V. A. MELYANTSEV

Doctor of Economics, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University

Keywords: developing countries, world economy, globalization, comparative and dynamic advantages, models, competitiveness

1. Tectonic shifts in the world economy. There is no doubt that we are witnessing major changes in the balance of power of the most important actors in global development. The significant deregulation and financialization of the global ^economy1 that has taken place over the past three or four decades, which is known to have caused destabilization and crisis phenomena in many developing countries (RS)², has caused very serious damage to the developed countries (WG)³. These factors, no matter what ultra-liberal economists say, ultimately slowed down the development of the real sector of their economy, including due to the acceleration of its deindustrialization and the relocation of production capacities and jobs to countries with lower labor, environmental and social costs.

Under these conditions, very rapid growth was found mainly in a number of Asian new-industrial and large DCS with considerable comparative and dynamic competitive advantages (China, India, Indonesia): (a) rather intensively involved in international value chains, (b) with a relatively strong pro-market state, (c) pursuing a generally balanced macroeconomic policy, (d) relying on advanced business-oriented elites, (e) huge masses of relatively cheap, capable labor.

While the average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in the RG almost halved - from 3.6% in the 1950s-1980s to 1.7% in the 1980s (2.5% in the 1980s, 1.8% in the 1990s, and 1.1% in the 2000s-2013), in the RS as a whole, they are On the contrary, they grew, respectively, from 2.6% to 3.1%, including from 1.5% in the 1980s to 2.5% in the 1990s and 4.9% in 2000-2013 (see graph. 1 and 2).

As a result, the share of DCS, which account for more than four-fifths of the world's population (together with transition economies-almost 9/10), increased in global GDP growth from 1/3 in the 1980s to 2/5 in the 1990s and 3/4 in 2000-2013, which represents, even when adjusted for the global financial crisis, which primarily affected Russia, is a phenomenal event. This shift in the proportion of world production increases a third of a century ago would have been hard to imagine, because no one would have expected that the world economy would be so large.

Figure 1. Developing countries: GDP growth rate per capita in 1951-2013,%.

Figure 2. Developed countries: GDP growth rate per capita in 1951-2013,%.

Graphs 1 and 2 are calculated by: Maddison A. The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris, 2003. P. 232, 236; IMF. World Economic Outlook, 2013, October. Washington, D.C., 2013. P. 153; The World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2014. Washington, D.C., 2014. P. 18; Total Population, Annual, 1950 - 2050 - http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=97

certainly and for a long time (and - paradoxically - in the context of the information revolution unfolding at that time ⁴), economic growth rates will slow down, and China and India, contrary to many forecasts, will find, despite the mass of problems they have, unprecedented dynamism of development ⁵.

Due to the fact that the average annual growth rate of the share of RS in the creation of global GDP, primarily due to the "Asian segment", increased almost fourfold - from 0.3 - 0.4% in 1950-1980 to 1.1-1.2% in 1980-2013, it is, when calculated in PPP 2005 (54% including NIS and transition economies), has already exceeded the combined position of Western countries and Japan by almost one-fifth (46%, see Table).⁶. If the indicator under consideration were to evolve at the rate recently achieved over the current and next decade, then by 2030 the combined share of the countries of the East (excluding Japan) and the South in the world's GDP would be as close as possible to the symbolic " bar " of the beginning of the industrial revolution, when their share in the global product was more than twice than the future economic vanguard of the world (see Table).

At the same time, in the context of globalization, which significantly benefited Asian giants and NIS, the share of DCS in world exports increased by almost three-fifths (from 31-32% in 1980 to 49-50% in 2012-2013), including Asian DCS (including NIS) - more than twice (from 1/7 to 1/3)⁷. It is characteristic that to a considerable extent the expansion of exports of RS occurred due to the intensification of their export to the RS

Table

The share of developed countries and developing countries in world GDP (calculated in PPP 2005), %

* Including (future) transition economies.

** The inclusion of new industrial countries (NIS) in Asia in this group is important when studying the dynamic features of the world economy, because until a couple of decades ago, some of them did not have a sufficient set of features inherent in developed economies.

*** Our calculations, which take into account the preliminary results of the last round of international comparisons of world incomes in PPP 2011 published at the end of April 2014 and adjusted for GDP growth indices up to 2013, show that the share of RGS is decreasing by 2 percentage points - to 44%, and among DCS, the share of which, respectively, It increases to 56%, and the share of MS in Asia significantly increases - up to 41%.

