A. M. VASILIEV

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

A. V. KOROTAEV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

L. M. ISAEV

Higher School of Economics

Keywords: Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Hamdeen Sabahi, army, elections, political processes

From May 26 to 28, 2014, Egypt held its second presidential election in the last two years. After the events of June 30, 2013, the highest post in the country was again vacant. The military established control over the political process, and Adly Mansour, the chairman of the Constitutional Court, became the interim head of state. Only two candidates competed for the presidency: former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the leader of the Egyptian moderate left from the Egyptian Popular Movement (at-Tayyar al-sha'biy al-Misri) Hamdeen Sabahi, who was considered a "Nasserist".

The very sparse list of candidates in the current election campaign is in sharp contrast to the 2012 elections. At that time, more than 10 candidates put up their candidacies, and at least five of them - Mohammed Morsi, Ahmed Shafiq, Amr Moussa, Hamdine Sabahi and Abdel Munim Aboul-Futuh-seemed to be quite strong and had a high chance of success in the election race. Yes, and everything was decided at the very last moment, when in the second round Ahmed Shafiq did not have enough 2% of the vote to defeat Mohammed Morsi.

The situation has changed radically. The army candidate al-Sisi had no de facto competitors in the May 2014 elections. Amr Moussa, Muhammad al-Baradei, Abdel Munim Aboul-Futuh, Ahmed Shafiq and other serious candidates refused to participate in the presidential race, and the leaders of the banned Muslim Brotherhood movement lost this opportunity altogether.

The fall of the Morsi regime was natural. Already in the first months of his rule, Morsi was faced with the need to pursue an extremely unpopular policy to overcome the socio-economic crisis in the country.

A signal of what political consequences this may lead to was the vote in the referendum in December 2012, when support for the constitution "pushed" by Islamists was not as obvious as it was, for example, in March 2011 when voting on the adoption of the interim constitutional declaration or in the parliamentary elections in December 2011-January 2012 years

The Muslim Brotherhood, becoming a victim of dizziness from success, refused to compromise with other political forces in Egypt and enter into coalitions with them. This can be largely explained by the fact that the movement has not yet had experience not only of governing the state, but also of participating in the legal political process. The Brotherhood has turned the main political forces of Egypt against itself during its year of rule, and aggressive Islamization has alienated not only Copts, but also secular-minded intellectuals.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not cope with the economic problems that were flooding in - inflation led to higher prices, capital flight from the country meant the closure of enterprises and increased unemployment, and hopes for improving living standards disappeared.

It is interesting to note the "behavior" of the main Egyptian stock indexs1. Thus, two days before the start of the protests against President Morsi, on June 24, 2013, the main Egyptian stock exchange index EGX-30 began to grow steadily: for the period between this date and the moment of-

The study was carried out within the framework of the Russian Science Foundation project N 14 - 18 - 03615 "Russian policy in the Middle East: opportunities and limits of cooperation with the countries of the region".

After the end of trading on July 2, 2013, i.e. immediately before the overthrow of M. Morsi, it grew by more than 10% - from 4,523 to 4,986 points, and immediately after the coup, on July 4 - to 5,335 points (so the total growth for the period June 24 - July 4 was 18%).². This indicates that even before the overthrow of Morsi, there was probably information about an alleged attempt to change power in the country in a completely specific direction, which stimulated stock market players to "invest" in shares of Egyptian companies.

After the Muslim Brotherhood's victory in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. After Mursi came to power and Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi and Chief of the General Staff Sami Anan were removed from office, the situation also became threatening for the Egyptian generals. Moreover, the "Brothers" began to look at the economic spheres under the control of the military, which caused an extremely negative reaction from generals and officers.³ Already by 2013, being the largest "businessman" in the country, the Egyptian army, along with the surviving "post-Mubarak" businessmen who worked in the "Gamal Mubarak team", realized the need for a joint confrontation with the "Brothers", which is confirmed by the dynamics of changes in Egyptian stock exchange indices after the opening of trading on June ^{24, 2013.4}

Another important fact is that since the departure of H. Mubarak from the presidency, Egypt has been experiencing interruptions in gasoline and electricity - the situation has constantly worsened, reaching its climax by the summer of 2013. The decline in natural gas production, the decline in the number of tourists and, consequently, the influx of foreign currency, the fall in the Egyptian pound-all this limited the government's ability to control the economy. Qandilya must pay for fuel both imported and produced in the country by international oil companies.

