V. V. KARLUSOV

Doctor of Economics

MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry

Far East Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences

A. P. KUDIN

President of MZB ADVIZER, Member of the Board of Directors of ESM GROUP

China Keywords:, power and business, retrospective analysis of relations

In the 1980s and 2000s, under the influence of both internal and external factors, and in line with the radicalization of market reforms, the state in China gradually moved from a policy of forced admission of private entrepreneurship and its social discrimination to a policy of balanced promotion and support of business in order to accelerate the growth of the country's total economic power in the context of globalization.

World practice on the examples of different countries and epochs has convincingly proved that the key factor in the formation and development of national market economies and corresponding social systems - the so - called market system genesis ¹-is constructive interaction between the state and private entrepreneurship.

Is modern China, with its transition economy, a nationally specific illustration of this rule, or, on the contrary, a peculiar exception to it?

This question is far from idle, because according to the current political guidelines, the country continues to build "socialism with the specifics of China", and the very concept of privatization, as before, actually remains outside the official political lexicon. In addition, during the current global financial and economic crisis, the world community was very insistent on the alleged return of Chinese politicians to the concept of unconditional priority of the public sector, on the renaissance in China of the corresponding diverse discrimination of private owners, and on the fact that under the pretext of fighting the crisis, "China crushed private business"².

In this context, we will briefly review the evolution of China's policy towards private entrepreneurship in the medium-term historical retrospect, structuring the development of national business and its relations with the authorities at the basic economic and institutional levels.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP: SOCIAL SCIENCE, POLITICS AND LAW

Changes in the institutional sphere during the years of reforms are manifested in the PRC at many levels-from the transformation of social science, ideology, political and legal system, forms of macro-and micro - economic regulation of private business development to the purposeful influence of the state on the mentality of the nation.

In particular, in the field of social sciences, quite heated discussions were unfolding. At the same time, the range of views on private property, entrepreneurship and privatization sometimes went far beyond the official approach, showing variations from conservative orthodox-communist to radical liberal-democratic beliefs.³ At the same time, during the entire period of market reforms, many Chinese scientists, as well as entrepreneurs, advocated for the state to ensure real equality of all forms of management based on both public and private property. The following measures were proposed to achieve this goal ⁴:

- bringing the "equalization of rights" of private property to its logical conclusion, consistently developing a modern regulatory framework for entrepreneurial activity, which includes a clear specification of the entire range of rights of owners and a system of state guarantees for their protection;

- elimination of the real (not only de jure, but also de facto) imbalance in taxation, crediting and resource supply of enterprises of various types.

forms of ownership, creating as equal macroeconomic conditions as possible for their free competition;

- step-by-step transfer and / or transformation of "shadow" forms of merging the private owner with the local bureaucracy into a much more legitimate joint-stock form of partnership between the public and private sectors of the economy (for example, within mixed joint-stock associations with a clear distinction between the rights of founders, etc.);

- implementation of a policy of overcoming the ideological and socio-psychological stereotypes of the past associated with discrimination against private property among officials and the population.

In the sphere of official politics and ideology of the People's Republic of China in the 1980s-1990s, and, to a certain extent, in the 2000s, a powerful anti-privatisation attitude complex continued to operate, inherited from traditional Marxism and Chinese political practice of the 1950s-1970s with its taboo on private property. Privatization was sharply criticized and categorically rejected as one of the possible directions of development of property reform. At the same time, as an "alternative" to privatization, a policy of economic diversification or "rational combination and development of diverse economic forms" was promoted and implemented, which included de facto small-scale private entrepreneurship, and - after the XIII CPC Congress (1987) - private capitalist entrepreneurship (in Chinese politicized terminology, respectively "individual enterprises" and "private enterprises")⁵.

The official political status of the private sector of the 1980s and early 1990s fixed the role and place of national private entrepreneurship as a purely subordinate, secondary, and therefore obviously unequal "complement" to the economy based on public property. This status reflected, first, the specifics of the phenomenon of privatization in Chinese as an evolutionary change from the bottom of the real macroeconomic ratio between private and public property in the national economy of the PRC. Secondly, he pointed out the level asynchrony of the privatization process in China, a kind of "dotted" correlation between its institutional and functional-economic components.⁶

In the 1990s and 2000s, the political status of private entrepreneurship was significantly adjusted, which was fully reflected in the decisions and official documents of the XIV - XVII CPC Congresses (1992-2007), and in fact took into account the above-mentioned recommendations of Chinese scientists on the need to legitimize private property in the PRC, gradually equalizing it in the national economy. rights with public property.

