E. I. ZELENEV

Doctor of Historical Sciences, National Research University Higher School of Economics-Saint Petersburg

Keywords: fitna, fitnah, "Arab spring", jihad, Saudi Arabia, Syria, caliphate, minority, majority

Methodologically, there is no minority without a majority, and, conversely, the discovery of a majority is inevitably accompanied by the identification of a minority. In almost all Arab countries affected by the crisis processes of 2011-2012 and later, the conflict along the "minority" - "majority" line defines the overall political landscape. This type of conflict manifests itself within the framework of a political identity crisis, pushing the individual to ally with a particular political force, including a non-dominant one. The same type of conflict divides society along the borders of religious, ethnic, social, cultural and other groups. Overcoming this type of conflict with the help of recently very effective methods of ideological consolidation, such as nationalism and patriotism, is becoming more and more difficult, as the states of the region are increasingly losing their real influence and ability to manage the society of their countries by civilized means.

Under these circumstances, the opposing sides - the authorities and the opposition - are trying to avoid bloodshed and collapse of the entire political system. Increasingly, internal political conflicts are taking on religious forms that are familiar to the Arab-Islamic political culture.

In a number of Arab countries in 2011-2012, as a result of the change or weakening of state power, Islamic political parties turned into leading political forces - the Islamic Renaissance Movement (Harakat Ennahda al-Islamiya) in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood Association (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun) in Egypt, the Islamic State (Ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya) in parts of Syria and Iraq, some others. Therefore, it is not surprising that religious circles have taken up the issue of the legitimacy of the events that took place, and they are interested in ensuring that the public opinion of their countries sees regime change as something permissible and legitimate, from the point of view of Islamic political and legal thought. There was even a somewhat curious trend of Islamic legal doctrine - "Fiqh of the Revolution", which was founded by a prominent Egyptian Islamic preacher - an authoritative scholar and theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi. ¹

The majority of Islamic religious experts consider mass protests in Arab countries in 2011-2012. and later as a traditional but illegal form of political action under Sharia law-fitnah. Islamic radicals believe that mass actions should be prohibited in accordance with the principle of" Sadd al-Zarai " - blocking the paths leading to what is forbidden by Sharia law.

An influential minority of Muslim experts basically deny the existence of such forms of protest in Islam in the past and consider the mass protests of 2011-2012 and later as an innovation borrowed from the secular West, which, in principle, is permissible: Muslims borrowed the achievements of Western education, economics, management, politics and law.

It is another matter whether this is acceptable in modern conditions, and whether it violates the imperative rules of Sharia law.

Answering this question, proponents of the " borrowing theory-

The publication is based on the results of the project "Minority and Majority in the Asian-African area: "Ethics" vs "Efficiency" in the Context of sociocultural Interaction", implemented within the framework of the Fundamental Research Program of the Higher School of Economics (HSE).

They are divided into two irreconcilable groups.

One group of Islamic jurists considers this innovation from the position of "presumption of permissiveness", i.e., as an innovation permissible from the point of view of Sharia law. Since the Sharia Law does not contain any direct prescriptions for mass demonstrations, for example, Yusuf al-Qaradawi asserts that they are permissible in principle, with some reservations.² This position is shared by the famous Muslim theologian and jurist Hakim al-Mutayri, the famous Kuwaiti scholar Bassam al-Shatty, of course, Yusuf al-Qaradawi himself and some others.

Another group of Islamic jurists also views mass protest movements as an innovation borrowed from the secular West, but regards them as b'ida-a sinful innovation. If the government deviates from Sharia and acts arbitrarily, then the only way to influence it is to exhort the ruler, appeal to him with advice.³

This group of legal experts comes to the conclusion that mass protests and demonstrations are unacceptable, but not because it is a traditional fitnah, but quite the opposite, because it is a bida - an unacceptable innovation. The main argument of the proponents of the" borrowing theory " is that neither in the time of the Prophet, nor in the time of his closest companions, nor later, did the practice of mass political protest actions exist among Muslims.

In the following study, the term fitnah is considered as a real form of mass protest actions, although undesirable for the authorities (who disputes this!), but in certain circumstances it is the only form of self - expression available to the opposition.

In modern Arab-Islamic political culture, the term fitnah, along with its religious meaning, gets a new, non-religious political meaning, which often brings it closer to the concepts of thaura (revolution) and jihad (holy war).

