K. A. VILNIN

Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Keywords: Sri Lanka, China, interethnic armed conflict, Indian Ocean, South Asia, "String of Pearls"

Modern history of Sri Lanka (pre-1972-Ceylon) It is largely characterized by a complex relationship between the main ethnic groups inhabiting the island - Sinhalese and Tamils*.

The prerequisites for their protracted hostility began to form even in the colonial period, under the British. After independence in 1948, the Sinhalese nationalists who came to power built their policies, often ignoring the interests of the Tamil population. The rights of Tamils were violated in matters of governing the country, working in State bodies, serving in the army, in education, and using the Tamil language, which caused dissatisfaction on their part.

Eventually, in 1983, the Sinhalo-Tamil conflict took the form of an armed struggle between the Government and Tamil separatists, who were fighting for the establishment of an independent state in the north and east of the island. The inter-ethnic armed conflict, which claimed, according to some sources, up to 100 thousand human lives, ended in 2009 with the complete defeat of the Tamil separatists.¹

China made a significant contribution to the final victory of the Sri Lankan government over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE - the main Tamil militant group), although it was not directly involved in the fighting.

CHINA'S ROLE IN ETHNIC CONFLICT

From the late 1970s, even before the outbreak of the armed conflict, the then President of Sri Lanka, Junius Richard Jayawardane (1978-1989), set out to diversify the country's international relations by moving closer to non-regional powers, including China. With the outbreak of hostilities, the Sri Lankan government, unlike India, which sought a peaceful settlement of the armed confrontation, was more interested in a military solution to the conflict. Jayawardane, hoping to gain the support of other countries in the fight against the separatists, began to actively develop relations with Beijing.²

In 1983, the brother of the head of state arrived in China as an extraordinary envoy, and in 1984 the president himself went on a visit to Beijing. At the end of 1984, Colombo was visited by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1985-the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, and a year later-the President of the People's Republic of China Li Xiannian (1983-1988). This was the first visit to Sri Lanka by a Chinese leader since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1957.3

Another factor that influenced Colombo's relations with Beijing was the rapprochement between the United States and China at that time (the United National Party, then in power in the country, was traditionally more inclined to cooperate with the United States than its main rival, the Sri Lankan Freedom Party).

* According to the 2011 census, Sinhalese accounted for 74.9% (15.2 million), Sri Lankan Tamils - 11.2% (2.3 million), Indian Tamils - 4.2% (842 thousand). See: Statistical Abstract 2011 // Sri Lanka Department of Census and Statistics -http://www.statistics.gov.lk/Abstract20117CHAP2/AB2-10.pdf

Table 1

Major arms suppliers to Sri Lanka (1983-2009, $ million)

Compiled according to SIPRI data (in 1990 prices) - SIPRI arms transfers database / / Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - http://www.sipri.org (25.12.2013)

Military cooperation has become more active. Following Jayawardane's visit to Beijing in 1984, China agreed to supply Colombo with military equipment, including patrol boats and small arms, which were used in operations against the separatists. In addition, the PRC provided assistance in training flight personnel for the Sri Lankan Air Force. In 1985, the port of Colombo was visited by a destroyer as part of the first visit of Chinese Navy ships to foreign countries since the founding of the PRC.⁴

While supplying weapons to the Sri Lankan army, China has tried to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, considering it an internal matter of Sri Lanka. So, when in June 1987, during the Indian operation to provide humanitarian aid to the population of Jaffna, Buddhist monks asked the Chinese Embassy in Colombo for military assistance in the fight against Tamils, Beijing limited itself to statements about the inadmissibility for major powers to interfere in the affairs of other states. China has come out in favor of a political solution to the ethnic conflict, ⁵ supporting the India-Lanka Accord*.

In this regard, the statement of the Russian researcher A.V. Pedin deserves attention:"...In the late 1980s and early 1990s, China's South Asian policy increasingly relied on India's recognition of the status of a leading state in South Asia" and refused "to directly intervene in crisis situations in the countries of the sub-region" ^.6

Since the late 1980s, as events unfolded in Sri Lanka, when the main political forces, including Tamil separatists, and almost the entire population of Sri Lanka were dissatisfied with the presence of Indian peacekeeping forces in the country (which eventually finally left the island in early 1990), the volume of weapons supplied from China has increased to Sri Lanka.

