By the end of the 1920s, it seemed that the British policy towards Palestine, proclaimed in the" White Paper " of 1922, was bearing positive fruit and did not require serious adjustment. But the world economic crisis of 1929-1933 worsened the situation in Palestine, both economically and politically. Shortly after the onset of the Great Depression, MacDonald's second Labour Cabinet was formed in June 1929. The UK is once again being led by forces that are not related to the Balfour Declaration. The new Colonial Secretary, Lord Pasfield (Sidney Webb), never expressed any sympathy for the idea of creating a Jewish "national home" in Palestine.

Keywords: Middle East, Palestine, British policy in Palestine, Second Labour Government, White Paper of 1930.

The Arab-Jewish riots of August 1929 reinforced the view of the Labour Cabinet that it was necessary to adjust its Palestinian policy. The two royal commissions of 1929-1930, which investigated the causes of these riots, confirmed the need to reconsider the course of Britain in Palestine, especially in the matter of helping Zionist organizations that sought to create a "national home" in the Holy Land. In doing so, the commissions gave Lord Pasfield an excuse to raise the issue of renegotiating the terms of the mandate for Palestine.

In early October 1930, Lord Pasfield informed Weizmann, President of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), of the main provisions of the new White Paper on the Palestinian question. The latter, being acquainted with them, resigned from his post on October 20, doing so in protest against the provisions of the White Paper. This gesture by Weizmann drew public attention to the fact that Britain wants to cancel the Balfour Declaration, and served as a starting point for consolidating opposition to the adoption of a new White Paper.

On October 21, 1930, the Pasfield Memorandum, known as the Pasfield White Paper, was published officially three days later [The Land..., 1984, p. 117]. The memorandum was a concentrated expression of the work of the two royal commissions on the Palestinian question and consisted of two parts: the first was a copy of certain provisions of the 1922 White Paper, and the second was a transcript of the findings of the report of the second Royal Commission on the situation in Palestine by a British civil official, Hope - Simpson.

The Labour Government has confirmed its intention to adhere to what it believes is the main provision of the 1922 White Paper, that is, that no group of the Palestinian population should benefit at the expense of the other. The memorandum stated: "It should be understood once and for all that Jewish leaders are unnecessarily pressuring His Majesty's government to agree to their policies regarding immigration and land, to the aspirations of radical trends."

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zionism. Adopting such a policy would mean neglecting the duty of the mandate State towards non-Jewish residents of Palestine " [The Political..., 1947, p. 11]. The document explained that "guaranteeing the rights of other parts of the population is just as important as encouraging Jewish immigration." The Balfour Declaration was not mentioned at all.

Referring to the findings of the Hope-Simpson Commission on land, Pasfield, in particular, confirmed that "with the current methods of land cultivation, there are no free territories for settling new immigrants in Palestine-not counting the virgin lands that the Jewish Agency has already acquired." As the document noted the increasing de-colonization of the Arab population and the increase in unemployment, the memorandum provided for the reservation of public land by the Palestinian Authority for landless Arabs or Arabs without sufficient land. The resettlement of landless Arabs was supposed to be considered as a socially important goal [The Land..., 1984, p. 118]. The Government promised to keep a stricter eye on land allocation and protect tenants from both being driven off the land and being charged excessive rents.

The document approved the temporary suspension of immigration to Palestine, implemented by the Government in the spring and summer of 1930. In the future, the scale of Jewish immigration was to be made dependent on the total number of unemployed people in Palestine. In 1930-1931, Jewish immigration to Palestine was reduced to four thousand people a year (Sudeikin, 1976, p. 239).

While rejecting the WZO's claim to participate in the governance of Palestine, the British Government called in the White Paper for accelerating the introduction of elements of self-government in Palestine. It provided for the creation of a Legislative Council on the model proposed in Churchill's White Paper: 22 people, including 10 official and 12 unofficial members. However, the real power still had to be concentrated in the hands of the High Commissioner. The British Government did not want to give full control of Palestine to the majority of its population. It reminded Arab leaders that the reason for refusing to grant the constitution demanded by the Arabs was a double commitment from the British Government.