This adjustment initiated and politically ensured a radical change in the place of private entrepreneurship in the legal sphere as well. So, if in 1982 the Constitution of the People's Republic of China legalized only small business, and in 1988 - already medium and large, but only as a "supplement to the socialist social economy", then in 1999 national entrepreneurship received a qualitatively new rank of "the most important component of the market socialist economy". In 2004, the country's Constitution was finally amended in principle on the "inviolability of the lawful private property of citizens".

Accordingly, the system of legislation and legal regulation of entrepreneurial activity was gradually, but eventually very radically, changed and formed, including the adoption of a whole package of laws and bylaws. First, in 1981-1988, administrative and political guidelines and temporary regulations were adopted. But already in the 1990s, relatively modern market laws were introduced: on companies (1994), on unit enterprises (1997), on practicing doctors, on enterprises of individuals with their own capital (both 1999), and others.

In the 2000s, as part of the overall development of a systematic process of equalizing the rights of enterprises of all forms of ownership in the PRC, political, legal and rule-making activities in this area became even more active. The legislative and executive branches have adopted and / or put into effect policies, laws and bylaws that directly or indirectly regulate business activities based on various forms of ownership.

Thus, in 2003, the State Council of the People's Republic of China adopted a decree establishing sub-committees under regional governments responsible for reforming property relations (in fact, privatization) in state-owned enterprises. In 2005, "Some considerations on measures to encourage, support and guide the development of individual, private and other types of enterprises in the non-State sector of the economy", known as "36 regulations", were published. This is a fundamental document that significantly expanded and regulated the scope of access for private businesses to the sectors of the economy that were previously monopolized by the public sector. In 2006, a Regulation on the management of special funds for the development of medium and small enterprises was published, and in 2007 - Guiding proposals on the participation of the non-State sector in the construction of defense science, technology and industry and a Decree on the reform of the investment system, Considerations on accelerating the development of the service industry.

Table 1

Structure of annual growth rates of value added by the main registration types of industrial enterprises of the PRC (2010-2011,%)*

* Compiled according to the State Tax Service of the People's Republic of China.

** Only de jure private (de facto private capitalist) enterprises.

As of mid-March 2012, 10 yuan = $1.58 (approx. ed.).

In 2004. The National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China enacted the Law on Government Decisions, in 2005 approved the Law on Personal Income Tax (its updated version has been in effect since 2007), in 2006-the laws on bankruptcy of enterprises, on companies, on mutual funds (new versions). In 2007, the NPC ratified the laws on property rights, on corporate income tax, on registration of joint ventures, on employment promotion, on the employment contract, and others. In particular, the Law on Property Rights (also known in domestic Chinese studies as the law on "property law") for the first time in the history of the People's Republic of China guaranteed equality of rights of state and private property enterprises, the Law on Income Tax unified taxation of income of enterprises of national and foreign capital and approved a corresponding single rate (25%).

In May 2010, in addition to previous regulations and laws, the State Council of the People's Republic of China published a package of new regulations aimed at encouraging the private sector and encouraging private investment in infrastructure, housing, utilities and financial sectors (the "New 36 Regulations").

ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE NATIONAL BUSINESS: KEY DYNAMIC PARAMETERS AND TRENDS

One of the tangible consequences of the positive changes in the state's policy towards national business was the rapid development of the latter in comparison with all other sectors of the country's mixed economy, including the public sector and enterprises with foreign direct investment.

Thus, in the decade (1989-1998), the average annual (arithmetic) growth rate of the number of private capitalist (de jure "private" enterprises employing hired labor of 8 people or more) enterprises amounted to 33.3%, exceeding the corresponding indicators of state-owned enterprises (5.4%) by 6.2 times and collective enterprises (0.3%) - 111 times. Significantly inferior in terms of the average annual growth rate of their number to enterprises of foreign capital in 1989-1994 (40% against 70.9%), in 1995-1998 enterprises of national capital in this indicator already exceeded them by 10.8 times (29.7% against 2.75%).⁷. Much the same dynamic superiority of private business in the 1990s was also observed in the growth of such indicators as the number of employees, the cost of fixed production assets, the volume of gross output and retail turnover, tax payments, etc.