Since the 1990s, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has become the largest supplier of arms and military equipment to Sri Lanka. From 1983 to 2009, the total amount of deliveries was $606 million (see Table 1).

In the 2000s, military cooperation continued to strengthen. During the LTTE's massive offensive on Jaffna in 2000, China was one of the first countries to respond to the Sri Lankan government's request for weapons supplies. In 2002, the PRC assisted in the modernization of the Sri Lankan Navy to prevent illegal arms supplies to the tigers. According to Jane's Defense Weekly, in 2007, China and Sri Lanka signed an agreement on the purchase of weapons from China in the amount of $37.6 million.⁷

As before, China has refrained from directly engaging in domestic developments in Sri Lanka. It did not participate in donor conferences held during the peace process**, preferring to act on a bilateral basis (including because donor countries conditioned their assistance on the need for democratic reforms). At the same time, Beijing has always supported the efforts of the island's authorities: both when they tried to resume peace talks with the tigers, and when the troops conducted an operation to finally destroy them.

Sri Lanka and China have an identical position on issues related to national security, which was confirmed at a meeting in February-March 2007 in Beijing between Chinese President Hu Jintao (2003-2013) and current Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapak-

* To establish peace and normalize the situation in Sri Lanka. Signed by J. R. R. Tolkien On July 29, 1987, one of the points provided for India's military assistance to Sri Lanka, and soon the Indian peacekeeping forces were deployed to the island.

** The peace process (mediated by Norway and supported by the United States, Japan and the EU) to resolve the armed conflict in Sri Lanka took place from 2002 to 2006. Within its framework, international donor conferences were held, at which decisions were made on the allocation of funds for the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka.

ce (from 2005 to the present). In a joint communique, Colombo supported the "one China" policy, while Beijing reiterated support for Sri Lanka's efforts to " defend its sovereignty, national unity and territorial integrity." The parties expressed their desire to fight against the "three evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, as well as to expand anti-terrorist cooperation at the regional and international levels.⁸

Beijing does not attach too much importance to the human rights situation in its partner countries, considering it an internal matter, and is focused on protecting its political and, to a large extent, economic interests.

Among foreign scientists, there is even such a concept as the " Beijing Consensus "(as an alternative to the" Washington Consensus"*), a variant of market development "without democratic freedoms", which "China will continue to impose" as a "recipe" for third world countries.⁹ Beijing was directly interested in providing military-technical assistance to the Sri Lankan leadership, since the early end of the armed conflict opened up prospects for the implementation of Chinese economic projects on the island and in South Asia as a whole.

It is largely thanks to China that the UN Security Council did not take concrete steps towards Sri Lanka in the final phase of the conflict, limiting itself to a statement of concern about the humanitarian crisis in the country, calling on the parties to ensure the safety of civilians. ¹⁰

A special session of the UN Human Rights Council in late May 2009 adopted a resolution that did not actually criticize the actions of the Sri Lankan Government during the armed conflict. As a response to initiatives, mainly by a number of European countries and the United States, to conduct an independent investigation into cases of human rights violations in the country, it was supported, including by China, which opposed the Western proposals.¹¹

China has consistently opposed the adoption by this UN body and another resolution on Sri Lanka initiated by the United States in March 2012 (which was eventually adopted by a majority vote), criticizing the use of resolutions aimed at specific countries in order to put pressure on them. Beijing has repeatedly stressed that" the Sri Lankan Government and people will manage their internal affairs "on their own, while noting that there have been"major advances in the protection of human rights and the implementation of national reconciliation." ¹²

China's role in protecting Sri Lanka's interests in the international arena is very significant, and this is recognized in Sri Lankan political circles. For example, in an interview with Xinhua in 2011, Sri Lankan President Rajapakse stated: "We are ... We highly appreciate China's understanding of the pressure exerted on Sri Lanka in the post-conflict period, and its support for "healing the wounds" of the war. " 13

Using the situation when the West, in particular the United States, refused military assistance to the Sri Lankan authorities during the armed conflict and reduced economic support under the pretext of serious human rights violations, China filled the "void" that was created. Against the background of constant accusations of the Sri Lankan government from Western countries (which India recently joined), it is China that has turned out to be the political and economic "lifeline" that helps Sri Lanka cope with growing international pressure.