In addition, the current situation in the electricity sector was strongly influenced by security issues. So, in early June 2013, two power plants in Egypt (in Banha and Ain al-Sokhna) they did not function because the Government failed to ensure the safety of their employees. In addition, the level of national electricity consumption in Egypt increased by the summer of 2013, while its production fell ⁵. Many kilometers of queues for gas stations began to appear on the streets of the country, the fellahs did not have enough fuel for agricultural machines, pumps, etc.

AFTER THE "JUNE 30 REVOLUTION"

However, after the" June 30 revolution", the situation improved, which can also serve as an indirect confirmation that in June, interruptions in the supply of fuel and electricity were also connected with direct sabotage of the businessmen involved in the conspiracy. It seems that there was a rather high level of planning and coordination of the events that led to the resignation of President Morsi.

This point of view can also be supported by the fact that after the overthrow of M. Morsi, the post of acting Prime Minister went to Hazem al-Bablawi. A lawyer by training, he began his career as an adviser to the Kuwaiti Finance Minister in the 1970s, and for ten years before the Arab Spring, he worked as an adviser to the Arab Monetary Fund in Dubai.

It is possible that reaching an agreement on granting Egypt a loan through this organization was largely his merit, in exchange for which he received the post of prime minister. It cannot be ruled out that the appointment of Hazema al-Bablawi, who is well-known to the financial structures of the Gulf, to the post of prime minister (or deputy prime minister) in the government that was planned to be put in power after the coup, was one of the conditions for guaranteeing the "putschists" several billion dollars immediately after the "revolution of June 30"⁶.

At the same time, it would be wrong to assume that the Muslim Brotherhood consciously pursued a special socio-economic policy based on its ideology. This can be seen at least from the fact that al-Bablawi, after becoming Prime Minister, actually continued the financial policy of the Cabinet of X. Kandilya. No less important for the Egyptian economy was the Qatari loan received under Morsi: from April to May 2013, Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves increased, reaching $16.04 billion in May. So, in early April 2013, an Egyptian government delegation went to Doha, where an agreement was signed on the Qatari financial assistance to Cairo in the amount of $3 billion.⁷ Egyptian stock indexes also showed similar dynamics: on the eve of the visit of the Egyptian delegation to Qatar, on April 3, 2013, the EGX-30 stopped its decline at 4,926. 22 points.

Finally, the conflict between Saudi Arabia, which was joined by Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, and Qatar and Turkey, which supported Morsi, put an end to the Muslim Brotherhood's rule. This is confirmed by the fact that immediately after the overthrow of Morsi and his arrest, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates announced financial assistance to Egypt in the amount of $12 billion: most of them - $ 5 billion. - received from Riyadh, 4 billion-from Kuwait and 1 billion more. less - from the UAE. At the same time, it was assumed that financing would be carried out in three ways: through the placement of deposits in the Egyptian Central Bank, in the form of oil products supply, and through direct money transfers.⁸

In principle, this amount should have been enough for Egypt just for six months, i.e. until the planned construction of the country.-

As of February 2014, the People's Assembly elections were scheduled (but did not take place), given that subsidies are a "sacred cow" for any government on the eve of elections and are not subject to cuts*. Thus, the tranche to Egypt, approved by the above-mentioned Gulf countries, had clearly visible political goals.

Of course, Qatar's increasingly strong position in the region in recent years could not but worry its neighbors and, above all, Saudi Arabia, which since the end of the second half of the last century has not hidden its leadership ambitions in the Middle East.

Qatar is currently the richest country in the world in terms of per capita income. Its GDP has grown almost 4 times over the past 10 years, while the same indicator of other monarchies of the Persian Gulf has increased twice as slowly.⁹ Qatar's influence has especially increased since the beginning of the "Arab Spring", which was largely due to the fact that the traditional" heavyweights " in the face of Egypt, Syria, and even earlier Iraq, were busy with internal problems, temporarily forgetting about their role as regional players.