In our opinion, the interpretation of mass protest movements in Arab countries using the concepts of traditional Arab-Islamic political culture makes it easier to understand the course of events and motivate their participants.

THEORY AND RESEARCH METHOD

The term fitnah is translated into Russian as temptation, enticement, enticement, rebellion, rebellion, confusion, indignation, riots, riot, unrest, protest, recklessness, madness, discord, disagreement, delusion, provocation, disaster, misadventure, unbelief or even denial of faith. Equally diverse will be the options for translating this concept into English-temptation, enticement, mutiny, rebellion, turmoil, riot, revolt, insanity, discord, delusion, testing, afflictions, trials, lack of faith, disbelief. Such a variety of translation possibilities is understandable: fitnah as a concept - polysemantic, as a historical phenomenon - occurs in a variety of forms.

The relevance of the fitnah study is explained by the application of this term to various political protests in the Arab world in 2011-2014. As noted above, among the Islamic religious community, most experts tend to view mass protest actions as similar, close, or identical in form to the traditional fitnah.

Objective analysts do not look for the right and the wrong, but seek to understand the economic and political aspects (internal and external).⁵ consequences of the Arab uprisings reveal specific features of local political processes ⁶. Studies that analyze the meaning and meaning of specific concepts and categories of political culture in the Arab world*are somewhat different. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, concepts, if they carry the meaning of cultural codes**, have a huge impact on ordinary participants in political conflicts, complementing and even replacing reality.⁷

Often, a change in the essence of political culture begins precisely with a revision of the meaning of basic concepts. The concept of fitnah, entering into a "language game" in the field of Arabic, especially other languages, can very ambiguously characterize an oppositional political action. As a traditional Qur'anic concept, fitnah has been very fully considered by Islamic theologians, such as Muhammad al-Humayes [⁸] and his interpreters [⁹].

The novelty of the research consists in the method of binary consideration of the fitnah phenomenon both as a concept and as a historical and political phenomenon at the same time, as well as in identifying new functions of fitnah, for example, as a form of mass political action during the pre-election political struggle.

FITNAH IN THE HISTORY OF THE ARABS

In 2012-2013, a number of Russian and foreign publications published articles about the Arab concept of fitnah as a kind of updated form of political action,which became unexpectedly widespread in a number of Arab countries during and after the events of spring 2011.10, 11, ^{12, 13, 14.} There is reason to say that fitnah as a phenomenon of Arab and international politics is considered to be

* We are talking about followers of the "symbolic" or "interpretive" anthropology of the American scientist Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) (author's note).

** For the concept of" cultural code", see: E. Lawrence. The Central Liberal Truth: How Politics Can Change a Culture and Save it from Itself. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 288 p.; Narochnitskaya N. A. Russian code of Development. Moscow, Knizhny mir, 2013.

shire-Islamic political culture has deep not only religious, but also historical, political and social roots. The widespread use of this form of political protest in modern conditions, not only in the Arab and Islamic world, but also beyond their borders, is apparently not accidental.

The term fitnah and its derivatives occur more than 30 times in the Qur'an, and always with a negative moral assessment. The meaning of this concept is based on the meaning of the verb basis "fa-tana" - to charm, bewitch, seduce. This puts on all the words from this basis a shade of "unconscious" and" involuntary " action, but this cannot serve as an excuse before the Almighty. The Qur'an says that fitnah (disbelief, temptation, confusion) is a greater sin than even murder [Qur'an, 2: 191]. "And fight them until there is no more fitnah (disbelief, temptation)" [Quran 2: 193]. "Kill them until the fitna (disbelief, temptation) ceases." [The Qur'an, 8: 39]. From the context, it is clear that the Qur'an refers to a form of religious dissent - sectarianism.

It is very likely that fitnah as a term and as a phenomenon existed even before Islam. In the Qur'an, fitnah is described as a highly undesirable phenomenon, but it is well-known and widespread. In the Islamic period, fitnah as a form of protest was preserved, moreover, it acquired, so to speak, "classical forms".