STRENGTHENING COOPERATION

Bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and China are developing dynamically. The parties regularly exchange visits of high-ranking officials of various departments. M. Rajapakse, for example, has already visited China six times.¹⁴ On the eve of one of his trips to China, he noted that over the past few years, "relations between China and Sri Lanka have been at the highest level of friendship and understanding."¹⁵

It was not without the assistance of the PRC that Sri Lanka was granted the status of a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2009. In 2010 Colombo ignored the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. ¹⁶ In 2012, a number of agreements were signed to further expand bilateral ties.¹⁷ Joint space programs are actively developing, which, however, causes concern among some Indian analysts. In their opinion, the communication satellites that Sri Lanka launches with the help of China can also be used by the latter to collect intelligence. ¹⁸

Chinese warships periodically enter Sri Lankan ports for refueling, particularly during training exercises and anti-Somali pirate patrols.

* The term was introduced in 1989. Denotes a set of principles of economic policy typical for most developed countries, which should be adopted by countries experiencing financial and economic difficulties. For more information, see: Ananyin O. I., Khaitkulov R. G., Shestakov D. E. Washington Consensus: Landscape after the Battle.

Table 2

The largest projects in Sri Lanka financed by the PRC (2005-2014, $ million)

Sri Lankan officers are being trained in China. In early 2013, Defence Minister Gotabaya Rajapakse (the President's brother) warned that if the US continued to deny Sri Lankans the opportunity to improve their professional skills in US military schools, Colombo would make a similar request to Beijing.¹⁹

In September 2012, China, along with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives and India (observer) , participated in large-scale military exercises of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces in the east of ^the Island20. China has also agreed to allocate $100 million to equip military camps of the Sri Lankan army in the north and east of ^the country21 - and this is at a time when the West and opposition Tamil political forces in Sri Lanka are calling for the demilitarization of these areas of the country.

In recent years, China has been the largest investor in Sri Lanka's economy. According to the Sri Lanka Department of Commerce, it also ranks second only to India among Colombo's trading partners; in 2012, exports to Sri Lanka, excluding Hong Kong, exceeded $2.5 billion.²² Moreover, Colombo and Beijing are actively negotiating a free trade agreement23. According to the External Resources Department of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance and Planning, from 2005 to September 2013, China's state-sponsored economic development assistance totaled $5.6 billion, or 94% of China's total investment ^{since 1971.24}

The PRC allocates the most significant financial resources (loans, subsidies, investments, in particular through Hong Kong) for infrastructure development: construction and modernization of roads, ports, airports, improvement of the energy and telecommunications sectors, etc. (see ^Table 2-25). Moreover, Chinese investors, as follows from the message of the information department of the Secretariat of the President of Sri Lanka, expressed their readiness to invest $50 billion in the next 10 to 15 years. for the development of the port city of Hambantota with the involvement of Hong Kong, Singapore and American companies ²⁶.

Since the end of the armed conflict, China has provided humanitarian assistance for the rehabilitation of northern Sri Lanka, which has suffered the most during the fighting, in particular by providing mine clearance equipment, heavy equipment, tents and donations of $100 million to the island's authorities.²⁷

CHINA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SRI LANKA

As China's economic power grows, so does its influence on the international stage, and in particular in South Asia, where it has established good relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and small countries in the region, largely due to its close economic ties, where the main focus is on developing infrastructure projects.

In 2007, as part of one of these projects, Sri Lanka signed an agreement on the construction of the above-mentioned seaport in Hambantota on the southern coast of the island (China received this right after the United States and India had previously refused to participate in the project). Beijing began to show interest in it in 2001, when a Chinese firm offered to conduct an economic assessment of its suitability for the construction of a deep-water port28.

Some Western and Indian experts believe that the construction of a seaport in Sri Lanka is an integral part of the so-called "Thread Zhem" strategy.-

chuga", conducted by China on the territory of its friendly states. This strategy provides for the creation of" nodes "of strategic importance - naval, air bases and ports that will" thread " across the Indian Ocean-from the South China Sea to the Persian Gulf.²⁹

Chinese projects for the construction and modernization of port systems in the territories of friendly states are still purely economic in nature, dictated by commercial considerations and aimed at developing maritime trade and ensuring energy security*. However, such activity in Beijing raises concerns in Delhi and Washington in connection with the possible future use of "pearls" in the performance of broader tasks by the Chinese Navy.³⁰

The importance of the Hambantota port for Beijing will depend directly on the implementation of other projects, particularly in Southeast Asia. The Washington Times, in an article (17.01.2005) on the "String of Pearls" strategy, quotes excerpts from an internal report of the US Department of Defense: "China is considering financing the construction of a $20 billion shipping channel across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, which will allow [its] ships to pass the Strait of Malacca."³¹

The PRC considers this Strait to be its vulnerable point. On the one hand, the strait, through which most of China's energy supplies pass, is subject to attacks by sea pirates, on the other hand, it can be blocked by the United States in the event of a serious conflict.

