islam. Often lectures are purposefully addressed to young people.

However, as representatives of the police authorities in Meknes assured us during interviews, the centers and hotbeds of radicalization are not so much mosques, where religious communication and sermons are open and monitored not only by representatives of the ministry, but also by "masses of conscientious Muslim Moroccans devoted to the faith of their fathers and the king", as prisons, where the prisoners are extremists They have the opportunity to communicate regularly with other prisoners and explain to them "foreign views brought in from abroad".

Since the threat of terrorism is cross-border, steps are also being taken to prevent the radicalization of the population of neighboring countries. In 2013, 500 imams from Mali were retrained and/or trained in Morocco as part of a regional initiative.

The security component, however, also remains in the field of view of the Moroccan authorities. In September 2014, Morocco's security forces "eliminated a terrorist cell that was engaged in recruiting fighters in the kingdom" for the Islamic State (IS) extremist group operating in Syria and Iraq. Cooperation is being implemented with the special services of the United States, France, and Great Britain.-

co-UK Counterterrorism agency.

The fight against international terrorism and the situation in North Africa are discussed during regular meetings and mutual visits of officials of Morocco and the Russian Federation.

The search for and implementation of adequate measures to respond to changes in the situation and the interaction of the Russian state with state and non-state actors is underway in other countries of the continent.

This is not an easy task that requires non-trivial approaches and solutions from Russian diplomacy. It is complicated by the fact that the growing role and influence of non-State actors is a relatively new phenomenon in international relations, which has become particularly important in the context of globalization and the maturation of civil societies in many countries, the transition to a post-industrial world and the formation of a single information space.

It should be recognized that Russian diplomacy, which is just developing new "post-Soviet" areas and objects of work, sometimes lacks neither the experience, nor the tools, nor the means to actively and widely use this" layer " of the Ministry of Defense in its favor.

Some successes, of course, are evident, but the reality is that a huge number of NGA initially build their work on anti-Russian positions. This applies not only (and not even so much) the region we are studying. Unfortunately, this is the case in many parts of the world.

* In politics, both domestic and international, subjects or actors are distinguished - free and independent participants in the political process (for example, certain communities of people, institutions, organizations, etc.), as well as objects - social phenomena with which the subjects purposefully interact in one way or another. As a result of such interaction, political relations arise, which, in turn, are determined by the political interests of the subjects.

² See, for example: Rosenau J. Study of World Politics. Vol. 2: Globalization and Governance. Taylor and Francis, NY. 2006; idem -Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity. Princeton, PUP. 1990; Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization. Princeton, PUP. 2003; Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World. Cambridge, CUP. 1997.

³ Studies were conducted with the financial support of the RGNF (project 14 - 07 - 00028).

⁴ See, for example: Meshcherina K. V. New Libya: a thorny Path... Where to? // Asia and Africa today. 2014, N 2. (Meshcherina K.V. 2014. Novaya Liviya: temistyi put... Kuda? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 2) (in Russian); its name is Libya. The long road to stability or the threat of collapse? // Asia and Africa today. 2014. (Meshcherina K.V. 2014. Liviya. Dolgyi put k stabilnosti ili ugroza raspada? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 8) (in Russian)

⁵ http://archives.tsa-algerie.com/divers/plus-de-400-terroristes-d-aqmi-activent-en-kabylie_239 70.html

⁶ Le Figaro. 7.08.2014.

⁷ Although propaganda posters usually depict Mulatamin wearing balaclavas under a black banner and are therefore often referred to as "masked" in the West, they should actually refer to "lisam / litam", or" tagelmust", a Tuareg turban (also called"shash" in Arabic). Among the Tuareg and some other Berber groups, from the moment of coming of age, a man must hide his face under tagelmust, an indigo-colored headdress made of cotton or linen, which is both a veil and a turban - a long, several meters long piece of fabric. The Tuareg people call themselves "Kel tagelmust" - the people of the turban. For an adult Tuareg male, appearing in front of strangers or people higher up in the social hierarchy with an undisguised face is considered indecent.

