L. M. ISAEV, National Research University-Higher School of Economics

A. V. KOROTAEV, Doctor of Historical Sciences

Keywords: Egypt, Mohammed Morsi, army, gold and foreign exchange reserves, stock indexes

On July 3, 2013, Egyptian Defense Minister Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi announced in an address to citizens that President Mohamed Morsi had been removed from office and that the constitution adopted in December 2012 had been suspended. Thus, the short but unique period of the Muslim Brotherhood's rule has come to an end.

Already in the first months of his rule, Morsi was faced with the need to pursue an extremely unpopular policy to overcome the socio-economic crisis in the country. A signal of what political consequences this may lead to was the vote in the referendum in December 2012, when support for the constitution "pushed" by Islamists was not as obvious as it was in the March 2011 vote on the adoption of the interim constitutional declaration or in the parliamentary elections in December 2011-January 2012.1

It was obvious that it would not be possible to solve socio-economic issues by promoting Islam and populist slogans, which meant that the president would either have to retreat from the policy of Islamization, which would inevitably lead to a split among Islamists in Egypt, or all the frustrations associated with not improving (or even worsening) living conditions of the population and unresolved socio-economic problems, which would be strongly associated with the period of Islamist rule, which would sharply affect their support from citizens. However, Morsi was given a year to implement the Egyptian "economic miracle", which left no chance for the fifth Egyptian president to retain power.

WHO KNEW AND WHO GUESSED ABOUT THE CHANGE OF POWER

Nevertheless, if you observe the behavior of the main Egyptian stock exchange indices, you can identify extremely interesting patterns. Thus, two days before the start of the protests against President Morsi, on June 24, 2013, the main Egyptian stock exchange index EGX30 began to grow steadily (figure 1): between this date and the closing of trading on July 2, 2013, i.e. immediately before the overthrow of M. Morsi, it grew by more than 10% - from 4,523. 32 to 4,986. 81 points, and immediately after the coup, on July 4, - to 5,334. 54 points (so the total increase for the period June 24 - July 4 was 18%).

A similar trend was observed with other Egyptian stock exchange indices. For example, the Egyptian EGX 100, which started growing from 613.69 on June 23, 2013, grew by almost 10% (to 671.26) by the close of the exchange on the eve of the coup, and after the coup - on July 4, it jumped to 728.91 (so the total growth for the period June 23 - July 4 was about 19%)..

The Egyptian EGX 70 also showed rapid growth, rising from 348.81 points on June 23, 2013 to 380.87 points by the close of trading on the eve of the coup, on July 2

Chart 1. Dynamics of the EGX 30 index (September 2012-September 2013)

Source: http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CASE:IND

The study was carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program of the National Research University-Higher School of Economics in 2014.

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2013, and further jumped to 422.62 points immediately after the coup, on July 4.

This indicates that even before the overthrow of Morsi, there was information about an alleged attempt to change power in the country in a very specific direction (but, as we will see, not only about this), which helped to encourage stock market players to "invest" in shares of Egyptian companies. But first things first.

The most rapid decline in Egyptian stock indexes during the "Arab Spring" occurred in January 2011. Then, on the eve of the "January 25" revolution, trading on the Egyptian stock exchange (EGX30) stopped at 6,723. 17 points, as of the evening of January 24, 2011. I must say that until today, EGX 30 has not been able to reach that mark, even failing to overcome the symbolic mark of 6,000 points. After that, in two days, the stock exchange index fell by as much as 16.01%: trading on January 27, 2011 closed at 5646.5 points*. In March of the same year, the EGX30 dropped to levels around 5,000 points.

CONFLICT BETWEEN THE YOUNG AND OLD "GUARD"

This is not surprising, because the main losers during the events in January - February 2011 were representatives of the so-called "Gamal Mubarak team" - young businessmen and politicians, whom the son of the Egyptian president actively promoted to key positions in state authorities (primarily, the Shura Council, the People's Assembly and the Cabinet of Ministers) and the ruling National Assembly.-The Democratic Party (NDP). By that time, the split within the Egyptian political elite had not been overcome, and the Egyptian elite had not been able to transform itself in order to stay in power.