Calculated from: Maddison A. Contours of the World Economy, 1-2030 AD. New York, 2007. P. 379; UN. World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014. New York, 2014. P. 153 - 156; The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2008. Washington, D.C., 2008. P. 8 - 10; The World Bank. Global Economic Prospects, 2014, January. Washington, D.C., 2014. P. 18; The World Bank. Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures of World Economies. Summary of Results and Findings of the 2011 International Comparison Program. Washington, D.C., 2014. P. 34 - 38.

while the corresponding share of high-income countries decreased from 3/4 in the 1990s to 2/3 in the early 2010s. ⁸

The intensification of export-oriented development in the countries of the East and South was largely based on the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI)into their economies⁹. An idea of the role of FDI in economic development can be obtained from an approximate calculation based on the following model, built for major countries of the world in the 2000s based on international statistics:

where YPI0, _YPGRI, FDI/_Yi and HOMICIDE i mean, respectively, for country i its GDP per capita at the beginning of the study period, the average annual growth rate of this indicator, the ratio of FDI inflows to GDP on average for the period, the number of homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants. The latter indicator, in our opinion, reflects the real situation in a country with political stability better than a number of other synthetic and largely subjective indicators used in international comparisons. Indicators of significance levels are shown in parentheses. They are below 1% for all parameters, which may indicate that there are approximately 99 chances out of a hundred that the observed relationship is not random. The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted =0.81) indicates that the model, as a whole, is able to explain a significant part (more than four fifths) of all variations in the considered average annual growth rates of per capita GDP.

According to our calculations, the higher growth rate of per capita GDP was largely determined by a higher indicator of FDI inflows, which is related to the size of the country's GDP. At the same time, this influence is "cleared" (as far as possible) from the influence of a number of other important factors, such as, for example, the initial level of economic development of the country and the ability of the state to maintain law and order (in a number of very significant areas).

As for the change in the share of DCS in global FDI inflows, depending on the method of calculation, it has increased many times over the past thirty - four years - by 3-4 times (up to 58-59%), and again mainly (by two-thirds) at the expense of Asian DCS and NIS10. This is partly paradoxical, since many fast-growing DCS lagged significantly behind other countries that clearly slowed down their growth rates in terms of some common (and probably far from perfect) indicators of the investment climate (India ranked 134th among the 189 countries included in the index in 2013, while Indonesia ranked 120th).China - 96th, while Japan - 27th, Germany-21st and the USA-4th) ¹¹.

However, international and national investors seem to take other important factors into account. The investment attractiveness of the RS consists both in the huge, far from exhausted potential of natural resources, and in the very favorable ratio of cheapness and quality of their labor force (its price is on average 10-20 times lower than in Western countries and Japan, and its increased qualifications, measured, in particular, by the average number of years of study, only twice or three times lower than the latter), and the increased scale and relatively more stable ¹² growth of their economy, and in general increased (as a result of, in particular, improving the level of economic management) the efficiency of capital investment, which, on average, in the RS is one and a half to two times higher than in the WG ¹³.

Emerging, emerging and transition economies now account for half of the world's exports of high - tech goods and 3/5 of industrial production, 2/3 of global fixed capital investment, as well as about 2/5 of global R & D spending and over 2/5 of global patent filings14. At the same time, as in previous comparisons, Asian DCS and NIS, which make up approximately two - thirds of the population of the entire DCS group (including transition economies), account for 85-90% of the noted DCS achievements. This shows the considerable competitiveness and efficiency of their economies.

I would like to emphasize that the People's Republic of China, whose hard-working people are very much talked about economically, is rapidly increasing its competitive advantages of the highest and most innovative order. If in 2005 - 2009 the share of R & D expenditures in the country's GDP was 1.4 - 1.5%, then in 2013 it reached 1.9% and, according to forecasts, in 2014 it will be 2%, thus outstripping Spain and Italy (1.2-1.3%), Brazil, Portugal and the Russian Federation (1.3 - 1.5%), Norway (1.7%), the United Kingdom (1.8%) and Canada (1.9%), reaching the level of Belgium and the Netherlands (2.0 - 2.1% of GDP). At the same time, in 2013, China's absolute R & D expenditures, calculated in PPP terms, were 5-6 times higher than in the Russian Federation, and even higher than in Japan and Germany combined, amounting to a little less than three-fifths of the level of the United States, which, according to available forecasts, the PRC will reach, with All other things being equal, in 202215 Of course, investment in R & D is not yet innovation itself, but it is the most important factor in ensuring it.

