The eleven-year reign of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) determined the subsequent internal political development of Pakistan and the transformation of local society from 1988 to the present, playing a key role in its Islamization. In addition, under the regime of that time, significant features of the country's foreign policy were formed, which remain to this day, despite the changes that have occurred over more than two decades inside and outside it.

Keywords: Pakistan, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Fauji Foundation, Islamic factor, Nawaz Sharif, Pervez Musharraf.

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF THE MILITARY RULE IN 1977-1988

The rule of the military under Zia-ul-Haq was one of the turning points in Pakistan's history. During this period, the ruling regime carried out the transformation and reform of the country in a radical form, in accordance with specific ideas about the norms of Islam. There are four main features of this government.

First, under Zia-ul-Haq, the army's position in various spheres of the country's public life was significantly strengthened [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 313]. In the 1980s, the leadership of Pakistan carried out actions aimed at satisfying the interests of the army elite. A system of rewards for military personnel was established. It included top positions in the state apparatus and state corporations with high salaries, service abroad under a contract with payment in foreign currency, and obtaining land holdings for hereditary use. According to the Punjab Provincial Assembly, during the military regime in Punjab, retirees received ownership of 450 thousand acres of land [Pleshov, 2003, p. 151]. The size of the "army" penetration into the economy was great. The Army's Fauji Foundation has grown to a significant size. His interests spanned the cement industry, fertilizer production, cotton industry, electronics, food production, and agriculture. The total amount of capital invested by the fund was not mentioned, but judging by the scale of its activities, it was huge. The Shahin Foundation, which belonged to the Air Force, as well as similar entities associated with the naval forces, successfully expanded its activities [Siddiqa, 2007, p. 139-155].

According to the National Assembly, the number of senior army officers who held high positions in the State administration and State corporations reached 20 people. Then a quota system was introduced, according to which children of military personnel had unhindered access to universities and colleges, medical and other professional educational institutions. For young officers, a program of advanced education was developed at Pakistani universities in subjects such as history, psychology, and political science. Previously, this practice

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it was rare. There are cases when officers were sent abroad to improve their educational level. Something has been done for enlisted and non-commissioned personnel recruited from the poorest areas of north-west Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Soldiers and sergeants were given salaries far exceeding those of civilians. They began to receive education and medical care that was incomparable to what people outside the army had to be content with. Relatives of soldiers received a preferential right to leave for work in the countries of the Near and Middle East [Pleshov, 2003, p. 151-152]. In addition, spending on the armed forces was constantly increasing, both from budget funds and from foreign aid, which made it possible to increase the size of the army, improve its training, and modernize military equipment. All three branches of the armed forces received the latest weapons at that time. Finally, during the period under review, a decisive step was taken towards the development of nuclear missiles. Thus, the reign of Zia-ul-Haq can rightly be considered a "golden age" for the Pakistani army.

Secondly, during the long period of the military dictatorship, the already frail "sprouts of democracy"were diligently trampled underfoot. So, immediately after the coup of 1977, all power was concentrated in the hands of the chief of Staff of the army, General Zia-ul-Haq, who became the chief military administrator, and from September 1978, the country's president. Special and field military courts were established to deal with cases involving violations of the rules of martial law. The authorities immediately began a broad purge of the state apparatus and the army from supporters of the former regime. A number of political figures were arrested. In the autumn of that year, all political parties, strikes, demonstrations and rallies were banned as contrary to the norms and principles of Islam. Strict censorship was introduced, and opposition newspapers were closed.

All these measures were based on the policy of Islamization, which was used as a means of legitimizing political repression and strengthening the dictator's power. Thus, in order to establish a truly Islamic system of government, in December 1981 Zia-ul-Haq established the Majlis-i-Shura 1 by a special decree-a half-consultative body, half-ersatz parliament, appointed by the head of the military regime as a result of consultations with close associates.

The direct military rule of Zia-ul-Haq lasted until 1985. The transition from it to civilian rule (mostly only in form) It was carried out slowly and under the control of the military, who took a number of unusual measures for this purpose. For the first time in the history of the country, the procedure for electing the president of the country by referendum was introduced into practice, since this procedure was not provided for in the Constitution. The referendum organized by Zia-ul-Haq in December 1984 presented a very complex and confusing question, which did not allow the voters to answer "no". Therefore, it was not difficult to predict the results of the" people's poll". In addition, during the period of preparation for the referendum, political activity and any campaigning work were not allowed, and censorship was maintained. The courts were barred from hearing any cases related to the referendum. All of them had to be decided by the election commission appointed by the President. All this combined to ensure a favorable outcome of the referendum for the ruling regime.

