N. B. LEBEDEVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Key words: India, China, Asia Pacific, South China Sea, ASEAN, Disputed Territories, Navy

India is a major player in the" chess game " in which the United States is trying to build a unified international anti-Chinese front. According to a well-known security expert, American Professor M. T. Clare, author of the acclaimed book "Oil and Blood" published in 2012, the meaning of the Obama administration's strategy is not only and not so much in the fight against terrorism, but in curbing China's economic recovery and limiting its access to the World's oceans and important sea communications. ¹. Washington relies on its traditional allies - Japan, South Korea, and Australia-in this game, while taking the Philippines under its wing.

THE "BIG GAME" WITH CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

It seems that the United States has a desire to further join Vietnam and Indonesia to this front. Washington assigns a specific role to India, intending to use its geostrategic and political advantages as a mechanism for "containing" China and controlling oil flows to the Middle Kingdom passing through the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea (SCM).

Washington benefits from both some of the rough spots in India-China relations and India's growing military capabilities. This country has a strong and quite modern armed forces, the 5th largest fleet in the world, large military bases on the west and east coasts of the country, and a good experience in organizing anti-terrorist struggle.²

The question arises: can the Pentagon carry out its plans alone in an environment where the United States is currently going through hard times? The hope for a quick way out of the economic crisis is questionable, and the international prestige and role of this superpower are weakening.

In the changing conditions in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), the US administration was forced to announce a transition to politics

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa today. 2014, N 1.

multilateral cooperation, including at sea. Developed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral M. Mullen, the strategy, called the "Global Maritime Network", and a little later - the "Global Maritime Partnership", provided not for the growth of the American Navy, but for the unification of its 300 ships with 700 ships of allies and "sympathizing" countries. ³

The United States ' concern about military and political shifts in the world's oceans is reflected in the book "Red Star over the Pacific", published at the end of 2010 by two well - known experts from the Washington Maritime College - Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes. China's rise and changes in US maritime strategy". It analyzes in detail the latest achievements of Beijing in building a Navy with the goal of becoming a naval power No. 1 and Washington's response to them ⁴.

THE MIDDLE EAST STANDOFF

This response, in particular, was that the United States sought to push China away from the sources of resources in the "Arab Spring" zone-in Libya, Sudan, Egypt - or create similar problems for the PRC in other regions of the world, for example, in the same South China Sea. According to some political analysts, behind Washington's initial plans to bring "democracy" to the region, overthrowing "authoritarian leaders", there were plans to use the "Arab Spring" in their own interests and oust China and Russia from the Mediterranean.

I'll give you some examples to prove it. So, in Libya, at the beginning of the known crisis, the PRC accounted for 11% of oil exports, and Chinese companies sold contracts totaling $18.8 billion. After the NATO military operations, China had to curtail 50 major projects and evacuate more than 30 thousand people. specialists who worked primarily at oil-producing and refining enterprises. China also left two metallurgical projects unfinished here and suffered significant losses - up to $16 billion. - losses of funds invested in railway and civil construction and other industries ⁵.

In Egypt, China did not have such large-scale projects. But in 2010, he announced the creation of a Chinese free economic zone (FEZ) in the Suez region with an investment of $1.5 billion. One of the goals of its creation was to get as close as possible to the Suez Canal and repeat the scheme of gradual acquisition of concessions that was successfully tested on the Panama Canal. As a result, the Suez Canal would eventually fall into Chinese hands. The wave of revolutionary events in Egypt scared them - by the end of 2012, investments did not even reach $1 billion.⁶

It is no coincidence that back in 2011, Li Daokui, a leading adviser to the People's Bank of China, called the prolonged political crisis in the Middle East, as well as the simultaneous rise in oil prices, the "worst-case scenario" for the Chinese economy. At the same time, China seems to have feared that attempts to support revolutions in Arab countries too actively

The Chinese armed forces on the east coast of the country.

It may have a negative impact on its relations with the oil and gas States of the Gulf, which are its main sources of energy. ⁷

The division of Sudan and the endless conflicts between the South and North of this country made the future fate of $15 billion. Chinese investments in oil fields and other industries, as well as the prospects for joint development of oil fields with India, are rather vague. Meanwhile, China received more than 7% of oil imported from Sudan.⁸ In Syria, China also established a joint venture for oil production in 2004 and significantly expanded trade ties, although it had almost no significant interests or investments in this country. China's position in another major oil - producing region, the Caspian Sea, is not very strong.⁹

From the above, the current special interest of Beijing in the South China Sea region, which, however, is not yet the main source of energy resources for China, becomes clear. But the Chinese, as you know, prefer to look 20 years ahead, and over time this region can become the largest source of hydrocarbons.

