D. IRVING. The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17. London. "Cassell" 1968. 337 p.

As you know, the secret does not immediately become clear, and it often takes years before it finds its objective explanation. One of these events, over which a veil of secrecy hung for a long time, is the defeat by the Germans of the sea convoy PK-17, which was sailing from Iceland to the Soviet Union in early July 1942. The essence of this tragedy is the death of 24 transports out of 37 with cargo worth more than $ 700 million, so necessary for our country at that difficult time, when the Eastern Front was fighting hard against the fascist hordes that were rushing to the Volga and the Caucasus.

I, at that time People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR, well remembered the sad reports about the death of transports caused by the attack of German submarines and aircraft after the British and American short-and long-range cover ships" at full speed "departed to the west, and the escorted vessels were ordered to" disperse and follow to Russian ports." I have personally reported this to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I remember him asking: "Was there a need to stop escorting?". I answered: "As far as I know, there were no serious reasons for this." On July 23, 1942, J. V. Stalin wrote to W. Churchill: "The order of the British Admiralty to the 17th convoy to leave the transports and return to England, and the transport ships to disperse and reach the Soviet ports alone without an escort, our experts consider incomprehensible and inexplicable. Of course, I do not believe that regular transportation to the northern Soviet ports is possible without risk and loss. But in a war situation, no big deal can be accomplished without risk and loss. You know, of course ,that the Soviet Union is suffering incomparably more serious losses. " 1
1 "Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945". Vol. I. M. 1957, p. 54.

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Around the same time, I interviewed Rear Admiral J. Miles, head of the British naval mission in Moscow. I wanted to find out the real reasons for the abandonment of transports by warships and try to persuade our allies that, despite the risks and losses, they would not waste time and form a new convoy as quickly as possible. Miles promised to immediately inform the Admiralty of our request to W. Churchill, and after him L. Eden claimed that the British Admiralty had received a request from the British Admiralty. it is correct that Admiral D Pound, who gave the order to abandon the transports, does not deserve reproach. In the same spirit, W. Churchill writes about this sad episode in his memoirs, although he kept records after the war and could, if desired, make it completely clear how events developed from the moment the convoy left Iceland and until the arrival of the survivors of the sinking ships in Soviet ports.

Now archival documents are available, and many things are presented in a different light. There were also special works for this one. In particular, the book "The Defeat of Convoy PK 17"by the English historian David Irving was published. Its author, who spent five years on the study, had the opportunity to put the actions of the British and German command, study archival and special materials, use more than 300 testimonies of participants in the events and, in general, drew a fairly objective picture of the course of the event. In the preface, he learns that "a lot of lies have been written and published about the tragic convoy operation PK-17, partly in order to impose responsibility for the disaster on the officers who were least responsible for it" (page VI) D. Irving tries to recreate the truth, although he is still not completely objective. But none of the foreign authors came closer to the truth than him. Many people, writes D. Irving about the existing literature abroad, would prefer not to take out the trash from the hut so that the whole truth about the gross mistakes, misdemeanors and misunderstandings that led to the defeat of convoy PK 17 remained unknown, and in some cases, to achieve this goal, they did not avoid lying (ibid.). The author's idea is partially reflected in the five chapters of the book "Just a stone around your neck", "A Chivalrous act", "Sacrifice - convoy PK 17", "Decision and Disaster", "A Model of Valor", "Duty to avoid death", "Novaya Zemlya", "First Return from Hell"., "Investigation". In these chapters, Irving seeks to reconstruct in detail the circumstances of the disaster and explain the causes of the tragic event, although he does not answer many of the "whys". The text of the book clearly shows how negative the British Admiralty was about sending transports to the USSR. "Arctic convoys are becoming a rock around our necks," First Sea Lord D. Pound wrote to US Admiral E. J. King in May 1942. These words express the essence of the point of view of the British naval command and actually answer the question of why the disaster occurred. The general attitude of W. Churchill and D. Pound to convoys in the USSR entailed certain consequences. "If convoys need to be sent for political reasons, then we must accept very serious and heavy losses," said the commander of the home Fleet, Admiral J. Smith. Tovi, who was responsible for ensuring the safety of transports.

Even then, in July 1942, we did not understand why the transports were abandoned to their fate. One could only guess at the reasons, based on some general considerations about the long-standing anti-Soviet policy of British imperialism. W. Churchill" with a stone around his neck " became our ally in 1941, without denying that he remains a consistent opponent of communism. Accordingly, he behaved throughout all the years of the war, especially when the question of opening a "second front"repeatedly and very sharply arose. Churchill did not hesitate to express his innermost thoughts in the notorious Fulton speech in March 1946, which opened the era of the "cold war". D. Irving does not speak clearly enough about all this, and he simply glosses over some of it. Nevertheless, when it comes to events at sea, he paints a very clear picture and directly answers the questions of why the convoy was abandoned by large formations of the Anglo-American fleet; who exactly made such a decision; whether there were sufficient grounds for it.