The referendum was followed by parliamentary elections, albeit on a non-partisan basis. The authorities deliberately set the date of the parliamentary elections almost a month earlier than the announced deadline, thereby putting the opposition parties in a difficult position due to the too short pre-election period. As a result, following the results of the elections, supporters of the military regime won the majority of seats in the parliament and provincial legislative assemblies. Meanwhile extremely low turnout in the electorate-

1 Consultative meeting.

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Lei showed weak electoral support for the regime in the elections, which forced the dictator to prepare even more carefully for the moment of lifting martial law in the country. He confirmed his intention to stay on as Chief of Staff of the army after the abolition of martial law, as well as his intention to amend the Constitution before its official implementation. Eventually, the eighth amendment to the Basic Law of the country was adopted, which significantly expanded the power of the president, mainly at the expense of the powers of the Prime Minister. Along with the Parliament, the head of State became a part of the legislative power and received the right of a suspensive veto. Not so strictly as under the Constitution, the president was obliged to follow the advice of the Prime Minister. The head of State could, at his discretion, dissolve the lower house of parliament, call early elections, create a provisional government, hold a referendum, and make appointments to the highest state and military posts. The President received the right to appoint the Prime Minister and members of the government and dismiss them, which he did not hesitate to use in the face of escalating contradictions with the central government on May 29, 1988 [Jones, 2002, p. 281].

With the introduction of the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the country, the preparatory stage for the transition to civilian rule has been completed. On December 30, 1985, Zia-ul-Haq announced the lifting of martial law. Political life was being restored in the country, and military tribunals were being shut down. At the same time, the ban on the activities of professional and student unions was maintained, and political prisoners continued to serve sentences set by military tribunals. The President retained the post of Chief of Staff of the army, concentrating in his hands the highest civilian and military power (under the conditions of civilian rule, this was done in Pakistan for the first time in all the previous time) [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p.330]. Thus, the transition to civilian rule was only partially implemented, which allowed the dictator to continue to determine the main directions of the country's domestic and foreign policy alone even after the lifting of martial law.

The third feature of the regime, which has already been discussed in part, was the introduction of a "truly Islamic" way of life and thought to Pakistani society. For this purpose, a number of radical changes were carried out in the country. A ban was introduced on the use of alcoholic beverages and narcotic substances, on gambling, on pornography, as well as strict traditional punishments for violating these prohibitions and for committing other crimes in accordance with Sharia law (retaliatory punishments for murder, payment of compensation for murder, etc.). on giving evidence, which assumed that all documented obligations must be witnessed by two men or one man and two women. This meant that none of the business transactions were legal if they were witnessed only by women. The Islamization of education and culture was very important. Under Zia-ul-Haq, school textbooks, college and university curricula were thoroughly revised. They had to conform to the "ideology of Pakistan" (Jones, 2002, p. 18]. The country's history was now presented as a series of events that led it to the idea of creating an Islamic state. If earlier textbooks contained at least brief descriptions of the ancient cultures that once flourished in what is now Pakistan, now everything pre-Islamic simply ceased to exist. Even the Pro-Pakistan Movement has changed its approach. Now it was interpreted as a movement for the renaissance of Islam. A characteristic feature of the textbooks of that time was their communal orientation. Hindus and the syncretic Ahmadiyya Islamic sect were particularly scathing.

In addition to textbooks, everything that could be Islamized was subject to Islamization. In schools, a chador was introduced for girls, a mandatory midday prayer for all,

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Starting from the sixth grade, all children are required to learn Arabic. Reading the Qur'an became necessary for obtaining a high school graduation certificate, and literacy was made dependent on religious knowledge. Knowledge of the basics of Islam became a prerequisite for being appointed to the position of a teacher in any field of knowledge; in all subjects, those aspects that at least indirectly related to religious aspects, and in particular "Islamic values", began to be highlighted. Books on secular or purely scientific topics unrelated to religion began to disappear from libraries [Hussain, 2007, p. 19]. They gave way to religious literature directly or indirectly related to the introduction of the "Islamic system"in the country. Along with civilian educational institutions, Islam was also used as the basis for training and education in military educational institutions. In the army, the same prohibitions and restrictions stipulated by sharia law were introduced as in the whole country. The mullahs in the units were elevated to the rank of religious teachers, and Islam was included as the main subject in the training programs of the personnel. When recruiting for military service and advancing through it, the observance of religious rules and customs by military personnel played an important role [Jones, 2002, p. 259].