Despite the moral condemnation of fitnah in the Koran, attempts to use spontaneous discontent for political purposes, to make spontaneous protest manageable, have taken place in various periods of Arab-Islamic history. In al-Tabari (838-923), the author of one of the most authoritative sources on the history of the first centuries of Islam, the term fitnah first refers to the events of the ar-ridda ("apostasy") - an uprising of the Arabian tribes that in 632-633 opposed the authority of the Caliph Abu Bekr15.

In Arabic political vocabulary, the term fitnah was widely applied to the events of 656-661 associated with the struggle for caliphal power between the fourth righteous Caliph Ali and the pretender to the caliphal throne from the Umayyad dynasty, the ruler of the Syrian regions of the Arab Caliphate named Muawiyah ibn Abu Sufyan. The unrest led to a major split within Islam - the emergence of the Kharijite sectarian movement, and in the longer term-the establishment of the ruling Umayyad dynasty and the beginning of a religious and political split in Islam into Sunnis and Shiites. This fitnah was of a mixed religious and political nature.

For the second time, the term was widely applied to the events of 680-692, which were caused by the death of the first Umayyad caliph, Mu'awiyah, and the rise to power of his son Yazid (d. 683). The first and second fitnah (as they are called in Arabic historical writings) can be considered as two stages of the same period the struggle for political power in the young Arab empire and had a mixed religious and political character.

Later, the term fitnah was applied to the events of 744-750 AD, which brought the Abbasid dynasty to power in the Arab-Islamic caliphate and the emergence of the so-called Baghdad Caliphate. These events are often referred to as the third fitnah. As the fourth fitnah in historical literature, events related to the coming to power of Caliph al-Ma'mun (813-833), who defeated his brother Al - Amin, appear. Both of them were sons of the great Harun ar-Rashid (766-809). The religious Islamic factor in all the first four examples of fitnah was of great importance along with the political factor, which allows us to characterize these protest movements as religiously political.

Later, the Arab-Islamic fitnahs no longer had the usual ordinal numbers, and events similar to it in form occurred regularly, dramatically, ambiguously, and, as a rule, with noticeable consequences for the history of the Arabs. An important feature of the manifestation of this form of protest actions at a later time was the reduction or complete absence of the religious factor.

Thus, a period of peculiar turmoil began in the Abbasid caliphate after the transfer of the capital from Baghdad to the newly built city of Samarra. 861-870 caliphs (rulers) The leaders of the slave Guards (Ghulams), who organized riots and riots, politically demoralizing the caliphs by threatening to use fitnah, became virtually hostages of the Baghdad or Abbasid Empire. The religious factor in these events can only be seen in the fact that the Ghulams opposed not only the secular ruler, but also the caliph - the head of the faithful, which from the Islamic point of view made their behavior absolutely illegitimate. There was a case when the demoralized Caliph Ahmad al-Musta'in (862-866), whose residence was located in Samarra, fled from the threat of turmoil to Baghdad, but was arrested and executed, and his place was taken by the Caliph al-Mu'tazz (866-869), who soon became the victim of a conspiracy-was starved and thirsty by the rebel Guards ¹⁶.

Such demoralization of the authorities during the time of troubles is quite rare and deserves special study. As a modern example, let us cite the flight of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who is now permanently stationed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from the turmoil of the "jasmine Revolution" in Tunis in January 2011.

In some cases, fitnah has become so established as a valid form of expression of non-religious protest that

acquired a ritual design. For example, in Ottoman Egypt in the 17th century, it became a practice to use the threat of fitnah (mass and not always peaceful protest) to remove an unpopular governor. In place of the deposed governor, a person acting temporarily at the choice of the Mamluk political elite, united in the governing political council - beylikat, was appointed.

The first precedent of this kind occurred in 1623, then it was repeated so often that it became a tradition and began to be accompanied by a certain ritual. The beys, who were part of the beylikat, decided to seek the removal of the governor appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, but they did not advertise this in any way, on the contrary, they made it clear that they were not acting out of personal arbitrariness, but as representatives of public opinion.