They draw the story of the convoy's defeat as follows. 37 transports (including the Soviet ships "Azerbaijan", "Donbass", 1 ship Panamanian, 1 Nider-

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Landsky, 1 Norwegian, 12 English and 20 from the USA) and 19 ships of direct protection on June 29, 1942 left Hvalfjord (Iceland) for the USSR. On board the transports were a huge number of different military cargo. Two groups of ships were formed to cover the ships. One, under the command of Admiral L. Hamilton, consisted of 4 cruisers and 3 destroyers; in the other, which had at the head of the commander of the Home Fleet, Admiral J. McCarthy. Tovi, there were 2 battleships, an aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers and 14 destroyers. On the German side, the largest ship in the waters of Northern Norway was the battleship Tirpitz. Our allies had every reason not to be afraid of a meeting with the Fascist fleet. According to the author, Tovey and Hamilton even "wanted to fight" with the Germans, but on one condition-that the Tirpitz would be in the waters west of Medvezhy Island (p. 5). In their plan to take the battle only in favorable conditions for themselves, they decided to use the convoy as an object to lure the German fleet. "In fact, the operation to conduct this convoy turned into a trap for the Tirpitz with a bait consisting of more than thirty heavily loaded vessels," writes D. Irving bitterly. This is a very important confession of an English historian, which directly exposes the unsightly game of politicians and the highest naval circles in England!

Events at sea after the start of the voyage developed as follows. The ships moved slowly eastward. Destroyers of direct cover were located near the transports. Admiral Hamilton's cruisers maneuvered relatively close to the transports, and much more seaward, to the southwest, was a large formation of Admiral Toki. German ships were still stationed in their bases: the German command warned of the danger of an early exit (it was necessary to get accurate information about the location of the British, especially their aircraft carriers). Only on July 2, the commander-in-Chief of the German fleets, Admiral E. Raeder, ordered the relocation of the Tirtsz and the cruiser Hipner from Trondheim to Altenfjord, in northern Norway. Realizing the importance of military cargo for the USSR, the Germans prepared for the" complete destruction " of transports, primarily with the help of submarines and aircraft, but, if necessary, with the use of surface ships.

Around midnight on July 3, the Germans discovered Hamilton's cruisers and therefore refrained from putting the Tirpitz to sea until the situation was clarified, not without reason fearing the superior forces of the British, and especially their aircraft carriers. However, something startling happened next on July 4 at 21.11, the convoy's command received a "very urgent" telegram from the Admiralty, which ordered "the cruisers to move west at full speed" (p. 113). Just a few minutes later, a second radio message arrived: "Secret. Urgently. In view of the threat from surface ships, the convoy will disperse and proceed to Russian ports." Here it is, a fatal order for the fate of transport vessels! What caused it? Despite the objections of the staff, Admiral Pound gave it, based only on the assumption that the German ships "can go out" to sea. This means that the British Admiralty did not have serious intentions to successfully conduct their ships, and fully confirms the opinion of D. Irving that the convoy was used only as bait.

"Tirpitz" put to sea on July 5 at about 10: 00 and, having been discovered by the Soviet submarine "K-21", which was commanded by captain of the 2nd rank N. A. Lunin, and then by British aircraft, at about 21: 00 went on a return course to Altenfjord. Meanwhile, the British support ships were already heading west at full speed. Even the direct-cover destroyers under the command of Captain J. Broome, 3rd Rank, were withdrawn from the transports. The convoy as such ceased to exist. Now the dispersed transports were easy prey for German submarines and aircraft. As D. Irving writes," on the scene " there were essentially defenseless merchant ships, against which German submarines and aircraft acted. Even the ships of direct cover, which after the departure of the destroyers still remained: at the convoy, a telegram was given: "An attack by enemy surface forces is likely within the next few hours. Your main task is to avoid death in order to return to the area of attack after the withdrawal of enemy forces and pick up the victims." All this clearly describes the position of the British Admiralty. No wonder D. Irving calls

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the telegram referred to is "the most deplorable of the entire war." And indeed: in the middle, the ships of direct protection receive an order to "avoid death", leaving the transports unprotected! In terms of understanding the reasons for the defeat of the convoy, this could be put to an end. At the same time, we deliberately tried not to replace the author with our own arguments and quoted what he said himself.