In addition to educating young people in the Islamic spirit through education, Islamist organizations actively engaged in religious propaganda through the media, which were usually controlled by religious parties. Radio, television and newspapers were aimed at blurring the "popular" Islam that prevailed among the population, and at promoting "true" Islam. People who were somehow opposed to this were subjected to repression. This policy could not but have serious consequences for the country. During the period under review, there was a sharp surge in Islamist sentiment among the general population. In addition, the policy of Islamization has increased the division of the Muslim community and the contradictions between its various movements and schools. For example, between the Shiite and Sunni communities, between the Sunni schools of Deobandi and Barelvi, etc. [Belokrenitsky, 2008, p. 331].

The fourth feature of Zia-ul-Haq's rule is related to the country's foreign policy, which is increasingly dominated by the Islamic factor. Perhaps the most serious foreign policy action of those times was Pakistan's participation in what is sometimes called the Soviet-Afghan war (1979 - 1988). Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan affairs of that period was quite reasonable and logical from the point of view of the Zia-ul-Haq regime. Ever since the formation of two states - Pakistan and Afghanistan - the development of good-neighborly relations between them has been hindered by a territorial dispute. Thus, the Afghan government refused to recognize the "Durand Line", which was established by the British after the completion of the conquest of India and which divided the Pashtun tribes living in the north-west of the subcontinent into two approximately equal parts. In this regard, official Islamabad tried its best to achieve recognition of the "Durand Line" from Kabul as a state border.

In April 1978, the left-wing democratic forces, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, came to power in Kabul as a result of a coup. The established regime in ideological terms was sharply opposed to the Pakistani one. Not only did Zia-ul-Haq have no hope of resolving the border issue, but he soon faced the problem of refugees from Afghanistan. After the entry of a contingent of Soviet troops there in late December 1979, the Pakistani military regime embarked on a tough confrontation with the ruling forces in Afghanistan. Zia-ul-Haq sought to establish a regime friendly to Islamabad and (ideally) subordinate to it. As part of the solution of this main task, the settlement of the Pashtun problem was also assumed.

Supporting the" over the border " sabotage war of the Afghan Mujahideen detachments with government troops and Soviet units has become a cornerstone-

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Zia - ul-Haq, Pakistan's foreign policy chief from 1980 to 1988, hoped that the rise of Islamists to power in the neighboring country would strengthen his position both domestically and internationally. A Mujahideen victory would mean building a strong rear against Pakistan's traditional rival, India. Finally, the Pakistani leaders realized that it was a tough policy towards Kabul that would provide them with political and financial and economic assistance from the West and the rich countries of the Middle East [Naqvi, 2010, p. 71].

Pakistan did not recognize the Afghan government headed by B. Karmal, whose power was proclaimed at the end of 1979, and broke off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In the international arena, Islamabad has become one of the main initiators of actions directed against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Millions of Afghan refugees have been granted political asylum. On the territory of Pakistan, bases and camps were established for training military formations of the Afghan opposition, which were provided with weapons delivered from abroad. The main parties and organizations opposed to the Kabul authorities have established their headquarters in Peshawar. Here, in February 1988, the opposition created the interim Government of Afghanistan. Pakistan thus became the main springboard for conducting military operations against the Afghan authorities and the Soviet troops supporting them, and for many years became involved in the internal instability of the neighboring state [Yousaf and Adkin, 2001, p. 91-127].