2. Competitiveness and efficiency of the economy. It is typical for DCS that have generally pursued a balanced macroeconomic policy, managed to increase the rate of extended savings, and diversify exports, that their international competitiveness ratings (according to the World Economic Forum) have reached dozens (in 2013 in Malaysia, Thailand, and India-18-32, in China, Indonesia, and Vietnam - by 40-50) positions above the trend generated by the logarithm of their per capita income (see graph 3). If in 2001, out of the thirty most competitive countries in the world, RS and NIS accounted for only one-fifth, then in 2013-for more than a third ¹⁶. All this shows the considerable potential and, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of the development of the rapidly growing countries of the East and South.

Calculated by us for the 2000s.

Graph 3. Correlation between the level of per capita HDP and the international competitiveness of the world's 30 largest economies, 2013

Compiled and calculated by: The World Economic Forum. Global Competitiveness Report, 2013 - 2014. Geneva, 2013. P. 15; The World Bank. World Development Report, 2014. Washington, D.C., 2013. P. 296 - 297.

the model for 37 large and medium-sized countries of the world, which concentrate approximately 90% of the population and the value of its GDP, allows us to conclude that the fast-growing developing countries are ahead of the per capita income growth rates of developed countries due to approximately 2/3 higher price competitiveness of the latter and 1/3 higher indicators of their investment rate and export growth ¹⁷:

where YPGR _i, PGR _i, and XGR _i are, respectively, the average annual growth rates of per capita GDP, population, and exports; _YPI0 is the initial level of per capita income in PPP, USD in 2010; and M _i is the average share of capital investment in GDP over the period. The adjusted coefficient of determination (Adjusted = 0.74) indicates that the model is able to explain approximately three-quarters of the variations in the growth rate of per capita GDP. The coefficients are significant at a fairly high level (1 and 10%).

To elaborate on the above, we emphasize that, according to one of the models we previously calculated, in the last three and a little decades, from a third to two-fifths of the difference in GDP growth rates between the more dynamic China and India can be attributed to the former country's greater contribution of exports to economic growth^.18 It is also difficult to overestimate the role of accumulation in economic development. According to our calculations and estimates, the share of fixed capital investment in GDP for the RS group as a whole increased from 6-8% in 1800-1950 to 22-24% in 1950-1980 and 27-29% in 1980-2013, exceeding the average figure for the RG by about a third (half in 2000-2013). Taking into account investments in human development (in education, health and science), total development expenditures in GDP increased in the RS from 8-9% in 1800-1950. up to 29-30% in 1950-1980 and 36-38% in 1980-2013, which is a huge success. However, first of all, such achievements were not observed in all MS (there is a huge difference within MS, in particular, between East and partly South Asia, on the one hand, and Africa and Latin America, on the other). Second, in terms of this aggregate indicator of investment rates in development, Western countries and Japan as a whole are still leading, despite the serious economic problems they are experiencing. For the corresponding periods, the indicator considered for them was equal to 13-15%, 39-41% and 42-45% ^.19 Third, it turns out that the share of investment in human capital in total expenditures on the formation of human and physical capital (excluding housing) increased, on average, in Western countries and Japan from 1/4-1/3 in 1800-1950. up to 2/5-1/2 in the 1950s and 1980s and almost 3/5 in the last three decades or so, while, in general, according to

where YPGR _i and XGR _i are the average annual growth rates of per capita GDP and exports of the country (i), M _i is the share of capital investment in GDP, and D _i is the share of people under the age of 15 and over 64 in the total population of the country. Based on the data shown in parentheses, all the main parameters are statistically significant (at a level of less than 4%), and the adjusted determination index is very high. The model is designed for 43 developing countries, for which more or less reliable and comparable data were collected.

RS it also increased, but more modestly-from less than 1/5 to 1/4 and less than 1/3 ²⁰, respectively.