In the 2000s, the rapid development of private entrepreneurship in the PRC continued, and the contribution of the non-state sector to the overall high growth rates of the Chinese economy also increased more and more. Thus, during the 10th five-year plan (2001-2005), the number of private capitalist enterprises increased from 1,762 (2000 = 100%) to 4,301 million units, or 2.44 times; the number of people employed in them - from 20,112 to 58.24 million people, or 2.9 times; private investment in fixed assets (including the "individual" sector) increased from 470.94 to 1389.06 billion yuan-

Table 2

Dynamics of the share of enterprises of various forms of ownership in the non-agricultural sector of the Chinese economy (1978-1999,%)*

* Compiled and calculated according to the State Administrative Administration of Industry and Trade (GAUPT) of the People's Republic of China.

** The numerator shows the indicator as of the beginning, and the denominator shows the indicator as of the end of the period.

*** Including the capital of "compatriots from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao".

**** Individual and private sector.

***** Calculated indicator with a conditional tolerance of the base level 0 = 0.0001. In our opinion, such high growth indices of the share of this type of enterprises are primarily due to the fact that Chinese statistics do not reflect the real share of the shadow economy based on private ownership in the base level of 1978.

****** The calculated indicators of this line, among other things, take into account the phenomenon of sociomimicry of private enterprises under public ones (for more information, see: Karlusov V. V. Private entrepreneurship in China (Moscow, 1996), as well as the general weakening of the impact of this phenomenon as private property is legitimized and institutionalized in the PRC. This takes into account, in particular, the indicators of the mimicry part of farms in the "collective" sector (which accounted for 40-60% or more of all de jure collective enterprises in the country, the indicators of de facto private farms in the settlement and volost enterprises (VVP), as well as the share of small and part of medium-sized public sector enterprises (5 - 10%), which are rented out to individuals for multiple extended (as a result, virtually indefinite) leases. The calculation method uses the principle of averaging the results in the direction of minimizing them.

it, or 2.95 times. (As of mid-March 2012, 10 yuan was equal to $1.58 (editor's note).) The corresponding average annual (geometric average) growth rates were 19.54%, 23.70% and 24.15%^.8

During the 11th five-year plan (2006-2010), with an average annual GDP growth rate of 10.3%, the number of private enterprises grew by 14.3%, their authorized capital and tax payments to the state increased by 20.1% and 22.2%, respectively (while, for example, the latter indicator exceeded the corresponding average annual level of the public sector by 12.7%) ⁹.

In the 12th five-year plan (2011-2015), despite the ongoing impact of the global economic crisis on China, the phenomenon of rapid development of private business is still making itself felt. Thus, in January-October 2011, the value added of private industrial enterprises in China increased by 19.6% compared to the same period in 2010, which exceeded the corresponding indicators of enterprises with foreign capital by 1.8 times, state - owned enterprises-by 1.9 times, and collective enterprises-by 2.2 times (calculated according to Table 1).

In particular, the following conclusions and generalizations can be drawn from the above numerical indicators.

First, the rapid development of private capitalist entrepreneurship in relation to all other sectors of the mixed national economy can be traced in fact throughout the reform period as a steadily dominant, defining trend.

Second, as the overall scale of the private sector increases, its generally faster economic growth is increasingly showing a downward trend. For example, the average annual growth rate of the number of enterprises decreased from 33.3% in 1989-1998 to 19.5% in 2001-2005 and 14.3% in 2005-2010; the rate of decline was 2.3.

Third, differences in the growth rates of individual factors of production indicate a consistent consolidation of the average size of private enterprises. So, according to estimates, in the first half of the 2000s.

the number of employees grew faster than the number of enterprises by 1.21 times, and investments in fixed assets-even faster than the two mentioned indicators, respectively by 1.02 and 1.24 times. In the second half of the decade, the registered assets of a private entrepreneur and their tax payments increased-

Table 3

Increase in the share of non-state entrepreneurship in the sector-by-sector structure of capital investment in fixed assets in China (1995-2015,%)*

* Compiled and calculated from: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2006 (Statistical Yearbook of China 2006). Beijing, 2007.

** The numerator shows the indicator as of the beginning, and the denominator shows the indicator as of the end of the period.

*** Calculated as the geometric mean.

**** Forecast based on extrapolation of the indicator dynamics in 1995-2005.

The number of private enterprises grew faster by 1.41 and 1.55 times, respectively.

As one of the results of the development of the process of consolidation of medium-sized private capitalist enterprises, it can also be noted that by 2006 the share of farms with registered capital is more than 1 million rubles. RMB each reached 1.19 million units, or almost a quarter (more precisely, 23.9%) of the total number of these enterprises, and continued to grow ¹⁰.