What is worth the fact that during the time of M. Morsi, the League of Arab States began to be called nothing more than a department of the Qatari Foreign Ministry, drawing an analogy with the times of Gamal Abdel Nasser, when the Arab League was called a branch of the Egyptian foreign Ministry. And when Egypt, a key country in the entire Arab world, was brought to power by Mursi, who was financed from Doha, the situation for Qatar's neighbors became unbearable, as subsequent events showed. And the current policies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates in relation to the ruling house of al-Thani are largely aimed at pointing Doha to its place.

The unpredictability and transience of events taking place in the Arab world in recent years have become indispensable attributes of the "Arab Spring". In Egypt, two presidents have been replaced over the past three years, a parliament has been elected and dissolved, two constitutions have been adopted, etc. Only one thing remains unchanged - the strong influence of the army on the internal political process in the country, regardless of who was in power.

And it turned out that the most pragmatic policy was the policy of neutrality in relation to the Egyptian events of the last three years, which was occupied by Russia. After all, the initial bet of Qatar and Turkey on the Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoyed great popularity in 2011, was the most obvious solution, but, as it turned out, only in the short term. Today, it is difficult to find a capital that has more strained relations with official Cairo than Doha and Ankara.

The less obvious, but nevertheless completely feverish, position of the United States - to please almost everyone - also failed to justify itself. After ultimately relying on the "Brothers", the Americans found themselves in an embarrassing situation that weakened their position in Egypt. Distrust of Washington continues to grow in Egyptian society, and associating oneself with the Americans, and even more so demonstrating rapprochement with the United States on any issues , is the same as an extremely unpopular position in modern Egypt.

In such a situation, it was convenient for the Egyptian generals to find an acceptable partner in the form of Russia.

First, the long - standing close ties between the two countries are still alive in the memories of the Egyptian people, and their "living" symbols-such as the high-rise Aswan dam or the Helwan Metallurgical Plant-continue to preserve the memory of the assistance that the Soviet Union provided to the Arab Republic of Egypt many decades ago.

Secondly, Russia's unblemished reputation plays a role in the events of the "Arab Spring", including in Egypt: Moscow has not taken sides in the Egyptian confrontation over the past three years, which, as a result, allowed the Egyptian generals to consider Russia as one of the few neutral partners.

Third, the Egyptian military has long recognized its dependence on American weapons and, as soon as the opportunity presented itself, did not fail to weaken it. The current head of the Egyptian defense department does not owe anything to the Americans and is able to act more freely in foreign policy terms than his predecessors.

Finally, the Egyptians 'view of Moscow in the fall of 2013 was largely a consequence of the" Syrian syndrome", after which many Arabs began to perceive the Kremlin as a possible guarantor of their security and a defender against external invasions in the event of a conflict with Western countries.

THE ARMY IS AN UNSINKABLE INSTITUTION

As a result, the military again received the presidential post, which, with the exception of the rule of M. Morsi, which lasted only a year, since 1952 belonged to the natives of the army elite. Interestingly, in an address to the nation in March 2014 on the occasion of his candidacy for president, al-Sisi declared that he would never wear a military uniform again, thus repeating a similar move by Mubarak, who became the first "demilitarized" president in Egypt.

Mubarak then needed to create his own image, which was different from both Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, who had extraordinary charisma. This was done - Hosni Mubarak became the first president to be elected to the presidency.

* Here it is enough to recall the" Bread Riots " in Egypt in January 1977, when the abolition of bread subsidies led to mass protests with numerous victims, which forced President Anwar Sadat to return to the subsidy policy.

I tried to present myself as a" civilian " leader ¹⁰. Al-Sisi followed the same path, which once again only underlines the continuity of the Mubarak and current eras.

Now in Egypt, there is an increasing influence of the military on the power in the country, which was a consequence of the"June 30 revolution". Portraits of Marshal al-Sisi are increasingly juxtaposed with portraits of the leader of the 1952 revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The forces that overthrew M. Murray together with the military, and, above all, the economic elite, realized that it is more expensive to continue any serious attempts to seize the property of the military "for themselves" and it is better to recognize the dominant position of the military in the new ruling bloc, as well as the inviolability of their "economic empire" (including by constitutional amendments). It was clear to the military's allies in the fight against the "Brothers" that any serious attempts by them to take a leading position in the ruling bloc could end up losing incomparably more than they could gain.¹¹

Another question is how strong the current alliance of the army and the economic elite that survived from the Mubarak era will be. It is obvious that in the near future, no one in Egypt is capable of going against the military at the legal level. Back in the summer of 2013, after the overthrow of Mohammed Morsi, the military was absolutely categorical in raising the issue: those who are not with us are against us. Even then, virtually all political forces in the country, with the exception of the Muslim Brotherhood itself (although many leaders of the movement were quick to disown Morsi), in fact, swore allegiance to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.