Over the past decades, despite all the existing failures, backtracking movements, and significant differentiation of successes (and failures) among the RS21, they have generally made considerable progress not only in accelerating the average annual growth rate of labor capital-to-labor ratio (in 1950-2013, by about 5-6 times compared to 1900-1938). but also in the development of their human factor. In 1950 - 2010/2012, the average life expectancy from birth increased almost twice (from 35-37 to 68-70 years), and the average number of reduced years of adult education increased more than fivefold ²². At the same time, the average age of the population in the RS is now about one and a half times lower than in the RG (28 years and 43 years, respectively) ^.23 This suggests that, unlike Japan and Western countries, a number of MSS already have, and in the next two to three decades, the vast majority of them (with the exception, in particular, of China, where the average age is already 36 years). it will have a solid competitive advantage, determined by the demographic dividend²⁴. Countries that have a higher demographic burden ratio (CDN), whether due to a relatively higher proportion of the old or, conversely, young population, tend to experience lower GDP growth rates per capita.

According to our calculations based on the model ²⁵ below, in the 1990s-2000s, Sub - Saharan Africa (SSA)²⁶ lagged behind the countries of East, South-East and South Asia in terms of average annual growth rates of per capita GDP (by about 3 percentage points) by almost a third due to the higher level of GDP growth in SSA countries. In the SSA countries, the growth rate of exports of goods and services is more than a quarter lower than the rate of capital investment and more than two - fifths lower than in the SSA countries.

A significant indicator of the macroeconomic and socio-cultural performance of MS can be considered the fact that according to the human development index (HDI), this group, in general, steadily pulled up to the RG - from one-fifth in 1950 to one-third in 1980 and over two-fifths-by 201327 ^A number of Asian NIS and the most advanced regions of China In general, Western countries are ahead in terms of IQ and the level of mathematical training of students ²⁸.

While in Western countries and Japan, the average annual growth rate of changes in the absolute value of shifts in the sectoral structure of employment evolved rather smoothly - from 0.4% in 1800-1950 to 0.9% in 1950-1980 and 1.0% in 1980-2010, then, in general, for the RS, the indicator under consideration is the same as for the Russian Federation. This indicator, which characterizes to a certain extent the dynamics of their modernization, moved forward in a spurt-like manner: from 0.1% to 0.5% and 1.2%, respectively. In RGS, in which, in contrast to RS, the gap between macro-sectors in capital-to-labor ratio and productivity is smaller than in the past, the contribution of the effect of intersectoral displacement of employment to labor productivity growth decreased by more than three times (from 10-12% in the 1950s-1980s to 3-4% in the 1980s-2010), while in the RS as a whole it was (a) significantly higher than the average for the WG; (b) increased by more than one and a half times, respectively, from 16 - 18 to 28-30%²⁹.

While surpassing the average annual growth rate of aggregate factor productivity (TFP) in the last three and a little decades by about half, the RS, due to the lower quality of their investment climate, institutions and technologies, on average fell three times behind the WG in terms of the contribution of TFP to GDP growth and 3-7 times in terms of its level ³⁰. Although after the beginning of the global crisis (in 2008-2013), the average annual GDP growth rate in the Russian Federation as a whole turned out to be 8-9 times (!) lower than the average for the RS (0.6 and 5%, respectively) and three times the growth rate of the SFP (0.5 - 0.6% and 1.6%), The contribution of SFP to GDP growth in the countries of the economic vanguard reached about 9/10, and for the RS-a third (see graph A).

3. Contradictions and development prospects. In 2013, China's GDP in PPP terms in 2005 reached 4/5 (and according to preliminary results of surveys in PPP terms in 2011-already over 9/10) of the US level ³¹. However, China still lags roughly three times behind the United States (and India and Japan are twice as far behind) in terms of productive wealth³²

It seems that in the whole group of MS, we cannot exclude the possibility of maintaining the emerging trend towards a decrease in the average annual rate of their economic growth (from the mid-2000s to 2011-2013 by about two-fifths, including in China-by more than a third, in India-by half ³³), at least in the medium term in the future, due to a number of circumstances.

The tightening of the so-called "quantitative easing" policy by the US monetary authorities since last year has caused capital outflows from the RS, provoking a number of macroeconomic imbalances (India, Turkey, Thailand, etc.). In China, which over the past five years has been trying to overcome a number of crisis phenomena in its economy, including through credit pumping, the total debt of the country in relation to its GDP has almost doubled - to 230% ³⁴. Due to the relative increase in the cost of labor in China and some other DCS and, on the contrary, its cheapening in the Russian Federation, as well as a slowdown in the growth of energy prices, an increase in the degree of self-sufficiency in a number of Western countries.

