Diminishing the Nuclear Threat. NATO's Defence and New Technology, Lnd. 1984. 63 p.

In 1980, the British Atlantic Committee (BAC) invited its president, Marshal of the Royal Air Force of England Lord Cameron, to lead a special group to develop a new "global strategy" for NATO. The group included military personnel who held the highest positions in NATO, permanent representatives of the United Kingdom in this organization, serving from its staff. In February 1984, a document was published on behalf of the LHC, which represents the outcome of this work.

It is noteworthy that among the reasons for the need to review the problems facing NATO, the authors cite the unprecedented rise of the mass anti-war movement, as well as the fact that some aspects of the policy of this aggressive bloc cause doubts and disputes even among its supporters. With this in mind, the authors set themselves two tasks: to outline a NATO course that would correspond to the "new military technology" and at the same time contribute to "maintaining the prestige of NATO in the world" (p.5), i.e. would be acceptable to British public opinion and at the same time influence its formation.

The rapid development of science and technology in recent years requires, according to the authors, to re-examine and rethink the main foreign policy and military goals of the West, which, in their words, consist in "establishing peace by constantly moving towards a new world order" (p. 9). Stating that such an order does not yet exist in the world, the authors believe for NATO, it is necessary to have such "deterrents" that would make it "clear to any alleged aggressor that the price to be paid for aggression will be prohibitively high "(ibid.). Previously, this idea, the authors note, was expressed by the doctrine of "flexible response", but in the new conditions, from their point of view, it no longer meets this goal. It is the new technology that makes it possible, according to the LHC, to provide effective "deterrents". Along the way, it is suggested that this technology will gradually weaken the West's dependence on nuclear weapons.

In the 60s, the authors point out, NATO, having an advantage in both medium-range and strategic nuclear weapons, expected to significantly increase its combat power in the field of conventional weapons, which, however, did not happen. The authors acknowledge that the Warsaw Pact Organization (ATS) has "achieved nuclear parity" (p.10). In the field of conventional weapons, the authors, despite the well-known facts confirming the existence of an approximate balance of the armed forces and weapons of NATO and the ATS, claim that the balance of forces has changed in favor of the ATS, and this, in their opinion, also contributed to the fact that the strategy of "flexible response" is outdated.

The new technology, the document says, allows for non-nuclear defense. It will be possible to openly, clearly and clearly declare the reduction of the huge number of" superfluous in the new conditions " nuclear warheads accumulated by both sides (p. 13, 14, 61). The document calls for renewed efforts to exchange information, promote dialogue and discussions, and establish clear rules of coexistence between East and West. These measures, the document says, would eliminate the situation in which " each side tries to leave behind the other, adhering to the obsession that the other side has a monopoly on certain types of weapons. This should also mean the curtailment of forward-launched nuclear warheads" (p. 61).

Hoping to use these measures to make the NATO bloc more attractive to the public, as well as taking into account the peoples ' concerns about the growing threat of a thermonuclear catastrophe, the authors state that while all these actions would reduce the threat of nuclear war, they would not make nuclear weapons unnecessary at all. It is characteristic that they do not reject the concept of a "first nuclear strike", and this actually negates their reasoning about reducing the thermonuclear threat, once again confirming the aggressive nature of NATO.

In the prevention of a new World war, the authors assign a particularly important role to "surveillance devices" designed to control the situation in the country.-

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provide information about the parties ' "weapons and calculations" in a timely manner, which they believe reduces the risk of armed conflict. However, historical experience does not confirm the opinion expressed by the authors, who claim that it was the lack of such "means of observation" in the first half of the twentieth century that led to the outbreak of two world wars, since this circumstance was associated with miscalculations regarding the possibilities of attack and the strength of a retaliatory strike.

It is characteristic that the authors emphasize the importance of the "new technology" of surveillance for developing countries, where, according to them, it is almost completely absent (pp. 20-21). In general, BUCK believes that outside of Europe, NATO countries should take into account the almost complete lack of surveillance tools and possible political and military miscalculations associated with this and "act to eliminate their consequences" (p.95). Such judgments are actually aimed at justifying the intervention of the United States and other NATO countries in the affairs of developing countries.

Speaking about space weapons, the authors note that "surveillance" using new technical means can also become an important stabilizing factor. At the same time, the document points out that an attempt by any side to achieve the ability to conduct a space war would not only be ridiculous, but would also cause a weakening of deterrence (pp. 22-24).

In the document under consideration, NATO is repeatedly and persistently presented as a defensive alliance of states that allegedly seek to live in peace with the USSR and other ATS countries. NATO's "new strategy" of nuclear and conventional weapons, the authors pharisaically state, is designed to serve this purpose. Meanwhile, the current dangerous situation in the world has developed precisely as a result of the course of the United States and NATO aimed at disrupting the military - strategic balance, achieving military superiority over the USSR and other ATS countries.

Then the authors proceed to direct consideration of the actual technological issues. If during the First World War, they write, the development of weapons was determined by achievements in chemistry and mechanical engineering, and during the Second World War-by successes in physics, now the most important direction is electronics, which provides the development and "improvement of communication tools, observation techniques from outer space, advantages in target guidance, tactical observation." and in countermeasures both in air space, on the ground and at sea (pp. 27, 28, 30-31). A special place is given to the development of battlefield surveillance tools. The new technology, the authors point out, allows you to conduct military operations in any weather conditions and at any time of the day. The leading developments in this area, according to the LHC, belong to Great Britain (p. 29, 61-62).

The document notes the need to develop a new mechanism for consultation, strategic planning and servicing of high-level conferences, which could be held more frequently, which would benefit the cause. NATO members, the document says, should try to reach an agreement under which Western European countries would allocate more funds for conventional weapons, provided that "the United States takes a more flexible position on nuclear disarmament issues" (p. 35). Public opinion, the report emphasizes, should be considered as a potential force that should participate in the debate and, therefore, be taken into account when developing a new strategy.

The document contains specific proposals for the development of the NATO branches of the Armed Forces. 33 - 41, 46 - 47, 62). These proposals are expansionist in nature and pursue clearly aggressive goals. This is evidenced by the authors 'reference to the" Malvinas campaign " (p. 43), i.e. the actions of Great Britain in the area of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). It is no coincidence that special importance is attached to the design of ships capable of independent navigation (pp. 41-43). At the same time, it is proposed to bring British weapons in line with NATO standards (p. 44-45).

Thus, the authors do not offer anything significantly new for the NATO strategy. Their curtsies to the public are clearly demagogic in nature. The true position of the authors is most obvious when they put forward a program of a non-nuclear arms race created on the basis of the latest achievements in science and technology, a further build-up of the military power of the aggressive NATO bloc, a program in the implementation of which

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Great Britain should have an important role to play.

As for the establishment of norms of relations between States, the Soviet Union, as is well known, repeatedly put forward specific and detailed proposals to agree, for example, on the norms of relations and behavior of nuclear Powers. The adoption of these norms, which our country strictly adheres to, by all nuclear Powers would significantly reduce the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

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