Thus, Lord Pasfield's memorandum formally preserved continuity with the previous British policy in Palestine, but its actual vector in the Holy Land was changing. The thesis of equal rights for all religious communities in Palestine took on a new meaning. The Labour government has stressed that it will support not only the Jewish side, but also the Arab side. Conservative governments, while claiming the equality of all religious groups in the Holy Land, were actually pursuing a policy of creating a "Jewish national home." MacDonald's Labour cabinet, on the other hand, tried to really move towards a policy of respecting the equal interests of all groups of the Palestinian population.

The reaction of Zionists and pro-Zionist circles in England and abroad to the publication of the 1930 White Paper was expected. The WSO Executive Committee expressed its extreme indignation, saying that the document interpreted the mandate in a spirit of prejudice against Jewish interests, that it not only deviated from Churchill's 1922 statement (which in itself was already a derogation from the mandate), but also did not take into account the recommendations for the economic development of Palestine contained in the Hope report- Simpson [Lacker, 2000, p. 699]. Jewish leaders insisted that the conclusions of both royal commissions were inaccurate and, consequently, that the final conclusions of the 1930 White Paper were wrong. They argued that the Pasfield memorandum "contradicts the terms of the mandate and invalidates the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government with regard to the Jewish national home up to this point" [Great Britain..., 1945, p. 56].

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The Arab side reacted to the conclusions contained in the memorandum with more restraint and less unambiguity. Moderate members of the Arab Executive Committee, Musa Kazem al-Husseini and Rahib al-Nashashibi, were satisfied that the British had met Arab demands in the memorandum against the Jewish "invasion" [The Land..., 1984, p. 119]. The most radical elements of Palestinian Arab society were not going to accept Pasfield's White Paper just because it provoked discontent among the Zionists. Members of the Palestinian Arab Executive Committee, such as Jamal al-Husseini and Subhi al-Khadra, continued to demand that the Balfour Declaration be repealed in the first place. Some other members of this committee, including Mufti Amin al-Husseini, were not satisfied with the memorandum, as they did not see in the British draft of the Legislative Council the desire to create a Palestinian parliament in the full sense of the word, similar to the Transjordan parliament. The difference of opinion in the Arab Executive Committee will lead to a loss of time, and therefore a chance to reach a compromise with the British government. The official response of the Arab side to the Pasfield memorandum was published only in January 1931-after the discussion of the "White Paper" in the British Parliament.

Yet the greatest criticism of Pasfield's White Paper has been in Britain itself, including in Parliament. The MacDonald Government was a minority Government, and when changing course in Palestine, it did not fully take into account the strength of the opposition represented by influential members of the Conservative and liberal parties.

On October 30, 1930, three leading members of the opposition-Baldwin, Chamberlain, and Emery-expressed regret at the refusal of the MacDonald cabinet to join Dr. Weizmann's proposals for a round table between Jews and Arabs, thereby accusing the government of abandoning the policy outlined in the mandate [Great Britain..., 1945, p. 56]. However, the sharpest criticism of the 1930 White Paper, according to Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, was a letter to the Times from lawyers Lord Hailsham and Sir John Simon. The lawyers argued that the memorandum violated some of the terms of the mandate, especially articles related to immigration and land distribution. In their opinion, until the International Court of Justice in The Hague makes a special decision on the new interpretation of the terms of the mandate, the White Paper of 1930 should not be applied in practice. A significant role in this kind of reaction was played by the fact that the Jewish lobby had a significant influence in the British ruling circles. Many prominent statesmen and public figures in Great Britain at that time, like Sir Samuel, James de Rothschild, Lord Riedan, and the famous industrialist Lord Melchett, were Jews. In addition, some of them had their own economic interests in Palestine. Thus, according to some estimates, about a third of the land purchased in Palestine belonged to the Anglo-Jewish billionaire Rothschild [Nikitina, 1968, p. 41].