SEA "GREAT WALL OF CHINA"

China's political and economic position at sea has always been weaker than on land. For this country, the so-called "first sea ridge" has long been problematic: the Korean Peninsula - the Japanese Archipelago-Taiwan-the Philippines. Each of these regions has always been a source of tension for China. According to the above-mentioned T. Yoshihara and J. According to Holmes, this ridge can be considered as something like the "Great Wall of China" on the sea, deployed, however, against China, and as a defensive line built from US allies-South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.

Understanding the complexity of overcoming the "first ridge" in the context of increasing dependence on the supply of energy resources, goods and mineral raw materials, the Chinese military developed a strategy of two "island ridges (chains)", aimed at gradually developing sea areas and establishing a military presence first within the "first ridge".

In the zone of the" second ridge " stretching from Japan and covering Indonesia, the Carolinas and Mariana Islands with the island of Guam, Beijing expects to have its own fleet by 2020. Some experts have put forward the idea of a "third ridge", in the center of which is the Hawaiian archipelago with its air and sea bases. Its implementation was planned for 2020-2050.

All the proposed concepts were based on the main strategic task - to push the country's defense line hundreds of miles out to sea so that China would not be trapped by the forces of its enemies. It is interesting that both the "two ridges" and "three ridges" concepts largely coincided with the American concept of the advanced lines of defense of the United States and its allies, i.e., in fact, with the concept of "containing" China.

When Washington created an anti-Chinese front in the second decade of this century, together with its allies, the strengthened Chinese navy will have only a few corridors for access to the Pacific and World Oceans. That's why China is trying to get as many islands as possible and control as much of the surrounding seas as possible. Both are part of the mechanism of his " grand strategy "against the US doctrine of" blocking access "to China or" blocking " its access to the World's oceans.

In 2009, a group of US Congressmen called on the Pentagon to pay more attention to the development of the situation in the region. Here, in their opinion, tensions are growing, generated, inter alia, by the rapid growth of the Chinese Navy, which may eventually become a serious counterweight to the dominance of the American fleet in the Pacific basin.¹⁰

The period that lasted until 2010, when the United States did not interfere in territorial conflicts in the South China Sea and even avoided expressing its position on these issues, seems to have ended. U.S. officials announced in Hanoi that same year that they intended to pursue a constructive diplomatic process to resolve territorial disputes without any coercion, based on the fact that legitimate claims to parts of the South China Sea should be justified by the configuration of land territories. The US position announced for the first time contradicted both China's claims to almost all (up to 80%) of the South China Sea area and its desire to prevent the internationalization of disputes. In the ASEAN countries, the American position was generally approved.

In the current complex and contradictory circumstances in the South China Sea, India, on the one hand, supports the adoption of a new Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, the content of which has been discussed for a very long time - since 2002. On the other hand, India has not yet officially released its view on the current situation in the South China Sea. Although, according to the Indian Express newspaper, on May 20, 2013, Prime Minister M. Singh made a statement about India's refusal to take into account China's position on the disputed islands of Nansha (Spratly), Xisha

(Paracel) and Zhusha, as it considers them to be in international waters.

CHINA'S CHALLENGES AND ASEAN AND US RESPONSES

Beijing considers these islands located in its economic zone (an area of 3 million square kilometers!). Beijing authorities have included the South China Sea among the areas of their "key national interests", such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. China's desire for its own tight control in the South China Sea will create huge problems for many states, and not only in shipping.

Indonesia and Australia fear that China may use the same Spratly Islands (where the Chinese garrison of 9,000 people is already located, and by 2020 its number will increase to 20,000) as a springboard for seizing gas fields on the Indonesian shelf, and for a breakthrough to the South Pacific, where it already has their" bases of influence " are Fiji and Papua New Guinea.

Chinese intransigence and assertiveness negatively affected the discussion of the disputed territories in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Forum in Phnom Penh in 2012, where for the first time in 45 years of the organization's existence, there was a split in the positions of the Association's member countries, and the final communique was not signed. Initially, Vietnam and the Philippines, as the most interested parties, tried to work out a document, combining the positions of the Association's members in order to counter the claims of the PRC. Meanwhile, Cambodia and Laos, which have long been closely linked to China by special ties of friendship, have not joined the document.

Did this mean at the time that Beijing was able to shake the myth of the group's collective unity? And for a more distant period-that a new balance of power is emerging in Northeast Asia? In this regard, it is natural to think about the main consequences of this event, as well as about the prospects for the development of the situation in the region.

