The problems of Soviet-British relations have always attracted the attention of Soviet historians. Their works deal in detail with such important issues as the objective prerequisites for the development of these relations in various fields, the struggle between two trends - positive and negative-within the ruling circles of Great Britain on relations with the USSR, the foreign policy concepts of the main parties of Great Britain, and the peculiarities of Soviet-British relations at different stages of their development .1
These problems, as well as the changing role that Great Britain plays in the international arena, the specifics of Soviet-British relations in the post-war period, and in particular in the years of detente, are discussed in detail in the book by V. G. Trukhanovsky and N. K. Kapitonova "Soviet-British Relations. 1945-1978" (Moscow, 1979). The authors make a reasonable conclusion that in the 70s, during the period of detente, Soviet-British relations rose to a new level. At the same time, they also point to the activation of detente opponents in the UK. Soviet-British relations at the turn of the 70s-80s are considered in generalizing works on the history of foreign policy of the USSR 2 . In recent years, works have also been published on the specifics of the formation and implementation of British foreign policy .3 However, there are practically no works specifically devoted to Soviet-British relations during this period, the peculiarities of this stage of their development, and the new factors that determined their character at the turn of the 70s and 80s. This article attempts to show the main lines of development of political relations between the USSR and Great Britain during the reign of the conservative government of Thatcher.
The Soviet state has always supported normal and stable relations with Great Britain, which is one of the most developed countries in the West. It is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a close ally of the United States, an active member of the EEC and NATO, and a member of many international organizations. The UK retained significant positions in developing countries. All this underlines the importance of the state of Soviet-British relations for the whole world. However, the history of their development shows that they were characterized, as a rule, by instability. When in the 70s on the agenda
1 Cheklin V. N. USSR-Great Britain: Development of Business Relations, Moscow, 1979; Shchelokova N. A. European Security and Politics of England, Moscow, 1982, Chapter 4; Ryzhikov V. A. USSR-Great Britain: Development of Relations. 60-70-ies. Moscow, 1977; Kapitonova N. K. Issledovaniya o sovetsko-angliyskikh otnosheniyakh posleboennogo perioda [Studies on Soviet-English relations of the post-war period]. Voprosy istorii, 1975, No. 12.
2 History of Soviet foreign policy. Vol. 2. M. 1981; etc.
3 Great Britain. M. 1981; The process of forming and implementing the foreign policy of capitalist states. M. 1981; Modern diplomacy of bourgeois states. M. 1981.
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There was a question of increasing the stability of Soviet-British relations, and it was clear that the best way to achieve this was to develop the legal framework for cooperation in various fields, the system of organizations that promote its development, and the main forms and directions in which this cooperation is carried out.
These issues were raised at the summit talks in Moscow in February 1975 and during subsequent bilateral contacts. By 1979, various agreements were concluded defining the forms and directions of cooperation in trade, economic, scientific and technical fields, and a protocol on consultations was signed, which is very important from the point of view of developing relations in the political field. According to this protocol, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both countries should hold regular consultations on issues of mutual interest4 . Practice has shown that these consultations were indeed an important element of political relations between the two countries. They were held at various levels, including at the level of foreign ministers, and became quite regular. During these consultations, a wide range of international issues and issues of bilateral relations were considered.
Steps were also taken in the field of military detente, in particular, the Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in February 1975 .5 As the then British Foreign Secretary, J. R. R. Tolkien, noted: Callaghan, it was "a unique declaration proclaiming a period of particularly close Anglo-Soviet cooperation." 6 In October 1977, the Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War was signed. 7 The USSR and Great Britain participated in the work of the Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in negotiations on the limitation of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and in negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the Complete Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests. Important new features have also emerged in the development of trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two countries.
However, in the second half of the 70s, the struggle over the attitude towards the Soviet Union intensified in England, and opponents of detente became more active. This was due to a whole range of different reasons. First, the disillusionment of certain Western circles with detente, which did not lead to the "evolution" of the countries of the socialist community along the capitalist path. Secondly, the development of military detente actually put arms reduction on the agenda, which contradicted the interests of the military-industrial complex, including the largest British monopolies. Third, the success of the national liberation movement and the objective process of changing the balance of power in the so-called third world were perceived by conservative circles in the West, including Great Britain, as a result of Soviet foreign policy. Following the American administration of J. R. R. Tolkien, Carter, the Labor government of J. R. R. Tolkien. Callaghan took a number of steps that significantly worsened Soviet-British relations, in particular, tried to use contacts in the cultural field to put pressure on the USSR. Subsequently, this method was used on an even larger scale by the Conservative Thatcher government.
The activation of detente opponents in the UK has received
4 See documents and materials of the Soviet-British negotiations in Moscow on February 13-17, 1975 (Moscow, 1975).
5 Ibid.
6 Callaghan J. Challenges and Opportunities for British Foreign Policy. Lnd. 1975, p. 11.
7 Pravda, 11. X. 1977.
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The foreign policy concepts of the Conservative Party, which was in opposition until 1979, are particularly pronounced. Whereas in 1974 Conservative foreign policy representatives R. Maudling in the House of Commons and Lord Carrington in the House of Lords acknowledged the obvious fact that there was no alternative to the policy of detente, and Conservative Party theorists often repeated the call for a" more pragmatic approach " to foreign policy and taking into account the realities of the international situation, after the right-wing party, led by Thatcher, came to power in early 1975, the situation changed.
