Libmonster ID: UK-1575
Author(s) of the publication: Sergey LAVROV

The history of the formation of relations between the USSR and the developed capitalist countries, and in particular with Great Britain - one of the leading participants in the intervention against Soviet Russia in 1917-1920, which then became the first of the major powers to negotiate and recognize Soviet Russia - is of undoubted interest. Even today, an unbiased observer can learn a lot from the history of such a turn.

Questions of the formation of Anglo-Soviet relations and England's foreign policy in the period of their origin are given a significant place in Soviet historiography .1 The 60s, however, were marked by the emergence of a complex of new sources on this topic. By the beginning of the 60s, the first volumes of the monumental publication of documents on the foreign policy of the USSR were published in our country2. By 1967, 15 volumes of the first series of documents on English foreign policy covering the period from 1919 to 19233 were published in England, and in 1966 and later in England, access was opened to extensive state archives and private collections of documents dating back to the period after the First World War4 . Among the works that use documents from the private archives of prominent British political figures, there is a three-volume study by R. Ullman (who had access to the extensive archives of D. Lloyd George, E. Bonar Law, O. Chamberlain, Lord Milner, etc.) and a book by M. Gilbert, in whose exclusive use the richest personal archive of W. Churchill was provided. 5 In general, these materials provide a much fuller picture of the UK's policy towards Co-

1 From the works of recent years, see: "History of foreign Policy of the USSR". In 2 vols. Vol. I. 1917-1945. M. 1976; "History of Diplomacy". Vol. III. M. 1965; K. B. Vinogradov. David Lloyd George. M. 1970; A. N. Krasilnikov. The USSR and England. Soviet-British relations in 1917-1967, Moscow, 1967; V. G. Trukhanovsky. Winston Churchill (political biography), Moscow, 1968.

2 "Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR". Tt. I-III. M 1957 - 1959.

3 "Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919 - 1939". First Series. Vols. I-VI. L. 1947 - 1958 (ed. R. L. Woodward, R. Butler); Vols. VII-XV. L. 1958 - 1967 (ed. R. Butler, J. P. T. Bury) (далее - "British Documents").

4 This refers to the materials of the State Archive of England - "Public Record Office", containing documents, materials (minutes of meetings) of the Cabinet - Cab. (Cabinet Office), individual departments: the Foreign Office-F. O. (Foreign Office), the War Office-W. O. (War Office), etc.

5 R. H. Ullman. Angio-Soviet Relations, 1917 - 1921. Vol. I. Intervention and the War. Princeton. 1961; Vol. II. Britain and the Russian Civil War. Princeton/Oxford. 1968; Vol. III. The Anglo-Soviet Accord. Princeton / Oxford. 1972 (for more information about this study, see our article "Anglo-Soviet relations of 1917-1921 in the light of R. H. Ullman" - "History of the USSR", 1974, N 6); M. GiIbert. Winston S. Churchill. Vol. IV.1917 - 1922. L 1975

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the Soviet state in the period of civil war and foreign intervention.

The issues of the establishment of Soviet power and the formation of the first socialist state, as well as the anti-Soviet course of the leading capitalist powers, in particular England, being constantly one of the main directions in the ideological struggle, caused noticeable activity in bourgeois historiography in the 60-70s, which tried to use the new documentary base to support falsifying concepts and in its own way react to the zeitgeist 6 . Today, when the growing power and authority of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the international positions of other socialist countries are leading to a process of defusing tensions, attention has increased to the history of relations between the USSR and bourgeois states.

In this article, the author suggests using these new documents and materials to trace the specific alignment of forces within the ruling circles of England, the struggle of various groups in the British government, and the evolution of their views on policy towards Soviet Russia, which was concentrated in the approach to the Anglo-Soviet negotiations of 1920-1921.

British imperialism was one of the main participants in the armed intervention against Soviet Russia and an accomplice to the internal Russian counter-revolution. Acting in alliance with other Entente powers, the United States and Japan, Britain made active efforts to unleash an anti - Soviet intervention in the spring and summer of 1918. The latter, like the entire British policy towards Russia since 1917, was determined by the class hatred of the British bourgeoisie for the socialist revolution, which undermined the forces of capitalism in the world and was a powerful incentive for activating the revolutionary and national liberation movement of peoples. London's anti-Soviet course was clearly marked by the reactionary nature of the British ruling class, which was compounded by the specific interests of British imperialism as colonial imperialism.

