Muhammad Daoud (1909-1978) was one of the most famous and still revered Afghan politicians of the late monarchical period, an authoritarian reformer and Pashtun nationalist. In 1973. he carried out a republican coup and became the first president of the country, in 1978 he was killed in a new coup by supporters of the left - wing radical group-the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. The rise of M. Daoud occurred both as a result of his desire for supreme power, and as a result of the attempt of the Yahyahel clan, to which he belonged, to resolve the problems that arose after the first and unsuccessful experiment of political liberalization of Afghanistan in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, this experiment created the possibility of a new format of "partisanship" for Afghanistan."the political process. In the first post-war decade, there were also shifts in the country's political elite, which largely determined the balance of power in the following decades.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Muhammad Daoud, clan oligarchy, political opposition, (proto -) parties, "Vish Zalmian", National Democratic Party, liberal experiment.

AFGHANISTAN AFTER WORLD WAR II. POLICY OF THE SHAH MAHMUD GOVERNMENT

Afghanistan, without even taking a direct part in World War II, emerged economically weakened, led by the oligarchic Yahyahel clan, which was dominated for many years by Prime Minister Hashim Khan. His despotic regime no longer satisfied not only the nascent opposition, but also new groups within the ruling camp itself, especially the so - called young ones, among whom the informal leadership belonged to the cousin of King Zahir Shah, Muhammad Daoud.1
The study was conducted with the financial support of the Russian Foundation for Scientific Research (project N08-01-335a).

1 Muhammad Dawud (1909-1978) was the eldest son of Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of King Nadir Shah. He studied at the Lycee Amania, then lived and studied in France. Since 1932 - Major General and commander of the troops of the Eastern Province, since 1934-and governor of this province. In August 1939, he was appointed commander of the Central Corps and the Kabul Military School. "Strong personality, energetic military man. Due to his headstrong and impatient nature, he is not very popular. He enjoys the confidence of his uncle, the Prime Minister, and seems likely to gain influence in the future" - noted in the British wartime handbook "Who's Who in Afghanistan" [BLIOR/R/12 / 125, p. 21-22]. Not much has been written about M. Daoud in the Russian literature; all researchers highly define his place in the recent history of Afghanistan. See the works of V. G. Korgun, M. F. Slinkin, G. P. Ezhov and others, among the latest publications [Ezhov, 2007; Slinkin, 2004, pp. 187-192].

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The foreign policy circumstances in which Afghanistan found itself at the end of World War II were quite favorable. At the final stage of the world conflict, Great Britain, the USSR, the USA and France took a common or similar position towards Afghanistan, considering it as a "safe haven", but on August 1, 1945, at the suggestion of the British Embassy in Kabul, the USSR was excluded from this team for fear of increasing its influence [NA, FO 371/45231, July-August 1945]. At the same time, British military and political circles were confident that the USSR would take a wait-and-see attitude. For Great Britain, which lost its main colonial possessions in South Asia after the formation of the dominions of the Indian Union and Pakistan in 1947, the question of maintaining its presence in this region remained relevant. This, in turn, determined the traditional strategic importance of Afghanistan as a buffer [NA, FO 371/92084, 24 August 1951] between the recent but rapidly moving away from each other allies in the anti-Hitler coalition.

The British considered the strengthening of the American presence in Afghanistan in economic and other forms to be an effective means of reducing the alleged Soviet influence, and therefore did not interfere with the Afghan-American cooperation, which began in the spring of 1944 with the discussion of arms supplies and training of military personnel for the Afghan army [BL, IOR/R / 12/165, April 28, 1944].2. Moreover, such cooperation with the distribution of roles (the Americans were recognized as leaders in the road transport sector and possible oil production) was considered by the British side as useful for preserving the Anglo-American partnership, although it could cause countermeasures on the part of the USSR.

The Afghan authorities themselves were enthusiastic about the prospect of a new "big friend": shortly after the change of government in 1946, the Afghan side asked the United States to take on the role previously performed by the British, "at least in the technical and economic sphere, organizing mineral exploration, construction of irrigation and communication systems" [Reshtia, 1985, p. 34]. But the Americans did not yet realize the political and strategic importance of Afghanistan, although at the end of World War II they proposed to the Afghan leadership a large-scale irrigation project in the Helmand River Valley, designed not only to increase agricultural production, but also to improve the socio-demographic structure and infrastructure of this area (health, education, settlement of nomads and landless peasants) [Azam, 1999, p. 13]. In March 1946, they signed a contract with the Afghan side for the construction of the Bogra Canal, a hydroelectric power station in the Helmand Valley and a number of irrigation facilities in the east of the country, as well as for improving roads in the south-eastern part of Afghanistan (Gurevich, 1983, p. 9]. The main contractor and executor of the project was a mixed American-Swedish firm Morrison-Nadsen (MN), and financing was provided by a loan from the Export-Import Bank (USA) [Michel, 1959, p. 155].