According to Indian researcher M. Mayilwaganan, "the Chinese military presence in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, becomes invaluable" for China's future "if the planned Kra Isthmus canal project in Thailand is implemented," which in turn could lead to "a sharp shift in the balance of power in Asia." ³².

The concerns of Americans and Indians are related to the ever-growing military budget of China, which is already second only to the United States. According to official data provided in the report of the Minister of Finance of the People's Republic of China, in 2012 it exceeded $104.5 billion. (at the exchange rate as of March 5, 2013: $1 = 6,222 yuan), and in 2013 it was planned to allocate more than $115.7 billion ³³. SIPRI estimates that China's military budget totaled $166 billion in 2012. and it is the fastest growing among large countries - from 2003 to 2012, the growth rate was 175%³⁴. According to the forecasts of the authoritative "Jane's Information Group", China's military spending will continue to grow and in 2015 will amount to $238.2 billion, which will exceed the total amount of military expenditures for key actors in the Asia-Pacific region35^.

In recent years, Chinese politicians and military officials have spoken out in favor of strengthening the presence of their naval forces in the world's oceans. At the end of 2004, Hu Jintao assigned the People's Liberation Army of China, among other things, the task of ensuring national interests in new areas, including in the world's oceans. In 2006, he called China a "powerful maritime power" and stated the need to strengthen and modernize the Navy. The 2006 Chinese National Defense White Paper outlined the Chinese Navy's plans to expand the boundaries of its strategic defense frontiers.³⁶

It is increasingly common to hear statements from senior Chinese military officials about the importance for China of having military bases abroad.³⁷ Well-known Chinese scientist Shen Dingli also believes that China needs to operate in the "blue waters" of the open ocean and have military bases abroad. In his opinion, the main threat to China is "not terrorism or piracy", but "the ability of other states to block Chinese trade routes" ³⁸.

At the same time, opposing views on China's maritime "expansion"are also widespread. In China, there is no consensus among the military leadership on the need to build overseas bases.³⁹

The aforementioned Shen Dingli also pointed out that the construction of Chinese military bases abroad should be based on three main principles: first, the host country should give the go-ahead to the Chinese military presence; second, the purpose of creating such bases is to strengthen regional stability; and third, this should not cause objections from neighboring States ⁴⁰.

Another Chinese researcher, Liu Mingfu, insists that China seeks to gain the status of a powerful but non-hegemonic state (which is also characteristic of Chinese aspirations in the World's oceans), in contrast to the United States41. Moreover, the People's Republic of China currently does not have the ability to deploy its Navy in the Indian Ocean (according to some sources, it will appear no earlier than 2020-202542), and the issue of Taiwan remains a priority in its maritime policy and security 43.

According to a software specialist

* China transports most of its sea cargo and 85% of its oil and gas via the Indian Ocean. See: WeimarN. D. Sino-Indian power preponderance in maritime Asia: A re-source of Conflict in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea / / Global Change, Peace & Security. 2013. Vol. 25, N1, p. 15.

According to N. Samaranayake, at the moment there is no reason to believe that China is going to turn the port of Hambantota into a naval base or a tracking point. Skepticism about China's military intentions towards Sri Lanka is expressed by a number of former US diplomats and Indian intelligence officials. Some experts even say that the presence of a naval base there in the event of a serious conflict with India will not be an advantage, but a disadvantage. ⁴⁴

In an interview with Time magazine, M. Rajapakse said that the Hambantota port is "a Sri Lankan project" that Colombo proposed to China, and not the other way around.⁴⁵ In another interview with the Times of India, he confirmed that Chinese investments are purely commercial in nature.⁴⁶ Chinese officials hold the same positions.