The attempt at such a transformation led to a split between the "young" (Mubarak's team) and the "old" (army elite) guards within the elite. This conflict has been brewing for a long time and was largely caused by the rejection by the Egyptian generals of Gamal Mubarak as a potential successor to Hosni Mubarak as president of the 2 countries. As a result, the Egyptian military took a neutral position regarding the protest actions directed against X. However, they sided with the protesters when the "Mubarak team" tried to decide the outcome of the confrontation on its own, organizing the so-called "battle for Tahrir", also known as the "Camel Battle", on February 2, 20113.

This has subsequently led to a number of high-profile legal proceedings against those involved in the incident. Abd al-Nasser al-Gabri and Youssef Khattab, NDP deputies and businessmen in the People's Assembly and Shura Council, representing the Haram district of Giza, respectively, were involved in organizing the skirmish in Tahrir, according to a report submitted to the Prosecutor General in March 2011 by the Investigative committee of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) of Egypt. Two other NDP businessmen who covered the costs of the campaigns organized by Gamal Mubarak and Safwat al-Sherif were Ibrahim Kamel , a multi-millionaire who made money from investments in Egypt, the United Kingdom and Russia, and Mohammed Abu al-Naim, a former chairman of the industrial committee in Parliament and chairman of the board of directors of the Cleopatra Group.4

As a result, many Egyptian businessmen associated with the NDP either fled the country or went to jail, all this was accompanied by their disposal of their own assets, the collapse of stock prices, the fall of stock indices, etc. Contrast with the July 2013 "revolution", which was accompanied not by a collapse, but by a rapid growth of stock indices, of course, is obvious.

After the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections, the coming to power of M. Morsi and the subsequent dissolution of the SCAF from the post of Defense Minister Mohammed Tantawi, as well as Chief of the General Staff Sami Adnan, with the subsequent personnel changes in the military ranks, the situation became threatening for the Egyptian generals.

Already by 2013, being one of the largest "businessmen" in the country, the Egyptian army, along with the surviving post-Mubarak businessmen who worked in the "Gamal Mubarak team", realized the need for a joint confrontation with the "Brothers", which is confirmed by the dynamics of changes in Egyptian stock exchange indices after the opening of trading on June 24, 2013.

It is highly likely that a few days before the start of the protests against President Morsi, information has already been received that the military intends to go all the way, and if they succeed, Egypt expects a long-awaited loan from the Arab Monetary Fund and other financial players in the Gulf. In turn, guarantees of currency inflows to the country stimulated exchange players to invest in Egyptian stocks and ensured the growth of stock market indices.

GASOLINE AND POLITICS: WHAT CONNECTS THEM?

It is also important to note the following. Since X left. Since Mubarak's presidency, Egypt has experienced gas and electricity outages, and the situation has only worsened over time, reaching its climax by the summer of 2013.

The fall in natural gas production, the decline in the number of tourists, and consequently the influx of foreign currency, the fall in the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound-all this limited the ability of the government of H. Qandil to pay for fuel both imported and produced in the country international oil companies. In addition, the current situation in the electricity sector was strongly influenced by security issues. So, in early June 2013, two power plants in Egypt - in Banha and Ain As-

* On January 25, 2011, there was no trading on EGX 30.

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Chart 2. Dynamics of the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar (January 1-September 1, 2013)

Source: http://fx-rate.net/EGP/USD/

Sokhne - did not function due to the fact that the government could not ensure the safety of their employees. In addition, Egypt's national electricity consumption increased to 29,500 MW per day by the summer of 2013, while only 27,000 MW per day was produced.5
However, after the July 3, 2013 coup, the situation has improved markedly, which can also serve as indirect confirmation that in June, interruptions in the supply of fuel and electricity were also associated with direct sabotage of the businessmen involved in the plot, as well as a high level of planning and coordination of the events that led to the resignation of President M. Morsi.