The situation is not easy. Having formulated the principles of its attitude to territorial disputes in the South China Sea and following the "Pacific Age of America" doctrine announced in 2011, the United States not only hurried to return to the Asia-Pacific region, but also began to actively revive old military-strategic ties with its allies, strengthen and expand cooperation with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and other states in the region.

Central to the search for channels of rapprochement between Washington and ASEAN was Vietnam, which has been normalizing and significantly developing relations with the United States since 2010, including dialogue between military departments, development of training programs, war games, discussion of South China Sea problems, granting the right to call American ships in Cam Ranh, etc. ¹¹

At the peak of Manila's territorial dispute with Beijing in the first half of 2011 Washington has given a clear signal of its readiness to provide assistance to this country in various areas. Thus, a Hamilton-class coastal boat was sold to the Philippines and the sale of another one was promised, the issue of training Philippine military personnel by US advisers was positively resolved, joint maneuvers were conducted, etc. Recently it became known about the parties ' plans to re-establish American military bases on Philippine territory ¹².

ASEAN'S DIFFICULT CHOICE

The activation of the United States in this region, as well as its military and political rapprochement with Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries, forced the ASEAN leadership to make a difficult choice-what to do and with whom to be?

On the one hand, for many of them, China has been an important partner for decades, contributing to their economic recovery through a wide range of cooperation. At the same time, the militarily weak group feared both the growing ambitions of Beijing and its claims to almost all of the South China Sea, and exceeding the limits of US military and other involvement in the region. They realize that even collectively, ASEAN will not be able to withstand the onslaught of either China or any major power. Apparently, the ASEAN members would like to maintain an extremely cautious, neutral line between the two giants - China and the United States, while maintaining the unity of their ranks as much as possible. Their attempts at "soft balancing" turned out to be far from simple.

However, Beijing's hopes for a split in the traditional consensus in ASEAN have been called into question. Be that as it may, the negotiation mechanism has worked and continues to work at the meetings of the ASEAN heads of State.

In the summer of 2011, these countries adopted the first joint document with China - "Directives for the implementation of the 2002 Declaration". The Declaration signed in 2002 between China and ASEAN should regulate the policy of states claiming disputed territories in the South China Sea. One of the provisions of this important document provided for the development of the so-called "Code of Conduct", which should determine the final standards for the settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

At the Shangrila Dialogue meeting in Singapore in 2012, the key message in the delegates ' speeches was clearly the need to-

the need to seek common interests (global commons), freedom of the high seas, security and stability in Southeast Asia and in the seas surrounding the region.

In the run-up to the ASEAN summit in Sandar Seri Begawan, the capital of Brunei, in April 2013, senior diplomats from the Association's member countries repeatedly stressed that the main joint efforts should be focused on achieving consensus within the organization on the disputed territories in the South China Sea. The summit participants decided to urgently develop a unified platform before sitting down for further negotiations in August 2013 with China on a draft "Code of Conduct" in order to defuse the rather tense situation in the region. The initiative was supported by Sultan of Brunei H. Bolkiah, President of the Philippines B. Aquino and others.

The search for a coincidence of different points of view on the problem continued for several months. In May 2013, Singapore hosted a regular international conference "Shangri-la Dialogue" on security issues with the participation of defense ministers, scientists, and politicians from more than 20 countries. A month later, in Hanoi, at the initiative of Vietnam, a three-day meeting of fleet commanders of the ASEAN countries discussed measures to strengthen naval cooperation of the Association's member states.

But if ASEAN tried to get the document approved as soon as possible, giving it a more stringent, binding character, then Beijing was ready to discuss it with interested parties separately. Apparently, in this way, he hoped to once again shake the unity of the ASEAN positions and try to persuade some of them to his version of the "rules of the game" in the South China Sea.

Once again, these hopes were not fulfilled. On August 13, 2013, in the resort town of Hua Hin, near Bangkok, at an informal meeting, the foreign ministers of the ASEAN member states reached a consensus on a mechanism for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea before starting negotiations with the PRC (two meetings in the ASEAN - PRC format were held in mid-September 2013). that the" Code of Conduct " in the South China Sea should become a tool for strengthening mutual trust, preventing and resolving conflicts in the event of their occurrence ¹³.

As for the degree of India's involvement in the region's affairs, in general, ASEAN members welcome its role as a certain "counterweight" to China's course. India can and does play a positive role, especially when its interests coincide with those of regional actors, but it must be extremely cautious in its actions, as its leadership demonstrates.

AN ARMS RACE OR A TRADE BLOC?