In 1975-1976. Thatcher made a number of speeches on foreign policy issues, which proclaimed the course of confrontation with socialist countries. It accused the Soviet Union of seeking "world domination"without any justification. Even the conservative Times called it an "oratorical exaggeration." 8 Thatcher's position was, however, supported by many prominent Conservatives. The objections of the more moderate supporters of foreign policy, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the "shadow cabinet" (the"cabinet" formed by the opposition party) of the Conservatives, R. Modling, were simply not taken into account when developing the Conservatives ' foreign policy platform. At the annual conference of the Conservative Party in October 1976, a document was adopted, the foreign policy section of which basically coincided with Thatcher's program. The document referred to the "Soviet military threat" and emphasized the desire to achieve "genuine detente from a position of strength", which, in fact, meant putting pressure on the USSR to force it to make unilateral concessions in various areas. 9 "It became obvious that Margaret Thatcher was developing a line in international affairs, and especially in relations with the Soviet Union, which was, in words, at least, much tougher than my own, "wrote R. Maudling, who was dismissed from the Conservative" shadow cabinet " shortly after Conference 10.
The position of the Conservative party reflected the sentiments of the British monopolies, the military-industrial complex, as well as that part of the British ruling class that was directly interested in exploiting developing countries. This was especially evident, for example, during the debate on the military budget in 1975-1979. Even timid attempts by the Labour government to limit the growth rate of military spending were constantly met with fierce resistance from Conservatives, who referred to the " growing Soviet military threat." Thatcher, as it became clear later, actively used the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Conservatives not only in debates with the Labor Party, but also as a means of strengthening unanimity in her own party. In 1978, many prominent conservatives recognized that their party was effectively split. Its leaders, such as J. Gilmour, P. Walker and others, opposed Thatcher's economic program. However, their foreign policy views were characterized by anti-Sovietism, and that is why Thatcher chose anti-Sovietism as a tool to strengthen her own authority as a party and then national leader. Of course, Thatcher's own views also played a role. "She has no experience in international affairs, and her views on the world around her are unknown, "wrote The Observer weekly on February 16, 1975, shortly after Thatcher was elected leader of the Conservative Party. However, the anticommu-
8 The Times, 4.II.1976.
9 Ibid., 4.X.1976.
10 Мaudling R. Memoirs. Lnd. 1978, p. 255.
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Thatcher's nism was no secret. The same newspaper later described her ideas about the Soviet Union as "dangerously simplistic." 11
The Conservatives ' foreign policy concept was finalized during the 1979 general parliamentary elections and during the formulation of the new Government's program. The Conservatives 'campaign document, the Conservative Manifesto, focused on "strengthening defense", increasing military spending, and modernizing the so-called independent nuclear forces. The importance of developing relations with socialist countries, including the USSR, and the policy of detente was not mentioned in this document at all12 . However, the first statements of the conservative government representatives after the election victory, along with statements about the need to "strengthen defense" (this meant a sharp increase in military spending) and develop cooperation with NATO partners, contained a promise to establish "more stable, more predictable and more fruitful relations" with the East .13 As practice has shown, however, the conservatives were not going to take any concrete steps in this direction.
The true intentions of the new Government were eloquently demonstrated by the composition of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the Minister himself, Lord Carrington, generally had the reputation of being a relatively moderate politician, his closest aide, who represented him in the House of Commons, Lord Privy Seal Gilmour, was known to be an ardent anti-communist. The same could be said of at least two state ministers (in fact, first deputy ministers) -P. Blaker and R. Luce. Thus, in 1979, a government with an openly anti - Soviet program came to power in Great Britain, whose practical activities in the field of foreign policy from the very beginning led to complications in Soviet-British relations.
The Soviet Government, guided by the principle of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems, sought to maintain normal relations with Britain. It has taken a number of steps to promote dialogue. "We are ready to continue to follow the path of expanding and deepening cooperation with Great Britain, if, of course, the British side shows the same intention, "the Soviet leadership emphasized in its greeting to the visitors of the National Exhibition of the USSR, which opened in London in May 1979,14 The desire of the USSR to develop interstate relations with Great Britain and continue the process of detente was emphasized during the meeting of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin with Thatcher during her short stay in Moscow on June 26, 197915 . "The Russians want to establish a more cordial relationship with the new government, "the Financial Times noted .16
The Soviet Government sought to actively use the existing mechanisms of bilateral relations to establish a dialogue with the British Government. In accordance with the protocol on consultations of 1975, consultations of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Great Britain at the level of deputy ministers were held in London in June 1979, during which a wide range of issues was discussed.
11 The Observer, 5.VI.1983.
12 Conservative Manifesto. Lnd. 1979, p. 29.
13 Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons( hereinafter-PDHC). Vol. 967, col. 569.
14 Pravda, 24. V. 1979.
15 Ibid., 28. VI. 1979.
16 Financial Times, 5.VII.1979.
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range of issues of international politics and bilateral relations. On August 26, 1979, during the XXXIV session of the UN General Assembly, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two countries was held.