This point of view can also be confirmed by the fact that after the overthrow of M. Morsi, the post of acting Prime Minister went to Hazem al-Biblawi. A lawyer by training, he began his career as an adviser to the Minister of Finance of Kuwait in the 1970s, and for ten years before the Arab Spring, he worked as an adviser to the Arab Monetary Fund in Dubai. It is possible that reaching an agreement on granting Egypt a loan through this organization was largely his merit, in exchange for which he received the post of prime minister. It cannot be ruled out that the appointment of al-Biblawi, who is well-known to the financial structures of the Gulf, to the post of prime minister (or deputy prime minister) in the government that was planned to be put in power after the coup, was one of the conditions for guaranteeing the "putschists" several billion dollars immediately after the July "revolution".

The dynamics of the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar is also interesting here (Figure 2).
As can be seen, at the beginning of 2013, the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar was rapidly falling: from $0.1557 per pound on January 4, 2013 to $0.1489 on February 1, 2013.. After that, the decline was already at a slower pace until the end of May-beginning of June 2013, when the pound - dollar exchange rate was in the range from $0.1431 to $0.1429 per pound. The situation began to deteriorate again starting on July 18, 2013, i.e. a few days before the protests against Morsi began.

This situation continued for three weeks, reaching its peak on July 8, 2013, when the exchange rate fell to a record $0.1403 dollars per pound. It was on this day that the Muslim Brotherhood protests began in two resort Egyptian cities-Hurghada and Sharm el-Sheikh. In addition, on July 8, 2013, supporters of former President Morsi attacked the headquarters of the Republican Guard, which resulted in the death of about 70 people. However, the return of the military to power contributed to a slow but still growing exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the dollar (on September 2, 2013, 1 eg. pound was equivalent to $0.1433), which could not be achieved in the previous period.

HELP CAME FROM OUTSIDE

This was largely achieved thanks to the almost immediate decision of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to provide financial assistance to Egypt. In addition, the adopted incentive package was supposed to restore investor confidence in Egypt after the overthrow of M. Morsi, stop the fall in the country's credit rating and promote the development of the economy.-

Chart 3. Dynamics of changes in the money supply (MO), 2012-2013 (in millions of European pounds)

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt

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Chart 4. Dynamics of changes in the money supply (M2), 2012-2013 (in millions of European pounds)

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt

Chart 5. Dynamics of the consumer price index (2012-2013)

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt

negotiations between official Cairo and the International Monetary Fund.

But perhaps most importantly, the assistance provided by the Gulf countries was intended to reduce the country's budget deficit and stop the decline in foreign exchange reserves, which is extremely important for Egypt, given that countries import more than half of their basic consumer goods, especially wheat. 6 A As you know, interruptions in the supply of wheat are extremely painful for the Egyptians themselves. This is confirmed by the second wave of agflation (i.e., rising food prices), which can be safely considered one of the factors that led to an increase in discontent in the country in January 2011.7 However, it is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that the rate of decline of the Egyptian pound to close to zero values has not yet been slowed down administration of the Muslim Brotherhood. Under the new administration ("putschists") this trend has only continued. At the same time, the instrument of this strengthening was the same for both of them (and at the same time, in the end, rather dubious) - massive external borrowing.

Before proceeding to the consideration of Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves, I would like to draw attention to the following aspect: the dynamics of the MO money supply aggregate (figure 3).
It can be seen that, starting from January 2013, the money supply in Egypt began to grow rapidly, caused by an increase in the issue of cash. This led to the fact that by July 2013, the country's cash supply (ML) had increased by almost a quarter.

At the same time, if we trace the dynamics of changes in the monetary aggregate M2 (diagr. 4), it becomes noticeable that the total amount of cash and non-cash money in Egypt increased by only a tenth from January to July 2013.