THE PROCESS OF OVERCOMING ZIA-UL-HAQ'S POLITICAL LEGACY

The period of " democratic enlightenment "(1988-1999) that followed the death of dictator Zia-ul-Haq in a mysterious plane crash can be considered a transition to a new military rule. The army was temporarily forced to give up its place at the helm of government to civilians and "keep order" from behind the political scenes. At the same time, the military actively intervened in the political process, trying to preserve the peculiarities of domestic and foreign policy that developed under Zia-ul-Haq. After the death of the military ruler, a peculiar configuration of power was formed, a power triangle was formed - the president, the government and the army. Relations in it did not develop easily. Conflicts between the president and the Prime Minister, in which the military acted as an arbiter, led to frequent elections and changes of government [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, chapter 6]. Only after Nawaz Sharif came to power for the second time as a result of the convincing victory of his party, the Pakistan Muslim League, in parliamentary elections. In the February 1997 elections, he was able to achieve the repeal of the Eighth Amendment and consolidate his power by reducing the political influence of the military. At the same time, Sharif continued a policy that was genetically linked to Zia-ul-Haq's course: he supported the Islamists and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Thus, Sharif did not begin to seriously dismantle the regime of power that had developed under Zia-ul-Haq, as this was contrary to his ideological attitudes, while Benazir Bhutto2, despite her desire, simply did not have the opportunity to do so.

Along with extreme political instability, the period of" democratic enlightenment " saw an increase in Islamist sentiment among the population, organized by certain political forces. There were mass protests in the country in defense of the Islamic order or with demands for full Islamization of the country, bloody Sunni-Shiite clashes, as well as persecution of representatives of religious minorities (prosecution of Christians in court on the basis of the Law on Blasphemy adopted under Zia-ul-Haq) [Belokrenitsky, 2008, p.330].

2 Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1988-1990 and 1993-1996.

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The surge in Islamic extremism was favored by events in neighboring Afghanistan. In February 1989, there was a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and in April 1992, the Mujahideen took Kabul. Pakistan has become embroiled in an internecine power struggle between the Mujahideen. In an effort to implement Ziyaul-Haq's idea of moving north, Islamabad, represented primarily by its military structures, among which the Joint Military Intelligence 3 stood out, continued to provide assistance to Islamists (primarily the Hezb-e Islami party led by G. Hekmatyar), and since 1994 has made the main bet on a new force - the Islamic movement The Taliban. Having broken the serious resistance of their rivals, largely thanks to help from Pakistan, the Taliban were able to gradually extend their power to most of Afghanistan in 1996-2001.

However, the success of the Taliban movement did not bring Islamabad the desired result. The Taliban refused to meet his demands for recognition of the "Durand Line" as a state border. The rise of Islamism in the country and the region has exacerbated intra-Islamic, inter-group contradictions, intensified the struggle for power, periodically weakening the established order, provoking rampant banditry and acts of sabotage in large cities, especially in the largest center of the country - Karachi [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 383-385, 394]. The internal political crisis steadily grew and was resolved in October 1999 by the next military coming to power.

The military coup of October 10, 1999 ended the period of presidential and parliamentary development of the country. The new leadership, led by General Pervez Musharraf, faced a difficult task-to lead the country out of a deep crisis. Since this crisis was a direct, if remote, consequence of Zia'ul-Haq's rule, the leadership needed to end Zia'ul-haq's legacy in order to overcome it. But this was not so easy to do: many of the government changes of the 1980s served not only the corporate interests of the Pakistani military, but also the interests of the authoritarian ruler, which was General Musharraf. Despite this, it was under Musharraf, in our opinion, that the process of gradually overcoming the Ziaulkhakov legacy began.

The rule of the military under Musharraf was not as authoritarian and total in terms of control methods as in the Ziaulkhak times. After Sharif's arrest, a state of emergency was imposed in the country rather than martial law. Therefore, a military administration was not created to govern the country. At the same time, the bureaucracy carried out all management work under the guidance and supervision of officers of the appropriate rank. At the same time, new provincial governors were appointed from among retired generals. The role of the military was not limited to "modest" provincial affairs; they took part in solving important national issues. A major role was played by the regularly held "Komkor conferences", at which senior statesmen participated together with corps commanders under the chairmanship of Musharraf and at which important state issues were resolved [Moskalenko, 2002, p.347].

The lifting of the state of emergency in 2002 did not significantly change anything, largely because before that, the National Security Council (NSC) was created in the country, which is directly subordinate to the president and has the right to control the actions of the government. The head of the National Security Service was the President; it included the Prime Minister, the Chief Ministers of provinces, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of three branches of the Armed Forces [Moskalenko, 2003, p. 312]. In addition, during Musharraf's constitutional and parliamentary rule, the bureaucracy was largely represented by people from the military environment-retired and active military personnel.