Gradually, American diplomacy, initially indifferent to Afghanistan, began to consider this country as a link in the southern "belt" of containment of the USSR, and therefore could not remain indifferent to the internal political processes at this crossroads of peoples and cultures. Although the Morrison-Nadsen project resulted in a huge cost overruns for Afghanistan, the American side itself and a narrow circle of its Afghan partners did not remain unscathed: for example, in 1951, the dividends of the MN Co-

2 At the same time, the British retained important channels of military and other cooperation with Afghanistan - at the request of the Afghan general Staff and personally M. Daoud, at that time the Foreign Minister, the issue of training Afghan officers in India, as well as in Great Britain itself, including at the prestigious Sandhurst military Academy.

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35% was set [NA, FO 983/100, Nov. 14, 1953]. The unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Helmand project did not prevent the Americans from signing in January 1951 a special agreement with Afghanistan on assistance in the amount of $ 1.2 million, which entered into force in the summer of 1953 [NA, FO 371/100978, 1952].

By the late 1940s, Afghanistan was one of the most backward countries in the world. The overwhelming majority of the population was made up of peasants (94%), who owned a third of the cultivated land (Pikulin, 1956, p.145), with an average land ownership of 1.5 jeribs (about 0.3 hectares). At the same time, only in the possession of King Zahir Shah was about 1.5 thousand hectares of land, and, according to some sources, on his accounts in American banks there were more than 25 million dollars. [WUA of the Russian Federation, 1954, op. 36, por. 27, folder 236, l. 3-4]. The industrial sector consisted of approximately 60 enterprises: 14 cotton gin factories, six textile factories, three woodworking factories, a furniture factory, a match factory, a brick factory, etc. The largest enterprises included the Puli Khumri textile factory, which employed 3,000 people, and the Mashin Khana military factory in Kabul with about two thousand employees. Industrial workers numbered 15 thousand people, artisans-150-200 thousand people.

The late 1940s and early 1950s marked a period of significant socio-economic and socio-political changes in Afghanistan. In May 1946, Prime Minister Hashim Khan, whose name was associated with numerous restrictions of the pre-war and war period, resigned, and Shah Mahmud, who succeeded him, also the brother of the late King Nadir Shah, announced a new ambitious program of socio-economic development. In fact, this program was the first experiment to accelerate the development of Afghanistan after the failure of Amanullah Khan and his supporters(1919-1929).

The changes also affected the political sphere - some prominent supporters of Amanullah Khan were released from prison: Abdul Hadi Davi, M. G. M. Gubar, Sarwar Juya, M. Amir and others. He himself, being in exile since 1929, lost his influence in the country, turning into an aged social benefit seeker. But Amanullah could only count on such an allowance if both houses of parliament approved his special appeal for the restoration of Afghan citizenship with a humiliating oath of loyalty to the ruling dynasty. He had to do this - the citizenship of the former monarch and his family was restored [Khattak, 2005, p. 74].

The beginning of the British withdrawal from South Asia and the formation of two dominions in 1947 - the Union of India and Pakistan, which soon transformed into independent states-contributed a lot to public revival. The creation of a new Muslim state, Pakistan, was particularly painful in Afghanistan, where the border imposed by the British (the"Durand Line") was a source of tension from the moment it was established in 1893. Even, according to British experts, the "Durand Line" was a kind of compromise that allowed the imperial borders to be extended to the Hindu Kush, but "it is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is not a border that is it didn't comply with any laws of geography, ethnography, or strategy. It was nothing more than a line drawn on a map and ignored by the local population on both sides, a border that cut the nation in two and even divided related tribes, a border to which the authorities did not have full access and which was guarded by a warlike and fanatical people..." [The Middle East..., 1948, GB165-0326, 3/1/5, p. 26], - noted after the events related to the partition of India, the former British envoy in Kabul, UK. Fraser-Tytler. One of the possible solutions to this complicated problem was the formation of a "bloc of Muslim states stretching from Turkey in the west to the Pamirs in the east", or even a "confederation of Muslim states from Turkey to Bengal" (The Middle East..., 1941, GB165 - 0326, 3/1/4), based on the old thesis about the "communist threat"..