Class hatred of the power of the workers and peasants in Russia increased among the ruling class of England because of its fear for its colonial empire. The colonial interests of the English bourgeoisie were one of the leading motivations for the anti-Soviet policy of England. Simultaneously with the struggle against Soviet power, it intended to solve the second task of its Russian policy - to dismember and weaken Russia as much as possible, since British imperialism traditionally considered the existence of a strong Russian power as an obstacle to establishing its dominance in Europe and Asia, in particular in the region of the Near and Middle East, where British imperialism intended to assert its hegemony, master the oil riches of Persia, Mesopotamia and Transcaucasia. As stated at a meeting of British ministers on November 13, 1918, "our interests demand that we eliminate Bolshevism to the east of the Black Sea." 7
6 G. A. Brinkley. The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917 - 1921. Notre Dame (Indiana). 1966; N. Davies. White Eagle, Red Star. The Polish-Soviet War, 1919 - 1920. L. 1972; R. Jackson. At War with the Bolsheviks. The Allied Intervention into Russia, 1917 - 1920. L. 1970; R.R.James. Churchill: A Study in Failure 1900 - 1939. Harmondsworth (Engl.). 1973; R. Luсkett. The White Generals. L. 1971; W. N. Medlicott. British Foreign Policy since Versailles. 1919 - 1963. L. 1968; W. G. Rosenberg. Liberals in the Russian Revolution. The Constitutional Democratic Party, 1917 - 1921. Princeton. 1974; J. S. Silverlight. The Victors' Dilemma. Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War 1917 - 1920. N. Y. 1970; E. L. Woodward. Great Britain and the War of 1914 - 1918. L. 1973; H. J. Elсос k. Britain and the Russo-Polish Frontier. 1919 - 1921. "The Historical Journal", Vol. XII, 1969, N 1; M. V. Glenny. The Anglo-Soviet Agreement, March 1921. "Journal of Contemporary History", Vol. V, 1970, N 2.

7 Lord Milner's Archive, op. cit. by: R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, pp 13 - 14.

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The anti-Soviet policy of England was not least determined by the desire of the British bourgeoisie to maintain its strong economic position in Russia, which was won thanks to the huge loans granted to the tsarist and Provisional governments in the amount of 5,300 million rubles, and investments in Russian industry in the amount of about 507 million rubles. 8 The British ruling circles also tried to resolve global inter-imperialist contradictions at the expense of Russia, and to preserve the "balance of power" in the world that was beneficial for England.

The fundamental premise of the British government in launching the intervention was that the interventionist troops were to serve as a kind of core around which the counter-revolutionary forces would rally. This idea was contained in the speech of the British Prime Minister of those years, D. Lloyd George, on March 16, 1918, at the inter-Allied conference of the Entente in London, 9 and in his letter to the Ambassador to the United States, Lord Reading, dated July 17, 1918, in which the British Prime Minister frankly wrote:: "If we do this (that is, a broad allied intervention will be carried out), we will create a gathering point... for all liberal and democratic forces in Russia " 10 .

The defeat of Germany and the end of World War I were used by the Entente powers and the United States to expand their armed intervention against Soviet Russia.: "Our situation has never been so dangerous as it is now. The imperialists were busy with each other. And now one of the groups has been swept away by a group of Anglo-French-Americans. They consider it their main task to stifle world Bolshevism, to stifle its main unit, the Russian Soviet Republic. " 11
However, already at the end of 1918, there were significant differences in views in the British government on the policy towards Soviet Russia, which focused on the differences and fluctuations that arose on this issue among the leaders of the allied powers. They were caused by the failure of the interventionist plans of the Entente powers, reflected the growing resistance of the Soviet people and the growth of the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries .12
The most reactionary circles in the political leadership of England were a group of hard-headed interventionists, which included the leaders of the right wing of the Conservatives: the Lord President of the Council, the Marquis Curzon, the Minister of Colonies, Lord Milner and the first Lord of the Admiralty, W. Long, as well as the parliamentary Deputy Foreign Secretary, R. Cecil, the Minister of the Interior, E. Shortt, the military elite, as well as the leaders of France Zh. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch, - advocated a military campaign of the Entente to overthrow the Soviet government, against any negotiations and contacts with the Soviet government. The most consistent and energetic representative of this trend in the British government was W. Churchill, who became Minister of War in December 1918 .13 Such views were supported by influential circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, The Times and The Morning Post, the well-established publications of the British bourgeois press, the Conservative majority in parliament, and a significant number of representatives.-

8 See P. V. Ol. Foreign capital in Russia. Fri. 1922, p. 9.

9 "France. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Archives diplomatiques Guerre 1914 - 1918". Vol. 1000, p. 262.

10 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. I, p. 222.

11 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 37, p. 164.

12 See ibid., p. 461.

13 The parliamentary elections in late 1918 were won by a coalition of the Conservatives and Lloyd George's group of Liberals, who won 351 and 136 seats respectively. In the new coalition cabinet, Churchill, then in the Liberal Party, became Minister of War, and Milner, his predecessor, was appointed Minister of the Colonies.

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but lost in the 1918 elections. However, blinded by hatred of the Soviet government, these leaders did not take into account that a direct military campaign against Soviet Russia threatened to undermine the financial and economic situation of England, revolutionize its working class to an enormous extent, and cause a social explosion in the country.

It was precisely these consequences of continuing direct intervention that D. Lloyd George and US President W. Wilson feared, who took more cautious positions; they had a relatively sober assessment of the strength of the revolutionary peoples of Russia, and a better understanding of the internal political situation in their countries. In the British government, such views were shared by prominent conservatives-E. Bonar Law (party leader), Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Balfour, Minister of Finance O. Chamberlain, as well as liberals - Minister of Education G. Fischer, Minister of Health K. Addison and a number of others. Together with Lloyd George, they formed a different current in political circles in England - a group of moderate conservatives and liberals. These figures also sought to destroy the hotbed of the socialist revolution in Russia, but for good reasons they sought more flexible political methods to achieve this goal.