3 InterService Intelligence (ISI).

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Only Musharraf's departure from the top military post at the end of 2007 (more on this below) and the February 2008 parliamentary elections changed the situation. In Pakistan, the process of personnel reshuffle began: the proteges of the former regime gave up their places to the new ones. As a result, civilians gradually ousted representatives of the army elite from the sphere of state administration. The culmination of this process can be considered the dissolution of the National Security Service in December 2008.

With regard to overcoming the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq's military and personalist authoritarianism, it should be emphasized once again that Musharraf's military regime was both a rejection of the previous stage of democratic rule and a new attempt to move towards parliamentary democracy. Unlike Zia-ul-Haq, General Musharraf never raised the question of the inconsistency of representative democracy with the conditions of Pakistan. On the contrary, he has consistently stated that the country needs a "complete democracy", "free from all restrictions and layers, with deep roots in society." In April 2000, Musharraf launched a nationwide campaign to promote human rights in Pakistan. The Government has shown respect for the judiciary. After the coup, the Supreme Court, although it justified the army's rise to power, at the same time, for the first time, set a time frame for the military regime - three years. Although the general could have had this decision of the supreme judicial body overturned, its composition changed, etc., the Supreme Court's decision was accepted as a guide to action. In addition to this verdict, the judicial authorities continued to have the opportunity to "say their say" on various issues [Moskalenko, 2004, pp. 50-51].

In order to implement the Supreme Court's verdict on the time frame for returning to a parliamentary form of government, an action plan called "Path to Democracy"was developed. This plan was implemented by the authorities strictly and on time. In the period from December 2000 to August 2001, local government elections were held in several stages. According to observers, the elections were "free and fair", although they were held on a non-partisan basis.

In the run-up to the general parliamentary elections, the electoral system was slightly changed. Thus, the curial (religion-dependent) electoral system introduced under Zia-ul-Haq was abolished, the age limit was lowered from 21 to 18, and an educational qualification was introduced for deputies of legislative authorities (they must have a higher education). Due to population growth, the number of seats in the Parliament and legislative assemblies was increased.

Following changes to the electoral system, the authorities proceeded to hold parliamentary and provincial legislative elections, which were held on 10 October 2002, before the three-year deadline set by the Supreme Court for the dismantling of purely military rule. Along with parties loyal to the military regime, opposition forces were also allowed to participate in the elections. However, experienced and respected political figures such as Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, who were sentenced to prison after their trials and were abroad, were barred from running for election because they would be immediately arrested upon their return to Pakistan. In addition, in order to completely exclude any possibility of their return to power, a presidential decree was adopted prohibiting them from holding the post of Prime Minister three times (both of these figures were heads of government twice). Another decree prohibited persons deprived of the right to participate in elections from heading political parties. The removal of experienced leaders from the right of leadership negatively affected the activities of their organizations, especially during election campaigns and contributed to the successful performance of the pro-government Pakistan Muslim League named after M. A. Jinnah (Qaid-i - Azam) in the general elections [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, pp. 417-418].

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General Musharraf was also tempted to take advantage of the experience of his predecessor, Zia-ul-Haq. To legitimize his presidential power (he assumed the post of head of state in the summer of 2001), he resorted to a nationwide referendum in April 2002.However, the question put to the vote was clearer and more correct than in the Zia-ul-Haq referendum in 1984, and the voter turnout was slightly higher. An equally important tool for consolidating the power of the military was the adoption of the seventeenth amendment to the Constitution by the newly elected Parliament in 2003. It was essentially similar to Ziaulhakov's Eighth Amendment and gave the President broad powers. In addition, by concentrating the entire executive power in his hands, Musharraf, like Zia-ul-Haq, retained the highest military post - Chief of Staff of the army-after the restoration of civilian rule.

Despite this fact, in the early 2000s, formally democratic, parliamentary orders were gradually established in the country. The events of 2007 showed, however, their inconsistency and inconsistency. It all started with a confrontation between the President-General and the Supreme Court. On March 9, 2007, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, was dismissed from office by the President on charges of official misconduct. According to observers, he showed excessive independence, which inspired the president with concerns. Chaudhry's resignation sparked widespread anti-government protests that lasted several months. Musharraf was forced to agree to reinstate him as chief justice in July 2007, but the standoff did not end there.