The army once again proved that it is an "unsinkable" institution in the turbulent political sea of Egypt, it is once again popular in the land of the pharaohs: Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, unlike his predecessor, acted much more far-sighted and preferred to take the military "into the shadows", performing the role of "gray cardinal" and almost immediately formally by giving the reins of power to the Provisional government. Al-Sisi, by removing himself from the firing line and exposing al-Bablawi's team (so far) as responsible for the economic failures, has made the military invulnerable while maintaining control of what is happening in the country.

In this scenario, it would be simply strange to enter into a confrontation with the army for leading positions in the future political elite of the country. Even the Salafists chose to compromise their own principles and side with al-Sisi rather than be "crushed" as happened with the "Brothers". In addition, Salafists are forced to look back at the position of Saudi Arabia, which, having broken with the "Brothers", strongly supported the military. An alliance with the military for the economic elite is a "tit in the hands", guaranteed freedom of entrepreneurial activity, which the Egyptian generals are ready to grant to this elite for loyalty.

On the other hand, the military today needs a team of competent economists to lead the country out of a deep financial and economic crisis. At the same time, there is an obvious conflict between the remnants of Mubarak's team and left-wing secularists like Hamdeen Sabahi, whose views on the economic reform program differ.

It seems that the vector of further economic development was largely determined by the last elections, the victory in which is, at the same time, a serious risk for the winner: after all, the role of the force responsible for the effectiveness of the implemented socio-economic policy will now be performed by the army. Over the past three years, it has managed to maintain its position both after the January revolution and during the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. Gamalev's businessmen became its allies, as did the secular intelligentsia, and Islamists were eliminated from the legal political arena. But it will also be responsible for the possible failure of the socio-political line.

Al-Sisi himself was in no hurry to run for president. It was not profitable for him to change the chair of the Minister of Defense to the presidential one, since "pharaoh" is responsible for the socio-economic situation in the country, and no real improvements are expected. His nomination showed that the army elite did not want to take any chances. This was also due to the fact that, in accordance with the Constitution adopted in January 2014, the post of Defense Minister looks much more attractive than the post of president.

It is the Minister of Defense who is the Supreme Commander (Article 201), he is removed from subordination to the President (Article 234) and reports directly to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (and these two positions in Egypt, as a rule, are combined). Due to the unstable situation in the country, the post of president looks more vulnerable than the post of Defense Minister, largely due to the fact that the country's leader will soon have to carry out a number of unpopular socio-economic reforms.

Be that as it may, al-Xi won the presidential election-

xi, with 96.91% of the vote. Even though Sabahi is a strong opponent, finishing third in the 2012 election with 20.7% of the vote, which is only 2% less than Ahmed Shafiq and 4% less than Morsi, his chances of defeating al-Sisi were initially zero. And the point here, rather, is that now is not his time. The country needs reforms, security, and a path of stable development. The Muslim Brotherhood is currently politically neutral, although its extremist wing is resorting to acts of violence and terror, and the task of the military is to consolidate the success achieved in this direction. The new Egyptian government is objectively becoming more authoritarian, evoking memories of the Mubarak past.

But Egyptian society continues to be divided, a trend that began during the 2012 presidential race, when in the second round the votes were almost evenly distributed: 48.27% - for the army protege A. Shafiq and 51.73% - for the Islamist M. Morsi.

A similar trend continued after the two constitutional referendums of 2012 and 2014. At the same time, the results of voting in both cases should not be misleading. Thus, we can say with complete confidence that the majority of Egyptians were tired of the uncertainty and instability of the "time of troubles" and hoped that the new constitution of 2012 would be the starting point for normalizing the internal political situation and starting socio-economic changes.

This is perhaps one of the main reasons why the population did not take into account the controversial provisions of the Basic Law, even though it was largely in the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood ⁱⁿ power12. But discontent accumulated and resulted in a near-insurrection on June 30, 2013.