To the governor's displeasure, the beys sent a messenger in a white cloak and white cap riding on a donkey with a very dangerous mission: to announce the threat to start fitnah. The messenger entered the territory of the governor's residence, entered the reception hall, bent the edge of the floor carpet or touched the edge of the small carpet on which the pasha was sitting, and said: "Pasha, you are displaced." According to another version, he left in silence, because just his appearance spoke for itself. The governor was left with a choice: to fight against the imminent "mass spontaneous protest movement", which at any moment could turn into an armed rebellion, or to resign and leave the country.¹⁷

Social and political discontent in the form of fitnah, which developed into an uprising, took place in Egypt in 1882 and 1919. ¹⁸ Even the entire known period of political struggle that brought Muhammad Ali (1803-1805) to power in Egypt resembled a "classic turmoil" ¹⁹. The author of these lines witnessed mini-troubles. - 1993, which took place in Egypt in the area of Al-Tahrir Square in Cairo.

We believe that fitnah was present in the Arab-Islamic political culture as a stable form of protest action where there was no effective mechanism for resolving the contradiction between the majority and the minority. Fitnah was perceived (usually unconsciously) by its participants as an extreme, but unavoidable form of expressing their political will in the current conditions. If the authorities agreed to treat the protest as a fitnah, ordinary participants did not risk anything; if the authorities overestimated the threat level, calling it, for example, an uprising (inkilab), then casualties on both sides became inevitable.

Finally, already in the twentieth century, fitnah acquired an exclusively political meaning, becoming an instrument of political pre-election struggle. One of the first examples of this kind is connected with the events of 1908, when the pre-election campaign trip of the famous religious and political figure Rashid Rida (1865-1935) to Damascus, where he called for voting for the candidates of the Young Turk Unity and Progress party, provoked thousands of protest demonstrations.

It almost came to armed clashes on a cross-party basis. An unfavorable development of events was stopped at the last moment with the help of government-sanctioned intervention by representatives of the Syrian religious elite loyal to the Young Turks. It was the religious elite represented by Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar and some other theologians who mediated between the population and the authorities in this case.²⁰

In this case, the search for the social, economic, and especially religious background of what happened hardly leads to an adequate understanding of the events that are included in the historical literature under the title "fitnah in the month of Ramadan". It is the form of fitnah that makes the behavior of the authorities and the opposition understandable, especially since the subject of disagreement is quite democratic and modern: the electoral interests of political parties.

In all the countries affected by the events of the "Arab spring" of 2011, fitnah, if we follow the majority of Muslim religious and legal experts in recognizing its existence there, even in some updated form, was not religious, but political in nature, since it was directed against secular dictators, which, as noted above, has had precedents in history.

FITNAH AND THE ARAB SPRING EVENTS

The past grows into the future. To capture this trend is the task of the historian. Mass political unrest in the first half of 2011 caused the relatively "peaceful" fall of the authoritarian rule of "permanent presidents" in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen. The resulting political tsunamis swept away the dictatorship of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, plunged Syria into civil war, swept waves of instability across the political landscapes of Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, aroused Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and many other Arab and non-Arab countries. Wherever the society lost stability, an unnamed and not always realized image of fitnah emerged, which often transformed into a painful state of society - anarchy (fauda) with a characteristic armed arbitrariness on both sides-the authorities and the opposition.

In fact, events in all these countries in 2011-2012 followed a similar scenario. In certain places, spontaneous mass events occur.

crowds of protesting people of different social backgrounds and political beliefs. They organize impromptu rallies, put forward various political slogans, which, in the end, boil down to one thing - the overthrow of the existing political system.

Chaos and apparent powerlessness can hardly deceive an attentive political observer: almost all events from the first day of acts of" civil disobedience "to the moment of the overthrow of the" hated political leader " follow an invisible scenario, guided to one degree or another by the experienced hand of political manipulators. In this case, we are not talking about conspiracy theory, but about the "internal" mechanisms of fitnah management, when the victims borne by the protesters turn out to be "combustible material" that feeds the growing protest movement, and Friday services, as a rule, result in mass political rallies and demonstrations.

And yet, what is the specific feature of modern fitnah in comparison with previous periods? The specific feature, in our opinion, is that fitnah has taken a prominent place in the arsenal of methods of political struggle precisely in those countries where, in principle, there is no possibility of a public consensus that is actually achievable in time. The mobilization of the population to participate in mass protest actions is based on the desire of citizens to reach a conventional agreement on the goals and meaning of the policy being implemented.