Under pressure from the opposition, Lord Pasfield published comments on his White Paper in the Times on 6 November 1930. It is no accident that a contemporary wrote: "... now it is difficult to say whether the colonial office is frightened by its recently announced policy of restricting assistance in creating a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine " [The British..., 1932, p. 125]. Pasfield stated that the memorandum does not in any way exclude the possibility of building a future Jewish "national home" through land acquisition or immigration [The Land..., 1984, p. 122].

To confirm this interpretation of the 1930 White Paper and mitigate Zionist criticism, on November 11 the British Government invited members of the Jewish Agency to discuss controversial issues concerning British policy in Palestine. (It should be noted that the Arab side was not invited to the discussion.) During the November 14 talks, Pasfield assured Weizmann that the Zionists had misinterpreted the White Paper, but at the same time continued to resist their demands.

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requirements, such as the requirement to allow mass immigration to Palestine. Representatives of the Jewish Agency also pointed out that the Jewish side is determined "to ensure the correct interpretation of the White Paper and the creation of an impartial [Palestinian] administration" [Lacker, 2000, p.700].

Under these circumstances, Pasfield was forced to make some corrections to his instructions to the Palestinian High Commissioner. Thus, he insisted that all land bills should be submitted first to the Jewish Agency and only then to Arab leaders for their respective comments. Chensler, the High Commissioner of Palestine, however, already had no less than six laws by which he could independently restrict the sale of land to Jews and restrict Jewish colonization. (After all, in Palestine, all land redistribution had to be coordinated with the opinion of the High Commissioner first of all.) In other words, S. Webb gave in to the pressure of the WZO, but the Palestinian High Commissioner in the Arab-Jewish "squabbles" still wanted to remain as impartial as possible. That is why Weizmann asked the Jewish Agency in Palestine not to negotiate with the High Commissioner, but instead to exert maximum pressure on London, where Chancellor's views could be ignored.

The Zionists also sought to nullify the provisions of the 1930 White Paper by transferring the discussion of the Palestinian question from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office. Although Weizmann failed to secure this transfer, Labor's foreign policy chief, Henderson, took the path of discussing the issue with the Zionists, thus reducing Pasfield's role in resolving it. On November 17, at his first meeting with the Zionists, Henderson assured them that no land legislation would come into force until the ongoing negotiations were completed. Thus, S. Webb had to face serious internal party opposition on the issue of his policy in Palestine.

The upcoming parliamentary by-elections also had an impact on the course of negotiations with the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The need to take into account the votes of Jewish voters forced the government to issue an additional 1.5 thousand immigration certificates to the Holy Land in mid-November 1930 [The Land..., 1984, p. 127]. In October 1930, at its annual conference, the Labour Party reaffirmed its commitment to the policy of creating a Jewish " national home."

Against this background, a debate on the Palestinian question broke out in the House of Commons on November 17, 1930. The Labour Cabinet was represented in the debate by Prime Minister MacDonald and Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies Dr Drummond Schiele. Responding to criticism of the opposition, Schiele, as if justifying himself, said that the government "never set out to depart from the mandate" and "that this criticism is based on misunderstandings" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 92-94]. In addition, Schiele said that the White Paper contains general provisions, not detailed proposals, and before any legislative or administrative action is taken, the Jewish Agency, on the one hand, and Arab representatives, on the other, will have the opportunity to express their views on them.

At the same time, however, representatives of not only the Labour government, but also the British civil service did not hide the fact that they, unlike the opposition, do not have positive emotions about the economic activities of Jews in Palestine. Schiele pointed to the increase in unemployment in Palestine due to the emergence of a new wave of Jewish immigrants. This colonial Office official opposed the allocation of land to Jews from the state fund, citing the fact that they already own 1.25 million dunams1 of cultivated land (the total area of cultivated land in Palestine was 6.844 million dunams). Out of this amount

1 dunam = 0.001 sq. km, or 10 Russian acres.