CHANGING PLACE AND INCREASING ROLE OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

However, the most noticeable result of the rapid growth of private entrepreneurship in the reform China was a radical change in the sector-by-sector structure of the mixed economy. It is known that the official Chinese statistics, due to the continued politicization, in the 1990s did not yet reflect the phenomenon of mimicry of private enterprises under public ones. Nevertheless, according to its data, in 1978-1999 the share of the public sector in the gross industrial output of the country decreased from 77.6% to less than 50%, and the private sector increased from 0 to 38.8%; in retail trade, the corresponding indicators were 54.6%; 21% and 0.1%; 62.2%. At the same time, according to our estimates, as well as those of other experts who took into account the factor of social mimicry, the share of de facto private national entrepreneurship in the GDP of Chinese industry already exceeded 50% in 2000 (see Table 2).

In the second half of the 1990s and especially in the 2000s, as China moved from a predominantly labor-intensive to a predominantly capital - intensive type of economic growth, the place and role of private capitalist entrepreneurship in the national economy of the PRC continued to increase.

Thus, in 1995-2005, the share of non - state enterprises in the national volume of capital investments increased from 45.56% to 66.58%, or 1.46 times. At the same time, the corresponding aggregate share of the de jure individual and private sectors increased from 12.79% to 15.65%, and in 2006-to 17.1% ¹¹ (see Table 3).

In 2006, the de jure contribution of the private sector alone to the country's GDP exceeded 40%¹².

As of 2008, private capitalist enterprises took the leading positions in almost all parameters (at least extensive factorial and resultant) of the activity of industrial enterprises with an average size above the established standard ¹³ (see Table 4). Thus, their share in the national number of these enterprises (426,113 units) was 57.70%, in the number of employees-32.50%; in total assets-17.59%; in income from the main business-26.30%; in total profit-27.16%; in gross output-26.87%. For comparison, we note that the corresponding shares of state-owned enterprises were clearly or noticeably lower - 2,27%, 7,86%, 15,56%, 9,51%, 8,28% and 9.23%¹⁴.

In 2008, the share of private national capital in the total number of excess wholesale trade enterprises (59,432 units) reached 58.3%, retail trade (41,503 units) - 52.1%, hotel business (14,628 units) - 37.3%, restaurant business (22,523 units) - 70.3% ¹⁵ (see Table 5).

Table 4

Comparative analysis of the share of private and state-owned enterprises in the macroeconomic indicators of industrial enterprises of the People's Republic of China with an average size above the established standard (2008,%, units)*

* Calculated from: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2009 (Statistical Yearbook of China 2009). Beijing, 2010. Above - the-limit businesses (so-called over-the-limit or "over-the-limit" businesses) are business units with a core business income of more than 5 million yuan per year per enterprise. Their total share in the Chinese industry in 2008 was 426,113 units.

** De jure private (actually private capitalist) enterprises - syin tse, state-owned enterprises-goyu tse.

As of 2010, private enterprises formed the largest group of enterprises in the People's Republic of China (excluding individual farms) with 8.4 million units, an authorized capital of more than 19 trillion yuan and annual tax deductions of 1,117. 3 billion yuan. RMB. The total number of people employed in the non-agricultural private sector (including individual and private enterprises) reached 180 million. The total export volume of all non-state enterprises (including enterprises with foreign capital and the capital of "compatriots" from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) reached $450 billion, more than 2 times higher than the corresponding indicator of the public sector. Taking into account the still active factor of social mimicry of the private owner for public enterprises, the position of all de facto private enterprises in modern China is undoubtedly even more impressive ¹⁶.

Moreover, this conclusion is valid in relation to industries focused on both the domestic market and foreign economic relations.

Table 5

Number and share of private national capital enterprises in the total number of excess enterprises by sectors of the PRC economy (2008, units,%)*

* Compiled and calculated by: Zhongguo Tongji nianjian 2009 (China Statistical Yearbook 2009). Beijing, 2010.

** "Enterprises above the established standard" - see the note to Table 4.

*** Total for the specified industries.

PROBLEMS OF PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THEM

While noting significant progress in the real development of national private entrepreneurship and its institutionalization in China in the 1980s and 2000s, it should also be borne in mind that society in China continues to be a transitional society with a still politicized economy. This, for example, is clearly evident in the insufficient maturity of the institution of private property and the general incompleteness of the process of legitimizing national entrepreneurship in the PRC, at least from the point of view of the modern regulatory market economy.

This circumstance, in our opinion, is the root cause, the underlying cause of many specific problems in the development of the private sector.