However, the increase in the cash supply by a quarter in the first half of 2013 clearly contrasts with the growth of the consumer price index for the same period (figure 5). Thus, this indicator increased by only 6% from 127.9 in January 2013 to 136 in July 2013. Thus, the cash supply issued from January to July 2013, which amounted to about 65 billion eg. pounds, went not only into inflation. Moreover, the government has a similar policy. Qandilya was continued by his successor, H. al-Biblawi, which is clearly seen in the graphs (diagr. 3-5), which show the growth rate of the money supply issue, as well as the consumer price index, which continued in July 2013.

HOW TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY

In late August 2013, Al-Biblawi's government approved an additional $3.2 billion stimulus package to restore confidence in the Egyptian economy. 8 As it became known from the statement of Deputy Prime Minister Z. Bahaa al-Din, these funds will be used for high-tech projects, such as the modernization and construction of roads and railways, sewage treatment plants, etc. In addition, the country's leadership has already promised its own citizens that the government intends to avoid raising taxes and reducing subsidies in order to reduce the budget deficit.

In this case, such a move by the Egyptian government can be considered quite sensible, if only because this business plan includes investment costs, and not subsidies and wage growth. However, to date from-

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However, the main question remains: how does the government of al-Biblawi plan to stimulate investment growth and reduce the budget deficit, on the one hand, and not increase taxes, on the other? Indeed, at the beginning of the 2013/2014 fiscal year, the country's leadership announced plans to increase GDP growth from 2% to 3.5% per year and reduce the budget deficit from 14% to 9% of GDP, while one of the main sources of income - tourism-is at a dead end.9
Let us now turn to the dynamics of Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves (see chart 6).:

Chart 6. Dynamics of changes in Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves, 2006-2011 (in $ billion).

Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/egypt

It is obvious that since the end of 2005, Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves have been growing rapidly, with a slight drop in 2009 caused by the global financial crisis. At the same time, this indicator reached its maximum on the eve of the "Arab Spring" - in December 2010, amounting to $36.04 billion. Immediately after the January 2011 revolution, the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves began to sharply decline, reaching their lowest level in March 2013 - $13.42 billion, which is almost three times lower than the pre-revolutionary level.

However, from April to May 2013, there was an increase in Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves, reaching $16.04 billion in May, which is primarily due to the assistance that Qatar began to provide. Thus, in early April 2013, an Egyptian government delegation went to Doha, where an agreement was signed on Qatar's financial assistance to Cairo in the amount of $3 billion.10
The bailout was supposed to come in two ways: by purchasing a portion of Egyptian bonds and by placing deposits in Egyptian banks. As you can see, this is exactly the amount that Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves increased by in May 2013. Egyptian stock market indices (diagr. 1): Ahead of the visit of the Egyptian delegation to Qatar, on April 3, 2013, the EGX30 stopped its decline at 4,926. 22 points. After that, its growth was observed until May 30, 2013. In June 2013, Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves fell again (to $14.92 billion). A similar trend was observed on the Egyptian stock exchanges: the EGX 30 index by June 24, 2013. it fell by 702.9 points, reaching the level of 4223.32. This behavior of stock market players can be explained by the country falling into a period of uncertainty: most likely, the first reports of the impending coup began to appear, but its success was not yet so obvious. The situation of uncertainty ended on the eve of the first protests against M. Moray on June 25, 2013 - it was then that the military finally decided on the future strategy to overthrow the fifth president of Egypt, which confirms the beginning of the growth of stock market indices (see fig. 1 - 3).

ARMY AND GOVERNMENT

On the one hand, the position of the Egyptian army may seem very strange: to take power into their own hands at a time when the Egyptian economy is experiencing outright difficulties and requires unpopular socio-economic decisions (for example, raising fuel prices, food, etc. 11), means political "suicide" in the run-up to the upcoming parliamentary elections. Elections scheduled for February 2014. However, this political move looks very sensible in the light of the loan to Egypt approved by the Arab Monetary Fund and other Gulf financial and political structures, which was allocated subject to a change in the country's leadership.