Graph 4. Average annual growth rates of GDP and its most important factors in developed countries (WG) and developing countries (RS) in 2008-2013,%.

Note: 1. Y, L, K, and R represent, respectively, the average annual growth rates of GDP, employed population, fixed capital, and aggregate factor productivity (TFP).

2. Calculation of the growth rate of SFP is calculated by the formula: R = Y-b*L - (1-b)*K. The elasticities of GDP growth for labor (b) and capital (1-b) are assumed to be equal for RG 0.7 and 0.3, for RS 0.6 and 0.4.

Calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2012. Washington, D.C., 2012. P. 242 - 244, 246 - 248; ILO. Global Employment Trends, 2014. Geneva, 2014. P. 93, 97; UN. World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014. New York, 2014. P. 153 - 156; The IMF. World Economic Outlook, 2013 October. Washington, D.C., 2013. P. 155; Melyantsev V. A. Developed and developing countries in the era of change (comparative assessment of the effectiveness of growth in the 1980s-2000s). Moscow, 2009. pp. 182-183, 208-209.

^There is a tendency to return a number of industries to the Russian Federation and reindustrialize their economy on a higher technological basis.

It should be clarified that only a few dozen of the (semi -) peripheral countries (although some of them are quite large, such as China, India, and Indonesia)have made significant progress on the path of catch-up development in recent decades³⁶. At the same time, no less than three or four dozen countries in the South are, alas, so-called "failed states" with particularly acute problems and underdeveloped socio-political institutions.³⁷ In addition, the absolute gap in the level of per capita GDP relative to the RG has increased over the past three to four decades for the entire group of DCS ³⁸, including the relatively fast-growing China and India.

The negative externalities of modern economic growth include losses associated with the depletion of natural resources and pollution of the environment, which were estimated in the 2000s at 3-4% of world GDP. At the same time, if in the WG this indicator was equivalent to 1 - 2% of their GDP, then for the RS it was, on average, 5 - 7 times higher (8 - 10%, reaching 13 - 14% of their GDP in sub-Saharan Africa)³⁹. In terms of air pollution, India ranks 174th and China 176th among the 178 countries surveyed in ^the world40.

Economic growth in the RS, which occurs in an environment of high and growing levels of income inequality⁴¹ does not contribute to the rapid elimination of poverty. Although the number of critically poor people (daily consumption per capita of less than $1.25 in PPP in 2005) in the whole MS in 1981 - 2010 decreased by two-fifths (mainly due to the PRC), in sub-Saharan Africa it almost doubled. The share of beggars among residents of the RS during this period decreased by two and a half times (from 52-53% to 20-21%), but the total number of beggars is still comparable to the population of one of the largest countries in the world - India (1.2 billion). If the underestimated criterion is doubled to $2.5, it turns out that there is still progress in MS as a whole, since the share of the critically poor, according to available data, decreased by almost a third in 1990-2010, but by the beginning of this decade it was still half ⁴².

In general, despite the noted economic, environmental, social and rather acute political problems experienced by the RS (including mass uprisings against corrupt regimes), it seems that a considerable number of these countries, where a large part of the population of the countries of the East and South is concentrated, have quite resolutely implemented reforms and improved institutions, and have entered the path of development. economic growth, demonstrating productivity growth rates and indicators of international competitiveness that are above the trend line determined by the level of their per capita income. Therefore, if GDP does not retain its meaning in the near future, ^it is possible that, according to recent forecasts, the share of modern MS in its global volume may increase to 3/5 by the beginning/first half of the 2020s and to 3/4 by the middle of this century43.

¹ See: Meliyantsev V. A. Razvitye i razvivayushschiyesya strany v epokhu peremen. M., 2009, part 1 (Developed and Developing Countries in the Era of Change (comparative assessment of growth efficiency in the 1980s - 2000s). the same. Analysis of the most important trends in global economic growth, Moscow, 2013, pp. 22-23.

² Unless specifically stated in the text, this set of countries, as is now increasingly practiced by a number of international organizations, also includes transition economies.

³ See: Fituni L. L. Differentiation of developing countries: Monetary and financial aspects / / Asia and Africa Today. 2012, N 5, 6. (Fituni L.L. Differentsiatsiya razvivayuschikhsya stran // Azia i Afrika Segodnya. 2012, N 5, 6) (in Russian)

⁴ See: Melyantsev V. A. Information revolution, globalization and paradoxes of modern economic growth in developed and developing countries. Moscow, 2000.