At the same time, if the port in Hambantota is only of commercial importance, then India and the United States can even benefit from this, reaping the benefits of cooperation between China and Sri Lanka. According to Sri Lankan newspaper I-Land, with the opening of the Kra canal, Hambantota port will become an important transit point directly "on the way of sea transport communication between Asia and Europe"⁴⁷.

This option looks more likely in the light of Chinese investors ' proposals to invest $50 billion. for the development of the port city. In addition, the investment of Indian private companies in the development of Hambantota ⁴⁸ and the statement of the American Ambassador to Sri Lanka M. Sison about the US interest in increasing investment and learning more about opportunities in the Hambantota district ⁴⁹ suggest that these countries may be beginning to reconsider their attitude to the city on the south coast as a potential " pearl"Of China.

During almost the entire course of the inter-ethnic armed conflict in Sri Lanka, Beijing formally tried not to interfere in the internal affairs of the island state. But it was China's significant military and financial assistance in the last years of the conflict, when Western countries refused to support the Sri Lankan authorities, that was one of the decisive factors in defeating the tigers. China's military-technical, political and diplomatic support for Sri Lanka raises concerns in some political circles in India and the United States in connection with the eventual threat to their long-term interests in the Indian Ocean.

In turn, against the background of concern of Indians and Americans about the inclusion of Sri Lanka in the so-called "String of Pearls" strategy, many current and former officials, experts, as well as private investors who are ready to invest in the development of Hambantota do not see any threat in this project and, apparently, consider it more likely that the port will become a port. to the "hub" of broad international cooperation, and not to the Chinese "pearl" that creates tension in the region.

At the same time, another option is not excluded, in which China, by developing its relations with the countries of South Asia, responds, in this way, to the growing influence of the United States in this region, which relies on expanding cooperation with India. And the construction of the Hambantota port can become an important link for Chinese military-strategic interests (although this option is still unlikely today).

With its presence in the South Asian region, China acts as a kind of counterweight to Indian influence and thus provides an opportunity for other countries in the region to receive dividends from the current situation (although, in the end, they may also become hostages of it if negative processes develop in the region). As Sri Lankan sinologist M. Verake wrote back in 1990:"From the point of view of the small states of South Asia, a more serious presence of China as a balancing force is a desirable phenomenon in the face of India's growing and unquestionable dominance in the region." ⁵⁰

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¹ For more information, see: Yu. Kuznetsov. Dangerous tension / / Asia and Africa today. 1987, N 4; Antonov A. The tragedy of the island / / Asia and Africa today. 1990, No. 5; Listopadov N. A. Razrom terroristov v Sri-Lankey [The defeat of terrorists in Sri Lanka]. Ethnicity and religion in modern conflicts [ed. by V. A. Tishkov, V. A. Shnirelman]. Moscow, Nauka, 2012; Vilnin K. A. Interethnic conflict in Sri Lanka: causes and main stages of development // Mayo. 2012, N 8.

² For more details on the role of India, see: Lunev S. I. Vzaimoshnosheniye Indii s neigbor'nimi gosudarstvami Yuzhnoi Azii (80-ies) / / India 80-ies: tendentsii sotsial'no-politicheskogo razvitiya. Collection of reviews [ed. - comp. A. G. Belsky]. Moscow, INION, 1990; Vilnin K. A. Sri Lanka: the Indian factor in the interethnic conflict / / Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 8.

^{Suryanarayan V.} 3 Sri Lanka's policy towards China: Legacy of the past and prospects for the future // China Report. 1994. Vol. 30, N 2, p. 212; De Silva KM. Regional powers and small state security: India and Sri Lanka, 1977 - 1990. Baltimore (MD), 1995, p. 134; Mishra K. Rapprochement across the Himalayas. Emerging India-China relations in post Cold War period (1947 - 2003). New Delhi, 2004, p. 109.

^{Ghosh P.A.} 4 Ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and role of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). New Delhi, 1999, p. 55; Mishra K. Op. cit.

^{Muni S.D.} 5 Pangs of proximity: India and Sri Lanka's ethnic crisis. New Delhi, 1993, p. 100.

⁶ Cit. by: Ivanko A. I. China's Policy towards India (co-

nets 80-ies of XX century-beginning of XXI century). Dis.... Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 2007, p. 29.