However, the Conservative government launched an anti-Soviet campaign in the first months of its rule, which was initiated and actively participated by members of the Government. Minister of Defense F. Pim declared that the USSR is as much a threat to the world as Nazi Germany was in the 1930s 17. 18 October 1979 Thatcher, speaking in Luxembourg, threatened the Soviet people with "no less suffering" than during the Second World War18 . Her speech caused outrage in the British public; the Tribune described it as "one of the most egregious and harmful mistakes" ever made by a British Prime Minister. [19] In November 1979, a prominent member of the Conservative Party, F. Bennett, spoke in Parliament with a proposal to recall the British ambassador from the USSR and reduce the level of representation to charge d'affaires 20 . In this context, Pym's statement that "detente, not confrontation, is the leading strategy of the Western alliance" sounded like blatant demagoguery .21 The anti-Soviet campaign was designed to justify the government's toughening of the policy towards the USSR and the build-up of weapons. "The English public was prepared ahead of time and purposefully to accept the ideas and proposals that the government intended to implement," wrote the progressive English publicist G. York22 . Summing up the first year of Thatcher's reign, her biographer especially noted her "hawkish attitude" towards the USSR .23
The British government took the next step on the path of confrontation with the Soviet Union in early 1980, when, fulfilling its international duty, the Soviet Union, at the request of the Afghan government, sent a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan. Attempts by imperialist circles to disrupt the development of the revolutionary process in this country have failed. Representatives of the British government tried to prove that the Afghan events predetermined the deterioration of Soviet-British relations. In fact, the conservatives from the first days of their rule were guided by a policy of confrontation with the USSR. The events in Afghanistan were used by them as a pretext for whipping up anti-Sovietism, aggravating relations with the USSR, and justifying a new round of the arms race.
Following the United States, the United Kingdom took a series of so-called sanctions against the USSR. In the EEC, the UK tried to play the role of "coordinator" of anti-Soviet actions at the pan-European level; however, these attempts were not successful with its partners. So, although restrictions were imposed on trade with the USSR, but not on the scale that the British government sought. The position of Great Britain's partners in the EEC significantly limited the ability of the Tories themselves to apply sanctions against the USSR.
Specific measures were announced in Parliament in a special government statement on 24 January 1980. It provided for the cancellation of contacts at the highest and ministerial levels, the rejection of military exchanges that had taken place since 1975, the intensification of the ideological war against the USSR, and the restriction of trade, economic and cultural cooperation.-
17 Pravda, 20. IX. 1979.
18 Survey of Current Affairs, November, 1979, p. 319.
19 Tribune, 26.X. 1979.
20 PDHC. Vol. 973, col. 689.
21 The Times, 26.XI.1979.
22 York. War psychosis on the banks of the Thames. Problemy mira i sotsializma [Problems of Peace and Socialism], 1980, No. 7, p. 89.
23 Stephenson H. Mrs. Thatcher's First Year. Lnd. 1980, p. 88.
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tour exchange. The Conservative Government also tried to limit all contacts between British citizens and citizens of socialist countries - which, by the way, contradicted the spirit and letter of the "third basket" of the Final Act of the Pan-European Conference, which the British government has repeatedly defended .24 Soon the issue of boycotting the Olympic Games in Moscow came to the fore. But despite the various forms of pressure applied by the conservative government, British athletes took an active part in the Moscow Olympics.
The Thatcher Government sought to use the events in Afghanistan to justify its aggressive foreign policy and military course and to counter the policy of detente. Imperial habits, which were clearly evident during the Conservative years, and the desire to see vast regions of the globe as a sphere of British influence also played a role. As it became known later, a prominent conservative, former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, A. Douglas-Hume, sent a special memorandum to the parliamentary Committee on Foreign Policy, in which he called on the government to "take advantage of the current" situation. " 25 In an effort to restore British influence in the Middle East, the Tory government hastened to take advantage of this recommendation. A detachment of British warships was sent to the Mediterranean Sea in early 1980. At the same time, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, toured the countries of South-West Asia. This visit was followed by a number of others. Later, the UK supported the decision of the US government to create a "rapid deployment force" and announced that it would create such a force itself.
Britain also tried to use the Afghan events to strengthen its influence in the European Economic Area. This was especially evident when defining the economic sanctions of the EEC against the USSR, as well as during the development of the so-called plan for neutralizing Afghanistan, proposed by Lord Carrington. Thus, a precedent was created that could later be useful for the British ruling circles to justify the rights of England to a decisive role in the development of the EEC's foreign policy line. But all attempts by the ruling circles of Great Britain, together with the United States, to put pressure on the USSR and force it to abandon support for the revolutionary struggle of the Afghan people failed completely.
In the UK, there were sober voices of those who saw the danger of whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria. When Lord Carrington, speaking in Parliament on 6 February 1980, declared that the West was showing "weakness" in its relations with the East, and called for a return to the Cold War policy, this prompted the following comment from Milford, a member of the House of Lords: "I am extremely concerned about the danger created by the hysteria of some Cold War knights who have been forced to He noted that they seek to "use the events in Afghanistan to increase international tensions, accelerate the arms race, and create new obstacles to detente." 26 The Tribune noted that the threat to detente did not arise from the policy of the Soviet government, as the British conservatives claimed, but because of the course of the US administration supported by the United States. Thatcher and aimed at expanding the arms race in Europe and around the world 27 .
That the development of normal relations between the two countries depends on-
24 Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords (hereinafter - PDHL). Vol. 404, col. 530.