There is hope in the political atmosphere that such an agreement can be renewed regularly through fair and free elections. But, alas, this is practically impossible if the government has turned into an administrative process, the purpose of which is to undermine the status of a citizen.²¹ Fitnah participants in today's circumstances not only expect concessions from the authorities, but, first of all, they demand the inclusion of mechanisms for critical discussion of values and their participation in this discussion, i.e. they strive to produce a culture.²²

This happened in February 2011, when the Al-Wafiq movement agreed to a dialogue with the authorities, putting forward very radical demands of a general democratic nature for Bahrain.²³ In Tunisia, the mission of producing a new culture was taken over by Islamists representing the Ennahda political movement.²⁴ In Egypt, the situation was even more complicated, when the poles of cultural renewal were, on the one hand, radical liberals grouped around Muhammad Mustafa al-Baradei, and on the other - representatives of the Justice and Freedom Party, behind whom stood the Muslim Brotherhood.²⁵

Paradoxically, but the fact is that the desire for cultural renewal was much deeper among the participants of the events than superficial political discontent. In essence, both liberals and Islamists (the two poles of the opposition political camp in Egypt) sought to create a new democratic political culture based on the "unanimity of the mega-community", completely replaced by the modern Arab political culture with its "political power without responsibility".

In the current conditions, fitnah is losing its character as a local form of protest, but it is increasingly becoming a universal tool for political pressure on the authorities where other forms of dialogue between the people and the rulers, "minorities" and "majorities" that are not really such, are absent (or seem unpromising). In the modern information environment with the Internet and mobile communications, fitnah is likely to be used by different political forces as a form of expressing certain political (non-religious) demands.

TURMOIL OR REVOLUTION?

On January 29, 2014, a number of Saudi publications published articles about a citizen of His Majesty Suleiman Al-Subayi who returned from Syria to his homeland and entered the territory of Syria through Turkey in August 2013. In Syria, he joined the movement of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL - Da'lat al - Islamiyya Iraq waa sham)²⁶ and participated in the armed resistance to the regime of Bashar al-Assad for about 6 months. It is noted that the young man, being in the ranks of ISIL, actively maintained his Twitter page, in which he described the fighting everyday life of the opposition. He also posted photos of the corpses of partisans killed in various parts of Syria.

His blog has gained wide popularity and collected more than 300 thousand rubles. subscribers. According to Saudi sources, Al-Subayi went to war after the death of his brother there, without even informing his parents, who found out about his son's decision when he was already on the Turkish-Syrian border.²⁷

The reasons for Al-Subaya's return to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and his departure from ISIS are not given. At the same time, Al-Hayat columnist Nasser al-Haqbani believes that the Saudis who fought in Syria against the Assad regime are beginning to reconsider their role in the conflict and are returning to KSA.

Arab News journalist Abdullah Ali Al-Bargi believes that the statements of Saudi theologians calling on young people not to join any armed groups in Syria, calling this country "the land/territory of troubles" - "Ard al-Fitna" ("the

land of fitnah"), because there are Muslims fighting against Muslims ²⁸.

Readers 'comments on this article cite the views of those who believe that jihad cannot be waged in Syria, since it is a war between Muslims, and the muftis and imams who call for a Holy War in Syria behave like" agents of foreign powers." Another opinion is expressed that the call to Holy War from the mouth of the mufti does not allow for doubts and hesitation, becoming an absolute duty of a Muslim.

A number of authoritative people close to official circles argue that declaring jihad is the prerogative of the supreme political leadership, and not of religious figures, whose opinion may be important, but not decisive. The key question remains whether the call to Holy War can be applied to a country that has been declared a " territory of turmoil."

"Territory of troubles" - "Ard al-fitna". The meaning of these words only at first glance seems superficially allegorical. In fact, we are talking about an important concept of modern Arab political culture-fitnah as a traditional form of political action, transferred from the past to modern political life.

conclusions

1. For some Muslims, the term fitnah remains exclusively a Quranic term that contains moral condemnation of the relevant actions and is used as an argument in Sunni-Shiite religious and political discussions.

2. Outside of the religious context, fitnah occurs in history in the form of mass political protest movements that unite both Muslims and non-Muslims who share the demands of the Muslim majority.

3.The term fitnah is not used by participants in political protest movements as a self - designation; competent observers, on the contrary, often use this term to characterize mass political protest actions, thereby emphasizing their officially unauthorized, but non-military nature.