⁷ Sri Lanka signs military assistance pact with China// Daily Times (Pakistan), 15.06.2002 - http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp? page-story_15 - 6-2002_pg4_2; Balachandran P.K. Sri Lanka battles cash crunch // Hindustan Times, 25.06.07 - http://www.hindustantimes.com/ world-news/SriLanka/Sri-Lanka-battles-cash-crunch/Articlel-232703.aspx

^{Fernando S.N.} 8 China's relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives: Models of good relations among big and small countries // China Report. 2010. Vol. 46, N 3,p. 287.

⁹ China in the 21st century. Globalizatsiya interesov bezopasnosti [Globalization of Security Interests]. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 2007, p. 16.

¹⁰ Security Council press statement on Sri Lanka, SC/9659 // United Nations Department of Public Information, 13.05.09 -http://www.un.org/News/Prcss/docs/2009/sc9659.doc.htm

^{De Alwis M.} 11 The 'China factor' in post-war Sri Lanka // Inter-Asia Cultural Studies. 2010. Vol. 11, N 3, p. 438.

¹² Regular press conference on March 22, 2012 at the official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Hong Lei // Press Service of the Chinese Foreign Ministry -http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/rus/xwfw/fyrth/lxjzhzhdh/t917188.htm

¹³ Sri Lanka looks forward to increasing co-op with China: president // Xinhua, 08.08.11 - http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/ indepth/2011-08/08/c_131036553.htm

^{Patranobis S.} 14 10 Pacts on table during Rajapaksa China visit // Hindustan Times. New Delhi, 27.05.13.

¹⁵ Sri Lanka looks forward...

^{Samaranayake N.} 16 Are Sri Lanka's relations with China deepening? An analysis of economic, military, and diplomatic data // Asian Security. 2011. Vol. 7, N 2, p. 136 - 137.

¹⁷ Sri Lanka, China sign agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation // Presinform, The Official Website of the Data and Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat. Sri Lanka, 17.09.12 http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201209/20120917sl_china_sign_agreement s enhance bilateral_cooperation.htm

^{Joji T. P., Sruthijith K.K.} 18 As China takes space, India looks for room // The Economic Times. New Delhi, 19.03.13; SupremeSAT signs in Orbit delivery contract for SupremeSAT - II // SupremeSAT Official Website, 28.05.13 - http://www.supremesat.com/home_new.php; DeSilva-Ranasinghe S. Another bead in the "string of pearls"? Interpreting Sri Lanka's foreign policy realignment // WSI China Security. 2011. Issue 19, p. 65.

^{Samaranayake N.} 19 Op. cit, p. 132; Lanka warns US it may turn to China for military training // Dawn, 20.01.2013.

²⁰ Multi-national exercise Cormorant Strike III' draws to a close // Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, 25.09.12 http://www. defence. Ik/new. asp?fname-Multi_National_Exercise_Cor morant_Strike_III_Draws_to_a_Close_2012092403

²¹ China to build military housing in North-East // The Sunday Times. Sri Lanka. 26.08.12.

²² Total imports from the world - country wise [2005 - 2012] // Department of Commerce, Sri Lanka - http://www.doc.gov.lk/web/ index.php?option=com_content&view-article&id=68&Itemid=83〈 =en

²³ Lanka-China trade up 306 percent // Sunday Observer, 20.10.13 -http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2013/10/20/fin04.asp

²⁴ Global partnership towards development 2013 // Sri Lanka Department of External Resources, Ministry of Finance and Planning http://www.erd.gov.lk/files/FM-Global%20Partnership-Book-English.pdf

²⁵ Таблица составлена на основе данных официальных сайтов правительства Шри-Ланки и периодических изданий: Global partnership in development 2011 // Sri Lanka Department of External Resources, Ministry of Finance and Planning http://www.erd.gov.lk/files/EEnglish%20Section%20-Edited.pdf; Global partnership... 2012... - http://www.erd.gov.lk/files/ERDBudget_ English2012.pdf; Global partnership... 2013; Annual report 2011 // Ministry of Finance and Planning - http://www.trcasury.gov.lk/ reports/annualreport/annualreport2011-eng.pdf; Chinese firm to build $1,4 bn Sri Lanka 'port city' // Fox News, 24.07.2013 -http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/24/chinese-firm-to-build-14-bn-sri-lanka-port-city/

²⁶ Chinese firm to invest USD 50 billion in H'tota Trade City // Presinform, The Official Website of the Data and Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat. Sri Lanka, 02.04.13 - http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201204/20120402chinese_firm_invest_port _investment.htm

^{De Alwis M.} 27 Op. cit., p. 437.