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An important event in the post-war political life of Afghanistan was the elections to the lower house of parliament - the National Council (Shura-i meli) in the first half of April 1949. The National Council was elected every three years, and in 1949 its seventh composition was formed. In fact, only these elections gave rise to hopes that the National Council could become a real parliament (the upper house of the Majlis-i ayan, consisting of 50 people, was appointed directly by the king). In the previous period, the election procedure was strictly controlled from above: the governor gathered the people, and at such a meeting parliamentary candidates were proposed [NA, FO 371/75625, May 16 1949]. This time, the government did not openly interfere in the election process, either in Kabul or on the ground, although some of its members, including Prime Minister Shah Mahmoud, claimed parliamentary mandates. The 1949 elections to the National Council were the first test of the nascent opposition's strength, and it quite successfully used this channel of influence on society and the authorities.

The internal political situation in Afghanistan worsened by the fall of 1949 - in October, the King issued a decree on the formation of the Supreme Council of Government. Most notably, the King's cousin, Prince Muhammad Daoud, was gaining control of the army, the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Communications, and the Tribal department. In fact, he became the sole head of the country's internal policy, which could not but create friction with the current Prime Minister, M. Hashim Khan. What was important was that Daoud gained control of the two main forces of the Afghan state - the army and the Afghan (Pashtun) tribes. Another center of power was entrusted to Abdul Majid Zabuli3, who received a mandate in the form of the Ministry of National Economy retained for him and supervising other departments close in profile. The decree of November 2, 1949 set out the goals of creating the Supreme Council of Government: ensuring a course loyal to the king and the constitutional monarchy, respecting the rights of Afghans on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border, etc.

THE FIRST EXPERIENCE OF PARTY AND POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION

Economic difficulties and other problems of the war and post-war periods exacerbated social contradictions in Afghan society, which resulted in the growth of political consciousness and the emergence of new political movements and groups that significantly differed from their historical predecessors - the constitutionalists and Young Afghans, as well as other trends of socio-political thought in the first half of the XX century. Under these conditions, the largest political grouping of the late monarchical period, Vish Zalmian, appeared and later took organizational form ("The Awakened Youth"). The Vish Zalmian Initiative Group (VZ) was formed in the spring of 1946 and included famous poets, writers and public figures Abdurrauf Benawa, Gul Pacha Ulfat, Ghulam Hasan Safi, Qiyamuddin Khan Khadem and others. It was the members of this group who prepared and distributed the first draft of the organization's charter (300 copies) in 1946. One of the main ideas of this document was to unite all Afghans, from the Amu Darya to the Indus, into one state-Greater Afghanistan. The tasks of the struggle against backwardness were also set.

3 Abdul Majid Zabuli started his career at the Herat customs, and since 1920 he was in Moscow, where he successfully engaged in business. During the civil war of 1929 in Afghanistan, he acted as a mediator between the Soviet leadership and the deposed King Amanullah Khan. In the early 1930s, he founded the first bank and joint-stock company Shirket-i Askhami in Afghanistan. From September 1938 - Minister of Trade, then-Minister of National Economy. In 1939 and 1941, he negotiated economic cooperation with German leaders, and advocated the creation of a Berlin-Baghdad-Kabul axis. At the beginning of 1941, he went abroad for medical treatment, spent several years in Germany and Switzerland, and returned to his homeland in 1946 [NA, FO 371/52293 1946].

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development of national culture and education. However, a year later, this program was revised and the idea of creating a Greater Afghanistan was removed from it.

In 1947, the same group published a collection of articles with a circulation of 500 copies under the title "Vish Zalmiyan" - this was already a real manifesto, calling on young people to unite and fight for progress. The next work was a brochure of 2 thousand rubles. A book directed against the reactionary clergy was published in Bombay by Abdurrauf Benawa and Ghulam Hassan Safi. The Afghan historian M. G. M. Gubar, who himself took an active part in the democratic movement since the 1920s, writes that the creation of "Vish Zalmiyan" was openly announced in 1947. Among the large number of its founders and members (about 50 people in total) In particular, he names Musa Shafiq, Maulavi Obaidullah Safi, Nur Muhammad Taraki, and G. H. Safi (Ghobar, 2001, p. 199).

As a result of preparatory work, branches of the organization were established in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Mazar-I-Sharif by mid-1950, and the first Vish Zalmian congress was held in Kabul in September of the same year. It was attended by 40 delegates from the four branches mentioned above, and at a meeting on September 15, 1950, the congress adopted the program and charter of the party [WUA RF, l. 75-77]. It was also decided to create a single governing body, the Central Committee, by delegating three representatives from each organization [WUA RF, p. 57]. The Vish Zalmian Central Committee was established on November 6, 1950 in Kabul at a meeting of representatives of provincial committees.