Immediately after the overthrow of Morsi and his arrest, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates announced financial assistance to Egypt in the amount of $12 billion, most of which - $5 billion-should come from Riyadh, $4 billion-from Kuwait and $1 billion. less - from the UAE. At the same time, it was assumed that financing would be carried out in three ways: through the placement of deposits in the Egyptian Central Bank, in the form of energy products, as well as through direct money transfers.12 In principle, this amount should be enough for Egypt for just six months, i.e. until the February 2014 elections to the People's Assembly, given that on the eve of the elections, subsidies are a "sacred cow" for any government and will not be subject to cuts. Thus, the tranche to Egypt approved by the above-mentioned Gulf countries had clearly visible political goals.

It should be noted that, as a rule, from the adoption of a fundamental decision on the allocation of loans by international financial organizations to the actual receipt of money to the borrower's accounts, a very noticeable period of time passes, usually calculated in months. Meanwhile, as Figure 6 shows, already in July, Egypt's gold and foreign exchange reserves increased by almost $4 billion. So, already in

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In July, Egypt received a very significant part of those promised by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This suggests that an agreement in principle on the allocation of these funds to the" putschists " was reached (apparently not without the participation of Hazem al-Biblawi) even before the July 3 coup. Apparently, the receipt of information on the achievement of this agreement on June 23-24, 2013, led to the beginning of the growth of quotations on the Cairo Stock Exchange.

In this case, there is a split within the members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC). It is obvious that the position of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which supported the military coup in Egypt, was directed against Qatar, which, along with Turkey, supported M. Morsi. In many ways, the attitude of the pro-Egyptian coalition in the Arabian Peninsula, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, to the events taking place in Egypt is a reflection of the relations between these countries. Since the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, relations between Cairo and Riyadh, as well as with Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, have noticeably deteriorated. At the same time, President Morsi's focus on Doha was obvious.

From the very beginning of the Arab Spring, Qatar actively positioned itself as an independent political player in the Middle East arena, which could not but cause disapproval, first of all, from Saudi Arabia, which claims to be a key country in the Arab world. This has become particularly relevant in the context of the weakening of the traditional "heavyweight states" of the region - Egypt, Syria and Iraq.

The recent rapprochement between Doha and Tehran is also significant: in June 2013, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Qatar to personally congratulate the new Emir Tamim al-Thani. In turn, Qatar was one of the first countries to congratulate the new Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif on his appointment on August 15, 2013.

But the military's bet on removing Morsi from power and then accepting a stimulus package would probably have been justified if not for the Muslim Brotherhood's harsh response.

It is known that supporters of the Brotherhood organized mass protests against the removal of Morsi from the presidential post, which ultimately resulted in riots and clashes with the police and military, which lasted until the second half of August 2013. The situation was particularly complicated after demonstrations spread to the tourist centers of the country-Hurghada on July 8, 2013 and Sharm el-Sheikh 13. It is not surprising that the current situation significantly affected the reduction of tourist flow to Egypt, and consequently deprived it of one of the main items of its income. Thus, the collapse of the tourism industry in Egypt provoked by the "Brothers" no longer guarantees the current government headed by Adly Mansour a confident economic development before the 2014 elections.

The situation is further complicated by the rising yield of Egyptian government securities. On July 25, 2013, the Government of Egypt placed two issues of short-term bonds: maturing in 1 year at 13.82% and 6 months at 13.32%. Currently, this indicator in Egypt is one of the highest in the world, which puts an additional financial burden on the state.

However, the main problem lies in the fact that the current deficit financing received in Egypt from the Persian Gulf countries is able to solve (and even then with a stretch in the conditions of the Brothers ' demarche) only short-term, current economic problems due to the country's regular getting into debt due to external borrowing. So, as of December 2012, Egypt's external public debt amounted to $38.92 billion, which is almost 4 billion more. This figure is higher than in December 2011 - $35 billion.