By the beginning of 1919, it became obvious that the interventionists ' expectation that foreign troops would serve as the nucleus around which powerful White Guard armies would emerge capable of destroying Soviet power was not justified. As early as February 15, A. Balfour acknowledged in a secret memorandum intended for a narrow circle of cabinet members that "the assurances that we at one time constantly received that it is enough only to have a disciplined and foreign core in any part of Russia in order for all patriotic and order-respecting elements to crystallize around it in overwhelming numbers, in none of them no specific cases were confirmed. " 14
In England itself, the Government was confronted with a powerful labour movement. In 1918, more than 1 million people went on strike - twice as many as in the pre-war period of 1913, and in 1919 the number of strikers reached 2.5 million people .15 England was shaken by the unprecedented scale of workers ' actions - the strike of 100 thousand workers in the industrial area of Glasgow in January 1919, the grandiose strike of 400 thousand railway workers in the autumn of the same year. Under the influence of the Great October Revolution, revolutionary sentiments, organization, and a sense of proletarian solidarity grew in the English working class. The economic goals of the struggle were closely intertwined with political demands. England was entering a period of post-war revolutionary upswing. Despite the deception of public opinion on the part of the Government, there was a growing awareness among the English people of the anti-Soviet nature of the intervention. The decisions of the Conference of British ministers of November 13, 1918, recognized that "the people will not consent to an (anti-Bolshevik) crusade." 16 In January 1919, a national conference of various progressive organizations with the slogan "Hands off Soviet Russia!"was held in London. The anti-intervention movement began to take on formidable dimensions .17 In April 1919, the head of counterintelligence, B. Thomson, informed the government:

14 R.H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 127 - 128.

15 F. D. Volkov. Great October and the international aid of the English working class. Voprosy Istorii, 1975, No. 8, pp. 67, 69.

16 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 14.

17 Many bourgeois authors recognize the importance of the influence of this factor on the policy of the British government (R. R. James. Op. cit., p. 131; J. S. Silverlight. Op. cit., p. 263; R. H. Ullman. Op.cit. Vol. II, pp. 187, 335, 362 - 363; E. L. Woodward. Op. cit., p. 448; D. G. Воadle. Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy 1918 - 1922. Hague. 1973, p. 69; S. R. Graubard. British Labour and the Russian Revolution, 1917 - 1924. Cambridge (Mass.). 1956, pp. 73 - 74).

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"It seems that all strata of the workers are opposed to conscription and intervention in Russia." 18 Under the influence of the masses, the Labour Party, at its conference on June 26, 1919, condemned all forms of intervention and threatened to call a general strike to stop it .19
Domestic policy considerations precluded the possibility of sending new large contingents of troops to Russia. To the growth of the protest movement was added the fatigue of the masses from the war. Ferment engulfed the army, demanding early demobilization and the abolition of conscription. Soldiers 'unrest" took place in England, in the expeditionary force in France. The disintegration of the Allied forces in Russia began. Therefore, the British government was forced to withdraw its troops from Russia in 1919, and to place the main emphasis on the forces of the Russian counter-revolution: in the spring of 1919 - on Kolchak, and then on Denikin.

However, although differences in the political circles of England and the struggle of various trends in them were one of the significant factors that hindered the implementation of interventionist policies, these were differences in tactical issues, methods and forms of implementation of this policy, which did not affect its fundamental goals. Hence the indecisiveness and inconsistency of moderate English politicians, their peculiar "split". Churchill rightly wrote to Lloyd George in a private letter on September 22, 1919, that the Prime Minister's" difficulty " was that he "had one policy in his heart and pursued another policy." 20
The defeats of the White Guards and the powerful anti-intervention movement that engulfed broad democratic circles of English society were the most important factors that led to the end of open, and then indirect, British intervention against Soviet Russia. At the same time, the Government's position was also influenced by other considerations.

In British military circles, the real capabilities of the army (given the widespread anti - war sentiment in the country) began to be perceived as inconsistent with the new tasks that included suppressing the growing labor movement in England, waging a dirty colonial war in Ireland, and suppressing the national liberation movement in the British colonies in the East .21 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, H. Wilson, wrote to Vice Admiral Cowan on 11 April 1919: "All my energies are now directed to getting our troops out of Europe and Russia and concentrating all our power in our approaching storm centers, namely, England, Ireland, Egypt, and India." 22
The concern that O. Chamberlain, one of the most influential conservatives and Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was in a position to monitor the financial resources of Great Britain, began to express from the beginning of 1919 reflected the recognition of London politicians

18 " Public Record Office "(hereinafter-PRO). "Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom", N 1, 30 April, 1919, Cabinet Paper G. T. 7195; Cab. 24/78.