Thus, according to the results of the ^7th National Sample survey of private enterprises conducted in 2006,17 A steady increase in scale and overall increase in income from business activities was accompanied by not so rare phenomena of declining profits and an increase in the share of unprofitable enterprises. In the first half of this year, the number of such enterprises accounted for 8.6% of the total number of private farms. Although the procedure for obtaining loans has become easier and more convenient for many private entrepreneurs, the conditions for collateral and sureties have become tougher. In general, 85.5% of the surveyed private entrepreneurs noted certain problems with obtaining loans.

Among the findings of the survey, it was also pointed out that difficulties in accumulating funds and discrimination on the ground continue to hinder the further regulatory development of private national enterprises.

Summing up some of the final results of the survey, Bao Yujun, Chairman of the China Society for Private Sector Problems, stated that despite a marked improvement in the external environment for the development of private enterprises in China in the 2000s, "our country has not yet developed a favorable climate for fair market competition"¹⁸.

Large-scale state financial support for the national economy-as a very effective anti-crisis measure in general-was at the same time strictly socially oriented.¹⁹ As observers and experts have pointed out in this regard, it was state-owned enterprises, not private ones, that got a huge part of the anti-crisis package of public investment totaling 4 trillion yuan ($ 588 billion, according to the 2009 exchange rate), designed to stimulate the Chinese economy through the construction of new highways, railways and other major infrastructure projects.

"The private sector gets the bones, and all the meat is eaten by state - owned enterprises," said Cai Hua, vice director of the Zhejiang Provincial Chamber of Commerce. In his opinion, state control over industry is necessary for China to successfully compete at the international level and guide the development of the country's economy accordingly. However, the advantages that state-owned enterprises enjoy at the local level, such as priorities in obtaining loans from state-owned banks, financial assistance in crisis situations, and in distributing government stimulus packages, obviously place the private sector in a position of"fundamental inequality" ²⁰.

"In 2009, we witnessed a significant expansion of the state's presence in the corporate sector," says Huang Yasheng, one of China's leading experts working in the West21. " This year alone, the leadership of a number of provinces and cities in China created about 8,000 state-owned companies, through which the flow of state investment in industry and other industries passes economic spheres... State-owned enterprises now - among other things-produce yogurt and engage in real estate. " ²²

As Michael Wynes, an expert on the New York Times global economy, notes on this occasion,"...Today (March 2010 - Ed.), economists are wondering whether China, which officially continues to call itself socialist, but in the West has long been perceived as a model of rigid capitalism, is going to restore state control over some areas of the economy. Today, this issue is more important than before. This year, China surpassed Japan to become the world's second-largest economy, and the state-led development model it embodies is hugely attractive to poor countries.²³ Once diligently trained by the United States, Chinese leaders during the financial crisis were reasserted in their belief in the crucial importance of government management of the economy and that private enterprise should play only a supporting role... At the same time, the Chinese authorities tried to limit the excessive activity of state-owned enterprises in the field of real estate speculation, lending, etc.... Still, China's success provides a powerful argument for a strategy of widespread state presence in the economy.

South Korea and Japan have also achieved success and prosperity in the face of strong government intervention in the economy... Experts are only concerned with two questions: how much longer will state control over large sectors of the economy continue to contribute to their growth, and will China be able to restructure its policy towards these sectors of the economy if the current strategy ceases to bring success? " ²⁴

In our opinion, quite balanced answers to such questions of Chinese and foreign analysts concerning the relationship between government and business in China were given in a number of post-crisis speeches by the country's top party and government leaders.

In particular, as Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, noted at a press conference following the 4th session of the National People's Congress of the 11th convocation (March 2011), China is now detailing the rules aimed at further promoting the development of the non-state sector of the economy. Although China "promised to treat enterprises of all forms of ownership equally in terms of legislation and policy measures, such as budgetary, tax and financial measures, as well as in the area of market access" in the above-mentioned "36 regulations" and "New 36 Regulations", however, " such measures have not been fully implemented", which caused private investors to complain about visible and invisible barriers in the development of their own business.

"We are currently developing detailed rules for implementing the New 36 Regulations," Wen said....The Government adheres to the principle of strengthening and developing the public sector of the economy and supporting, encouraging and directing the development of the non-State sector... We encourage enterprises of different forms of ownership to compete with each other in order to ensure common development. " ²⁵

Summing up some general results, we can conclude, in particular, the following. During the reform period - and especially in the 2000s and 2010s-China, despite certain backward movements caused by the global situation, developed an evolutionary process of institutionalization and legitimization of private entrepreneurship.