25 Consequences of Soviet Expansion for British Foreign Policy. Vol. XVII. Lnd 1980, p. 405.
26 PDHL. Vol. 404, col. 1371, 1436.
27 Tribune, 11.I.1980.
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Many conservatives were also aware that it was not only in the interests of the USSR, but also of Great Britain. Thus, in January 1980, Lord Carrington spoke of the need to "preserve the channels of communication" with the Soviet Union, including the political consultations provided for in the 1975 protocol, although the British government intended to conduct them at a lower level. Carrington stressed that although the events in Afghanistan would affect Britain's attitude towards the USSR, the British government was nevertheless willing to continue negotiations if it was in its interests to do so .28
The experience of the detente policy, which meant much more to the UK as a European country than to the United States, the need to continue dialogue on limiting the arms race, the refusal of which could have serious internal political consequences for conservatives, and finally, the pressure of realistic politicians and influential business circles interested in trade with the East, the progressive public of the country-all this limited the possibility of practical manifestation of anti-Sovietism. Lord Carrington, who has repeatedly stated that perpetual confrontation with the USSR is in no way in the interests of the country29, pointed out the following possible areas of cooperation:: Britain should seek "agreements on arms control, commercially viable trade, and other mutually beneficial arrangements." 30
Soviet-British relations in 1980-1981 presented a very complex picture. On the one hand, the USSR showed a constant readiness for dialogue, which was especially necessary in the context of the worsening international situation. On the other hand, the British government, while declaring its desire to preserve the channels of communication with the USSR, did not fully resume the dialogue, while putting forward preliminary conditions that were obviously unacceptable for the Soviet Union. 31 The anti-Soviet campaign continued in England. On October 1, 1980 ,The Daily Telegraph declared that " considering Russia as a civilized power and a legitimate member of the international community is a historical mistake." The Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Party Congress described the state of Soviet-British relations as "stagnation - and not through our fault." 32
In May 1980, at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and Great Britain after the declaration of sanctions, the parties ' "readiness to develop and maintain dialogue" and their intention "to develop relations on the basis of full equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for national sovereignty and mutual interests of the parties" were confirmed .33 However, there were no positive changes in the position of Great Britain, and on September 25, 1980, during a new meeting with Lord Carrington, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko stressed that the foreign policy of Great Britain "is aimed at supporting the extreme militaristic tendencies of NATO countries 'policies in European and world affairs" 34 .
At the end of 1980, when martial law was imposed in the Polish People's Republic, a new explosion occurred in the UK
28 PDHL. Vol. 404, col. 530.
29 See, for example, his presentation of 21 July 1980 in the Financial Times ot 23. VII. 1980.
30 PDHL. Vol. 404. col. 535.
31 For example, this was stated by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs P. Blaker in Parliament on October 6, 1980 (PDHC. Vol. 991, col. 471).
32 Materials of the XXVI Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1981, p. 25.
33 Pravda, 18. V. 1980.
34 Ibid., 26. IX. 1980.
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anti-Soviet hysteria. Forgetting its own statement of December 14, 1981, about the implementation of a" policy of non-interference " in Polish affairs, the British government announced new sanctions directed against both Poland and the USSR. In relation to the Soviet Union, they were limited to some restrictions on the movement of Soviet diplomats and trade representatives in the United Kingdom, 35 and so on.
At the same time, bilateral contacts continued in 1980 and 1981-1983. Consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Great Britain were held twice in 1981, twice in 1983, and in 1983 - at the level of deputy ministers. The range of issues discussed expanded; for example, whereas in 1981 the situation in the Middle East was mainly discussed ,in 1983 such international issues as detente and arms limitation came to the fore. 36 Meetings of foreign ministers continued to be an important channel of bilateral relations. They were held in 1981 and 1982 during the session of the UN General Assembly, in November 1982 in Moscow and in January 1984 in Stockholm during the Conference on Confidence-and Security-building Measures in Europe. As before, during these meetings, the intention of both powers to develop bilateral contacts was confirmed. In November 1982, the parties expressed their support for the development of political dialogue and business relations between the two countries. At a meeting in January 1984, it was noted that "cooperation, not confrontation, meets the vital interests of the peoples of both countries, the cause of peace and security on the continent" 37 .
In July 1981, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington paid a working visit to the USSR. The main focus of the talks was on the so-called plan for neutralizing Afghanistan, developed by the British Foreign Ministry. According to this plan, at the first stage of negotiations on the settlement of the Afghan issue, representatives of the legitimate government of Afghanistan were excluded from them, and at the second stage, representatives of the Afghan counter - revolutionaries were included. According to Carrington's plan, representatives of the great powers and the UN Secretary - General were to take part in the negotiations at the first stage, and at the second-the states neighboring Afghanistan. However, this attempt to control the fate of the country behind the backs of its own people was rejected by the Soviet state .38 The conservatives sought to hold the USSR responsible for the deterioration of Soviet-British relations. Thatcher hypocritically argued that if the Soviet side accepted this plan, it would be possible to "open a new chapter in relations between East and West." 39 However, the real plans of the Conservatives were different: Lord Carrington, in an interview before the visit, explicitly stated that the main purpose of the trip was to put pressure on the Soviet Union. 40
While the Soviet government considered the development of bilateral relations as one of the prerequisites for detente, as an essential factor in preserving peace and international security, the British government, on the contrary, sought to pressure the USSR to make concessions on a variety of issues related to the NJ-
35 Survey of Current Affairs, 1982, January, pp. 8 - 11, March, pp. 67 - 68.
36 Regular consultations between the Soviet and British Foreign Ministries were held in Vienna and London in February and March 1984, respectively. They discussed a wide range of international issues, including ending the arms race and disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and bilateral relations (Pravda, 22.11.1984; Izvestia, 31.111.1984).