REPEAT WHAT YOU'VE COMPLETED

In this connection, an analogy can be traced to the second half of the 19th century, when first during the reign of Muhammad Said Pasha, and then under Ismail Pasha, as a result of loans provided by European banks, the Egyptian state debt arose. At the same time, during the reign of Ismail Pasha, the construction of the Suez Canal was completed, the area under cotton crops was expanded, irrigation facilities were erected, and the construction of more than a thousand kilometers of railways, bridges over the Nile, several thousand kilometers of telegraph lines, educational institutions, ports, water and gas supply facilities, etc. continued. All this in the long run contributed to the development of Egypt, but for Ismail Pasha himself it turned out to be fatal - in 1879, under pressure from European creditors, he was removed from his post by the decision of the Ottoman Sultan, and Tawfiq Pasha took his place. At the same time, Egypt was under the external management of creditors.

Equally necessary for Egypt is the adoption of a stimulus package from the Gulf states. At the same time, the forces that win the People's Assembly elections will have to pay the price for relatively sustainable development until February 2014. In view of this, paradoxically, it is not profitable to win the upcoming Egyptian elections, primarily for economic reasons. However, from a political point of view, victory as air is needed by both the military and Islamists.

The former, in case of defeat, run the risk of experiencing the revenge of the Muslim Brotherhood for the illegal removal of Morsi from power, as well as the subsequent arrests of their leaders and harsh treatment of their supporters during the protests in July-August 2013.

In turn, the "Brothers" themselves may again lose the opportunity to legally participate in the Egyptian political process and be banned, and this kind of initiative has already been repeatedly voiced after the military coup of 2013.

Of course, the most acceptable option for the Egyptian military would be a situation in which the Islamists, having won the 2014 elections, would be able to discredit themselves again. However, the events that followed sver-

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Rather, Morsi's actions suggest the opposite: both sides will try to get another mandate, thereby putting their political interests above the economic interests of Egypt.

* * *

Our young Egyptian friends from among the "left-wing revolutionaries-liberals" call the events of recent months in Egypt a "counter-revolution". And we fully agree with them that these events can quite correctly be called so. But with one significant difference.

Our young revolutionary-minded Egyptian friends think of "counter-revolution" as something unambiguously negative. We believe that the Egyptian counter-revolution also has many positive aspects. Yes, it may well be called a "counter-revolution", because it returned to power the very bloc of military, economic and bureaucratic elites that ruled the country before the 2011 revolution. But, as we have already shown earlier, it ruled Egypt very effectively, ensuring that the last years before the revolution were very successful (in the first place). features on the global background) economic and social development of a great country 14.

However, of course, it cannot be said that Egypt has now returned to exactly the same point where it was before the revolution. At the same time, a number of new developments clearly contribute to the regime's destabilization. This is primarily the radicalization of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which only worsened after its ban in late 2013, and the emergence of powerful media support in the form of a special al-Jazeera satellite channel, Mubasher Mysr (http://mubasher-misr. aljazeera.net/livestream/). However, even more of the new elements that emerged during the Egyptian Revolution and Counter-Revolution are more likely to help stabilize the regime.

The Egyptian revolution in 2011 was able to win an unexpectedly easy victory largely due to the following two circumstances: (1) a powerful intra - elite conflict - this is primarily a conflict between the military (the"old guard") and the economic elite (the"young guard") - a group of leading Egyptian businessmen led by Gamal Mubarak; (2) the creation of an unexpected broad opposition bloc that brought together a fully coordinated united front of left-wing young liberal secularist revolutionaries and Islamists.

The current situation is similar to that of January 2011, "exactly the opposite": (1) The Egyptian revolution forced the Egyptian economic elite to come to terms with the military, and in June 2013 they came out in a united, well-coordinated front that ensured the rapid overthrow of Morsi; and there is no sign of a new split between the two countries. these groups are not yet visible to the Egyptian elite. (2) The Revolution followed by the Counter-Revolution led to the deepest split among the January (2011) opposition "macroblock", along many lines.

Within this macroblock, even the Islamist bloc was split - after all, the regime is now supported by the second most powerful Islamist party - the fundamentalist Salafist party Hizb al-Nur (and a number of other prominent Islamists). The secularist left-liberal bloc has also been split, with the majority of its members so intimidated by the Muslim Brotherhood's year of rule that they continue to support the regime.