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The Jewish-owned land, Schiele said, is 270 thousand dunams owned by the Jewish National Fund. Moreover, 155 thousand dunams have not yet been distributed, which creates an opportunity for further Jewish immigration without prejudice to Arab land ownership. Schiele also requested an additional loan of £ 2.5 million from the British Treasury for the development of agriculture in Palestine, in particular for the development of irrigation, which was beyond the capacity of a small-scale Arab farmer [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 94-95].

The Deputy Minister of Colonial Affairs reminded the deputies that Palestine is a sacred place not only for Jews, but also for Muslims and Christians. In this regard, the British Government, in his opinion, should not forget its obligations to the non-Jewish population of Palestine. On the one hand, Britain has international obligations to the Jewish people. On the other hand, the leaders of Zionism must understand that without the peace of the Arab population, the full success of the Jewish "national home" cannot be achieved. Therefore, the British government should give guarantees to the Arabs, as well as to the Jews [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 103]. MP Cox noted in this regard that "in Palestine we are dealing with 700,000 Arabs, whose ancestors lived there almost as long as the English live in England, and 150,000 Jews, most of whom have lived here for only about 10 years" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 163]. Colonel H. Howard, after expressing concern about an article in a Jewish newspaper that defined the goals of Zionism as nothing more than the creation of a State, bluntly stated that "the Arabs at present have real and genuine grounds for fear of Jewish domination" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 144].

Opposition from prominent conservatives and liberals - most notably Lloyd George, Leopold Emery, Herbert Samuel and others who have guided British policy in Palestine over the past decade - has lashed out at Pasfield's White Paper. Emery reproached the Colonial Secretary for "suddenly issuing a White Paper on his own instead of consulting specialists" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 111]. That is why, according to Emery, the" White Paper " of 1930 did not initially meet British interests in the region: the British position in Palestine was quite strong and did not require drastic changes. For example, Emery said, "While the French could barely contain our neighbors [the Syrians] with a force of 40,000 men, we gradually got rid of army units and had only a separate air force squadron divided between Palestine and Transjordan" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 107]. Now, after the publication of this "White Paper", unrest is possible in Palestine and a new increase in the British military presence will be required.

Attacking the White Paper, the opposition also harshly criticized the conclusions made by the Hope-Simpson Commission. Jones, a member of the House of Commons, drew the attention of parliamentarians to the fact that Hope-Simpson surveyed "only 10% of the area, making final conclusions on the basis of this" [Parliamentary Debates ... 1930, p. 174]. Lloyd George insisted that there was still enough land in Palestine to continue implementing the idea of a Jewish " national home." Referring to the impossibility of supporting immigration to Palestine due to its high unemployment, Emery said that "out of a population of almost 800,000 Arabs, Jews, Muslims and Christians, only about 2% are unemployed... And we must remember that such (low, from the point of view of Emery - M. S.) unemployment exists in the period of a serious depression " [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 100].

The opposition emphasized that Jewish colonization contributed to the remarkable economic prosperity of Palestine. So, the MP of the House of Commons, Snell, emphasized that "a selected and well-trained Jewish immig-

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a rant is more than an additional unit of the population. It brings with it energy and creativity, knowledge. That is why he is probably capable of creating much more wealth than the Arab believes" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 147]. Lloyd George has reported that since the beginning of the World War, "between 40 and 50 million pounds of Jewish money" have arrived in Palestine [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 84]. Jews, according to Lloyd George, brought electricity to Palestine and created the conditions for increasing the wages of Arab workers by 120%. Moreover, "most of the land acquired by the Jews was swampy and malarial, and required a great deal of effort and money before it could be made habitable" (Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 85). Samuel emphasized that " if Sir John Hope-Simpson had been 20 years ago in the place where Tel Aviv is now, he would have seen a desert without a single house... It now has a population comparable in size to that of Chester or Bedford, with more than 150 factories and workshops" [Parliamentary Debates(1)..., 1930, p. 128].