4. Showing the most important property of the "language game" - to be similar to other forms of protest actions, the concept of fitnah interacts with other key concepts, such as fauda (anarchy), thaura (revolution), jihad (war for faith) and others, giving rise to new meanings within the local political cultures of individual countries.

5. In the modern Arab world, protest movements in the form of fitnah de facto lose their unambiguously negative connotation. The ease with which even in the radical Arab-Islamic political culture of Saudi Arabia, authoritative experts simultaneously give such fundamentally different definitions to the same event-fitnah and thaura (revolution) - indicates the blurring of the meaning of these concepts in traditional political culture and the impossibility of unambiguously defining conflicts containing the "minority-majority" conflict.".

* * *

The" socio-cultural viability "of Arab countries, to use the terminology of M. Thompson and A. Wildavsky, ²⁹ out of the five "pure" types of "lifestyle" (individualism, egalitarianism, hierarchy, fatalism, and autonomy), until 2011, hierarchy, fatalism, and egalitarianism (a typical combination in the Arab-Islamic world)*came to the fore.

In 2011, in a number of Arab countries, the combined actions of opposition forces led to a weakening of government institutions and their inherent relationships, and a lack of individualism and autonomy began to be felt. Their strengthening in the public consciousness is associated with the spread of protest political speeches in Arab countries, which resemble the traditional fitnah in form. The tendency to participate in them was shown not only by marginal urban social strata, but also by young students, especially students, who were supported by a significant part of the liberal intelligentsia.

Summing up, we note that the change in political culture begins with a change in its conceptual apparatus. Islamic political culture, facing conflicts based on the irreconcilability of the interests of the minority and the majority, is on the verge of serious paradigm shifts, is open, ready and, moreover, focused on them.

* According to this theory, the combination of these types of "lifestyles" determines the nature of political culture. For example, in the United States, individualism and egalitarianism dominate, which weakens the hierarchy. In Great Britain, hierarchy and individualism prevail, which practically excludes egalitarianism from the national political culture .

^{Syukiyainen L. R.} 1 "Arab Spring" and Islamic legal thought. HSE Journal. 2013, N 1, с. 16 - 37. (Syukiyaynen L.R. 2013. "Arabskaya vesna" i islamskaya pravovaya mysl // Pravo. M.) (in Russian)

² Ibid., pp. 26-27, 30, 33.

³ Ibid., pp. 30-33.

^{Saif I} 4., Rumman M.A. The economic agenda of the Islamic parties. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2012 - http://carnegieendowment.org/ files/islamist_econ.pdf; Sasson J. Economic lessons from Iraq for countries of the Arab Spring. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars. 2012 -www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Eco nomic%20Lessons%from%: Hakimian H. The Economic Prospects of the "Arab Spring": A Bumpy Road Ahead. London: CDPR SOAS. 2011 - http://www.soas.ac.uk/cdpr/publica-tions/dv/file69272.pdf

⁵ One year of the Arab Spring: Global and Regional Implications. Eds. Guzansky Y., Hel-

ler M.A. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies. 2012 -http://www.inss.org.il/ uploadimages/Import/(FILE) 1330948414.pdf; Dixon M. An Arab Spring // Review of African Political Economy. June 2011. Vol. 38, No. 128, p. 309 - 316; Steinberg G. Qatar and Arab spring: support for Islamists and anti-Syrian policy. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik, 2012 - http://www.swp-berlin.org/ fileadmin/ contents/products/ comments/2012C07_sbg.pdf; Cornel S.E., Verstandig N. Winners and losers of Arab Awakening. Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy. 2012 - http://www.isdp.eu/ images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2012_cornell-vers tan dig_arab-awakening.pdf; An Arab springboard for EU foreign policy. Eds. Biscop S., Balfour R., Emerson M. Gent: Academia Press for Egmont-The Royal Institute for International Relations: Brussels: CEPS; European Policy Centre. January, 2012 - http://www.epc.eu/documents/ uploads/pub_1409 _academia-egmont_papers_54_u1795_16x24_v2.pdf