All interested parties in territorial disputes in the South China Sea understand that a final decision, despite their efforts to find an acceptable model, will probably not be made soon. Moreover, these disputes are becoming increasingly contentious. These include regrouping the interests and positions of the participating countries, leading to a new balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, debunking the already mentioned myth of ASEAN unity, bringing India and Japan closer together in military and strategic terms, etc.

The accelerated arms race in the region is a serious problem. Of course, the ASEAN countries are much weaker militarily than their neighbors from Northeast Asia or leading non-regional powers. Most ASEAN countries explain their desire to acquire more and more new weapons not only by the situation on the seas, but also by the need to combat pirates, terrorists, poaching in fishing, illegal transportation of drugs and weapons, etc.

In 2011, defense spending in Southeast Asia increased by 13.5% compared to 2010 to $24.5 billion, and is projected to increase to $40 billion by 2016. In 2011, defense budgets totaled: tiny Singapore - $9.66 billion, Thailand - $5.52 billion, Indonesia - $5.42 billion, Malaysia - $4.54 billion, Vietnam - $2.66 billion. The Philippines, which receives 90% of its weapons from the United States, plans to spend more than $1.8 billion over the next five years to modernize its armed forces.14

The volume of arms shipments to Southeast Asian countries almost tripled in 2007 - 2011, compared to 2002 - 2006, while worldwide it increased by only 24%. Large quantities of weapons were purchased during this time by Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. Singapore ranks 4th in the world in terms of spending on the import of modern weapons after China, India, and the Republic of Korea. In 2012, these expenditures accounted for 24% of the national budget and reached $10 billion.

Most of these purchases are made, for obvious reasons, for naval weapons - warships, patrol boats, radar systems, submarines, anti-ship missiles, etc. Vietnam plans to commission 6 submarines by 2020, mostly of Russian production. Each of the three states - Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia-expects to add two submarines to its submarine flotillas by that time. ¹⁵

To strengthen and raise the importance of ASEAN as a leading interstate association in the region, the following initiatives can be initiated:

there are new integration trends that are important for finding the former unity. The most attractive one is the idea of creating a Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP). It was put forward in 2011 at the ASEAN summit by one of its most energetic supporters and adherents, Malaysia, and once again highlighted the Association's ability to generate positive trends in the Asia - Pacific region. India not only showed interest in this project, but also played a big role in its promotion.

The formation of the RCEP is in the most difficult phase. On the one hand, the work on its creation has already been completed by 3/4. But for the final achievement of this extremely urgent goal, according to experts, many important problems remain to be solved. In particular, the ASEAN member States should strengthen intra-Asean economic integration, resolve existing differences, including, apparently, on the South China Sea, and ensure sustainable and even growth for each country. This appears to be difficult to achieve in a short time frame due to the uneven level of economic development and the later integration of some countries, including Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, into ASEAN.¹⁶

The question of the composition of participants in the future Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership was not so simple. During the first round of RCEP negotiations in June 2013, China questioned the feasibility of including India in the future organization, apparently mindful of the tensions that exist between the two countries in the South China Sea, and not only. Having managed to win the support of the majority of ASEAN states, India still became a member of the bloc. The second round was held in September 2013 in Australia.

India's participation in the future structure is important for the ASEAN member states, which are in a state of territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. They view India as a serious partner in pushing for the early development of a" Code of Conduct " and welcomed the statement made by Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid at the Brunei summit on the need to continue discussions on the adoption of the code by consensus.¹⁷

Thus, the 10 member states of the Association plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand intend to create a huge trade mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region - the RCEP, which many analysts see as a counterweight to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or a free trade zone in the Asia-Pacific region with more than 10 members. countries (but without the participation of the Asian economic giants-China and India).

The RCEP, which is scheduled to launch at the end of 2015, may become the world's largest trading bloc-it will represent 1/3 of the global economy. 3.3 billion people currently live in the territory of its future member countries. human.

Most likely, the new economic project will give a fresh impetus to strengthening integration trends under the auspices of ASEAN in East Asia, unite the organization and its partners on a mutually beneficial basis, stop the slow process of declining importance of the group and, probably, open the gateway to resolving issues of rivalry of national sovereignty in the South China Sea.

All this is necessary in the context of a certain complication of the atmosphere in the East Asian Summit (EAC) due to the admission of the United States and Russia to its structure in 2010, which made the organization more cumbersome and the interests of its 18 members difficult to combine. Although, after the Russian presidency at the APEC meeting in Vladivostok in September 2012, it became obvious to many that the participation of our country in the APEC summit in Vladivostok is not a problem.-

Our role in solving Asian problems is extremely important and promising.