Speaking as a direct representative of the VSO, James de Rothschild, among other things, reminded the deputies: the Jewish battalion of Palestine, numbering 18-20 thousand people, took an active part in the liberation of Palestine from Turkish rule and thus earned for Jews the right to participate in deciding the future fate of the Holy Land [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 176].

The parliamentarians discussed the Palestinian issue, but not so much as lobbyists for the Jewish or Arab side, but as British citizens defending its interests in the region. Elliot was blunt: "This is not just a question of Palestine. This is not just a question of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. This is a question that even goes beyond the League of Nations " [Parliamentary Debates(1)..., 1930, p. 187]. In addition to being a global issue, Pasfield's "White Paper", according to the opposition, could undo the achievements and successes of past cabinets in the Holy Land and weaken Britain's position in the region. Deputy Hogasin stated that "if the policy outlined in this White Paper is implemented, it will be the biggest mistake since we lost the American colonies" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 185]. Lloyd George, as one of the politicians responsible for the mandate for Palestine, pointed out that the Pasfield memorandum "is regarded as a revocation of the mandate" and stated that this document is "a betrayal of trust and a breach of contract" [Parliamentary Debates(1)..., 1930, p. 79].

As always, there were references to the economic interests of the empire. Samuel recalled that the Palestinian port of Haifa is of strategic importance not only for the Holy Land, but also for all the Middle Eastern possessions of Britain, since it is here that the planned railway line and the oil pipeline line from Iraq will be completed [Parliamentary Debates..., 1930, p. 128]. In addition, Elliott warned the parliamentarians, the United States is interested in the Palestinian issue and is closely monitoring its solution, and although the Arab-Jewish riots of 1929 did not lead to official statements or actions on the part of the American government, but the US Ambassador General Dawes was instructed to discuss in London the possibility of moving American cruisers in the direction of Palestine "to protect the lives of American citizens in the event of renewed indignation" [Nikitina, 1968, p. 45]. The parliamentary debates of November 17, 1930, actually showed that the White Paper of 1930 could not be implemented in practice. Even in the ranks of Labour, many feared the consequences of its implementation.

Under these circumstances, the MacDonald cabinet was forced to compromise, admitting that it was also not satisfied with certain points of the Pasfield White Paper. Under pressure from all sides, the British Government reshuffled the Colonial Office in 1931. The new High Commissioner of Palestine was General Sir Arthur Wauchope, who was more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.

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zionism. But since even the opposition recognized that the Pasfield memorandum was a fait accompli that could not be denied, it was decided to develop a new document designed to serve as an official interpretation of the White Paper. A special committee, which included members of the British government and representatives of the Jewish Agency, worked out the new document. (Again, the Arabs were not invited to join the committee.) After much discussion, the British-Zionist committee agreed on the most important points of the new document.

Meanwhile, in January 1931, the Arab Executive Committee gave an official response to the 1930 White Paper, not thinking that the Pasfield Memorandum could be changed after its discussion in the English Parliament. The Committee simply put forward its own conditions, reflecting Arab aspirations in four points: the repeal of the Balfour Declaration, the establishment of a Palestinian government responsible to all elected representatives, the prohibition of the sale and transfer of Arab land to non-Arabs, and the end of Jewish immigration [Great Britain..., 1945, p. 84]. However, after February 13, 1931, these requirements were already completely impossible to fulfill.