^{Samaranayake N.} 28 Op. cit., p. 126.

²⁹ As early as the 1960s, there were rumors in Indian circles that the Chinese wanted a naval base in Sri Lanka in exchange for long-term economic assistance, and that such an agreement was allegedly reached during the visit of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, to China in 1962, but the Ceylonese authorities denied such ideas. See: Kodikara S. U. Keynote address: Geostrategic perspectives of Indo-Sri Lanka relations / / Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Colombo, 1991, p. 16 - 17.

³⁰ For more information about the strategy "Thread of Pearls", see: Lebedeva N. B. The Great Indian Ocean and the Chinese strategy "Thread of Pearls" / / Asia and Africa today. 2011, N 9; Khurana G.S. China's 'string of pearls' in the Indian Ocean and its security implications // Strategic Analysis. 2008. Vol. 32, N 1; Kostecka D.J. Places and bases: The Chinese navy's emerging support network in the Indian Ocean // Naval War College Review. Winter 2011. Vol. 64, N 1.

³¹ China builds up strategic sea lanes // The Washington Times, 17.01.05 - http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2005/jan/17/20050117-115550-1929r/?page-all#pagebreak

^{Mayilvaganan M.} 32 Engaging post-LTTE Sri Lanka: India's policy options // India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs. 2012. Vol. 68, N 1, p. 27.

³³ Report on the implementation of central and local budgets in 2012 and on draft central and local budgets for 2013 // The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. 20.03.13 -http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Speeches/2013-03/20/content_1789653.htm

³⁴ Trends in world military expenditure, 2012 // SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2013 - http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1304.pdf

³⁵ These include: Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, New Zealand. See: China to exceed combined defense budget of all other key defense markets in APAC by 2015 // IHS Pressroom, 14.02.12 - http://press.ihs.com/press-release/defense-risk-security/ china-exceed-combined-defense-budget-all-other-key-defense-marke

^{Erickson A.S.} 36 The growth of China's navy: Implications // Strategic Analysis. 2008. Vol. 32, No. 4, p. 655 - 656.

^{Kostecka D. J.} 37 Op. cit., p. 63 - 64.

^{Pant H.V.} 38 China shakes up the maritime balance in the Indian Ocean // Strategic Analysis. 2012. Vol. 36, N 3, p. 364 - 365.

^{Samaranayake N.} 39 Op. cit., p. 140.

^{Lou С.} 40 US-India-China relations in the Indian Ocean: A Chinese perspective // Strategic Analysis. 2012. Vol. 36, N 4, p. 632.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 631.

^{Khurana G.S.} 42 Op. cit., p. 3.

^{Lou p} 43 Op. cit.

^{Samaranayake N.} 44 Op. cit., p. 131, 140 - 141.

^{DeSilva-Ranasinghe S.} 45 Op. cit., p. 61

^{Parashar S.} 46 'Major troop cuts in Tamil areas' // The Times of India. Chennai, 11.08.12.

^{Soysa D.} 47 China's silicon sea route via Thailand. Boon to Hambantota, but threat to Singapore // The Island Online, 14.09.08 - http://www.island.lk/2008/09/14/features9.html

⁴⁸ Investment agreements for a $ 220 million refinery project; an agreement to invest 3.5 billion Sri Lankan rupees (more than $27.5 million). at the exchange rate for February 2013) for the construction of an information center. См.: Shree Renuka Sugars to Set up $220-m Refinery in Sri Lanka // The Hindu Business Line, 11.02.13 - http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/companies/shree-renuka-sugars-to-set-up-220m-refinery-in-s ri-lanka/article4402954.ece; Sirimane S. I India's Trimax IT to Invest Rs 3.5 bnin Technology Park at Hambantota//Daily News. Sri Lanka, 29.11.12.

⁴⁹ US keen to increase investment in SL - Ambassador // Presinform, The Official Website of the Data and Information Unit of the Presidential Secretariat. Sri Lanka, 23.01.13 - http://www.priu.gov.lk/news_update/Current_Affairs/ca201301/20130123us_keen_increase_invest ment_sl.htm

^{Werake M.} 50 China and South Asia: Some historical perspectives // South Asian strategic issues: Sri Lankan perspectives. New Delhi, 1990, p. 65.

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