Indirect presidential elections were held in October, after the end of the five-year term. Under the Pakistani Constitution, the President is elected by an electoral college consisting of members of the Federal Assembly (Senate and Lower House) and the provincial legislative assemblies. After the agreements reached earlier, Musharraf won a convincing victory. The Supreme Court, however, delayed deciding on the legitimacy of Musharraf's participation in the election as a senior military official. In response, the President declared a state of emergency on November 3 and took measures that resulted in the replacement of the Chief Justice and almost all members of the Supreme Court. The new composition of the court announced the legality of the election of Musharraf as president. Public discontent, as well as external forces, primarily Western countries, forced the authorities to announce the lifting of the state of emergency within a few weeks. On November 28, 2007, Musharraf finally left the post of Chief of Staff of the Army, and the next day was sworn in as president [Pakhomov, 29. XI. 2007].

Autumn 2007 was full of not only these, but also other events. On October 18, Benazir Bhutto returned to her homeland from years of exile. Her triumphant return to Karachi was overshadowed by the biggest terrorist attack in history. It killed about two hundred of its supporters and wounded almost half a thousand. On December 27, Bhutto fell victim to another assassination attempt. After her death, the party was headed by her widowed husband Asif Ali Zardari. At the end of November, Sharif returned to the country from exile.

As already mentioned, general parliamentary elections were held on February 18, 2008. Despite accusations of rigging their results, most observers believe that they were conducted fairly fairly and were marked by a sharp struggle between the parties. The election was won by two parties opposed to Musharraf-the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML (N)). The pro-presidential party took the third place in terms of the number of votes. As a result of the elections, a coalition government was formed under the leadership of one of the leaders of the PPP, Yusuf Raza Gilani, which lasted, however, only two months. Then a new stronger government coalition was formed, led by the PPP. In ab-

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In the fall of 2008, under the threat of impeachment, Musharraf, deprived of public and political support, voluntarily left the presidency. Asif Ali Zardari was elected as the country's new president in September.

Since the seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution was still in force, Zardari was given the broad powers that the post of President gave him under the current constitutional norms. He was also the leader of the ruling party. The TNG's monopoly on power and Zardari's personal involvement sparked protests. A campaign has been launched in the country to reject or replace the Seventeenth Amendment. The period of preparation and implementation of the constitutional reform took almost two years and ended with the entry into force of the eighteenth amendment to the Constitution on April 19, 2010. In accordance with it, in essence, the norms of government introduced by the constitution adopted in August 1973 were restored. Zia-ul-Haq's legacy in this area can be considered completely overcome. Pakistan has returned to a parliamentary system of government, in which the president has largely only symbolic power, and the final word remains with the Prime Minister, who is at the head of a government that enjoys the confidence of Parliament. Zardari's influence on the country's political life has diminished, but not very noticeably due to the fact that he, as noted, heads the leadership of the party, of which Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani is a member.

The other side of dismantling Zia-ul-Haq's legacy is the fight against the influence of islamofundamentalist and extremist forces. It began shortly after Musharraf came to power and continued with varying success throughout the following years. This marked a departure from the previous policy of flirting with Islamists and resorting to Islamist rhetoric, which was especially noticeable during the second rule of N. Sharif in 1997-1999.

Musharraf launched the fight against Islamists some time before the September 2001 events, because even then the authorities sensed the danger that radical Islamism poses to the state itself. Islamabad has declared that it is impossible to use Islam for political purposes. Some Islamist terrorist organizations were banned or taken under control, their financial sources were blocked, and activists and members of these organizations were arrested. At the same time, the army and the Joint Military Intelligence were purged of traditionalists, who were a significant force at the time. The same thing happened among the scientific and technical personnel associated with the country's nuclear missile potential [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p.428]. Despite the ruling regime's determination to root out Islamic radicalism in the country, it has been forced to abandon some serious measures under pressure from certain pro-Islamic groups. Thus, in May 2000, Musharraf was forced to withdraw a draft law that provided for making procedural changes to the infamous Ziaulkhakov blasphemy law [Hussain, 2007, p. 8].