⁵ See: Akimov A.V. World Crisis: Sustainability of economies and development prospects // The Trinity: Russia facing the Near East and the Near West, Moscow, 2011; Berger Ya. M. Economic Strategy of China, Moscow, 2009; Gelbras V. G. Ekonomika Kitayskoy Narodnoi Respubliki, Moscow, 2010; Huang Ya. Kapitalizm po-kitaiski, Moscow, 2010; Malyarov O. V. Nezavisimaya India. Evolyutsiya sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi modeli [Evolution of the Socio-economic model], Moscow, 2011; Medovoy A. I., Galishcheva N. V. Ekonomika Indii, Moscow, 2009; Melyantsev V. A. Ekonomicheskiy rosta Kitai i Indii: dinamika, proportii i posledstviya [Economic Growth of China and India: Dynamics, Proportions and Consequences]. 2007. N 9; Potapov M. A., Salitsky A.M., Shakhmatov A.V. Ekonomika sovremennoi Azii [Economics of Modern Asia], Moscow, 2011; Fridman L. A., Karamurzov R. Problemy mezhdunarodnykh ekonomicheskikh sostavleniy [Problems of International Economic Comparisons]. Rossiya XXI. 2011. N 3, 4; Elyanov A. Ya.Globalizatsiya i razvitie [Globalization and Development]. 2012. N 11.

⁶ When calculated on the basis of PPP in 2011, the materials on which were provisionally published by the World Bank at the end of April 2014, it turns out that the RS exceed the WG in terms of their share in world GDP by a quarter (see note. to the table).

⁷ Calculated from sources to the table.

⁸ Calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 1998. P. 318; 2013. P. 94.

⁹ See: Tsvetkova N. N. TNK in the countries of the East: foreign direct investment and global production networks. Yearbook 2012. Moscow, 2012.

¹⁰ Calculated from sources to the table.

¹¹ To be fair, Asian NIS, which managed to significantly boost the investment process in their economies, were among the world leaders in terms of investment climate indicators: in 2013, Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively, took the 1st and 2nd places, the Republic of Korea-on the 7th, Taiwan-on the 16th. (see: The World Bank. Doing Business, 2014. Washington, D.C., 2013. P. 3).

¹² According to the World Bank, the instability index (standard deviation) of GDP growth rates per capita for the group of poor and middle-income countries as a whole decreased by more than a quarter in the 2000s compared to the 1990s, resulting in 1/10 lower than the average for high-income countries. per capita income (see: The World Bank. World Development Report, 2014. Washington, D.C., 2013. P. 303).

¹³ See: Melyantsev V. A. Developed and developing countries ... pp. 204, 206; on. Analysis of the most important trends ... pp. 20-21.

¹⁴ Calculated from sources to the table.

¹⁵ Compiled and calculated by: 2014 Global R&D Funding Forecast. December 2013 - www.rdmag.com. P. 7; Global R&D Spending to Grow 3.8 Percent in 2014 // The Burrill Report. 13.12.2013 - http://www.burrilIreport.com/article-global_rd_spending_to_grow_3_8 percent_in_2014.html).

¹⁶ См.: The World Economic Forum. Global Competitiveness Report, 2001 - 2002. P. 15; 2013 - 2014. P. 15.

¹⁷ Calculated from sources to the table.

¹⁸ See Melyantsev V. A. Developed and developing countries ... pp. 104-105, 204.

¹⁹ Preliminary calculations and estimates show that when calculated in PPP terms, the gap in favor of the WG will generally be higher.

²⁰ Compiled and calculated by: Melyantsev V. A. Analysis of the most important trends ... pp. 19-21 and sources to the table.

²¹ Here the calculations are made without countries with economies in transition.

²² Calculated from: Meliyantsev V. A. Vostok i Zapad vo vtorom tysyacheletii. M., 1996) (in Russian); on. Developed and developing countries... p. 130; The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2012. P. 88; World Development Report, 2014. P. 296 - 297.

²³ Рассчитано по: Median Age (Years) // The World Factbook, 2014 - http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html

²⁴ On the role of this factor in MS, see: Abramova I. O. Population of Africa in the new global economy, Moscow, 2010. (Ahramova I.O. Naselenie Afriki v novoi globalnoi ekonomike. M., 2010) (in Russian)

²⁵ Calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 1998. P. 42 - 44, 80 - 82; 2012. P. 42 - 44, 214 - 216, 242 - 244, 246 - 248.