THE INITIATIVE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY

After the "June 30 revolution", the initiative completely passed into the hands of the military, who clearly learned from past election campaigns and approached the referendum on the new constitution more prepared. Here, too, the Muslim Brotherhood was forced to appeal to its voters to boycott the referendum scheduled for mid-January 2014.

It has already been noted that there is a correlation between the number of people who did not participate in the 2014 referendum and the number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters in the respective governorates. ¹³ The largest percentage of the population supports the Muslim Brotherhood in the northern part of Middle Egypt (the provinces of Minya, Bani Suef and Fayoum), in the north and east of the country (Marsa Matruh, Giza and Alexandria) and in the two provinces of the Suez Canal zone-Suez and Ismailia. However, in Suez, and especially in Ismailia and Alexandria, an even larger percentage of the population supports the military.

In the southern part of Middle Egypt (Assiut, Sohag and Qena provinces), the Muslim Brotherhood is actively supported by only a fairly small (about a quarter) part of the population. But the military here is supported by an even smaller proportion of the population, and as a result, the Muslim Brotherhood has a significant advantage here. Their positions are particularly strong in the northern part of Middle Egypt and in the north-east of the country, where a high percentage of the population actively supporting the Muslim Brotherhood is combined with a low percentage of the population actively supporting the ruling regime.¹⁴

The results of the last presidential election in Egypt should also not be taken as full support for al-Sisi on the part of the Egyptian population. The turnout in the elections was 47.5% (despite the fact that the authorities decided to extend the election by one day), which continues to indicate a split in Egyptian society. The Brotherhood has called on its supporters to boycott the election, and many have followed suit.

A. F. al-Sisi gets a heavy legacy. Egypt is now more dependent than ever on external financial assistance, which so far has come mainly from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. But even Saudi generosity will come to an end sooner or later. And the first signals have already made themselves felt: in early June 2014, King Abdullah took the initiative to hold a forum of potential donors for Egypt, which largely indicates the desire of Riyadh to relieve itself of some of the financial burden of supporting Egypt.

Relations between the new leadership of Egypt and their "traditional" allies in the face of the United States and the West are difficult to develop. The consolidation of the new political power required harsh measures against the "Brothers", accompanied by shootings of demonstrations and mass arrests. The courts sentenced one and a half hundred Brotherhood leaders to death, and journalists from the Qatari Al-Jazeera TV channel who supported them-to many years in prison. Western leaders, victims of their own messianic idea of "democratic freedoms" and "freedom of speech," are forced to distance themselves from the leadership of present-day Egypt. Loans, investments, and economic and military aid to Egypt are being delayed, and Al Jazeera is gaining more popularity.

Another important issue for al-Sisi remains the issue of security, which is closely linked to the situation around the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, a rather contradictory picture is emerging in Egypt: on the one hand, there is a stabilization of the internal political situation and a decrease in the level of "legal" protest activity in society, on the other hand, the security situation is becoming threatening. The three-year-old legal battle against Hosni Mubarak also adds fuel to the fire. On this issue, al-Sisi will have to make a lot of efforts so that the next decision against the ex-president does not cause another surge of tension.

El-Sisi is most seriously facing the challenge of getting Egypt out of the severe socio-economic crisis that the country fell into in 2011. After all, over the past three years, none of the problems that Hosni Mu-barak was accused of have been solved. On the contrary, the situation has only worsened. The IMF estimates that regime change in Egypt cost 4.2% of GDP.¹⁵ Real GDP growth fell from 5.1% in 2010 to 1.8% ⁱⁿ 2012.16 Unemployment increased by ^2.5%during this period17. And in terms of the level of corruption, Egypt's rating under the Transparency International system has deteriorated by 16 points.¹⁸ In addition, according to Standard & Poor's, a financial market research firm, Egypt's credit rating has fallen from " BB+"to" B- " ¹⁹, which indicates unfavorable economic conditions that negatively affect the country's willingness to make debt payments.

* * *

Thus, the events that took place in the country on June 30, 2013, actually brought to power the forces that were at the helm until 2011.The reconstruction of political life reveals the return of Egyptian society to the zero point from which, in fact, the upheavals began. The new Egyptian government is becoming more militarized and less democratic. It is noteworthy that such changes are initiated not only "from above", but also "from below".