After the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the beginning of the military operation in Afghanistan, on January 12, 2002, the president made a televised address to the nation, in which he announced a program to combat religious extremism and terrorism. Five radical Islamist groups and parties were completely banned. Leaders of these organizations were arrested, and some of them were sentenced to various prison terms. The authorities detained more than 2,000 activists of these organizations and closed 600 of their headquarters. In early 2002, the United Jihad Council, a coalition of 16 extremist organizations fighting mainly in Kashmir, was banned. It was announced that madrasahs and mosques would be taken under State control in order to transform them from a hotbed of Islamic extremism into ordinary religious institutions. At the same time, their financing from foreign sources was prohibited. Such government measures were unpopular among the pro-Islamic part of the population,

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this forced the leadership to actively maneuver and fight the extremists in a rather mild form. Wide-ranging arrests usually resulted in the rapid release of detainees; judicial sentences were not distinguished by the length of prison terms. Banned organizations returned to the political arena under a different name. The army's purge of Islamist-minded soldiers was not accompanied by reprisals. The maximum penalty was retirement. But in most cases, complex permutations were used within the command staff.

After the state of emergency was lifted in the fall of 2002, Islamic extremism continued to pose the main threat to the State. Clashes between Sunnis and Shiites have intensified in the country. The terrorist activities of islamoradicals have also intensified. In response to the surge in violence and crime, the Pakistani leadership has stepped up its fight against extremists. Laws against terrorists have been tightened, and prison sentences for these crimes have been increased. "Murder in the name of honor", i.e. reprisals according to traditional, tribalistic rules, became equated with criminal offenses. In 2006, the law "On the Protection of Women" was adopted, which partially abolished Sharia punishments, primarily against women, introduced under Zia-ul-Haq, and transferred all violations of sexual order from Muslim justice to ordinary civil justice, which completely changed the proceedings and responsibility for such violations [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, S. 450-451].

However, the intensification of the fight against Islamism under Musharraf did not lead to its eradication, as evidenced by the conflict over the Red Mosque religious and educational complex in Islamabad in 2007. Thus, the radicalist leadership of the mosque began to put forward demands for the termination of state control over mosques and madrassas, the introduction of Sharia law in the country, etc. madrassas took hostages, attacked video stores, destroyed cassettes and discs with the works of Indian and Western cinematographers, etc. Endless negotiations did not lead to anything, the agreements reached were immediately violated. The conflict lasted for a whole half-year and ended on July 10-11 with a bloody storming of the complex (over 100 people were killed).

The struggle of the Pakistani authorities against Islamic fundamentalism and extremism also required a change in the country's policy towards neighboring Afghanistan, which by the end of the 1990s had become a stronghold of ossified Islamism and terrorism. In the fall of 2001, Pakistan joined the anti-terrorist coalition, denouncing the terrorist attacks committed against the United States. The country's military authorities have pledged to cooperate with Washington in the following ways: exchange intelligence information, grant the right to air space over Pakistan, as well as the right of access to the country's territory to the American military and logistics support of American troops in Afghanistan [Razvi, 2009, p. 46]. The country provided assistance to the Americans in catching the organizers of the September 11 attacks. At the call of the United States in March 2004. Pakistan conducted the first large-scale operation in South Waziristan (the Pashtun tribal area), where Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants were supposed to be hiding, but other military operations followed, but did not bring the expected success.

The new leadership of the country, led by Zardari, continued the fight against Islamic extremists launched by the previous authorities. However, in February 2009, the government made some forced concessions to the Islamists: it signed a truce agreement with militants in the Swat Valley, according to which the government effectively ceded control of the Swat Valley (located just 150 km from Islamabad) to them. However, in response to militant violations of the terms of the agreement, the authorities conducted a large-scale military operation in the Pashtun tribal belt and Swat Valley, which began in late April and early May 2009, and for the first time in November and December

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it ended with the success of the federal army. Thus, the success of the military operation helped restore the country's credibility as a key US ally in the fight against terrorism, which was undermined as a result of the February agreement with the Islamists. Despite many fundamental differences in the policy of the authorities under P. Musharraf and A. Zardari, there is some continuity in the actions of the two administrations. Thus, in 1999-2010, first the President-General and then the leader of the ruling TNG pursued a policy aimed at establishing nominally democratic orders in the country, as well as eradicating Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, i.e., they sought to rid the country of the legacy of Zia-ul-Haq. However, the transformations and reforms carried out by them differed in depth. Musharraf, because of his military status, could not decisively abandon Zia-ul-Haq's experience in the field of public administration, and also go to weaken the position of the military in Pakistani society. In contrast, Zardari and his party have taken a course to limit the role of the army in the life of the country to its constitutional responsibilities.