37 Pravda, 16.1.1982; 21.1.1984.
38 Ibid., 8. VII. 1981.
39 The Times, 2.VII.1981.
40 The Sunday Times, 5.VII.1981.
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review of the domestic policy of socialist countries. The implementation of this hard line was met with discontent even in certain circles of British diplomats. Observers noted, moreover, some differences between Thatcher and her Foreign Office, including on issues of relations with the USSR (of course, there were differences in nuances) .41 Opposition representatives in Parliament have sought to exploit these discrepancies and have repeatedly accused the Prime Minister and her closest associates of having a negative impact on the Foreign Ministry.
When Lord Carrington retired in April 1983, he called for an end to the" war of nerves " and a new dialogue with the USSR. His successor as Foreign Secretary, Pym, who was dismissed in June 1983, addressed Parliament on foreign policy issues three weeks later and noted that Thatcher's line towards the USSR during all the years of her rule was reduced exclusively to "firmness", while it was urgently needed to combine "firmness and strength". dialog " 42 .
Despite the deterioration of Soviet-British relations, in 1979-1983 it was still possible to preserve the foundations of the previously established structure of bilateral relations. As noted at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers in October 1980, thanks to the principled and at the same time restrained policy of the socialist countries, it was possible "to prevent the destruction of the existing normal political contacts and ties between states." 43 But if the structure of bilateral relations in the political sphere as a whole has been preserved, then the conservative British government has used it much less productively than the potential opportunities allowed. For example, during her meeting with Alexander Kosygin in Moscow in June 1979, Thatcher focused all her attention on the so-called issue of Vietnamese refugees, clearly hoping for an unfavorable propaganda effect for the USSR in the West .44
The unconstructive approach of the British side to the possibilities of expanding the Soviet-English dialogue was clearly manifested in the behavior of the British delegation at the Madrid meeting of the States participating in the Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the first days of the meeting, the USSR advocated its speedy and successful conclusion, for the continuation and deepening of the multilateral process initiated in Helsinki, and for the adoption of a meaningful and balanced final document. The determination of the Socialist countries to expand cooperation in all areas and to ensure continuity in the pan-European process of detente was also reflected in the Prague Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Member States, adopted in January 1983,45 In an address to the participants of the Madrid meeting in May 1983, the USSR expressed its readiness to accept the draft final document submitted by the group of neutral and non-aligned countries46 . This greatly contributed to the successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting in September 1983.
The UK's position was completely different. Long before the Madrid meeting, the British government introduced a semi-annual review in Parliament of the "implementation of the Final Act".-
41 See, for example, Ibid., 9. I. 1983.
42 The Times, 22.IV. 1983; Morning Star, 30.VI.1983.
43 Pravda, 21. X. 1980.
44 Ibid., 28.VI. 1979; Financial Times, 5. VII. 1979.
45 Pravda, 7. I. 1983.
46 Ibid., 7. V. 1983.
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ta", and it was not about the actions of this government to implement it, but about the policy of the socialist countries. In fact, the "reviews" contained an undisguised slander of real socialism. Speaking to one of them on 2 July 1980, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Peter Blaker, said that at the upcoming meeting the United Kingdom would focus on fulfilling the commitments made in Helsinki by other countries, primarily socialist ones, while "the prospects for developing new initiatives in Madrid are currently not encouraging" 47 . As the Financial Times has pointed out, "Western powers are seeking a meeting to denounce the Soviet Union," while the USSR is seeking to "turn the discussion to disarmament issues." 48 In his speech at the opening of the meeting, P. Blaker laid all the blame on the USSR for the complication of the international situation .49 Later on, in Madrid, the British delegation followed, in the words of The Times, "the most outspoken anti-Russian line." 50
As K - U - Chernenko, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, noted at a meeting with Thatcher on February 14, 1984 in Moscow, "if the British side was properly prepared, bilateral relations between our countries could also be more meaningful." 51 In the Queen's throne speech after the Thatcher government came to power in May 1979, the establishment of stability in Soviet-British relations was put forward as a priority, while during the Conservative years, not only the effectiveness but also the stability of relations between the two countries decreased, as Lord Carrington was forced to admit in November 198052 .
The anti-Sovietism of the Thatcher government was evident throughout British foreign policy. It has chosen the line of unconditional support for the United States. According to the Tribune, Thatcher's policy on all major issues of international life was simply an echo of the course of the US State Dept .53 Great Britain fully agreed with Reagan's policy towards the USSR. It is no coincidence that it was in the English Parliament that the American president proclaimed a "crusade" against socialism in June 1982. In a toast to Reagan at a reception at 10 Downing Street, Thatcher called his speech a "triumph" and praised it for calling for "a long-awaited offensive in the name of freedom." 54 The British government has supported almost all major US foreign policy actions, including the creation of a "rapid reaction force" and policies in Lebanon and Central America. Even the invasion of Grenada, a member of the British Commonwealth, undertaken without consulting London, was eventually approved by the Thatcher Government. At the same time, London referred to the need to "counter communism" on a global scale. The only exception was the resistance of the British government to Reagan's attempts to impose sanctions on British companies that supplied equipment to the USSR for the construction of the Urengoy - Uzhgorod gas pipeline, which affected both the prestige and significant economic interests of Great Britain.