The main social groups that formed the base and backbone of Vish Zalmian were intellectuals, Anglophobic Afghan khans who supported the independence of Pashtunistan, small and medium-sized merchants who were dissatisfied with the penetration of foreign capital, part of the clergy, and even a small group of military personnel (Captain Abdul Ali Khan, aide-de-camp to Prince Ahmad Shah, the eldest son of King Zahir- Shah, Colonel Ghulam Ali Panjshiri-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, some cadets of the military school). The military's membership was secret, and they only contacted certain members of the Central Committee [WUA RF, pp. 61-65]. Several representatives of religious circles close to the authorities, such as a member of the Hazrat family, Mojaddidi Muhammad Yusuf, a member of the Ulema Council, Maulana Kazn Bahram, and some others, were also included in the OT. Students were one of the most promising groups to join the party, and Faiz Muhammad, a member of the Vish Zalmian Central Committee, was commissioned to create a student union in early 1950. Its activists launched a political campaign, openly criticizing the policies of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud. Thus, a delegation of representatives of the Faculty of Law obtained an audience with the head of Government and directly demanded that he establish a democratic government. But the student union lasted only 8-9 months and was banned in November 1950.

In 1951, the Central Committee of the VZ began publishing the newspaper "Angar" - its first issue was published on February 28. The official publisher and editor-in-chief of Angar was Faiz Muhammad Angar, a member of the Vish Zalmian Central Committee, but in fact its publication was carried out by a three-person editorial board: in addition to F. M. Angar, these were members of the Central Committee A. Benava and N. M. Taraki. The newspaper was published every two weeks in Pashto and Farsi, it was printed on a rotator, and source materials for its publication were purchased directly from the bazaar. The newspaper was banned on April 22, 1951 due to the publication of an article demanding the restoration of the banned student union. But on the initiative of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, from June 20, 1951, another newspaper began to be published - the weekly Vulus in Pashto. The party's ideas were also disseminated through provincial newspapers published in Kandahar, Mazar-I-Sharif, and Baghlan. In September 1951, it was planned to hold the next, 2nd congress of the party, at which the leaders of the OT, headed by A. Benava, were going to raise the issue of revising the program and charter of the party and changing its name - all these components had to correspond to the task.

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transformation of the EO into "a mass, militant party that can organize and lead a broad democratic movement in the country" [WUA RF, p. 59].

The question of the name was not formal, because it had a nationalistic connotation. Thus, S. Rishtin proposed to change the name of the party to "Vish Pashtun" ("Awakened Pashtuns"). In 1951, the Kandahar branch broke away from the party altogether, acquiring its own name "Ikhwan" ("Brothers") and a program. It formed committees on finance, publishing, and public relations (Ghobar, 2001, p. 200). This split allowed some observers to note the emergence of a new Vish Zalmiyan party in Kandahar, and it was to this party that they began to attribute the existence of an extensive national network, the membership of well-known figures of the regime itself, etc.4
In fact, Vish Zalmian functioned throughout 1947-1951, and its most active members were arrested in the second half of 1951, although attempts were made to resume its activities in Kabul and Kandahar in early 1952. In response, the authorities again arrested Kandahar EW activists, and moved the leadership of its Kabul committee to work in the province and even abroad (for example, N. M. Taraki), which made it difficult to form an opposition in the 8th convocation Parliament.

According to Soviet diplomats, since 1950 Vish Zalmiyan has been distributing Marxist literature in its ranks: "History of the CPSU(b)"," Questions of Leninism " in Persian, and other materials that were brought to Afghanistan in late 1949 by Faiz Muhammad, who was undergoing medical treatment in the Soviet Union. The staff of the Soviet embassy in Kabul also supplied the " viszalmiyanovites "with political and propaganda literature, including the" Communist Party Manifesto " in Farsi and English [WUA RF, l.70-71]. The mere fact that Marxist materials were distributed in Afghanistan could not significantly affect the political views of even the most progressive part of the Afghan democrats of the first post - war generation-Marxist ideas were never popular in this country, although many educated Afghans were familiar with them. The Minister of Economy, Abdul Majid Zabuli, believed that " no more than a dozen individuals were trained in Russia to carry out communist work, and none of them are in Afghanistan "[NA, FO 371/92085, 11 March 1951]. At the same time, he did not rule out that from two to five hundred supporters of communist organizations or ideas could be located in the country itself, presumably in Herat, where the Tudeh Party (Communist Party of Iran) operated from its base in Mashhad, Iran.

Soviet curators were not fazed by the modest results of indoctrination of the Afghan Democrats. They set up their wards to expand the social base, and not without success - in 1951, the first party circle of workers was created at the textile factory in Puli Khumri. Nevertheless, according to Soviet observers, "it would be untimely and wrong to consider Vish Zalmian as a progressive political organization that has declared itself" [WUA RF, p. 81]. Nevertheless, the structural and political identity of Vish Zalmian and its activities, broad social representation clearly showed that a political group of a party type actually emerged and operated in Afghanistan, the first of its kind in the country's recent history. But its weakness and mistakes due to lack of political experience, emphasis on nationalist sentiments, etc. allowed the government to maintain control over the situation and prevent Vish Zalmiyan from becoming an influential force in domestic politics.

4 This opinion was expressed, in particular, by Khan Sahib Abdurrahman, Charge d'affaires a.i. of Pakistan, based on information provided by the staff of the Pakistani Consulate in Kandahar [NA, FO 371/92084, 15 th February 1951].

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It is probably this circumstance that has led to the widespread assessment of Vish Zalmian as a national movement, but not as a party or even its predecessor. The most critical assessment of "Vish Zalmiyan" was made by the Russian Afghanist Yu. A.Bulatov, who rejected all the arguments that allow us to consider the VZ as a party, considering them retrospective propaganda that glorifies the first leader of the PDPA, N. M. Taraki. "Such an attempt... It would not only be a distortion of the history of the national democratic movement, but also a mistake with far - reaching consequences, since it would create illusions about the state of public structures in Afghanistan and, accordingly, distort the internal political balance of power in relation to the past and present" [Bulatov, 1992, pp. 7-8].

One of the latest scientific works, in which the history of "Vish Zalmian" is based on a solid source basis, is the monograph of the Tajik orientalist K. Iskandarov on the political parties and movements of Afghanistan in the second half of the XX century, K. Iskandarov, based on unique documentary and field sources and comparing the positions of various authors-researchers and participants in the events, - He puts forward a version about the formation of "Vish Zalmian" on the basis of several political circles that have emerged in a number of major cities of Afghanistan (Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad). He is also inclined to believe that it was a massive group by Afghan political standards, numbering about 300 people [Iskandarov, 2004, p. 58]. However, after scrupulous work to clarify the personal composition and ethno-social profile of the EO, K. Iskandarov, like many of his predecessors, comes to the conclusion that it "...could not form into a clearly structured organization" [Iskandarov, 2004, p.67]. As an argument, he, in particular, refers to the de facto independence of the Kandahar wing of the EO, the cooperation of a number of Kandahar members of the organization with the authorities, etc. This conclusion cannot be accepted, since it contradicts Soviet diplomatic sources, which clearly prove the existence of not only the attributes of the organization, but also practically all the elements characteristic of party construction.

The social and political institutionalization of the anti - government opposition in Afghanistan in the first decade after World War II forced the ruling classes to rethink their own strategy and tactics, including intercepting some forms of work of opponents, and sometimes even their rhetoric. The essence of the new approach was precisely defined by the then British ambassador in Kabul: "The danger of introducing democratic rule in this country is such that the government must "intercept" the movement and direct it in the right direction" [NA, FO 371/83038 29 April, 1950]. On January 15, 1950, Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, in the presence of some members of the royal family and high-ranking officials, announced the creation of the "Klup-e Meli" ("National Club"). Deputy Prime Minister Ali Muhammad stressed at his inauguration ceremony that it would be an organization "for the free expression of the ideas of its members", although the most trusted people were told that the essence of the idea was to create a national Democratic party under the banner of the "club". Soon those who joined the " club "were privately informed about this - such secrecy was explained by fears that even the very concept of" party " would provoke the opposition to similar actions.

At the first meeting of the party, the names of its founders were announced: Shah Mahmud - Prime Minister, Muhammad Daoud - Minister of War and Acting Interior Minister, Muhammad Naim, brother of M. Daoud, - Minister of Public Works, Asadullah Seraj-Deputy Prime Minister, Ali Muhammad-Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Majid Zabuli-Minister of National Economy. The name of the party as a "national democratic" did not mislead anyone - very soon it was assigned the label "party of ministers". But from the very beginning, the NDP organizers faced serious difficulties: the opposition group

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Members of parliament (A. Makhmudi, M. G. M. Gubar, G. P. Ulfat, Nur Alam, etc.) refused to join it. The authorities were unable to achieve either mass participation or broad social representation in their party, and the attempts of the "national democrats" to involve students in it failed - in fact, the student youth took this as a signal or even the right to create their own organization [British Documents..., 2005, p. 6]. This beginning led the NDP leaders to reject the idea of a mass organization and accept only the most trusted candidates. According to the party's charter, each member must be a Muslim and a citizen of Afghanistan who has not been prosecuted, not profess views and not take actions directed against the territorial integrity and independence of the country, and approve the party's program and charter. Students, members of national minorities and women were not allowed to join the NDP. In fact, the party consisted of ministers, heads of departments, deputies of parliament, the top clergy, large merchants and landowners, governors-general, alakadars, walis, hakims, etc.P. But in the ranks of the NDP there were also those who advocated the use of European, primarily British, experience in party building.

By mid-1951, the PDP's largest branch in Kabul had 260 members, and branches were established in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-I-Sharif, and Balkh. Provincial branches of the NDP were headed by governors-general or chairmen of reform commissions [WUA RF, p. 36]. In February 1950, the draft program of the NDP was adopted, which formulated its goals and responsibilities of its members [WUA RF, l. 37] 5. Soon, the Kabul branch of the PDP adopted the party's charter and scheduled the first congress for August 1951. In order to avoid unauthorized activity of ordinary members and their excessive involvement in party affairs, the charter granted the right to speak on behalf of the party and make statements at congresses and in current work only to official party speakers, namely: the honorary chairman, the chairman, the chairman of the Central Committee, his deputy, the General secretary and some other specially authorized members. The committees of local NDP branches nominated candidates to the advisory bodies of governors and city administrations, i.e. all local party structures, not to mention the highest bodies, were closely connected with state institutions and were thus an integral part of the existing bureaucratic machine.

In January 1951, at a meeting of the Kabul branch of the PDP, its national leadership was elected: Chairman-Ali Muhammad, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Chairman-Muhammad Naim. The actual backstage leader of the PDP was Muhammad Daoud , the Minister of War and Acting Minister of Internal Affairs [WUA RF, l. 40-41] .6 Another key NDP figure was Abdul Majid Zabuli7, chairman of the Afghan National Bank. At the beginning of 1951, the government had an intention to legalize the NDP and activate its work, but the king and his entourage rejected this idea, fearing similar actions on the part of the opposition. For this reason, the party operated in a closed manner, during the year and a half of its existence, it appeared publicly only twice - at the inauguration on January 16, 1950, and in a letter from the NDP member M. Faruzi, director of the Bakhtar agency, to the editor of the Anis newspaper on April 26, 1951, the former Minister of Education Faiz Muhammad took, apparently with the knowledge of authorities, another attempt to revive a pro-government party called Ahrari, which included many members of the National Club, but this one is still under investigation.-

5 M. G. M. Gubar cites the text of the NDP program consisting of 11 points [Ghobar, 2001, p. 201].

6 At that time, M. Daoud was considered by Soviet diplomats in Kabul as "a well-known reactionary who advocated tough measures against progressive democratic elements."

7 Some researchers attribute A. M. Zabuli, undoubtedly an iconic figure of the Afghan establishment, to truly demonic traits: he is involved in almost all political projects, both on the part of the government and the opposition [Marwat, 1997, p. 244].

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The political gesture did not change the essence of the matter - the idea of self - organization of the upper classes in the party format failed at that time, and in March 1953 its phantom institute, the National Club, was also closed.

ALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL FORCES ON THE EVE OF THE "DAOUD ERA"

The spread of freedom-loving sentiments in the early 1950s, and especially the strengthening of organized parliamentary opposition, prompted the ruling elite to limit political activity from below as much as possible. Vish Zalmiyan has repeatedly tried to re-establish itself as a political force, but its potential has been seriously undermined by regime repression, arrests and expulsions of its leaders from Kabul to remote provinces and even outside the country. The experience of Vish Zalmian was not the only attempt to create an opposition political organization - in January 1951, the Vatan (Motherland) group appeared in Kabul. Its creator was Mir Ghulam Muhammad Gubar, a well-known historian and publicist, a member of the 7th convocation of the Parliament. He was known not only as a member of the Young Afghan movement, but also as a consistent opponent of the Yahya clan regime. After becoming a member of Parliament in 1948, Gubar, along with a group of other democrats, formed a legal opposition to the government. In his speeches and publications, he sharply criticized the former regime of Hashim Khan for usurping all branches of government, appealed to the ideas of French enlighteners of the XVIII century, and advocated the inviolability of private property.

At the insistence of A. A. Kohzad, G. F. Ettemadi and other moderate Democrats, the Watan group's program included a clause on supporting the ruling royal dynasty and the constitutional monarchical system. Probably, these fluctuations gave the democratic public a reason to consider it as an "aristocratic party" [WUA RF, p. 50]. Its creator, M. G. M. Gubar, held a different opinion - he considered himself and his associates to be opponents of the regime, which was confirmed by their further fate: in February 1952, the Vatan newspaper was closed, and 14 of the most active members of the organization were sentenced to various prison terms. Subsequently, attempts were made to recreate the leadership structures of the Watan group, but the authorities managed to break some of its members and even co-opt them into state structures [Ghobar, 2001, p. 207]. In 1956, Prime Minister M. Daoud officially announced the dissolution of the Watan organization.

The tightening of the political regime was also felt by adherents of left-democratic views, the most prominent expression of which was the group "Khalq" ("People"), created in 1951 by Dr. Abdurrahman Mahmudi and publicly presented through the newspaper "Nida-i Khalq". The Khalq group is usually presented as one of the most left-wing in the political landscape of Afghanistan in the early 1950s, which is not entirely accurate - its leader A. Mahmudi recognized the need to preserve the monarchical system at that time, he also supported the regime's foreign policy and advocated the neutrality of Afghanistan. But his demands for freedom of the press and legislative reforms increasingly irritated the authorities, and their patience came to an end when the pages of Nida-i Khalq published a critical article by G. H. Safi on religious issues, which initiated a major scandal involving the Mojaddidi clan. The Khalq leaders, no less than representatives of other branches of the public protest movement, tried to turn their organization into a party, but without success-the repressions, prisons and the death of A. Mahmudi in 1962 put an end to this project of creating a party system in Afghanistan.

The elections to the National Council (lower house of Parliament) held at the end of April 1952 were accompanied by violations and outright fraud. Representatives of the opposition A. Mahmoudi (849 votes) and M. G. M. Gubar (700 votes), who in the previous election campaign had the most votes, were outside the parliament.

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impressive results (about 13,000 votes each) indicated their popularity [NA, FO 371.100961 3 rd May, 1952]. The results of the April 1952 elections provoked an unprecedented rally in Kabul - a demonstration of young people chanting "Long live democracy!"right at the entrance to the royal palace. Responsibility for the riots was placed on a group of individuals known for their democratic views, including the defeated candidates for deputies, and in early May 1952, the police arrested 17 people: M. G. M. Gubar, A. R. Mahmudi, M. M. S. Farhang, B. A. Taj, G. S. Juya and others, mostly members of groups "Vish zalmian", "Vatan" and "Halk". The events of 1952 showed that the Afghan regime, which had partially changed its personal image, structure and some management techniques, was not ready for a dialogue with the nascent opposition. The government, originally determined to introduce a parliamentary democracy regime, abandoned these plans, the democratic experiment was postponed for many years, and the opposition was forced to operate from underground, emigration, and other indirect means.

The emergence of opposition liberal-democratic and left-wing radical groups was a symptom of the crisis of the political system of Afghanistan in the 1930s and early 1950s. This process forced the political and diplomatic circles of some countries, primarily the USSR and Great Britain, to pay special attention to the emerging opposition in Afghanistan. Moscow became interested in the most popular group - Vish Zalmiyan, which is rapidly transforming into a left-nationalist political organization (party), while the British were more attracted to other "democratic" parties. In a letter dated April 28, 1951, addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, H. E. Morrison, the British Ambassador in Kabul wrote: "... In principle, we should establish contacts with them and assist them as much as is consistent with our loyalty to the Afghan Government. In fact, we have already had contacts with the Vatan party and individuals whose party affiliation is unclear. We have provided them with materials on British political practice, and recently published a special development on our party system. ...I believe that by maintaining minimal contacts with two or three parties - Vatan, Vish Zalmiyan and the new party of Mullah Shur Bazar (emphasis added - V. B.), we should do what is really necessary for them today. After all, their influence is small, and their commitment and political platforms remain uncertain" [NA, FO 371/92085, 25 th April, 1951] .8
New developments in the political life of the entire Asian macroregion, especially in the neighboring states of India, Pakistan, and Iran, also contributed to the growth of social contradictions in Afghanistan in the early 1950s. Despite the difficulties of the transition of power to the national elites of the former British India, the constitutional order of the republican type was established there. The authoritarianism of the Pakistani leaders, who were concerned about Afghan propaganda in favor of the independence of Pashtunistan, did not prevent them from actively criticizing the state of affairs in the neighboring country. Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, speaking at a rally in Karachi in September 1950, did not ask rhetorical questions: "How is freedom in Afghanistan? What rights are granted to the masses? Is there a parliament there? " [Speeches and Statements..., 1967, p. 456].

The political temperature suddenly began to rise in the Muslim west - in neighboring Iran, remote Egypt, and after it in a whole group of other Arab countries. The "Revolution of free officers", during which the royal regime in Egypt was overthrown in 1952, as well as the formation of the National Front government in Iran headed by M. Mosaddegh testified to the crisis of the monarchical form

8 When referring to the" new party of Mullah Shur Bazar", the British diplomat was probably referring to the clashes in the spring of 1951 between pro-Islamic forces and their liberal-Democratic opponents, who accused the representatives of the Mojaddidi clan of pro-Pakistan and pro-British intrigues ("the case of G. H. Safi").

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authorities in a number of Asian countries, although the Iranian events of the early 1950s did not yet pose a direct threat to the Pahlavi dynasty. Yet it is the weakening of traditional political foundations in the Muslim world, whether it is coups organized by patriotic army circles (Egypt), or the breakthrough of new political forces to separate institutions of power (Iran), that has become the main challenge for the Afghan ruling oligarchy. Much less dangerous for the ruling regime in Afghanistan at that time were left-democratic and left-radical ideas and organizations - in this case, their source was considered to be the same Iran, where the Tudeh Party of Iranian Communists was noticeably strengthened, and only then the USSR.

The course of socio-political life in Afghanistan in the first post-war decades showed a weak rootedness of a new phenomenon - political parties (proto-parties), which could organically integrate into a completely civilized power - opposition formula-the driving force of the political development of most modern states. At the same time, today it is this experience that can be considered as evidence of a relatively long-standing, though failed, tradition of political maneuvering in Afghanistan in the mode of conflict-corporate interaction between the government and the opposition, which allows adapting the political process to various social and geographical (regional) conditions. The political project to "partisanize" the government failed, because at that time it was fraught with further activization of the opposition, which prompted the authorities to resort to bans and repression, i.e., to actually interrupt the liberal experiment, the first of its kind in Afghanistan, where power was still concentrated in the hands of the family oligarchy (the Yahyakhel clan) and those close to it. It includes the most influential representatives of business (A. M. Zabuli), clergy (the Mojaddidi clan, etc.).

However, the domestic and international political situation required further steps to strengthen the weakening power of the Yahyahel clan. One of the ways out of this situation was the coming to power in 1953 of a representative of the next generation of this clan, who had already established himself in high military and administrative posts (Minister of Defense, Interior, etc.)-Prince Mohammad Daoud. It was in the late 1940s and early 1950s that M. Daoud was formed as an active, independent politician, and the circumstances of the formation of new states in South Asia, in particular neighboring Pakistan, which included part of the Pashtun ethnic group, which is also titular in Afghanistan itself, strengthened the nationalist (Pashtun) origin in Daoud, which became his main character. a foreign policy credo for the rest of his career and life. In this sense, M. Daoud's occupation of the post of head of government in 1953 (and president in 1973-1978) and the activation of many areas of domestic and foreign policy can be considered important episodes, and then a period in the modern history of Afghanistan, which gave rise to both achievements and failures, including the tragedy of the late 1970s. - 1990's. Of course, M. Daoud cannot be solely responsible for all the subsequent cataclysms of his country, especially since his name is associated with many significant events and changes in the country (economic reforms in the style of a "guided economy", etc.), which provide him with a prominent place in the history of Afghanistan. This was confirmed by the solemn reburial in 2009 of the remains of M. Daoud, who died during the coup of April 27, 1978, and an attempt by the current authorities to pay tribute to their predecessors and restore peace on the Afghan land.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Political Science of the Russian Federation (WUA of the Russian Federation, f. Reference book on Afghanistan, 1951, op. 33b, por. 1, folder 226a.

Bulatov Yu. On the question of the origin of the revolutionary-democratic movement in Afghanistan (Essays on the history of Khalqism), Moscow, MGIMO, 1992.
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Gurevich N. M. Afghanistan: some features of socio-economic development (20-50s). Moscow, 1983.

Yezhov G. Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan. http://www.afghanistan.ru/doc/15127.html

Iskandarov K. Political parties and movements of Afghanistan in the second half of the XX century. Dushanbe, 2004.

Pikulin M. G. Afghanistan (Economic essay). Tashkent, 1956.

Slinkin M. F. Afghanistan: Opposition and Authorities (60-70 - ies of XX century). Simferopol, 2004.

Azam Ghulam Farouq. The Ejfects of Local, Regional and Global Politics on the Development of the Helmand-Arghandab Valley of Afghanistan. L., 1999.

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Pt V. From 1951 Through 1956. Series B. Near and Middle East. Vol. 1. Afghanistan, Persia and Iraq. Bethesda, 2005.

The British Library, Lndia Office Records (BL, IOF).

Ghobar M.G.M. Afghanistan in the Course of History. Vol. 2. Herndon, 2001.

Khattak M.A.Kh. A Pathan Odyssey. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2005.

Marwat F.R. The Evolution and Growth of Communism in Afghanistan (1917 - 1979): an Appraisal. Karachi, 1997.

Michel Aloys Arthur. The Kabul, Kunduz, and Helmand Valleys and the National Economy of Afghanistan. A Study of Regional Resources and the Comparative Advantages of Development (PhD thesis). National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council. Washington, 1959.

The Middle East Centre Archive. University of Oxford. Fraser-Tytler W.K. Afghanistan: a Brief Description (Anniversary Lecture), 1941, GB165 - 0326, 3/1/4.

The National Archives of UK (NA).

Reshtia Sayed Qassem. The Price of Liberty. The Tragedy of Afghanistan. Roma, Bardi Editore, 1985.

Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan (1941 - 1951). Collected & ed. by M. Rafique Afzat. Lahore, 1967.

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