The policy of Islamization pursued by the military dictator Zia-ul-Haq led to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. Islamist parties and terrorist organizations that were created with the financial and logistical support of the military regime have become a serious threat to national security and the very existence of the country. During the 11 years of military rule, a whole cohort of people grew up, whose worldview was formed under the influence of Islamist propaganda of such parties as Jamaat-e Islami and others, which were the ideological mainstay of the Ziaulkhakov regime. Young people infected with the virus of fundamentalism throughout the 1990s and 2000s sought to direct the life of the country in the direction that they were taught was the only right one for Muslims and the Islamic state: they organized mass protests in defense of the Islamic order or with demands for the general and complete Islamization of the country. In the 1990s, the authorities tried to avoid direct conflicts with Islamist parties. Moreover, under the government of N. Sharif, they tried to use their support. In the" zero years " in Pakistan, the struggle against Islamic fundamentalism and extremism, albeit ostentatious and inconsistent, was generally growing in intensity.

The negative consequences for the country of Zia-ul-Haq's policy of militarizing the economy and strengthening the role of the military in all spheres of public and political life have also been partially reduced by the measures taken by the ruling forces over the past decade. This became particularly noticeable in the period following the 2008 parliamentary elections.

The obvious consequences of Zia-ul-Haq's rule include the weakening of the norms and principles of political culture associated with the traditions of parliamentarism and political pluralism. Under him, the link between Pakistan and the truncated democracy imposed by the colonial regime was broken for the first time in the country's history. The General, who is hostile to any form of democracy, has openly rejected adherence to the principles of democracy and democratic institutions. This had a negative impact on the subsequent domestic political development of the country. The current domestic political situation remains unstable and unsettled, although its current state meets all the formal requirements of a democratic system.

No less significant for the domestic and international situation of Pakistan was the foreign policy of Zia-ul-Haq. Under his leadership, Pakistan began to actively interfere in Afghan affairs by providing assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen, who

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they fought against the ruling regime. The 1979 - 1988 Afghan War was a trap for Pakistan. This war and its consequences - Pakistan's involvement in the 1992-1996 civil war in Afghanistan and in the international fight against terrorism that began in the fall of 2001 - significantly depleted the country and caused it serious problems in the economy and in ensuring personal, public and State security.

list of literature

Belokrenitsky V. Ya. Etnoregional'nye i religiously-sektantskiye konfliktsii v Pakistane [Ethnoregional and religious-sectarian conflicts in Pakistan].
Belokrenitsky V. Ya., Moskalenko V. N. Istoriya Pakistanii XX vek [History of Pakistan in the XX century]. Moscow, 2008.

Moskalenko V. N. Osnovnye cherty i osobennosti politicheskogo razvitiya Pakistana [Main features and peculiarities of political development of Pakistan]. Issue 17. Moscow, 2003.

Moskalenko V. N. Politicheskaya rol ' pakistanskoi armii [The Political role of the Pakistani Army]. Army and Power in the Middle East: from Authoritarianism to Democracy, Moscow, 2002.
Moskalenko, V. N. Political situation in Pakistan // Pakistan, South Asia and the Middle East: history and modernity. M., 2004.

Moskalenko V. N., Topychkanov P. V. [Pakistan: presidential elections in 2007 and the current political situation]. Issue 35, Moscow, 2008.
Pakhomov E. Musharraf took the oath of office for a new term as the country's civil leader / / RIA Novosti, 29. XI. 2007.

Pleshov O. V. Islam, Islamism and Nominal Democracy in Pakistan, Moscow, 2003.
Hussain Z. Frontline Pakistan: the Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto. New Delhi, 2007.

Jones O.B. Pakistan: Eye of the Storm. New Delhi, 2002.

Naqvi M.B. Pakistan at Knife's Edge. New Delhi, 2010.

Razvi M. Musharraf: the Years in Power. New Delhi, 2009.

Siddiqa A. Miliary Inc. Inside Pakistan s Military Economy. Oxford University Press. Karachi, 2007.

Yousaf M., Adkin M. Afghanistan. The Bear Trap. The Defeat of a Superpower. Leo Cooper, Barnsley, 2001.

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