The reason for this policy lies primarily in the common class interests of the ruling circles of the two imperialist provinces-
47 PDHC. Vol. 987, col. 633.
48 Financial Trnes, 11.XI.1980.
49 Survey of Current Affairs, 1980, December, pp. 352 - 354.
50 The Times, 8.IV.1981.
51 Pride, 16. II. 1984.
52 PDHL. Vol. 415, col. 99.
52 Tribune, 13.V.1983.
54 Guardian, 9.VI.1982.
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zhav, which does not exclude, of course, rivalry between them. Both the Reagan government and the Thatcher cabinet represent the most aggressive circles in the West. In an interview on the occasion of the second anniversary of her rule, the British Prime Minister highlighted the coming to power in the United States of a president with foreign policy views similar to her own, primarily on relations with the East .55 Equally important was the desire to use the assistance of a powerful ally in order to strengthen the UK's position in the world.
The closeness of the positions of the United States and Great Britain on all major foreign policy issues is also reflected in the British policy towards Western European partners in NATO and the EEC. As the Financial Times pointed out in an editorial on March 9, 1982, " the main goal of British foreign policy in the future should be to strengthen the alliance (NATO. - L. G.)". In practice, this meant, first of all, the strengthening of "Atlantic solidarity", i.e., the readiness of Western Europeans to support US policy .56 Following the United States, the British government called on its allies to "redouble their military efforts" and speed up the deployment of new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Thatcher has been a vocal advocate of expanding the scope of NATO. In May 1982, at a meeting of NATO foreign Ministers, it was the United Kingdom and the United States that opposed the proposal of a number of European countries to include the word "detente" in the communique .57 The position of the Thatcher government most significantly contributed to the adoption of a political declaration in May 1983 at a meeting of the heads of major Western states in support of the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
The anti-Soviet nature of British foreign policy has also manifested itself in relations with developing countries. While visiting the Middle East in 1981 and 1982, members of the conservative government constantly talked about the" Soviet threat " to the countries of this region. Often negotiations ended with the discussion of military contracts or agreements on the provision of military assistance .58 At the talks with Gandhi in April 1981. Thatcher tried to convince the Indian leadership that relations with the USSR can only be built "from a position of strength." Earlier, in January 1981, the British Trade Secretary warned Indian businesses against expanding trade and economic ties with the USSR, as this could allegedly lead to "political dependence", and called for expanding contacts with the West in return .59 These statements did not achieve their goal. India continued to develop relations with the USSR.
Statements by members of the British government about the existence of a "Soviet threat" to the countries of Southeast Asia were refuted even by the very conservative parliamentary committee on foreign policy after studying the situation in this region60 . In fact, it was British policy that contributed to the growth of instability in several parts of the world. In July 1980, it became known that the British weapons in a significant number of-
55 The Daily Telegraph. 4.V.1981.
56 See, for example, Thatcher's speech in January 1981 and Pym's speech in February 1983-Financial Times, 30. I. 1981; The Times, 15. II.1983.
57 PDHL. Vol. 425, col. 107 - 109; Financial Times, 18.V.1982.
58 For example, the visit of J. R. R. Tolkien Nott's visit to Saudi Arabia in June 1981, and the negotiations of the British military delegation in Pakistan in February 1982 (Financial Times, 12. VI. 1981; Izvestia, 23. II. 1982).
59 The Times, 16.IV.1981; Financial Times, 21.I.1981.
60 См. Consequences of Soviet Expansion for British Foreign Policy. Vol. XVII.
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Most of the weapons are sent to Afghanistan to fight against the legitimate authorities in the country, although earlier representatives of the British government, including Thatcher, claimed that weapons were not and would not be supplied to the Afghan counter-revolutionaries .61
In the context of the policy of global confrontation with the USSR, the conservatives ' desire to develop military-political cooperation with China "primarily on the basis of strategic considerations" is also significant .62 The main form of such cooperation was the supply of the latest types of weapons to China. As the Tribune noted, Thatcher viewed the expansion of these supplies "not in the light of future trade with China, but as part of her tough policy toward Russia." 63 After the Conservatives came to power, a lively exchange of military and industrial delegations between China and the United Kingdom began, and a number of contracts were signed for the supply of various weapons systems to China. In the spring of 1980, an exhibition of British military equipment was organized in China. By 1981, 25% of British exports to China consisted of military-strategic materials .64 During Thatcher's visit to China in September 1982, her desire to support anti-Soviet tendencies in Chinese politics was clearly demonstrated .65
Summing up the first two years of Thatcher's reign, the Conservative party's Politics Today bulletin claimed that Britain was once again "playing a leading role in the affairs of the world." 66 In fact, the anti-Soviet course of the British government did not meet with the support of most developing countries and even a number of Western European allies of Great Britain. As The Observer noted on March 20, 1983, the Conservatives ' anti-Sovietism prevented them from playing a role in the development of relations between the West and the East, although this particular path could have led to an increase in the prestige and influence of Great Britain in the world, would have strengthened its security and thus would have served the true interests of the country.