On February 13, the joint British-Zionist committee published its opinion on the 1930 White Paper in an unusual form - in an 18-point explanatory letter from MacDonald to Weizmann. MacDonald, "to clear up some misconceptions and misunderstandings" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1931, p. 749], laid out the basic principles of British policy in Palestine as follows. He expressed "the intention of His Majesty's Government to continue to govern Palestine in accordance with the conditions contained in the mandate and approved by the Council of the League of Nations", without any derogation [Parliamentary Debates..., 1931, p. 750]. The British Government, the Prime Minister wrote, confirms its responsibility to encourage "the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine," however, taking into account the second part of the Balfour Declaration, which stated that "the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine are guaranteed." MacDonald officially acknowledged the constructive work done by Jews in Palestine, which had a beneficial impact on the development and welfare of this country as a whole, and assured that the British government did not seek to slow down the development of Palestine. In particular, the Prime Minister wrote, "His Majesty's Government does not mean to prohibit Jews from acquiring additional land." But at the same time, MacDonald reported that those Arabs who were "resettled after the transfer of their land to Jewish hands and did not receive compensation" [Parliamentary Debates..., 1931, p. 751] are entitled to state assistance in the form of providing them with a new plot of land. And in general, the redistribution and allocation of land in Palestine should now be under strict centralized control.

On the issue of Jewish immigration, the letter stressed that it should not cause any harm to the rights and situation of the non-Jewish population. "For this reason," MacDonald wrote to Weizmann," His Majesty's Government is forced to insist on controlling immigration " based on the criterion of the country's economic capacity to accept new immigrants. But the Government "does not intend to suspend or prohibit immigration of any category of the population. Immigrants who expect to get a job, even if only temporarily, will not be denied entry because they are not guaranteed employment for an unlimited period " [Parliamentary Debates..., 1931, p. 754]. The document also stated: "His Majesty's Government does not in any way question the right of the [Jewish] Agency to formulate or approve and confirm" the principle that all work performed by the agency or with its assistance should use only Jewish labor [Parliamentary Debates..., 1931, p. 755].

Thus, the explanations given in MacDonald's letter changed the emphasis placed in Pasfield's White Paper. The British government has gone to great lengths to-

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Many concessions were made to the Jewish Agency, even to the extent that it approved discrimination against Palestinian Arabs who were not employed in Jewish enterprises established "with the assistance" of the Jewish Agency. It is not by chance that MacDonald's letter became known in the Arab world as the "Black Letter". As early as February 19, 1931, the chairman of the Arab Executive Committee, Musa Kazem al-Husseini, wrote to MacDonald that his letter "... undermined the hope of a policy of cooperation between Arabs and Jews, if such a hope existed at all, and made mutual understanding between the two sides completely impossible" (Saker, 1992, p.40). Mufti Amin al-Husseini, in his address to the General Muslim Congress in December 1931, called on Arabs and Muslims to unite and prove to London that British interests in Palestine are linked to the Arab and Islamic world, and not to the Zionists. It wasn't random. The very fact of the White Paper's appearance demonstrated to the Arabs that there are forces in Britain that are ready to yield to Arab pressure [Pyrlin, 2001, p. 52].

The crisis of 1929 in Palestine crystallized the major changes that occurred during the 7 years of British rule in the Holy Land in the Palestinian national religious movements.

Mufti Amin al-Husseini has come to the fore in the Arab national movement. If in the early and mid-1920s the Palestinian executive committee, headed by Musa Kazem al-Husseini, played the main role in consolidating and rallying the Arabs, then thanks to the mufti's decisive role in the events of 1929, he was finally seen as the main leader of the Palestinian Arabs. The nomination of the mufti emphasized the religious significance of the Arab struggle against Zionism. Since Amin al-Husseini defined the main goal of the struggle as the protection of the holy sites of Islam, this slogan was well understood and evoked strong feelings not only in Palestine, but throughout the Muslim world [Connor O'Brien, 1990, p.46]. Although it is possible that this "elevation of Haj Amin occurred to a certain extent by accident" (Pirlin, 2001, p.51), it demonstrated the changes that took place in the Arab movement.