19 "Labour Party, Report of the Nineteenth Annual Conference". L. 1919, p. 156.

20 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 334.

21 These tasks were listed in Churchill's memorandum to Lloyd George in early September 1919 (see M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 195). Churchill pointed out that "in accordance with directives received from the cabinet," the war department was preparing "certain actions in case of a strike by the Triple Alliance "(the most advanced detachments of the English proletariat: miners, transport workers and railway workers). At a cabinet meeting on July 21, 1919. Lloyd George said of the threatened miners ' strike that "this is practical, not theoretical Bolshevism, and it should be dealt with with a firm hand "(cit. by: R. R. James. Op. cit., p. 131).

22 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 227.

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the fact that Britain, weakened by the World War and seized with ferment, is unable to shoulder the burden of war with Soviet Russia. February 17, 1919 Lloyd George wrote to Churchill in Paris when the Secretary of War tried at the peace conference to get a decision on organizing a broad military campaign: "We cannot take on such a burden. Chamberlain informs me that we can barely make ends meet in peace, even with the current huge taxes, and if we get involved in a war against a continent like Russia, it will be a direct road to bankruptcy and the establishment of Bolshevism in the British Isles."23 . At a cabinet meeting on July 25, Chamberlain indicated that Britain would be "unable to assume the support of General Denikin to the end." 24
We have discussed these factors in such detail because it was precisely under their versatile influence that the approach of the British ruling circles to negotiations with the Soviet Government and the evolution of their views in the course of the negotiations themselves were formed.

During 1918 - 1919, the British ruling circles only once considered the possibility of negotiations with Soviet Russia: in December 1918-January 1919, and this was explained by an attempt, using diplomatic methods ,to delay the Red Army's offensive against the White Guards that was then unfolding. 25
In the summer of 1919, under the impression of the failure of Kolchak's campaign, at the meetings of the British cabinet on July 25 and 29, and on August 1 and 12, the liberals G. Fischer, K. Addison, and the Minister without portfolio J. P. Morgan criticized the policy of intervention and proposed to reconsider the government's course in the "Russian question". Barnes, who pointed out that the facts indicate the strengthening of Soviet power. They feared that continued foreign intervention might further rally the peoples of Russia around the Soviet government .26 O. Chamberlain and O. Geddes, the Minister of Commerce, hesitated. Recognition of the failure of the plans of the interventionists and the White Guards was also made in the speeches of V. Long and Curzon .27
While Denikin was advancing, the doubts expressed in the summer of 1919 did not immediately lead to a change in the government's course. On the contrary, Britain played a crucial role in equipping Denikin's armies, which formed the striking force of the second Entente campaign in 1919. As Denikin advanced toward Moscow, expectations grew in London that the Soviet government would soon be overthrown. However, the Red Army's counteroffensive in mid-October proved that such calculations were unfounded. The failure of the interventionists ' plans, combined with other serious factors discussed above, led to a certain change in the balance of power within the Government. By the end of 1919, there was a tendency in the political circles of England to formulate a new approach to the problem of economic development.

23 D. Lloyd George. The Truth about the Peace Treaties. Vol. I. L. 1938, pp. 371 - 372.

24 J. S. Silverlight. Op. cit., pp. 265 - 266. The intervention in Russia and the support of the White Guards really required an impressive amount of money. In a speech on November 8, 1919. Lloyd George pointed out that England had spent 100 million pounds just to help the White Guards (The Times, 10. XI. 1919). In a letter to Churchill on September 22, 1919, he wrote that "various Russian enterprises have cost us this year between 100 and 150 million pounds, if we take into account the expenses of the army, navy and transport" (M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 332). Gilbert, the author of the official biography of W. Churchill, for his part, cites data according to which only 94 million pounds were spent on the maintenance of the British fleet in the Baltic Sea and on the implementation of its blockade of Soviet ports in 1919 (ibid., p. 307).

25 These goals were the basis of the famous diplomatic maneuvers of Lloyd George and Wilson during the Paris Peace Conference-the proposal to convene a conference in the Princes ' Islands in January 1919 and the sending of a Bullitt mission to Moscow in March of the same year.

26 J. S. Silverlight. Op. cit., pp. 263 - 265; M. Gilbert. Op. cit, pp. 308 - 309.

27 J. S. Silverli ht. Op. cit., pp. 265 - 266.

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The "Russian problem" should be dominated by those elements that were able to establish at least limited ties with Soviet Russia.

This was the situation that preceded the Anglo-Soviet trade and political negotiations of 1920-1921.

New notes in the position of the British government towards Soviet Russia were first heard in Lloyd George's speech at the annual banquet of the Lord Mayor of London in the Guildhall on November 8, 1919. The British Prime Minister, noting that "Bolshevism cannot be destroyed by weapons" and pointing out that Britain has spent more than 100 million pounds on providing assistance and support to the White Guards, stressed: "We, of course ,cannot afford to continue such a costly intervention in an endless civil war." 28 From the very beginning, in justifying the need to find a new policy on the "Russian question," Lloyd George pointed out Britain's interest in trade with Russia, and the need for Russian food, raw materials, and a market to raise the economic situation in capitalist countries as a whole.