A significant place in the Soviet-British relations of the period under review was occupied by the problems of military detente. On all major issues of disarmament and arms race limitation, the Soviet side made constructive proposals, emphasizing its readiness for private and general, bilateral and multilateral negotiations and agreements on these issues on the basis of the principles of equality and equal security for all parties. The British Government did not pay lip service to the policy of disarmament. However, its representatives constantly stressed the desire to negotiate "from a position of strength". The conservatives, who came to power under the slogan "Strengthening defense," focused on increasing military spending. "The Government is convinced that peace can only be maintained from a position of strength. Therefore, both conventional and nuclear defenses of Britain must be strengthened, "the Politics Today bulletin stated .67 And each time, to justify such a policy, the myth of the "Soviet military threat"was brought to light. Using a variety of techniques - counting some types of weapons in isolation from others-
61 PDHC. Vol. 977, col. 727-728. For more information about the policy of Great Britain in this region, see: Ovanesova R. New and old in the Middle Eastern policy of Great Britain. - World Economy and International Relations, 1982, N 2.
62 PDHC. Vol. 958, col. 1240.
63 Tribune, 2.XI.1979. Ivanov I. D. Mezhdunarodnye monopolii v vneshne politike imperializma [International Monopolies in the foreign policy of Imperialism]. Moscow, 1981, p. 55.
65 Survey of Current Affairs, 1982, October, p. 320.
66 Politics Today, 1981, N 8, p. 127. 67 Ibid.
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The conservatives sought to justify the arms race, such as overstating the numbers, attributing aggressive intentions to the USSR, and so on. At the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in June 1982, Thatcher stated that it was NATO's nuclear weapons that ensured the preservation of peace between East and West. 68
Rejecting one after another peace initiatives of the USSR, contributing in every possible way to build up the military potential of NATO, the British government sought unilateral concessions from the USSR in exchange for the full restoration of dialogue between the two countries. At the same time, the Conservatives could not openly declare their rejection of the policy of disarmament. They were under intense domestic political pressure, as the masses understood that any, even "limited", nuclear conflict would mean the death of Great Britain. That is why all government statements have emphasized" readiness " for arms control.
The outcome of the Thatcher Government's disarmament efforts was extremely disappointing. The Prime Minister's statement on this issue in November 1982 contained 15 points, but most of them turned out to be just a list of multilateral negotiations in which Great Britain participated, or proposals from NATO countries that Great Britain supported. This also included the declared but non-binding support for the SALT-2 Treaty (the conservatives announced this after the signing of the treaty), and at the same time London's participation in the notorious "double decision" of NATO, adopted in December 1979, which led to the deployment of new American missiles in Europe and a significant deterioration in the international situation. The move was also touted by conservatives as part of the disarmament process. 69 The British Government has repeatedly stated that it seeks specific, rather than general, arms control agreements .70 But when the USSR put forward initiatives of this kind, they were immediately rejected by Great Britain. In the Disarmament Committee, in the UN, British delegates voted against the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, working groups on disarmament issues, and other proposals of the USSR. Explaining this position, British Government spokesman Lord Trefgarn stated in March 1982 that "there are issues of greater importance that need to be brought to the attention of the United Nations" .71
The desire of the British government to pursue a policy "from a position of strength" and its negative attitude to arms limitation was particularly clearly manifested in the question of the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. From the first days of their rule, the Conservatives declared their support for this plan. All Soviet proposals were rejected. Great Britain, according to Lord Straton, the Minister of State for Defence, played a major role in the adoption of the NATO "double decision" in December 1979 .72 The British government referred to the desire to achieve a "position of strength" in negotiations with the USSR and the need to strengthen NATO. "It will be a disaster for the entire union (NATO. - L. G.), if the decision to modernize the nuclear forces of the theater of operations is not actually made, " said Thatcher 73 . Actively supporting the United States on this issue, the United Kingdom simultaneously began negotiations with them from the end of 1979.-
68 Survey of Current Affairs, 1982, July, p. 234.
69 Politics Today, 1982, N 22, pp. 402 - 403.
70 Survey of Current Affairs, 1981, October, pp. 293 - 294.
71 PDHL. Vol. 419, col. 403 - 404.
72 Ibid Vol. 403, col. 1390.
73 Ibid. Vol. 975, col. 1069.
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Russia has asked for help in modernizing its "independent nuclear forces" 74 and has agreed to sell the Trident missile system.
NATO's decision to deploy new American missiles in Europe has raised international tensions. The Soviet Union did not give up trying to achieve a reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe, to prevent a new round of the arms race. Even The Times had to admit that the USSR genuinely wanted a dialogue with the West on arms control issues .75 At the end of 1981, the USSR unilaterally stopped deploying new medium-range missiles in the European part of its territory. In December 1982, the Soviet Union proposed to reduce the number of its medium-range missiles to the level of British and French nuclear forces. At this point, the British government had a real opportunity to actively influence the course of Soviet-American negotiations on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, supporting the Soviet initiative. However, London rejected it outright and instead supported Reagan's "zero" and "intermediate" options. In December 1983, the deployment of American missiles began in Western Europe, including in England. Yu. V. Andropov's Statement of November 25, 1983 emphasized that the Governments of Western countries, including the United Kingdom, took full responsibility for the consequences of such a policy. The Soviet Union, in turn, was forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures .76
The British Government rejected the Soviet Government's proposal to freeze all nuclear weapons at the current level. At the UN, the British delegation voted against this proposal. London refused both the Soviet Government's Appeal containing the text of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 16, 1983, and the aide-memoire with a proposal to freeze nuclear weapons in quantitative and qualitative terms, transmitted to the British Ambassador in Moscow on June 21, 1983,77 The British government also refused to promise not to use nuclear weapons first .78 In May 1983, Thatcher declared her readiness to use nuclear weapons without hesitation .79 The refusal to support the Soviet proposals to freeze nuclear weapons and not use nuclear weapons first is largely due to the fact that the conservatives have launched a program to modernize their "independent nuclear forces", hoping to increase their capacity several times and thereby increase the potential for a NATO first strike.