The changes in the Jewish national movement were reflected in the fact that, beginning in 1929, two extremely radical trends emerged in the political life of Yishuv2: on the one hand, the Histadrut and Haganah movement led by David Ben-Gurion, and on the other, the "right revisionist" movement led by V. V. Yishuv. Zhabotinsky, who became the leader of the Betar group in 1931. Betar was founded in Riga in 1925 under the influence of Jabotinsky. In 1925-1929, some Betarites emigrated to Palestine and joined the Haganah. However, in 1931 they broke away from the Haganah in protest of its "inaction" and created the Etzel - Irgun Tsvai Leummi. The rise of "Revisionism" was particularly noticeable: if in 1925 four delegates were elected from its supporters to the World Zionist Congress, then in 1929 - 21, and in 1931 - 52 [Connor O'Brien, 1990, p.45]. Weizmann's ideas for reaching a compromise with the British government and the Arab side were losing their popularity. Although Weizmann had secured a refusal from MacDonald's cabinet to implement the provisions of the 1930 White Paper, some Zionist leaders chided Weizmann for agreeing to a simple letter from the Prime Minister without demanding an official rebuttal of Pasfield's White Paper. They wanted Weizmann not to accept the letter from the British Prime Minister as a basis for further cooperation with the UK.
At the Seventeenth Zionist Congress in Basel on June 30, 1931, the " revisionists "tried to force the WZO to formulate the" ultimate goal " of Zionism. V. Jabotinsky argued that economic achievements alone are not enough to make Zionism take a strong political position, and the MacDonald letter is an insufficient basis for cooperation with the mandate authorities, since it gives the Arabs the right to impose sanctions.

Yishuv -2 Jewish population of Palestine.

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veto any activity carried out in accordance with the mandate. Nor should the goal of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine be postponed for some distant future. The Zionist movement should make its position clearer by declaring that its goal is to create a Jewish majority as soon as possible, not just in Palestine, but on both sides of the Jordan River and establish a Jewish state. The alleged departure from the spirit of the Balfour Declaration is not solely the fault of England. It is also the fault of the Zionist movement itself, or at least of its leadership, which constantly assured the British government that the current political situation suited the Zionists [Lacker, 2000, p. 703]. The "revisionists" said that there has been too much talk lately about equality between Jews and Arabs, and even about a two-nation Palestine.

In an attempt to win back congressional favor, on July 10, 1931, Weizmann invited Ben-Gurion to visit him and, asking him to observe the strictest secrecy, informed him that he had just received a letter from the son of the British Prime Minister, Malcolm MacDonald, in which it was hinted that Ramsay MacDonald was ready to agree to the establishment of equal Arab-Jewish rule in Palestine, that is, that he wouldE. equal representation of Jews and Arabs [Bar-Zohar, 1991, p. 140]. The next day, Ben-Gurion and the secretary of the political section of the WSO Board, Professor Louis Niemeyer, flew to London, where they held talks with MacDonald at the Prime Minister's country residence in Chequers.

During the negotiations, Ben-Gurion demanded equality between Jews and Arabs "both in political and economic matters," because, as he said, "our rights to Eretz Israel apply not only to those Jews who have already settled in Palestine, but also to the Jewish people around the world.". MacDonald allegedly agreed with this interpretation of Jewish rights to Palestine. After saying that "the policy of His Majesty's Government in Palestine with regard to Arabs and Jews was determined by the principle of parity," he even claimed that this principle "should be interpreted in favor of the Jews... the original purpose of the mandate is to give Jews not what the Arabs of Palestine have, but more than that" (Bar-Zohar, 1991, p. 141). The only thing that is certain is that at the end of the conversation with the WZO representatives, MacDonald stressed that everything possible must be done to ensure that the leadership of the Zionist movement remains in the hands of Weizmann. The victory of the "right revisionists" in the WZO threatened to turn into complications for the British in Palestine.

However, by the time the negotiations ended at the British Prime Minister's residence, the Zionist Congress had already relieved Dr. Weizmann of his duties as chairman of the WZO, electing Nahum Sokolov, a Weizmann supporter, as chairman of the WZO by 118 votes to 98. Although the "revisionist" proposal to define the "ultimate goal" of Zionism once and for all was rejected, and the new WZO executive Committee included, in addition to Sokolov, such Weizmann supporters as Arlozorov, Brodetsky, Farbstein, Locker, and Neumann (Lacker 2000, p. 705), Jabotinsky's faction now ranked third in size. Thus, the ideas of ardent nationalism became increasingly widespread in the Jewish movement.