This model is more or less similar to foreign, primarily East Asian, analogues of social partnership in developing market societies. At the same time, it is a model that is adequate to the new stage of the socio - economic strategy of the PRC as a strategy for the harmonious development of the economy, society and nature.

¹ Market systemogenesis (RSG) is one of the key conceptual categories of market methodology as a sociosystem, introduced by V. V. Karlusov in the mid - 1990s and developed in a number of his subsequent scientific and educational works. - See, in particular: Private entrepreneurship in China (Moscow, 1996); Russia, continental and insular China: to the study of models of modern market systemogenesis // East. 1997, No. 6; Russia and China: to compare the market systemogenesis // RGNF Bulletin. 1997, No. 4; China and Russia: to develop the methodology of market systemogenesis // Abstracts of the VIII International Scientific Conference " China. Chinese civilization and the world. History, Modernity, Prospects "(Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on the Problems of complex study of modern China; IDV RAS, 1997. Part 1); East and West: on the typology of market systemogenesis // Abstracts of the IX International Scientific Conference " China, Chinese Civilization and the World. Istoriya, sovremennost', perspektivy [History, Modernity, Prospects]. Moscow, 1998, Part 1; Globalizatsiya // Economic diplomacy in the context of globalization. Textbook for universities, Chapter II (MGIMO (U) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, 2010).

² The New York Times, 03.09.2010.

³ For the main directions of these discussions in the 1980s and 1990s, see, in particular, Karlusov V. V. Private Entrepreneurship in China, Moscow, 1996, p. 17.

⁴ See: Karlusov V., Kudin A., Kalashnikov D., Ankilov K. China in the WTO: Lessons of National Business Support / Problems of the Far East, 2004, No. 1.

⁵ For more information on the Chinese essential and terminological features of identifying two blocks of the private national sector (small-scale and private-capitalist), see: Karlusov V. V. Decree of soch., pp. 60-62.

⁶ For more information, see: ibid., pp. 13-58, 250-255.

⁷ Data and calculation based on the data of the State Guard of the People's Republic of China.

⁸ Calculated from: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2006 (Statistical Yearbook of China 2006). Beijing, 2006.

⁹ Data and calculation based on data from the speech of the Chairman of the National Association of Industrialists and Merchants (UAPT) China's Huang Mengfu at a meeting in Beijing on January 18, 2011.

¹⁰ Calculation by: People's Daily, 2007, April 24.

¹¹ Calculation by: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1996-2007 (Statistical Yearbook of China for 1996-2007). Beijing, 1996-2007.

¹² "People's Daily" online, 2007, February 12.

¹³ so-called over-the-limit or "over-the-limit" companies, i.e. those with core business income of more than 5 million yuan per year per company.

¹⁴ Calculated from: Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2009.

¹⁵ Calculated from: ibid.

¹⁶ For more information about the sociomimicry of private owners in China, see: Karlusov V. V. Decree of soch., pp. 71-87.

^{The 17} official subjects and organizers of the survey were UAPT, HAUPT, and the Chinese Society for Private Sector Problems. The first survey of this kind was conducted in China in 1993.

¹⁸ Cit. by: People's Daily Online, 2007, February 12.

¹⁹ For more details on anti-crisis measures to support the national economy in the PRC, see, in particular: Karlusov V. V. Economy of China and the global financial Crisis / / People's Republic of China: politics, Economy, Culture. To the 60th anniversary of the People's Republic of China (Moscow: FORUM Publishing House, 2009, pp. 457-473); aka: China: anti-crisis potential of the economy and measures to combat the global crisis / Voprosy ekonomiki, 2009, No. 6, pp. 125-137; aka: Kitai: razvitie vseradstvie krizisu / Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, 2010, No. 4, pp. 191-200.

²⁰ The New York Times, 03.09.2010.

²¹ Professor at Harvard and Massachusetts Universities (USA), author of the fundamental monograph "Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State", well-known in the West, translated and published in Russian in the Skolkovo series. - See: Yasheng Huang. Capitalism in Chinese: State and Business, Alpina Publishers, 2010, 375 p.

²² The New York Times, 03.09.2010.

²³ In terms of GDP, calculated at the official exchange rate. If we calculate GDP based on purchasing power parity (PPP) of the yuan and the yen, then China surpassed Japan in this indicator back in 1995.

²⁴ The New York Times, 03.09.2010.

²⁵ Cit. Based on the materials of the Xinhua News Agency (March 2011).

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