As already noted, upon coming to power, the Conservative government of Great Britain announced its support for the SALT-2 Treaty and negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing. However, when the United States refused to ratify the treaty and broke off negotiations to stop nuclear testing, the British government did not consider it necessary to take any steps to influence its ally. By acquiring the Trident-2 missile system from the United States, the United Kingdom objectively contributed to the fact that a significant part of NATO's nuclear potential was removed from the WWS.
The United Kingdom, like other NATO countries, takes an unconstructive position in negotiations on the limitation of armed forces and
74 Ibid. Vol. 935, col. 535.
75 The Times, 10.III.1981.
76 Pravda, 25. XI. 1983.
77 Ibid., 22. VI. 1983.
78 PDHL. Vol. 425, col. 574.
79 The Guardian, 1.VI. 1983.
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weapons production in Central Europe. The British government supported the US plans to increase the production of chemical weapons, the production of neutron weapons, and the deployment of weapons in space. The Conservatives dramatically increased the country's military spending, which reached £ 16bn in 1983. By 1986, it is planned to increase them by 20% compared to 1980. The gross national product is expected to grow by only 1% 80 in the same period .
At the 1983 Conservative Party conference and during the May - June 1983 election campaign, the Conservatives ' desire to continue the policy of "strengthening defense" while maintaining the previous negative attitude towards disarmament issues was confirmed. This government policy was opposed-with varying degrees of determination - by all the main opposition parties in the UK-Labour, Liberal and Social Democratic. The struggle for detente and disarmament took a prominent place in the decisions of the XXXVIII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held in November 1983. The peace movement in England has reached unprecedented proportions.
At a time when the conservative government's policy of restricting political contacts with the USSR reduced the effectiveness of the structure of bilateral relations established in the mid-70s, political contacts at the non-governmental level became particularly important. Their importance was emphasized during the visits to the USSR of former British Prime Minister H. E. Wilson in April 1983, former Prime Minister J. R. R. Tolkien and former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Callaghan in October 1983 and a delegation of the Liberal Party of Great Britain led by its leader D. Steele in January 1984 81 . Issues of political relations have come to the fore in a number of forums, where they have usually taken a secondary place before. Some channels of Soviet-British contacts at the non-governmental level began to acquire a multilateral character, which is especially important in the context of a complicated international situation. Thus, in September 1983, for the first time, a representative American delegation took part in the traditional "Edinburgh Talks", which were attended by prominent scientific, public, and military figures of the USSR and Great Britain who were striving for a broad exchange of views on international relations and disarmament .82 Ties between Soviet and British supporters of peace were strengthened.
Economic factors had a significant impact on the development of Soviet-British relations in the political sphere. Attempts by conservatives to restrict all types of contacts with the USSR caused resistance from part of the British business community, which is interested in developing mutually beneficial trade. The conservatives could not ignore the demands of businessmen to "open the political umbrella" over the sphere of trade and economic cooperation and in some cases took certain steps to restore broken trade and economic ties. In 1982-1983, the X and XI sessions of the Soviet - British Permanent Intergovernmental Commission on Scientific, Technical, Trade and economic cooperation were successfully held. During these sessions, an agreement was reached to expand mutually beneficial cooperation .83 The interest of British business in trade with the USSR is best indicated by a series of conferences and seminars on the development of Soviet-British trade, organized by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the USSR, the British-British Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.-
80 PDHC. Vol. 983, col. 1023.
81 Pravda, 20. IV. 1983; Izvestia, 26. I. 1984; Morning Star, 18. X. 1983.
82 Pravda, 19. IX. 1983.
83 Foreign Trade, 1983, No. 1, pp. 41-42; No. 3, pp. 53-54; Izvestiya, 19.V. 1983.
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the Royal Chamber of Commerce, the Conference of British Industry, and other organizations. At a conference of this kind held in London in January 1984, a representative of the British government noted the interest of British firms in developing economic cooperation with the USSR and expressed readiness to "encourage mutually beneficial trade between British firms and Soviet organizations." 84 The trade turnover, which had noticeably declined in the first years of the Conservative government, began to grow again in 1982-1983.
1979-1983 occupy a special place in the 60-year history of Soviet-British relations. They are the beginning of a new, complex and contradictory stage in these relations, when everything achieved in the previous years is seriously tested. The course of the conservative Thatcher government towards confrontation with the USSR and limiting contacts in almost all major areas led to a deterioration of Soviet-British relations. This has contributed to an increase in global tensions and an escalation of the arms race. The deterioration of Soviet-British relations was contrary to the national interests of Great Britain, because its security as a result of such a policy was by no means strengthened. Therefore, the struggle between the two trends in the ruling circles of Great Britain has intensified. The positive trend has been reflected, in particular, in the expansion of political contacts at the non-governmental level, as well as in the field of trade and economic cooperation. The Soviet Union continues to fight for a return to detente, for the development of long-term, stable and mutually beneficial cooperation with Great Britain in all areas that meet the true interests of both countries and all mankind.
84 Pravda, 30. I. 1984.
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