Lenin brilliantly foresaw that "there is a force greater than the desire, will, and decision of any of the hostile governments or classes; this force is the general economic relations of the world, which compel them to enter on this path of communication with us."29 . In a statement to Parliament on November 13, 1919, compiled by Lloyd George together with Bonar Law, Balfour and Cabinet Secretary M. Hankey, it was noted that " the settlement of the Russian problem is vital for the economic restoration of the world. Russia is one of the most important reserves of food and raw materials " 30 . In assessing the need to establish economic relations, the Prime Minister and his associates in the government relied on the opinion of a number of experts and officials. In a letter to Lloyd George dated January 2, 1920, the Labour MP G. Roberts pointed out that England was suffering not only from the lack of direct Anglo-Soviet trade, but also from the increased world food prices due to the cessation of its export from Russia .31 The Prime Minister was particularly impressed by the memorandum of the British representative to the Supreme Economic Council of the Entente, E. Wise, dated January 6, 192032 . Wise pointed out that trade with Russia has long occupied an important place in England's foreign economic relations. Until the First World War, Russia was the main source of British imports of timber (50% in 1913), grain, flax (85%), but now, for example, due to its absence, the textile industry in Belfast and Dundee was half idle. Russia was a major buyer of English engineering products. Wise estimated that English exports to Russia averaged 75 million pounds a year. By the end of 1919, British industrialists began to worry that the Russian market might eventually be occupied by competitors: Germany, the Scandinavian countries.

However, it would be an oversimplification to deduce Britain's willingness to negotiate only from economic need. First, the industrial bourgeoisie, which was interested in the rapid resumption of trade, was only one of the detachments of the ruling class of England. Lenin, who gave a brilliant anatomy of British imperialism, emphasized its features as colonial and banking imperialism .33 The ban position-

28 "The Times", 10.XI.1919.

29 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 44, pp. 304-305.

30 "The Times", 14.XI.1919.

31 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 317.

32 "British Documents". Vol. II. L. 1948, pp. 867 - 870.

33 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 27, pp. 360-362.

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The loss of interest on the gigantic loans granted to the pre-revolutionary governments of Russia was a serious obstacle to the normalization of relations between the two countries. Secondly, as the history of Anglo-Soviet relations has shown, the British ruling circles have repeatedly deliberately escalated these relations and sacrificed the interests of developing mutually beneficial economic cooperation in order to achieve class goals: the suppression of the socialist revolution, and in the future the weakening of the Country of Soviets. In 1919-1920, such sentiments were personified by Churchill. He was well aware of the potential for trade with Russia. At the beginning of July 1919, when Denikin was advancing, Churchill pointed out that the British industrialists of Manchester, Sheffield and Leicester "can get in the face of Southern Russia a market of huge and long-term importance." 34 Churchill was ready to trade immediately with Denikin's Russia. He did not want to trade only with Soviet Russia.

The documents show that British politicians were also motivated to negotiate with Soviet Russia by internal political calculations and serious foreign policy considerations. Lloyd George often compared the Russian Revolution to the French bourgeois Revolution of the late eighteenth century, which showed his bourgeois narrow-mindedness. But he also realized something more. The Russian Revolution was more terrible because it challenged the bourgeois order all over the world, and its formidable ally was the world proletariat. "France is better protected from Bolshevism by the existence of a large number of peasant proprietors,"said Lloyd George at a cabinet meeting on November 14, 1918." We have here a huge, easily ignited industrial society. " 35 But there was another side to this thought. The majority of the population of Russia was the peasant mass. And so, when on January 16, 1919, at a meeting of the heads of Entente delegations at the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George said:: "There are reports that the peasants are becoming Bolsheviks," 36 for him this was a very serious symptom that it was time to diversify the means of fighting the Soviet government.

Trade was considered by Lloyd George and such figures as R. Horn 37, Bonar Law, Wise, as a method of combating socialist transformations in Russia. They hoped to use economic leverage to try to transform Soviet Russia into a bourgeois state. The thesis of fighting Bolshevism by trade and political means was the basis of the concept of establishing relations with Soviet Russia and is most clearly formulated in the following words of the British Prime Minister: "We failed to bring Russia to sanity by force. I think we can save her through trade... Trade, in my opinion, will bring an end... Bolshevism is truer than any other method. " 38 This thesis would become a constant motif of Lloyd George and Horn throughout 1920.

The very concept of negotiations went through a number of stages and was formed in a fierce struggle in the country's political circles. In the autumn of 1919 Lloyd George didn't go any further than stating the problem. Analyzing the mood in London, R. Hoare, a senior employee of the Russian department of the Foreign Office, noted in a memorandum dated December 22, 1919, that from Lloyd George's explanations, English politics would seem "chi-

34 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., pp. 306 - 307.

35 Ibid., p. 227.

36 Cit. by: "History of foreign policy of the USSR", Vol. I, pp. 100-101.

37 Minister of Commerce in 1920, who directly negotiated with L. B. Krasin in London.

38 "The Times", 11.II.1920.

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one hundred percent negative: no further spending, no blockade, no negotiations with the Bolsheviks. " 39 However, Lloyd George's remarks drew sharp criticism in France and the United States40 . The US Secretary of State R. Lansing, in a telegram dated December 4, 1919, proposed to the American Ambassador in London, J. R. R. Tolkien: To inform the" relevant members " of the British government about the US objections to attempts to reach an agreement with Soviet Russia41, which was an attempt to cause a split in the British government.

In London, influential ministers have steadfastly defended the old interventionist policies. Even in January 1920, Churchill remained a staunch supporter of organizing a crusade against Soviet Russia. "My alternative," he wrote on January 17, 1920, "as it has been for the whole of the past year, is to have a definite policy, to wage war on the Bolsheviks with all available resources and by all available means." 42 But the failure of Kolchak and Denikin made his position vulnerable. Curzon also called for more intervention in early 1920. The advance of the Red Army to the Caucasus threatened to overturn the calculations of the ruling circles of England to increase their colonial empire, thwarted plans to enslave the peoples of the Near and Middle East, and complicated the task of maintaining dominance over the peoples of Hindustan. Curzon proposed to strengthen the British garrison in Batum, send additional troops, including aircraft, to the Caucasus or Persia, provide "protection of Baku", and supply weapons to the" governments " of Menshevik Georgia and Musavatist Azerbaijan .43 Curzon was supported by W. Long and Admiral of the Fleet D. Beatty, who also sought to maintain British control over the oil of the Persian Gulf and Baku for the needs of the British Navy.

However, as Churchill and Chief of the General Staff G. Wilson pointed out, the troops were needed to suppress the independence movement in Ireland, to strengthen the position of England in Mesopotamia, India, and Egypt. R. Horn (who was then the Minister of Labor) said that the government would also need troops to suppress the strike movement in England. Churchill also argued that the best defense of British interests would be the overthrow of the Soviet government, and for this purpose it was necessary first of all to ensure the interaction of Denikinists, Poland and Finland .44 On the whole, however, the British government was forced to admit that, as stated in the Cabinet's decision of January 29, 1920, "there can be no question of an active war against the Bolsheviks, because we have neither men, money, nor credit, and public opinion is generally opposed to such a course."45
But England had not yet given up military means of fighting the Soviet state. In the conditions of the defeat of the white armies of Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich, the role of the shock force of the new anti-Soviet campaign was assigned to the reactionary bourgeois rulers of Poland, Rumania, Finland, and the Baltic States. In December 1919, at the Anglo-French conference in London, decisions were made to increase the supply of weapons to pan-Polish Poland. There are two lines of English policy from-

39 "British Documents". Vol. III. L. 1949, doc. N 619.

40 J. S. Silverlight. Op. cit., p. 338.

41 "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. Russia". Washington. 1937, pp. 129 - 130.

42 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. TI, p. 333.

43 "British Documents". Vol. III, doc. N 635.

44 The situation in the Caucasus was discussed at meetings of the British delegation in Paris on January 16-19, 1920. Finally, the Paris Peace Conference, meeting on January 19, 1920, accepted Lloyd George's proposal to supply arms and other assistance to the de facto recognized "governments" of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia (see British Documents, vol. II, pp. 922 - 925).

45 H. J. Elcock. Op. cit., p. 144.

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razhalo complex maneuvers and struggles in the English leadership. While recognizing the need for trade with Russia for the economic well-being of Britain, the ruling circles at the same time considered trade as a channel of bourgeois influence on the Soviet people, and stubbornly tried to avoid recognition of the Soviet government. Hence the original idea of establishing trade through the Central Union, which, according to London, retained considerable "independence" from the Bolsheviks .46 This line was consolidated in the decisions of the Paris Conference on January 16, 1920 and the Allied Conference in London in mid-February 1920. The decision of the leaders of Britain, France, and Italy of January 16 called for the lifting of the blockade of Soviet Russia and "allowing Russian cooperatives" to purchase goods "for the Russian people," but emphasized that "these agreements do not imply any change in the policy of the allied governments towards the Soviet Government."47
It is true that negotiations between the British and RSFSR officials were taking place in Copenhagen at that time, 48 but they were limited to the issue of the exchange of prisoners of war , although the Soviet side was ready to negotiate on a wider range of issues. This was explained by the fact that in the spring, even up to June - July 1920, the negotiations were considered by British politicians rather as a repetition of the idea of the conference on the Princes ' Islands, that is, not as negotiations to establish peace between England and the RSFSR, but as London's "mediation" between Soviet Russia and various pawns of anti-Soviet Entente combinations. In this context, Churchill did not reject negotiations either. Back at the cabinet meeting on August 12, 1919. Lloyd George and Bonar Law supported Churchill's statement that if" a balance is established between the conflicting parties", England "should try to force the anti-Bolsheviks and Lenin's government to come to an agreement" 49 . In the face of Denikin's failure and the flight of his armies to the Caucasus, Churchill turns to negotiations as a means to buy time and save the White Guards from complete defeat. At the same time, he hoped to use the desire for peace and negotiations repeatedly expressed by the Soviet Government. Churchill frankly stated his motives in a telegram on January 11, 1920 to General G. Holman, head of the military "mission" under Denikin: "I have reliable information that the Bolsheviks want peace, especially with England. If Denikin requests British mediation under these circumstances, I think the Prime Minister will go to great lengths to try to save as much as possible from collapse." On April 9, 1920, Churchill stated, referring to Wrangel: "I would quite agree to negotiations with the Soviet government regarding the preservation of the Crimea (that is, Wrangel's troops in the Crimea - S. L.) until any settlement is reached." 50
The fact that this approach to negotiations was shared not only by Churchill is evidenced by the repeated attempts of England in the spring and summer of 1920 to act as a "mediator" between the RSFSR and Wrangel, as well as between Soviet Russia and the White Poles at the height of the Polish - Soviet war in July 192051 . In the end, London was forced to

46 This was Wise's view when he proposed lifting the blockade (Germany and the neutrals are already trading) and establishing trade exchanges through Central Union cooperatives (see British Documents, vol. II, p. 870).

47 Ibid., pp. 894 - 896, 912.

48 Negotiations in Copenhagen at the end of 1919-beginning of 1920 between M. M. Litvinov and O?Grady ended with the signing of an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war on February 12, 1920 (see I. M. Maisky. The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1921. Voprosy Istorii, 1957, No. 5).

49 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 212.

50 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., pp. 368, 389.

51 "Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR", Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 678-679, 698-702.

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take into account the real facts of the failure of the interventionist policy and the strengthening of the Soviet Republic. In a memorandum dated February 16, 1920, R. Hoare acknowledged: "None of the reports recently received by us contains anything in support of the theory of the probability of the imminent fall of the Soviet government." 52
By the time the Anglo-Soviet trade negotiations53 began (May 31, 1920), the British government had to admit that it was precisely with representatives of the Soviet Government that it was negotiating .54 The decision of the Entente Supreme Council of April 26, 1920, adopted at the conference of the Entente Powers in San Remo in the wording proposed by Lloyd George, already recommended negotiations with the "Russian Trade delegation" in London in the near future on "the immediate resumption of trade relations through cooperatives or otherwise." 55
In an effort to prevent the collapse of the united front of the West in relation to Soviet Russia, the British government in the spring of 1920 tried to persuade France to participate in the London negotiations. The Millerand government refused 56 . The ruling circles of the United States also categorically refused to conduct any negotiations with Soviet Russia .57 The fact that the British government decided, nevertheless, to continue negotiations showed that the inter-imperialist contradictions were stronger than the desire to preserve the unity of the ranks of the "allies".

Starting negotiations, the British government began to specify its requirements. In a memorandum to the Cabinet of Ministers dated May 27, 1920, Curzon proposed to demand political concessions from Soviet Russia for economic assistance to England:"Such a price could be better paid by stopping the hostile activities of the Bolsheviks in parts of the world that are important to us, rather than by an imaginary exchange of goods." 58 Churchill supported Curzon. In its decisions of May 28, the Government concluded that "any agreement concerning trade will be impossible unless a general agreement is reached on the political issues that are the subject of dispute with the Soviet Government. It would be highly desirable for a comprehensive agreement to be reached. The Conference (of Ministers) was reminded that the recent political situation (i.e., the Belopolyakov offensive) gave His Majesty's government an opportunity for good bargaining. " 59
The British government tried "from a position of strength" to force Soviet Russia to make fundamental political and economic concessions. Already at the first meetings of the Soviet delegation with British ministers-on May 31, June 7, 16, and 29-Lloyd George focused on the demand that the Soviet government commit itself to "putting an end to anti-British propaganda and action."-

52 R. H..Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. Ill, p. 15.

53 Negotiations in London were preceded by meetings between L. B. Krasin and Wise in Copenhagen in February-April 1920, which took place after the decision of the Paris Peace Conference of January 16, 1920 (see B. E. Stein. "The Russian Question" in 1920-1921, Moscow, 1958, pp. 170-174).

54 See Lord Riddell's conversation with Lloyd George on 6 March 1920: J. S. Silver-light. Op. cit., p. 360; M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p. 64.

55 "British Documents". Vol. VIII. L. 1958, pp. 230 - 231.

56 SEE "British Documents". Vol. XII. l. 1962, p. 726 (on the proposal of England). French reply May 30, 1920 - "British Documents". Vol. VIII, p. 280; see also G. A. Brinkley. Op. cit., p. 249.

57 See A. V. Berezkin. The October Revolution and the USA (1917-1922), Moscow, 1967, pp. 273-275, 376-377.

58 "British Documents". Vol. XII, pp. 723 - 724.

59 PRO. Cabinet Decisions, Cabinet 33/20; Cab. 23/21.

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telyusty" and the issue of debt recognition 60 . The Soviet side reasonably replied that the solution of such political issues as the mutual obligation to refrain from hostile activities and propaganda and the settlement of claims "is possible only after the recognition of the Soviet Government and the restoration of peaceful relations between the two countries after peace negotiations and the signing of the peace treaty"61 .