^{Cordesman A.H.} 6 Rethinking the Arab "spring": Stability and security in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and the rest of the MENA region. Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies. 2011 -http://csis.org/files/publication/l 11102_MENA_Stability_Security.pdf; Flamini R. Turmoil in the Arab World: will democracy emerge from the "Arab Spring" // Global Researcher. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 2011. Vol. 5, No. 9, pp. 209-236; The Arab World after the Arab Spring. System monitoring of global and regional risks. / Edited by A.V. Korotaev, L. M. Isaev, and A. R. Shishkina. Moscow, Lenard, 2013. (2013. Arabskiy mir posle arabskoi vesny. Sistemnyi monitoring globalnykh i regionalnyh riskov. M.) (in Russian); The Arab crisis and its International consequences. A.D. Savateev, L. M. Isaev, M. M. Lenard, 2014. (2014. Arabsky krizis i ego mezhdunarodnye posledstviya. M.) (in Russian); Shishkina A. R., Isaev L. M. Arab World in the Digital Age. Social media as a form of political activity. M., Lenard 2014. 128 p. (Shishkina A. R., hsaev L. M. 2014. Arabsky mir v tsifrovuyu epokhu. Sotsialnye media kak forma politicheskoi aktivnosti. M.) (in Russian)

Bodriyar Zh. 7 Simvolicheskiy obmen i smert. M. Symbolic Exchange and Death, Moscow, Dobrosvet Publ., 2000, pp. 46-47. (in Russian)

⁸ The Contemporary Fitan (Afflictions, Trials, Test, Tribulation). Prepared by Saleh As-Saleh// Full text of 'English Islamic eBooks. (Abdurrahman.org/character/TheContemporaryFitan.pdf)

⁹ Islamic legal thought distinguishes two main types of fitnah: first, fitnatu-shubuhaat (fitna based on doubts); second, fitnatu-shahaawaat (fitna based on strong desires). Of the many reasons that cause fitnah, there are four main ones:: 1. Blind following of desires and corruption of intent; 2. Ignorance and the abandonment of knowledge; 3. Following the mutashaabih-unclear; 4. Following extremes or neglect). The main modern forms of fitnah are the following: 1. Fitnah on a material basis (fitnatul maal (the fitnah of wealth); 2. Fitnah because of women (fitnatu-nissa; the fitnah of women); 3. Fitnah because of fear of people due to the weakness of faith); 4. Fitnah 5. Fitnah based on following the traditions of the infidels (fitnat-taqleed al-kuffar); 6. Fitnah based on following the Shia political doctrine (fitnah of the Raafidhah). The latter type of fitna is considered by Sunnis to be a threat to their political interests in areas of traditional distribution of Sunni Muslims. This is followed by calls to protect yourself from fitna by praying to Allah, studying the Qur'an, and using Islamic education, and fourth, most importantly, forbidding others not to rebel against the general Muslim body and their leaders. - См.: The Contemporary Fitan (Afflictions, Trials, Test, Tribulation)...

¹⁰ Recipes of the Arab Spring: Russian version. / Edited by A.M. Vasiliev, N. I. Petrov, M., Algorithm, 2012. (2012. Retsepty arabskoi vesny: russkaya versiya. M.) (In Russian)

^{Isaev L. M., Shishkina A. R., Shcherbovich A. A.} 11 Egyptian turmoil of the XXI century. 2012. (Isaev L.M., Shishkina A.R., Shcherbovich A.A. 2012. Egitpetskaya smuta XXI veka. M.) (in Russian)

^{Zelenev E. I.} 12 The Arab Troubles. Up the stairs to the past / / However. Weekly magazine. N 34 (98), 10.10.2011, pp. 30-32. (Zelenev E. I. 2011. Arabskaya smuta. Vverkh po lestnitse, vedushchei v proshloe // Odnako. N 34) (in Russian)

^{Zelenev E. I.} 13 The Troubles? Anarchy? A revolution? Arab political culture on the way ...to the future / / Protest movements in Arab countries. Background, features, and prospects. Proceedings of the conference "round table". Moscow, Librocom. 2012, pp. 57-63.

^{Al-Bargi A.} 14 Saudi quits Syria fight, surrenders // Arab News. 29 January, 2014 - http://www.arabnews.com/news/517196?quicktabs_ stat2=1

^{Al-Tabari, Muhammad ibn Jarir Abu Jaafar.} 15 Taarih alummum wa-l-muluk. (History of peoples and kings). Beirut. 1407. 5 volumes. Vol. 2, p. 276.