²⁶ On Africa's successes and challenges, see Fituni L. L. The African Gambit // Nezavisimaya gazeta. 14.02.2014.

²⁷ Compiled and calculated by: Melyantsev V. A. Analysis of the most important trends ... pp. 9-10 and sources to the table.

²⁸ See: The WEF. The Human Capital Report, 2013. Geneva, 2013. P. 141, 209, 285, 453, 517, 521; Time for a Ceasefire // The Economist. 01.02.2014 - http://www.economist.eom/news/international/21595476-technology-and-fresh-ideas-are-repl acing-classroom-drilland-helping-pupils-learn-time.

²⁹ Calculations are made using the following formula: D Y/L= 00 D (Yi/Li) + 0/0 D(Li/L0) + D (Li/L) D(Yi/Li), where Y/L, Yi/Li, Yi0/Li0are labor productivity, in t.in the 1st industry and in the base period; Li/L, Li0/L0 - the share of the i-th industry in total employment, including in the base period. The first component is the effect of total labor productivity growth across economic sectors, the second component is the effect of intersectoral labor movement, and the third component is the combined effect of productivity and labor movement. Calculated from: Melyantsev V. A. Analysis of the most important trends ... p. 17 and appendix to the table.

³⁰ See: Melyantsev V. A. Developed and developing countries... p. 144; on. Analysis of the most important trends ... pp. 25-26.

³¹ If we take into account the preliminary results of the last round of international income comparison of the world's countries published at the end of April 2014, based on 2011 PPP, as well as their GDP growth indices, it turns out that in 2013, China could already reach about 93-95% of the volume of this indicator of the United States and, quite possibly, in the current or next year surpass it (see: The World Bank. Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures of World Economies. Summary of Results and Findings of the 2011 International Comparison Program. Washington, D.C., 2014. P. 34 - 38; The IMF. World Economic Outlook. Washington, D.C., 2014. April. P. 180, 184).

³² See: Melyantsev V. A. Countries of the West, East and Russia: long-term trends, factors and contradictions of economic development. Part 2 / / Bulletin of Moscow State University. Episode 13. Oriental studies. 2013. N 3. P. 10.

³³ См.: IMF. World Economic Outlook, 2013, October. P. 153, 157.

³⁴ См.: Scharma R. China's Debt-Fuelled Boom Is in Danger of Turning to Bust // The Financial Times. 27.01.2014 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/cfcb0568 - 8749 - 11e3 - 9c5c-00144feab7de.html#axzz2rdKiTVJv).

³⁵ См.: The Petrostate of America // The Economist. 15.02.2014 - http://www.economist.eom/news/leaders/21596521-energy-boom-good-america-and-world-it- would-be-nice-if-barack-obama-helped.

³⁶ See: Melyantsev V. A. Clarifying the contours of world economic development. Discussion "World economy: time for revaluation?" / / Vostok / Oriens. 2012. N 2. p.91.

³⁷ The Fund for Peace. The Failed States Index, 2013 - http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2013-sortable See also: Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L., Sapuntsov A. L. "Emerging" and "failed" states in the world economy and politics, Moscow, 2007.

³⁸ See: Melyantsev V. A. Strany Zapada, Vostoka i Rossiya [Countries of the West, East and Russia] ... P. 8.

³⁹ Calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2003. P. 176; 2012. P. 256.

⁴⁰ Air Quality. Environmental Performance Index. 2014 - http://epi.yale.edu/epi/issue-ranking/air-quality.

⁴¹ See: Meliyantsev V. A. Analiz vazhneishikh trendov globalnogo ekonomicheskogo rosta. M., 2013 (in Russian)

⁴² Compiled and calculated by: The World Bank. World Development Indicators, 2012. P. 72; 2013. P. 31; World Development Report, 2014. P. 303. Adjusted indicators of the share of the poor population in the RS based on the new 2011 PPP should be published in the near future. But at the same time, there is reason to expect that the main trends noted in the dynamics of its change will remain in force.

⁴³ See: ADB. Asia 2050. Realizing the Asian Century. Singapore, 2011; OECD. Looking to 2060: Long-term Global Prospects. Paris, 2012; The World Bank. China 2030. Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society. Washington, D.C., 2012.

Permanent link to this publication: