G. V. LUKYANOV

National Research University "Higher School of Economics"

Keywords: "al-Fateh revolution", Libyan army, "jamahirization", Gaddafi, "Arab spring"

In the new millennium, in the face of the political challenges of our time and the new political reality that is developing before our eyes, the problem of interaction between the armed forces and state power, as well as the very participation of the army and military in the political process of the Arab world states remains as relevant as in the second half of the XX century, when countries like Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Libya. It was the army that, in the absence of other similar institutions, became the driving force of society, which served as a catalyst and cradle of changes that led to a radical change in their path of socio-political development and the establishment of the power of the so-called "progressive regimes". The Army retained its function of protection, mobilization, and direction at the formal or informal level in parts of the Middle East region until the end of the first decade of the 2000s, when global and domestic changes challenged its dominant position.

In the light of the events of the "Arab Spring" of 2011, when authoritarian regimes in a number of countries faced the threat of collapse, the armies of these countries were perceived by the population and the public as an institution capable of performing two functions: either to preserve the power of agonizing regimes, standing up for them, or to restore order in conditions of chaos and anarchy, supporting

In Tunisia, where the ruling political party, interior ministry and security services were the mainstays of President Ben Ali's ruling regime rather than the army, the armed forces quickly joined the protesting population1. The situation is different in Egypt, where mass protests in Cairo and a long-standing conflict broke out in the ruling elite.² The armed forces have abandoned the president and his family, and have become a kind of arbiter in the conflict between the youth opposition to the regime and the ruling group. As a result, the thirty-year rule of H. Mubarak ended, and the political system created by him suffered a complete collapse.³ In this article, the author tries to analyze the role of the military in the political process of Libya during the reign of Muammar Gaddafi, as well as the role of the armed forces in the revolutionary events that led to a full-scale civil war, the destruction of the political system and the fall of the ruling regime.

A DIFFERENT COUNTRY

When analyzing the Libyan events, it is necessary to identify a number of fundamental factors that distinguish this country from any other in the Middle East and North Africa region.

First, it is the uniqueness of the political system of the Libyan Jamahiriya, in which the central place for most of its existence was occupied by the figure of Gaddafi himself. There were simply no mechanisms for transferring power. The Supreme Leader alone performed the functions of deconflicting the political space and pacifying intertribal confrontation. The very figure of the leader of the revolution-the arbiter, formally located above the battle of individual interest groups, was the foundation of the political system. The lack of any legal means for anyone other than Gaddafi to take this position led to the fact that the main method of transferring power in the Libyan political system in 1969-2011 was a coup or conspiracy.

Secondly, the country's armed forces were not the mainstay of the ruling regime. Unlike in Egypt, Syria or Algeria, where the army served as a source of replenishment for elites at all levels - from regional officials to the first person of the state, in Libya, the armed forces soon turned from the driving force of the revolution into one of the many institutions for maintaining Gaddafi's power, and not the most important one.

Third, the reason for the collapse of the Jamahiriya was not the mass disillusionment of the population with the socio-political and economic situation in the country-Libya was going through even more difficult times - but rather the struggle for power of groups of the political elite that were different in their composition and principles of solidarity.

Over the past 40 years of Libya's history, the army has lost its unity and cohesion as an integral independent elite.-

This is a new group, even though it was exactly what it was at the dawn of the Gaddafi era. It is thanks to this lost quality that the overthrow of the monarchy and the coming to power of a young revolutionary in the person of M. Gaddafi, who managed not only to build a new political system, but also to transform the political culture of the population itself, became possible.

1969-1977: WHEN THE ARMY WAS IN POWER

On September 1, 1969, the first successful military coup in the history of Libya took place, carried out by a group of young officers and went down in the history of the country under the name "Al-Fateh Revolution" * ⁴. After removing King Idris I, members of the Free Officers Unionist-Socialists organization (OSOYUS), led by Captain Muammar Gaddafi announced the beginning of a new era in the history of Libya. They created the Revolutionary Command Council (SRC) under the chairmanship of the same Muammar Gaddafi5. It included 12 officers, members of an anti-monarchist conspiracy. They represented junior and mid-level officers, and many were trained abroad. The high command of the Libyan Royal Army, although it did not participate in the coup, not only did not oppose the conspirators, but joined them and took part in the formation of a new government.

The first clash between Gaddafi and his supporters, on the one hand, and those who disagree with the revolutionary-reformist political course from among the military, on the other, occurred two months after the victory of the revolution. The counter-revolutionary putsch, organized by a number of representatives of large influential families and clans, was led by Lieutenant Colonels Adam Hawwaz and Musa Ahmed, appointed in September 1969 by Gaddafi himself to the posts of Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior. Neither Khawwaz nor Ahmed, who had received their titles from the king, were members of the OSOYU, but supported it after the overthrow of the monarchy and represented in the new government influential groups with the support of a number of tribes within the country and reliable financial contacts outside its borders.⁶

However, in the autumn of 1969, the support of Unionist officers and the young charismatic Gaddafi in the ranks of the armed forces and on the streets was so great that the defeat of the putschists was a foregone conclusion. Already in early December, the SRK reported on the arrest of the conspirators and 30 other officers involved in the attempt to overthrow the revolutionary authorities.⁷

In July 1970, the leaders of the fallen monarchist regime were repressed, accused of preparing a new anti-government plot in the south of the country. Members of the Royal Cabinet of Ministers, major dignitaries and financiers were targeted. At that time, the army served as the main tool of the revolutionary struggle. The "witch hunt" was supposed to rally the military around the new leadership and the ideas put forward by it of radical socio-political transformations and the creation of a new Libya. At the same time, contradictions were revealed in the army environment itself.

Over the next 4 years, the split in the ranks of the highest authority has noticeably deepened. The SRK consisted of the" inner circle " of the organization of unionist officers-those who led the revolution with Gaddafi in September 1969, and before that prepared it with him for several years. If Gaddafi's foreign policy platform did not cause disputes and doubts among them, then agreement on the internal political structure of the state could not be reached. Of the 12 members of the IRK, only five, including Gaddafi, formed a core of irreconcilable reformist radicals, while the remaining seven were more moderate.

By 1974, a group of Omar Moheishi, Bashir Hawwadi, Abdel Huni, and Awwad Ali Hamza, who were opposed to Gaddafi on a number of major domestic policy issues, had finally formed in the Council.⁸ The remaining three members of the IAC were neutral and wait-and-see: none of them was ready to offer a program of action,

* "The Al-Fateh Revolution "(from Arabic. "the revolution of the conquerors") (editor's note).

** The Free Officers , a secret organization in Egypt that led to the July 1952 revolution that overthrew the monarchy. It was founded by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1949.

different from the one put forward by Gaddafi.

THE LEADER'S POSITION: NO COMPROMISES!

The irreconcilable position of the leader of the revolution regarding the main reforms, their goals and methods of achieving them, and the unwillingness to even discuss other models of the political system of the Libyan state blocked all attempts by opposition-minded officers to reach a compromise or change the situation through peaceful negotiations. During 1971-1974, Gaddafi went into "informal retirement" several times, leaving the capital and cutting off all contacts with the outside world. Major Abdel Salam Djellud, who was both the head of the government and the "second number" in the radical core of the SRK, remained acting head of state.

In the summer of 1975, another coup attempt was made by the Libyan military circles. This time, the youngest member of the SRK, the Minister of Planning and Scientific Research, Major Omar Moheishi, was at the head of the group of plotting officers. The plot was prepared with the tacit consent or neutrality of the majority of moderate members of the SRK9, which made it possible to involve officers from various branches of the armed forces and garrisons throughout the country in the preparation of the coup. Led by Moheisha, the military planned to slow down the pace of revolutionary reforms in their essence and methods and adjust them towards the gradual construction of a parliamentary-republican state on a moderate model. To carry out such plans, it was necessary to take the reins of power in their own hands, removing the radical Gaddafi from power. The subject of controversy was only the question of the expediency of eliminating the colonel, which was decided by a majority vote in favor of physical elimination.

However, an attempt to destroy Gaddafi during a review of troops in June 1975, when a group of soldiers shot down a podium with top officials of the state with automatic weapons, failed ¹⁰. The investigation revealed many members of the conspiracy, which forced the latter to take active action. In August 1975, the largest open military action against the rule of Gaddafi took place at that time, but it ended in failure. Military units loyal to the President of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee entered the capital and secured the government area near the Bab al-Aziziya barracks. In pursuance of the Council's decision of August 18, about 80 people in the ranks of senior and middle officers were arrested. Several dozen of them were executed on charges of high treason ¹¹. The leader of the conspirators managed to leave the territory of Libya: initially he left for Tunisia, later emigrated to Egypt ¹², and then to Morocco ¹³.In 1983, the authorities of this country handed over the former major to the Libyan intelligence service, and less than a year later he was executed in Tripoli ¹⁴. According to eyewitnesses and journalists who worked in Libya, Gaddafi himself was very sensitive to the betrayal of Moheishi, whom he considered a close friend of his childhood and youth.¹⁵

The split in the ranks of the country's top political and military leadership, which at that time was represented by the same people, meant for Gaddafi himself and his supporters the need to abandon the perception of the army as the basis for revolutionary transformation and development of the state. The neutrality or tacit approval of the actions of the conspirators by a number of members of the SRK during the preparation of the coup was regarded as evidence of their unreliability. This led to the removal from power of the opposition group Moheishi-Hawwadi-Hamza-Huni and a smoother, but at the same time irreversible departure from the political pedestal of moderate members of the SRK - Mukhtar al-Gervi, Mohammed Najm.

However, at this stage, Gaddafi did not deprive the army of a leading role in the transformation of the country. As commander - in-chief, he brought closer to himself the "second echelon" of free officers-former sergeants and lieutenants, much less educated, but at the same time more loyal and loyal to him personally. Combining them with the radical core of the Council, he began to create a new Libyan army. They, the rank-and-file soldiers of the Free Officers organization, ¹⁶ were the mainstay of the regime during the revolution and in the anti-monarchist purges that followed, and gradually took up all senior positions in the army and police. In their eyes, Gaddafi was a benefactor who removed corrupt monarchists from their posts and gave them positions, titles and power. So they took his side and put down the Moheishi rebellion.

1976-1988: LOYALTY VERSUS EFFICIENCY

In 1976, on the eve of a comprehensive transformation of the Libyan state and its transformation into a Jamahiriya, the first part of Gaddafi's main philosophical and political work, The Green Book, was published¹⁷. At this time, so-called revolutionary committees (revcoms) were being formed in Libya at all levels of public life, designed to "lead the masses to the lofty ideals of a new society" and with full freedom of action and unlimited power to combat "counterrevolutionary reaction"^.18 A year later, the official re-establishment of the Revolutionary committees was completed.-

Renaming the country* to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (SNLAD) and adopting a Declaration on the Transfer of Power to the People ¹⁹.

During this period, the military begins to lose its privileged position in society and cease to be perceived by the authorities as a reliable support of the political regime. Despite the colossal scale of funding and the constant growth of material support for equipment and weapons**, as well as a noticeable increase in the number of personnel, the army remained ineffective as a combat unit and unable to adequately ensure the country's external security.²⁰ But at the same time, it continued to be a source of potential threat to the regime of Gaddafi's personal power.

Control over the armed forces was carried out by creating so-called military revolutionary committees in military units, as well as by radically changing the political function of the army. ²¹ It became a center for military training of the population, as Gaddafi's idea of an "armed people" - the basis of state defense-dictated. Civil and military revolutionary committees, in turn, took the place of the main support of the regime. The unprecedented purge of officers from hidden and obvious enemies of the regime organized by them led to a whole series of anti-government protests and attempts to physically eliminate Gaddafi by the middle and top commanders of the army.

By eliminating senior officers who displeased him, Gaddafi also elevated younger officers - less experienced, but more loyal-which led not only to the circulation of elites, but also ensured the pacification of the armed forces as a whole: privates, sergeants and lieutenants did not seek to support dissatisfied commanders, seeing in their elimination an opportunity for a social elevator for themselves.

In August 1980, the local garrison in Tobruk under the command of Major Idris Chehaibi rebelled against the policy of the Revolutionary Committees.²² Despite the fact that the rebellion was suppressed, the leadership of the Jamahiriya was faced with the refusal of a number of unit commanders to take part in the cleaning of the garrison. Moreover, in the following year alone, 1981, the military twice tried to physically eliminate the colonel. The first attempt was made by a group of staff officers led by Colonel Khalif Qadir, who personally shot Gaddafi. The attempt was foiled, and Gaddafi was slightly wounded in the shoulder. The second attempt was carried out by officers of the Libyan Air Force, when a group of pilots on two fighter jets tried to shoot down a plane returning from Moscow with Gaddafi on board.

LOYAL BUT INEFFECTIVE

Gaddafi's next step in reorganizing the army was the creation of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (RGC), a separate mechanized brigade of about 3,000 soldiers, consisting of Gaddafi tribesmen and subordinated only to him. Colonel Khalifa Heneish, who was personally loyal to Gaddafi, was appointed head of ^the brigade. Later, this unit, removed from the main army structure and hierarchy of subordination, was renamed the Jamahiriya Guard and was repeatedly used to suppress armed protests.

At the same time, the DAC brigade, which was distinguished by its loyalty to the regime, was so small in number that it was not possible to use it for any other purpose than to suppress dissent within the army. Libya's active but far from victorious participation in the civil war in neighboring Chad [²⁵] has formed an understanding in the highest circles of the Jamahiriya of the need to create highly professional armed forces.

To solve this problem, the Pan-African (Islamic) Legion, created in 1972, was re-formed.²⁶ Being an analog of the French Foreign Legion, it consisted of foreign professional mercenaries and performed the functions of a full-fledged combat unit, not burdened with responsibility to the revolutionary committees. Unlike the Syrian, Palestinian, and Egyptian instructors who had appeared in the Libyan army before, the legion's mercenaries from Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and Mauritania did not train Libyan soldiers, but independently applied their combat experience in practice.²⁷

Gaddafi's reliance on professional mercenaries and dedicated revolutionary guards led to the de facto elimination of the army from the system of making important political decisions by the end of 1983. As a result of the pressure of the revolutionary committees, which did not weaken for several years, about 10 thousand officers and privates were dismissed from the armed forces. The issue of the general expediency of preserving the traditional army as such was repeatedly put on the agenda by the media, given the "immoral behavior of military personnel and their corrupting influence on society" ²⁸.

1985 brought M. Gaddafi

* After the military coup and until 1977, the country was called the Libyan Arab Republic (editor's note).

** Throughout the entire existence of the Jamahiriya, its army possessed huge reserves of weapons, which, however, contrasted sharply with the relatively small number and low level of professional training of military personnel (author's note).

*** It was created in the mid-80s of the last century in the likeness of the" Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps " in Iran (editor's note).

disappointment in the loyal Jamahiri guardsmen as well. Colonel Hassan Ishkal, a relative of Gaddafi, one of the top officers of the DAC and a close confidant of the leader of the revolution, who was appointed commander of the expeditionary force in Chad, tried to kill him in Sirte, but failed and was executed.²⁹

Under these circumstances, Gaddafi chose the path of further fragmentation of the armed forces and the creation of paramilitary detachments to maintain order under the command of completely different beliefs, backgrounds and abilities of people. Creating a system of universal conflict, an atmosphere of struggle of all against all, fear and suspicion turned out to be the only effective mechanism for retaining power in the hands of a leader who did not want to share it under any circumstances.

In the mid-1980s, more than a dozen different paramilitary groups and units operated in parallel in the country, performing similar or the same functions.³⁰ These include the Jamahiriya Guard (or DAC), the Pan-African Legion, the regular troops, the Chadian Expeditionary Force, the People's Militia, the paramilitary detachments of the Revolutionary Committees, the battalions of Islamic youth, the armed detachments of the Intelligence Service, the police and paramilitary police, the people's cavalry units, etc. ³¹

The diversification of the armed forces, i.e. the creation of many parallel structures, was accompanied by personnel changes at the middle and highest command levels, territorial relocation of the headquarters of military districts and headquarters of branches of the armed forces, as well as a "change of signage": the creation of "repulse troops" and "protection troops", and later-the transition to the idea of an "armed people" ^.32.

In the late 1980s, the Libyan army ceased to exist as an independent political force. With the help of the revolutionary Committees, the most capable and active officers were physically destroyed, their place was taken by foreign mercenaries, natives of the Gaddafi tribe and former privates and sergeants who proved their loyalty to the country's leader, and the established atmosphere of fear for many years deprived the military of such qualities as political initiative and internal army solidarity. Attempts to overthrow and assassinate Gaddafi in the 1990s were repeated many times, but now they were backed by completely different forces (mainly Islamists), while the army became a passive observer of the country's internal political life.

1988-2011: IN SEARCH OF A WAY OUT

In the late 1980s and early 1990s,the socio-economic situation in Libya significantly worsened, both due to the activities of the revolutionary committees for the uncontrolled redistribution of property in the country, and due to a number of objective factors of a foreign policy nature. ³³ The economic and political blockade by Western countries, as well as the decline in world oil and gas prices, as a result, the state's revenues are reduced.

Discontent with the activities of the revolutionary committees, which were engaged in looting and self-enrichment rather than maintaining the political credibility of Libyans, was growing among the population. To maintain popular support, Gaddafi was forced to suspend the revolutionary committees and disband most of them.³⁴

The US military operation against the Jamahiriya in 1986, which included the bombing of a number of sites in Tripoli, rallied the population around Muammar Gaddafi as the leader of the nation. At the same time, the authority of the armed forces that are unable to prevent foreign aggression has fallen as low as never before.³⁵

After the end of the war with Chad in 1987, the Libyan army, defeated by an external enemy and destroyed from within by its own political leadership, no longer posed a threat to the regime of Gaddafi's personal power. But at the same time, it was also unable to fulfill the tasks that are assigned to any army in the world - to protect the state and the population from external threats. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991.-

der Revolyutsii lost the main supplier of weapons, which made it impossible to compensate for the small number and poor training of army personnel with equipment.³⁶

The solution to the problem of external security was found in the program for developing its own weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the last stages of the "Chad campaign", Libyan troops used chemical warfare agents of their own production, and after its completion, Libya began mass purchases of chemical weapons abroad.³⁷ At the same time, in the 1980s, the Libyans tried to buy a nuclear reactor from the USSR, and in the 1990s, they tried to buy radioactive elements from North Korea to build their own nuclear weapons.³⁸ Development management, as well as control over weapons of mass destruction, was transferred not to army ranks, but to a network of special services.³⁹ Gaddafi also entrusted them with special powers of the revolutionary committees.

In 1993, A. S. Djellud, Gaddafi's right - hand man and closest ally since the 1969 revolution, was dismissed. A year later, he and other members of the revolutionary leadership, with the exception of the Secretary of the People's Defense Committee, Abu Bakr Younes Jaber, were placed under house arrest. Purges and reshuffles again ensued in the army, with officers who were directly involved in the "Chadian campaign" and expressed doubts about the correctness of Gaddafi's political course being the first to resign.⁴⁰

2011: VISIBILITY OF POWER

Gaddafi's abandonment of the nuclear project in 2003-2004, the resumption of contacts with the outside world, and the improvement of the socio - economic situation in the country did not change the place of the army in the political process at home.⁴¹ Its main task was to ensure the foreign policy activities of Muammar Gaddafi on the training of combat organizations throughout the African continent. Libyan officers trained rebel and separatist combat units in several African countries. Militants from Darfur and South Sudan, opposition members from Chad and others had camps on the territory of SNLAD ⁴².

The Pan-African Legion was also formed from natives of African countries, whose number has increased 4 times since its creation.⁴³ It was this legion, as well as several elite units from the Gaddafi tribe, that were the only combat-ready, fully equipped military force in Libya. Their loyalty was guaranteed by a large salary and tribal solidarity with the leader of the revolution.⁴⁴

As for the regular Libyan army, due to the lack of a general staff and the Ministry of Defense, it was only a poorly organized and poorly trained paramilitary entity. The presence of a huge number of weapons of outdated models and the number of personnel that grew to ⁷⁶ thousand people created only the appearance of well-being, strength and power, as the events of 2011 proved.

Immediately after the outbreak of unrest in the east of the country, on the orders of Gaddafi, the security service arrested a number of senior officers who were then in Tripoli. Even 69-year-old A. B. Y. Jaber, Libya's only brigadier general and chairman of the Defense Committee, who escaped arrest in 1994, was taken into custody.⁴⁶ This indicated that the leader of the revolution continued to expect threats primarily from the army and the army elite.

The military operation against the rebels in Benghazi began relatively late. Before that, Gaddafi repeatedly sent negotiators and parliamentarians to the east of the country. The colonel was confident in his own abilities and did not see the need to use troops to resolve the current situation.⁴⁷ Indeed, all the major conspiracies against him up to this point have been the work of the army command or officers. Now, after the arrest of the army leadership, there was no need to fear such a scenario. On February 17, Gaddafi sent Abdel Fattah Younes, Secretary of the Supreme People's Committee of the Interior (Interior Ministry), to negotiate with the rebels.⁴⁸

But the disintegration of the armed forces affected immediately. The garrisons of Benghazi, Al-Beida, Tobruk and a number of small towns fled or surrendered to the protesters in the early days of the uprising, leaving numerous weapons depots unguarded, and General A. F. Younes immediately declared his solidarity with the rebels.⁴⁹

It was only in early March that the offensive on Benghazi began by forces loyal to the regime, which was based on the 32nd brigade under the leadership of the son of the leader of the revolution, Khamis Gaddafi, the Jamahiriya Guards brigade and the Pan-African Legion ⁵⁰.

The latter's participation is of particular interest. According to numerous testimonies51, immediately after the protesters took control of Benghazi and joined forces with a part of ^the local garrison, reprisals began against the soldiers of one of the legion units stationed here. Former protesters perceived black soldiers a priori as those "Gaddafists" with whom they could not negotiate. General army solidarity did not apply to them, and the regular army soldiers gave out legionnaires in exchange for the opportunity to leave the city. The reason for this attitude of the local population and Libyan soldiers towards black legionnaires is the constant participation of the latter in punitive operations and purges conducted by the security and intelligence services.

The elite units proved their reliability and professionalism when they managed to defeat the rebels and block them in Benghazi and Misrata in just 2 weeks. Most researchers are convinced that only foreign intervention saved the rebels from complete defeat at the end of March ⁵².

ON THE EVE OF THE BREAKUP

After the campaign dragged on, and the punitive operation turned into a war for survival for the forces loyal to the regime, the collapse of the army became inevitable.

Desertion of ordinary soldiers has become widespread. This is explained by the fact that tribal identity in Libya has always been valued higher than army solidarity. Protecting the interests of one's tribe or family, as well as property and possessions, in the midst of chaos for most military personnel turned out to be more important than the duty to swear an oath.

Most of the army battalions were only one-third full-time, which made it impossible not only to carry out effective offensive operations, but also to carry out defensive tasks.⁵³

The lack of highly qualified command staff also affected, which deprived the government forces of proper combat capability. The mass purges of the past years have destroyed a layer of professional officers in regular units who are able to take responsibility, mobilize people and material resources. The commanders who had passed through the "sieve" of the revolutionary committees and security services were uninitiative and had no combat experience. Even the release in April of the previously arrested officers of the Main Command * headed by General Jaber could not change the situation: ⁵⁴ some of the officers deserted, while the remaining officers were clearly not enough.

On a national scale, this meant the final destruction of the army. In some cities, small garrisons surrendered even before the enemy appeared, seeing no point in resisting. Elite units suffered losses and did not have the human resources to make up for them.⁵⁵

After the fall of Tripoli in August 2011, the army of the Jamahiriya ceased to exist at all. The main" successors " of the army in ensuring the security of the population were the tribes and their militias.

The mainstay of Gaddafi's own forces at this time were the remnants of elite units and loyal regular units. Moreover, military units were subordinate to tribal leaders and clan elders, and not to their commanders or, especially, intelligence officers or members of revolutionary committees. A similar situation also developed in the ranks of the forces of the Transitional National Council (TNC) and in other structures opposed to Gaddafi.

DEMISE OF THE JAMAHIRIYA

The death of Muammar Gaddafi on October 20, 2011 was a turning point in the history of Libya. His supporters went underground, creating the organization "Green Resistance", which at the moment is not only not the only one, but far from the strongest in political, ideological and military terms contender for power in Libya.

Gaddafi's "legacy" was the ruins and remains of a huge military machine. By the end of 2011, the huge stocks of weapons collected by the Libyan leader during 40 years of his rule had already spread not only to Libya itself, but also to neighboring states, adding, among other things, to the arsenals of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, whose activities were intensified in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali and others. Niger.

For all its losses, the Pan-African Legion, although it has ceased to exist as a single unit, poses a serious threat to regional security. Hundreds of well-armed and trained soldiers have already left the territory of the state that sheltered them earlier and returned to their countries, which led to a new round of conflict in the territories neighboring Libya - Niger, Chad, Mali, and Sudan.

Invited by Gaddafi to strengthen the loyal troops of the tribes living on the border-

* For more information about the Main Command, see: Yegorin A3. Liviyskaya revolyutsiya [The Libyan Revolution], Moscow, 1989, pp. 113-134. author's note).

They lost their employer and sponsor, but gained weapons and combat experience. The return to Mali of Tuareg tribal units, along with which many officers of the elite units of the Jamahiriya left Libya, led to a major military - political conflict in late February-early March 2012 and the country's split. ⁵⁶

* * *

Together with its creator, the ideological concept of the "Third World Theory" and the state called the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya finally went down in history. However, the civil war in Libya is not over, and those who have gained power in this country will face a long and difficult period of rebuilding what was destroyed. One of the primary tasks on the way to building a new state will be the creation of a new army. What this army will be like, and what place it will take in the political system of the new Libya - time will tell.

1 Levchenko A. Islamists and the army in Tunisia and Egypt / / Strategic Culture Foundation, 20.11.2011 - http://www.fondsk.ru/news/ 2011/1 l/20/islamisty-i-armija-v-tunise-i-egipte.html

² Isaev L. M. Groups of risks of political instability in Egypt-see: System monitoring of global and regional risks: The Arab Spring of 2011 [Rel. edited by A. V. Korotaev, Yu. V. Zinkina, and A. S. Khodunov]. Moscow, LKI, 2012, pp. 275-285.

³ For more information about events in Egypt, see: Isaev L. M., Shishkina A. R. Egyptian Turmoil of the XXI century, Moscow, LIBROCOM, 2012; Vasiliev A.M. Africa and Challenges of the XXI Century, Moscow, Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2012; Tsunami of Revolutions / / Asia and Africa Today. 2011, N 3, p. 2-18; The tsunami of revolutions does not subside // Asia and Africa today. 2011, N 6, p. 2-9.

⁴ For more information, see: Egorin A. Z. Liviyskaya revolyutsiya, Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1989.

⁵ Constitution of Libya (Adopted on: 11 Dec 1969) / ICL Document Status: 1992 - http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ly00000_.html

⁶ Egorin A. Z. Muammar Gaddafi, Moscow, IV RAS, 2009, pp. 72-73.

⁷ Al-Fateh Revolution in ten years. Tripoli, 1980, p. 140 - 144.

⁸ El-Magariaf M. Y. Libia min shar'ya dusturiya ilya shar'ya sauriya (Libya from constitutional legality to revolutionary). Cairo, 2008, p. 228.

⁹ Egorin A. Z. Muammar Gaddafi, pp. 72-73.

¹⁰ Zhirokhov M. A. Strange, small war (Egyptian-Libyan war of 1977) / / Art of War - http://artofwar.ru/z/ zhirohow_m_a/text_0240-1. shtml

¹¹ Washington Post, 11/15/1985 (due to the closed nature of the regime, data on persecution and executions in Libya remain mostly conjectural).

¹² Egorin A. Z. Muammar Gaddafi.., p. 77.

¹³ El-Magariaf M.Y. Op.cit., p. 256.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 469.

¹⁵ Jeune Afrique, 05.09.1979.

¹⁶ Egorin A. Z. Muammar Gaddafi.., p. 79.

¹⁷ Gaddafi M. The Green Book. Part One. The Solution of the Problem of Democracy. The Authority of the People. L., 1976.

¹⁸ Gaddafi M. On the driving force of the revolution-see: Gaddafi M. Testament. Moscow, Algorithm, 2012, pp. 98-117.

¹⁹ Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People (Adopted on: 2 March 1977) / ICL Document Status: 2 March 1977 -http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ly01000_.html

²⁰ Pollack K.M. Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948 - 91. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, London, 2002, p. 202.

²¹ The Revolutionary Committees // Libya: A Country Study. Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987 - http://country-studies.us/libya/

²² Libya: in the throes of change // The Hindu, 27.02.2011.

²³ Balmasov S. Why the Libyan military did not support Gaddafi. Slon.ru -http://slon.ru/world/pochemu_liviyskie_voennye_ne_ podderzhali_ kaddafi-692513. xhtml

²⁴ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. Washington, 1987, p. 126.

²⁵ Azevedo M.J. Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad. Routledge, 1998; Nolutshungu S.C. Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad. University of Virginia Press, 1995; WrightJ.L. Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara. C.Hurst, 1989; Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for United States Policy. US GPO, 1981.

²⁶ Flint J., de Waal A. Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. Zed Books, London. 2006, p. 23; Markakis J., Waller M. Military Marxist Regimes in Africa. Routledge. 1986, p. 73; Thomson J.E. Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 91.

²⁷ Wright J.L. Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara. C.Hurst, 1989, p. 140 - 144.

²⁸ Al-Zahf al-Ahdar, 03.04.1983, 04.05.1983.

²⁹ Newsweek, 1986, N 4, p. 29.

³⁰ Middle East Journal, 1983, N 2, p. 151.

³¹ Libyan Army // Information Portal "GlobalSecurity.org" -http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/army.htm; People's Militia - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/militia. htm

³² Egorin A. Z. Muammar Gaddafi.., p. 178.

³³ Egorin A. Z. Istoriya Livii [History of Libya]. XX century. Moscow, IVRAN, 1999, pp. 178-186.

³⁴ The Revolutionary Committees...

³⁵ Bone Y. Eldorado Canyon / / The Air Force Association, 1999 -http://www.afa.org/magazine/marchl999/0399canyon.asp Kulinchenko V. The first American strike on Libya / / Slovo, 07.04.2011.

³⁶ On changes in the military-political situation in the Middle East and North Africa (January 1-16, 2011) / / Institute of the Middle East, 17.01.2011 - http://iimes.ru/rus/stat/2011/17-01-11a.htm

³⁷ Libyan Chemical Weapons // Information Portal "Global-Security.org" - http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/ cw.htm

³⁸ Libyan Nuclear Weapons - http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/ world/libya/nuclear.htm

³⁹ Internal Security - http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/ libya/intro.htm

⁴⁰ Gaddafi's Intelligence and Security Agencies in the Nineties // Information Portal "Libyans4Justice" - http://www.justice4libya.com/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id-375&Itemid=172

⁴¹ Bartenev V. I. "The Libyan problem" in international relations (1969-2008). Moscow, Lenand, 2009, pp. 332-362.

⁴² Nolutshungu S.C. Op. cit.; Wright J.L. Op. cit; Libya-Sudan-Chad Triangle: Dilemma for United States Policy. US GPO, 1981; Thomson J.E. Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton University Press, 1996.

⁴³ Shimatsu Y. The Black African Soldiers who Fight for Libya // Informational portal "Empower Magazine", 16.03.2011 - http://www.em-powernewsmag.com/listings.php?article=1830

⁴⁴ Using Mercenaries to Quell Libya Revolution // On Islam, 24.02.2011 - http://www.onislam.net/english/news/africa/451221-using-mercenaries-to-quell-libya-revoluti on.html

⁴⁵ Military Balance, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 28.12.2009.

⁴⁶ McGregor A. Special Commentary: Can African Mercenaries Save the Libyan Regime? // Jamestown Foundation, 23.02.2011 -http://www.jamestown.org/

⁴⁷ See: Speeches of Muammar Gaddafi dated 22.02.2011, 25.02.2011.

⁴⁸ Simpson J. Libya's Rebel Chief who Never Won Trust // BBC, 29.07.2011 - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14349736

⁴⁹ Simpson J. Former Libyan Minister talks to BBC // BBC, 25.02.2011 - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14349736

⁵⁰ Kudelev V. V. Livia: who is fighting on the side of Gaddafi? // Middle East Institute, 06.04.2011 - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/ 2011/06 - 04 - 1 l.htm

⁵¹ Al-Jazeera, 18.02.2011, 28.02.2011.

⁵² Kudelev V. V. Decree. Op.

⁵³ Evseev V. V. On the role of the army in Libya / / IBV, 28.02.11-http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2011/28 -02-11. htm

⁵⁴ Libyan rebels edge westwards out of Misrata // Reuters, 13.06.2011 - http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/13/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110613

⁵⁵ Based on the materials of staff documents found in the brigade barracks after they were captured by the NTC forces.

⁵⁶ Bystroye, A. A., The Libyan "echo" in the Sahel, IBV, 18.03.12 -http://iimes.ru/rus/stat/2012/18 - 03 - 12.htm

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