D. Irving goes on to describe the tragedy that unfolded when German submarines and planes attacked the transports. Literally the beating began. After sinking one transport, the Germans, like on a training ground, looked for another victim and dealt her a fatal blow. Submarines did not even clear the need to dive under water, so as not to waste time on entering a new attack. The author reports on many facts that expose the reader to horror, and rightly emphasizes the heroism of the rank and file of ships that got into trouble due to the fault of the top military leadership. I remember well the July days of 1942 and the natural indignation of both the Soviet Supreme High Command and the workers of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. We were also surprised that Churchill stubbornly defended Admiral Paunz, although even then we guessed what this was caused by. D. Irving's book helps, although not always completely, to understand the actions of the British administrative mechanism that contributed to the defeat of the convoy.

The question of subsequent convoys is beyond the scope of this book. But note that ?Churchill took advantage of the loss of 24 ships to delay the departure of new transports to the USSR until September 1942. I can't help but recall the hard days in the summer of that year, when the fascists made a furious attempt to strengthen the situation on the Eastern Front. The situation was well known to both Churchill and his Admiralty. All the more clearly appears the unjustifiability of the decisions made by our Management. Against this background, the above message of the Soviet Supreme Commander-in-Chief, written in the days when we did not know all the circumstances of the disaster, now looks too soft, especially after reading the book by D. Irving. But Churchill, who was well aware of the true causes of the death of transports, later stubbornly, for a number of days, tried "not to take out the trash from the hut", in particular when he wrote his memoirs about the Second World War with a clear claim to"objectivity". According to D. Irving, Hamilton and Towne sought to shift all the blame to the Admiralty: they themselves had nothing to do, since the order to leave the convoy was received. Captain Broome, 3rd Rank, recalled by Hamilton from the transports, in turn, formally resented that he was not allowed to fulfill his duty to the end. However, all these arguments are given after the fact, to clear your conscience. In fact, almost all the senior leaders not only in the Admiralty, but also on the British ships, treated the convoy as a "rock on the neck" and as bait, thinking least of all about helping the Allies when it came to risking their warships. Let's not hide our point of view: a clear crime was committed!

The author, presenting specific data on the sinking of transports, simultaneously shows the reader that the Germans suffered very minor losses. Only a few Nazi planes were shot down, and the Germans managed to save their crews literally in front of the British. The major victory won by the Germans in this operation allowed them to save their forces for future clashes at sea. D. Irving does not consider the possibility of turning the convoy back on its course at a time when it was near Medvezhy Island and when the Admiralty did not consider it possible to keep warships east of this island. But such a question may arise for the reader. It seems to us that Soviet naval specialists should not lose sight of this aspect (in principle, it is beyond the scope of the review). The Germans, the author emphasizes, did not expect such an easy victory. According to German Admiral G. Schmundt, it was achieved only "thanks to the incomprehensible decision" of the convoy commander to disperse the ships.

D. Irving tells very sparingly in his book about the measures taken by the Soviet naval command in the North to search for survivors of the Allied transports and provide them with assistance. The author may not have had sufficient information. Let us point out that in those days the Soviet aviation (a group headed by the famous pilot I. P. Mazuruk) was engaged not only in searching for victims, but also in transporting them to hospitals.

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destroyers of our Northern Fleet were sent to the sea, and absolutely all the smaller floating means that were there were used. We must also reproach the author for not telling us enough about the hospitality and support that the Soviet people provided to the allies both on Novaya Zemlya and in Arkhangelsk, which, by the way, was written in those days by representatives of the British Navy in reports to their superiors.

It is impossible not to mention D. Irving's attempt to exaggerate the overall importance of Allied sea transportation during the war and their influence on the course of the struggle on the main Soviet-German front. In speaking of this, we do not want to forget in any way the help that was given to us by the Allies, the heroism of the British sailors and the sacrifices they suffered.

The book's shortcomings include the fact that its author, in fact, evaded the final assessment of the actions of the ruling circles of England, primarily the British Admiralty. He does not write, in particular, that the Admiralty used the tragedy of convoy PK-17 for a long delay in the departure of the next convoys to the USSR; he is silent about the unworthy political game that Churchill did not stop playing throughout the war. At the same time, it must be admitted that D. Irving put a lot of work to paint the true picture of the defeat of the convoy. This, of course, will be noted by the Soviet reader, since the book should appear in our Russian translation. First of all, it will interest, of course, Soviet military sailors.

Hero of the Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsov

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