In fact, we can agree with Amos, who argued that "the clash in Palestine was not between aborigines and colonists in the usual sense, but between two nationalist movements" [Amos, 1983, p. 27], which drew peoples into the conflict. The feeling of national hostility, aggravated by economic problems, had only just begun to appear by the early 1930s, but it threatened to turn into a real drama.

It can also be said that in these new conditions of the rise of two nationalisms in the late 1920s and early 1930s, British policy in Palestine was not able to significantly restructure. The second Labour Government lacked the usual determination to implement Lord Pasfield's course in the Holy Land, and neither did it have the time. (In September 1931, the Labour cabinet will be replaced by a "national" ruler-

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a state with a leading role of conservatives.) One can probably agree with O'Brien that MacDonald's letter to Weizmann in February 1931 "turned out to be the last successful attempt of the Zionists to influence the policy of the British government" (Connor O'Brien, 1990, p.48). In the 1930s and 1931s, the British government for the first time deviated from the policy of unconditional support for the Zionists. Spooked by the revolt of 1929 and the serious discontent that the events in Palestine caused among the Arabs of the entire Middle East, it took a number of private measures to limit both Jewish immigration and the removal of Arab peasants from the land, to reduce taxes and unemployment.

The rise of fascism in Europe triggered the Fifth Aliyah of the 1930s and 1939s, which led to a sharp increase in Jewish immigration to the Holy Land - especially since January 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. If in 1932 the population of Palestine was 1.052 million people, of which 771 thousand were Muslims, and 180 thousand were Jews, then in 1939 out of 1.5 million people there were 927 thousand Muslims, and 445 thousand Jews. [Great Britain..., 1945, p. 61].

The appearance of an additional mass of new immigrants will provoke new conflicts between Arabs and Jews. Between 1931 and 1939, three national uprisings took place in Palestine, during which Palestinian Arabs demonstrated their determination to fight for the granting of independence to Palestine and an end to Jewish immigration. The inability to resolve the Palestinian problem on the basis of compromises in a peaceful, negotiated way has made the British administration increasingly inclined to use force to solve the problem. As a result, in the mid-1930s, the British had to maintain six brigades of the regular army in Palestine under the command of General Montgomery.

The whole situation in the Middle East was also changing not in favor of the British Empire. The fascist German government already in 1933 entered into negotiations with al-Husseini and the leadership of Iraq on the issue of conducting a joint anti-British policy, which eventually led to an increase in Arab armed resistance in Palestine against the British and Zionists.

Under these circumstances, in 1933, the "national government" of Great Britain finally made changes in Palestinian policy. A decree on immigration issued in 1933 divided those arriving in Palestine into several categories, depending on their property status. Since the mid-1930s, the British government has been developing various plans for the partition of Palestine-from the creation of a cantonal system, when Jewish settlements would be concentrated in some autonomous regions, and Arab settlements in others, to the formation of three separate states in the territories of Palestine and Transjordan: a Jewish one, a much larger Arab one, and an enclave within the Jerusalem area with a corridor to the sea, for which the UK was to receive a permanent mandate.

By the late 1930s, however, both Arabs and Jews had completely lost faith in Britain's ability to help them realize their aspirations in the Middle East.

list of literature

Bar-Zohar Michael. Ben-Gurion. In 2 books. Translated from Hebrew by S. Wexler. Jerusalem: Aliyah Library, 1991.

Connor O'Brien. The siege. Book 1 / Translated from English by M. Lipkin. Jerusalem: Aliyah Library, 1990.

Lacker V. Istoriya zionizma [History of Zionism], translated from English by A. Blaise and O. Blaise, Moscow, 2000.

Nikitina G. S. Gosudarstvo Izrael ' [The State of Israel], Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1968.
Pyrlin E. D. 100 let protivoborstva [100 years of confrontation]. Moscow: Rosspen, 2001.

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