^{Bonner М.} 16 The waning of empire, 861 - 945 // The New Cambridge History of Islam. Vol. I. The Formation of the Islamic World Sixth to Eleventh Centuries. Ed. Chase F. Robinson. Cambridge University Press. 2011, p. 305-313; As-Sayouti, Muhammad Jalalad-Din Abd ap-Rahman. Tarikhu al-khulafaa (History of the Caliphs). Beirut, 2003, pp. 274-287.

^{Lusignan S.K.} 17 History of the Revolt of Aly Bey against the Ottoman Porte. London, 1783; Marsot A.L. al-S. A History of Egypt. Cambridge UP, 2007.

^{Goldobin A.M.} 18 Egyptian Revolution of 1919. Leningrad, 1958. (Goldobin A.M. 1958. Egipetskaya revolutsiya 1919 goda. Leningrad) (in Russian); Zelenev E. I. Moslem Egypt. SPb. 2007. (Zelenev E. I. 2007. Musulmankiy Egipet, SPb) (in Russian); Koshelev V. S. Egypt. History lessons. The struggle against colonial rule and Counter-revolution (1879-1981). Minsk, 1984. (Koshelev V. S. 1984. Egipet. Uroki istorii. Borba protiv kolonialnogo gospodstva i kontrrevolyutsii (1879 - 1981) Minsk) (in Russian)

¹⁹ For more information, see: Zelenev E. I. Muhammad Ali. The struggle for power in Egypt (1801-1805). St. Petersburg, 2002. (Zelenev E. I. 2002. Muhammad Ali. Borba za vlast v Egipte (1801 - 1805). SPb) (in Russian)

²⁰ For these events, see: Zelenev E. I. Osmanizm i ego rol ' v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhizni Syrie [Osmanism and its role in the socio-political life of Syria]. The second half of the XIX-early XX centuries, Leningrad, 1990. (Zelenev E. I. 1990. Osmanism i ego rol v obshchestvenno-politicheskoi zhisni Sirii. Vtoraya polovina XIX - nachalo XX v.) (in Russian)

^{Habermas J.} 21 Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe // Theorising Citizenship. Albany, SUNY Press. 1994.

^{Stezhneva M. V.} 22 Politicheskaya kultura v razlichnikh interpretatsiyakh: analiz sotsialnogo ponyatiya // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost. M., N 5, pp. 141 - 155. (Stezhneva M. V. 2002. Politicheskaya kultura v razlichnikh interpretatsiyakh: analiz sotsialnogo ponyatiya // Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost. M., N 5) (in Russian)

^{Melkumyan E. S.} 23 Vozdushenie vlasti i oppozitsii v Bahreine [The confrontation between the authorities and the opposition in Bahrain]. The Arab world after the Arab Spring. / Edited by A. V. Korotaev, L. M. Isaev, L. M. Shishkina. 2013, с. 40 - 63. (Melkumyan E.S. 2013. Protivostoyanie vlasti i oppozitsii v Bakhreine // Sistemnyi monitoring globalnykh i regionalnykh riskov. Arabskiy mir posle arabskoi vesny. M.) (in Russian)

²⁴ The Arab world after the Arab Spring // System monitoring of global and regional risks ... pp. 396-397. (2013. Arabskiy mir posle arabskoi vesny...) (in Russian)

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

²⁶ Ad-Dawla al-Islamiya is a Sunni military-political organization that emerged in 2006 with the support of Al-Qaeda as a result of the merger of 11 religious organizations under the general leadership of Iraqi Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (eliminated by security forces as a result of a special operation in 2010). Until 2014, the organization was called The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2014, ISIL announced the creation of a self-proclaimed Islamic State located in the geopolitical triangle between Syria, Iraq and Turkey in the territory of Western Syria and Eastern Iraq controlled by ISIL. Currently, the organization is called the Islamic State (Ad-Dawla Al-Islamiyya). Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Abdullah Ibrahim Al-Samarawi), he was proclaimed Caliph of the Islamic State on June 29, 2014.

^{Al-Bargi A.} 27 Saudi quits Syria fight, surrenders // Arab News. 29 January, 2014 - http://www.arabnews.com/news/5171967quicktabs_ stat2-1

²⁸ Ibidem.

^{Thompson M., Ellias R., Wildavsky A.} 29 Cultural Theory. Doulder, Colorado, Westview. 1990.

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