WILL INDIA BECOME A MEMBER OF APEC?

India, with its dynamically developing economy and growing population, certainly actively supports the plans to create a new block - the RCEP and does not want to miss the chance to find and occupy its niche in the rapidly developing integration processes in the region. It has repeatedly stated its commitment to the principles of open regionalism, polycentrism and inclusiveness in creating multilateral cooperation formats. From the point of view of its leadership, these formats are flexible enough to cover the diversity of countries in the Asia-Pacific region, and they can be used to solve a wide range of existing problems in the economy and politics.

India's entry into the South China Sea, which has proved to be a very complex region with many different problems and painful territorial disputes, has not stopped its movement on the way to the Asia-Pacific region, despite the fact that it is in the thick of events in this region. By judiciously calculating its capabilities and skilfully using the "Look East" course*, India has managed to overcome a number of obstacles and gain a foothold in this space. It is looking for new formats of cooperation with the Asia-Pacific countries in a wide range of areas.

One of the most important challenges for India in this context is its APEC membership. The next conference of participants of this cooperation structure of the 21st Asian and Pacific economies was held in Bali in October 2013. Here, according to local media, a large amount of preparatory work has been carried out, similar to those, although not as large-scale as in Vladivostok before the September APEC meeting in 2012 under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation.

If the issue is resolved favorably, India could offer APEC a variety of products and services in those areas where it has achieved the most impressive achievements of the world level. These include information technology and software, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, electronics, the production of satellites and platforms for offshore oil production, pharmaceuticals, biotechnologies, the use of solar and wind energy using nanotechnology, etc. India's experience of building bridges with ASEAN, a smaller grouping, showed difficulties in reducing trade tariffs, developing the legal framework for foreign economic relations, etc., but all these difficulties were eventually overcome.

At the same time, India's commitment to the principles of democracy, independent foreign policy, and creative approach to cooperation issues may be in demand by APEC members. India would like and could participate in the six-party talks on the situation on the Korean peninsula. It has already demonstrated its commitment to resolve disputes in the South China Sea without the use of force, by peaceful means, in accordance with international rules and the 1982 UN Maritime Code. India, as one of China's major and influential competitors, can step up efforts to seek greater understanding with the ASEAN members and come up with new constructive proposals.

Disputes in the South China Sea generated India's rapprochement with Japan and the possibility of forming a partnership: USA-Japan-India, but without official commitments from the latter. Together with Australia, it could be a skirmisher in confidence-building measures on the flanks of the Indo-Pacific megaregion: Australia in the southern Pacific belt, and India in the Indian Ocean zone.

* * *

By joining APEC, India has many chances to reach a new level of interaction with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region and create a solid foundation for expanding its position in this most dynamically developing region of the world.

* For more information, see: Asia and Africa Today. 2014, No. 2, pp. 8-13.

¹ See: Klare M. T. Oil and Blood. Hempshire College Press, 2012.

² European Energy Review, 18.05.2013.

³ Asian Perspective. Vol. 33, 2009, N 3, pp. 128-129; A Cooperative Maritime Strategy for ^21st Century Sea Power - www.Navy.mil/maritime / MaritimeStrategy.pdf (October 2007); Lebedeva N. B. The Strait of Malacca - are possible ways to security / / South-East Asia: actual problems of development. Issue XVII. Moscow, 2011, pp. 33-64.

⁴ См.: Yoshihara Toshi, Holmes James R. Red Star over the Pacific: China's rise and the challenge to US Maritime Strategy. Naval Institute Press, 2010.

⁵ China and the Arab Revolutions - m.forbes.ru (15.09.2012)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Expressa.ru/transiates/3379>peresma-trivaya-nezavisimost-indii.html

⁹ Special Interview: Increased military presence in South China Sea) - www.nanhai.org.cn (14.01.2013)

¹⁰ South China Sea dispute and India - maritimendia.org (May, 2011)

¹¹ The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Vol. 26, N 2, Fall/Winter 2012, p. 71.

¹² Southeast Asia spends unprecedented funds on defense - newsstreet.ru (08.10.2012)

^{An informal ASEAN meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers will be held in the Thai port city of Hua Hin on March 13} - Russian News Cn (14.08.2013)

^{Wezeman, Simon T.} 14 Marine measurement of incoming armaments in Southeast Asia in 2007-2011 - SIPRIYB12RUS. pdf (pp. 308-309, 312).

¹⁵ A new arms race in Asia - nuclearNo.ru (15.02.2011)

¹⁶ ASEAN Summit in Brunei - www.rodon.org

¹⁷ India will become part of a regional trade bloc - news-russ.ru

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