The Egyptians longed for a"strong hand." Al-Sisi became the personification of the latest aspirations of the Egyptian people. By voting for him, the majority of Egyptians did not just choose another president who came out of the military environment - they showed a willingness to go back to the days of Mubarak, preferring "stability" to democratic transformations. In the person of al-Sisi, the people would like to find a strong leader, a person who can "hard-hand" restore order, concentrating all the power. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, in turn, must go to the end in implementing his election program.

^{Isaev L. M.,} Korotaev A.V. Egyptian coup of 2013: experience of econometric analysis / / Asia and Africa today. 2014, N 2 (Issaev L.M., Korotayev A.V. 2014. Egipetskiy perevorot 2013 goda: opyt ekonometricheskogo analiza // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 2) (in Russian)

² Ibid.

^{Vasiliev A.M., Vinitsky D. I.} 3 "Time of Troubles" continues? // The Arab crisis and its international implications / Under the general editorship of A.M. Vasiliev. Ed. by A. D. Savateev and L. M. Isaev, Lenand Publ., 2014, p. 149. (Vasiliev A.M., Vinitskiy D.I. 2014. "Smutnoe vremya" prodolzhaetsya? // Arabskii krizis i ego mezhdunarodnye posledstviya) (in Russian)

^{Isaev L. M.,} 4 Korotaev A.V. Edict. op.

^{Ismail A.} 5 With Electricity and Water in Short Supply, Egyptians Grow Tense. McClatchyDC. 24.06.2013 - http://www.mcclatchydc.com /2013/06/24/194616/with_electricity_and_water_in.html#.UjIWMF HnCNg

^{Isaev L. M., Korotaev A.V.} 6 Decree. op.

^{Daragahi B.} 7 Qatar Gives Egypt $3 bn Aid Package // Financial Times. 10.04.2013 - http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/790a7d52_alf4_ 1 le2 8971_0144feabdc0.html#axzz2e5gDeWxu

^{Mustafa H., Flanagan B.} 8 Gulfs $12 bn Aid to Egypt Seen as "Lifeline", Not a Cure // Al Arabiya News, 11.07.2013 - http://english.al-arabiya.net/en/business/economy/2013/07/11/Gulf_s_12bn_aid_to_E gypt_seen_as_lifeline_not_a_cure.html

⁹ http://www.worldbank.org

^{10. Vidyasova M. F.} 10 Egyptian model: democratization on the background of the state of emergency / / Modern Africa: metamorphoses of political power / A. M. Vasiliev, Moscow, 2009. (Vidyasova M. F. 2009. Egipetskaya model: demokratizatsiya na fone chrezvychainogo polozheniya // Sovremennaya Afrika: metamorfozy politicheskoy vlasti / Otv. red. A.M.Vasiliev. M., 2009) (in Russian)

¹¹ See: Korotaev A.V., Isaev L. M. Anatomy of the Egyptian counterrevolution. 2014, N 7, 2014. (Korotayev A.V., Issaev L.M. 2014. Anatomiya egipetskoy kontrrevolutsii // World Economy and International Relations. N 7) (in Russian); Isaev JIM. Generals left, generals returned: the Egyptian Revolution is three years old / / Inviolable reserve. Debates about politics and culture. 2014, N 1. (Issaev L.M. 2014. Generaly ushli, generaly vernulis: egipetskoy revolutsii tri goda) (in Russian)

^{Vasiliev A.M., Vinitsky D. I.} 12 Novy vitok egiptskoy revolyutsii [The New Round of the Egyptian Revolution]. 2014, N 1. (Vasiliev A.M., Vinitskiy D.I. 2014. Novy vitok egipetskoi revolutsii // Aziya i Afrika segodnya, N 1) (in Russian)

¹³ For more information, see: Isaev L. M., Korotaev A.V. Politicheskaya geografiya sovremennogo Egypti: opyt kachestvennogo analiza [Political Geography of modern Egypt: experience of Quantitative analysis]. 2014, N 9. (Issaev L.M., Korotayev A.V. 2014. Politicheskaya geografiya sovremennogo Egipta // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 9) (in Russian)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ http://www.imf.org

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ http://www.worldbank.org

¹⁸ http://www.transparency.org.ru

¹⁹ http://www.tradingeconomics.com

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