However, other opposition forces remain deeply divided , as the left-wing liberal-revolutionary youth that opposes the regime resolutely rejects any idea of a new bloc with the Muslim Brotherhood-suffice it to say that one of their main slogans - Yaskut, yaskut illy Khan, in kana 'askar au ikhwan translates to" Down down with all those who have changed - be it the military or the Muslim Brotherhood!"

1 For more information, see: Vasiliev A.M. Egypt after the elections / / Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 4; Vinitsky D. I. Egypt: cold economic shower floods the heat of the "Arab Spring" / / Asia and Africa today. 2012, N 3; Isaev L. M. After the Arab Spring: on the way to the Islamic Republic? // Inviolable reserve, 2013, N 5; Korotaev A.V., Isaev L. M., Shishkina A. R. (ed.). System monitoring of global and regional risks. The Arab world after the Arab Spring. Moscow, Lenand Publ., 2013.

2 For more details, see: Isaev L. M. Groups of risks of political instability in Egypt // System monitoring of global and regional risks: Arab Spring 2011 / Ed. Korotaev A.V., Zinkina Yu. V., Khodunov A. S. M., Librocom, 2012.

Isaev L. M., Shishkina A. R. 3 Egyptian turmoil of the XXI century. Moscow, Librocom, 2012.

Gamal Essam El-Din. 4 NDP's Battle of the Camel // Al-Ahram Weekly. No 1039. 17 - 23 March, 2011.

Ismail A. 5 With Electricity and Water in Short Supply, Egyptians Grow Tense - http://www.mcclatchydc.com/20l3/06/24/194616/with-electricity-and-water-in.html#.UjlWM FHnCNg.

Yamani S. 6 Egypt Secures USD 12 Billion in Aids -http://www.aawsat.net/2013/07/article55309371

Korotaev A.V., Khodunov A. S., Burova A. N., Malkov S. Yu., Khalturina D. A. Zinkina Yu. V. 7 Socio-demographic analysis of the Arab Spring // System monitoring of global and regional risks: Arab Spring 2011.... p. 28-76; Korotaev A.V., Malkov S. Yu., Zinkina Yu. V., Filin N. A., Khodunov A. S. Burova A. N. Trap at the exit from the trap. Matematicheskoe modelirovanie sotsial'no-politicheskoi destabilizatsii v stranakh mir-sistemnoy peripherii i evtiya Arabyskoi vesna 2011 g. [Mathematical modeling of socio-political destabilization in the countries of the world-system periphery and the events of the Arab Spring of 2011]. Modelirovanie i prognozirovanie global'nogo, regional'nogo i natsional'nogo razvitiya [Modeling and forecasting of global, regional and national development], ed. by A. A. Akaev, A.V. Korotaev, G. G. Malinetsky, S. Yu. Malkov.

8 Egypt Approves USD 3,2 Billion Economic Stimulus Package -http://www.aawsat.net/2013/08/article55315341

Abaza D. 9 Egypt's Economic Stimulus Plan Hits Right Note but Must Reveal Substance - http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/ 3/0/80305/Business/0/Egypts-economic-stirnulus-plan-hits-right-note-but-.aspx

Daragahi B. 10 Qatar Gives Egypt $3 bn Aid Package -http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/790a7d52-alf4-lle2 - 8971 - 00144feabdc0. html#axzz2e5gDeWxu

11 See, for example: Korotaev A.V. New notes from Tahrir -http://polit.ru/article/2012/12/29/tahrir/.

Mustafa H., Ben Flanagan. 12 Gulfs $12 bn Aid to Egypt Seen as Lifeline", Not a Cure - http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/ economy/2013/07/11/Gulf-s-12bn-aid-to-Egypt-seen-as-lifeline-not-a-cure.html

13 Supporters and opponents of Morsi demonstrate in resorts in Egypt - http://ria.ru/arab_riot/20130708/948187587.html

Korotaev A.V., Zinkina Yu. V. 14 The Egyptian Revolution of 2011: Structural and demographic analysis / / Asia and Africa Today. 2011, N 6, 7.

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