⁸ The connotation is very interesting and eloquent, easily integrated into the" long-range goals " of AQIM. The Almoravid state, created in the middle of the 11th century by Berbers-followers of Abdullah ibn Yasin, included the territories of present-day Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, parts of Spain and Portugal. At the Battle of Zallak in the summer of 1086, the Almoravid army, led by Yusuf ibn Tashfin, completely defeated the combined Christian forces under the leadership of the Castilian King Alfonso VI.

⁹ http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20140806 185355/; http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140807-iyad-ag-ghali-le-leader-ansar-dine-reapparait-menace-fran ce/; http://www.maghrebemergent. com/actualite/internationale/item/39754-iyad-ag-ghali-abandonne-totalement-la-revendication -touareg-pour-basculer-dans-le-jihadisme.html

¹⁰ Not to be confused with the Arab country of the same name with its capital Khartoum. The historical and geographical concept of Sudan is ambiguous. Sudan also means a historical and geographical area of about 5 million ^km2 in the northern part of Central and West Sub-Saharan Africa (up to the 5th parallel north of the equator, which, however, is not identical with the borders outlined by Ansaru strategists, who include the Sahel in their area of activity).

Geographically, the Sahel is the border zone between Sudan and the Sahara. Sudan is divided into Western (the territories of Burkina Faso, central and southern Mali, parts of Niger, Guinea, Ghana, Ivory Coast and Mauritania), Central (part of the territories of the states of Niger and Chad) and Eastern (from Lake Baikal). Chad to the borders of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan). Modern Mali in the colonial period was called French Sudan, and in 1958-1960-the Sudanese Republic.

¹¹ For more information, see: Ivanova L. V. Al-Shabab in Somalia: hope for peace or threat to peace? // Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 12. (Ivanovo L.V. 2013. "Ash-Shabab" v Somali: nadezhda na mir ili ugroza miru? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian)

^{12 http://aljazeera.ru/%D0%B2-%Dl%81%D0%BE%D0%BC%} D0%B0%DO%BB%D0%B8-%D0%B8%D0%BD%Dl%82%D0%B5% Dl%80%D0%BD%DO%B5%Dl%82-%DO%BC%D0%BE%DO%B 6%DO%B5%Dl%82-%DO%BE%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7 %D0%B0%D1%82%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D0%BE %D0%B4

¹³ http://www.garoweonline.com/page/show/post/292/pentagon-confirms-death-of-somalia-terro r-leader

^{Abramova I.} 14 Migrant money transfers: their role in the socio-economic development of Africa // World economy and International relations. 2009, N 7. Pp. 82-90. (Abramova I. 2009. Denezhnye perevody migrantov: rol v sotsialno-economicheskom razvitii Afriki // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. N 7) (in Russian)

¹⁵ Cit. by: Criminal landing from Syria // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 20.02.2014 - http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014 - 02 - 18/1_desant.html

¹⁶ См.: Directorate-General for External Policies. Policy Department. POLICY BRIEFING DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/ 2013 71. PE 491.510. June 2013, p. 14.

^{Fituni L. L.} 17 Middle East: Technologies of Protest Potential management / / Asia and Africa Today. 2011. N 12. pp. 8-16. (Fituni L. L. 2011. Blizhniy Vostok: Technologii upravleniya protestnym potentsialom // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian); Fituni L. L., Solodovnikov V. G. Towards the "Arab Winter": Emerging political and economic trends in the countries of North Africa // Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 6. С. 2 - 9. (Fituni L.L., Solodovnikov V.G. 2012. Navstrechu "arabskoi zime"... // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 6) (in Russian)

^{Fituni L. L.} 18 "Arab Spring": Transformation of political paradigms in the context of international relations. 2012, N 1. С. 3 - 14. (Fituni L.L. 2012. "Arabskaya vesna": transformatsiya politicheskikh paradigm v kontekste mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy // Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya. N 1) (in Russian); Fituni L. L. Ekonomicheskie prichiny i posledstviya "arabyskoi vesna" [Economic reasons and consequences of the "Arab Spring"]. 2012, N 1. с. 90 - 97. (Fituni L.L. 2012. Ekonomicheskie prichiny i posledstviya "arabskoi vesny" // Problemy sovremennoy ekonomiki. N 1) (in Russian)

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