On the question of debt, Lloyd George demanded that the Soviet Government recognize the Russian state's debts to private creditors. 62. L. B. Krasin, in a memorandum to the British Government dated June 29, 1920, strongly criticized the British demand, emphasizing that the Soviet people had the right to present counter-claims for the enormous destruction caused by the civil war and foreign intervention, and that the hostile activities of the Entente countries had deprived them of the right to seek payment of their previous debts. This was now only a matter of negotiation .63 The Soviet position was reinforced by the Labour Party's declaration at its June 1920 conference:"No private or financial interests should stand in the way of the immediate resumption of trade with Russia." 64 In general, the principled position of the Soviet side showed the unreality of England's attempts to impose its conditions on it.

On June 30, the British government formulated in a memorandum four conditions of the agreement with Soviet Russia65: a mutual obligation "to refrain from hostile actions against each other and from conducting any official propaganda, direct or indirect, against the institutions of the other party"; an exchange of subjects held by the other party; recognition by the Soviet Government "in principle" obligations to pay compensation to private creditors. Resolution of other issues related to the debts and claims of both sides was postponed "until a mutual settlement in peace negotiations." Now the Soviet Government was asked to "make a statement on this issue." Fourth, the British agreed to the Soviet Government's proposals for measures to facilitate trade relations on a reciprocal basis, while each Government retained the right to object to the entry of any official agent considered persona non grata. The British government issued an ultimatum stating that if a positive response is not received within a week, it "will consider these negotiations over." But on the whole, these conditions reflected a serious departure of British diplomacy from its original demands .66
In a note dated July 7, 1920 The Soviet government stated that it " accepts the principles of the English document as the basis of the agreement between Russia and Great Britain." The Soviet government also agreed to view the plan proposed by the British Government as "a state of armistice between Russia and Great Britain" and shared its hope that the armistice would open the way to a final peace .67
60 "Documents of the Foreign policy of the USSR". Vol. II, doc. 403, p. 596; see also pp. 762-763; "British Documents". Vol. VIII, pp. 281 - 306, 380 - 388.

61 "Documents of foreign policy of the USSR", vol. II, doc. 403, p. 596.

62 M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., р. 66; J. S. SiIverlight. Op. cit., p. 361.

63 "Documents of foreign policy of the USSR", vol. II. doc. 403, pp. 593-594.

64 "Labour Party, Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference". L. 1920, p. 136.

65 "Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. III, Moscow, 1959, doc. 6, p. 17-19.

66 Ullman and Glenny, however, try to present these terms as being "preliminary" to the conclusion of the agreement (M. V. Glenny. Op. cit. p. 69; R. H. Ullman. Op.cit. Vol. III, p. 129, note 68).

67 "Documents of foreign policy of the USSR", vol. III. doc. 6, p. 16-17.

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The negotiations took place against the backdrop of the unfolding campaign of the White Poles and Wrangel. The line of the "military party" prevails in the ruling circles of England, and the Anglo-Soviet negotiations are interrupted .68 At the end of April 1920, Pilsudski's army, richly equipped with weapons from France, England and the United States, launched a long-planned offensive. The British government, however, was more cautious this time, giving France the role of outright instigator of the White Poles. At the same time, it tried to preserve the remnants of the White Guards under Wrangel's command for its game. In the spring of 1920. it assumed the role of" intermediary "between it and the Soviet Government, threatening from the very beginning that it would provide Wrangel with all-round assistance if Soviet troops" attacked " him in the Crimea .69 At the same time, Churchill and the British military officials in Constantinople and the Crimea took care of supplying weapons to Wrangel and providing him with assistance from the British navy. 70 Describing the British tactics as "sheer fraud," Lenin pointed out that these efforts were aimed at wresting Crimea from the Soviet state .71
Bourgeois researchers, as a rule, try to present the case as if England was trying to reconcile Poland and Soviet Russia as soon as possible .72 But they pass off necessity as a virtue. Of course, the assessment of events in London was not unambiguous, a number of prominent political figures condemned the pandering to white Poles-R. Cecil, the leader of the opposition Liberals A. Asquith, Lord Grey. Lloyd George himself was not particularly optimistic about the chances of the White Poles .73 However, the desire for" mediation " in the Polish-Soviet war appeared only when it was necessary to save the Entente's henchmen from defeat: on July 20, 1920, the British government threatened that if Soviet troops "invaded Poland", trade negotiations would be stopped .74 And on August 3, the British government sent an ultimatum to Moscow, demanding to stop the Red Army's offensive, otherwise threatening to openly enter the war on the side of Poland.

The government of Lloyd George Churchill was forced to abandon the participation of England in the war on the side of the White Poles by the British working people 75 . The movement of solidarity with Soviet Russia reached its greatest scale in 1920. On August 1, 1920, the Communist Party of Great Britain was formed. This was evidence of the increased political maturity of the advanced strata of the English working class. There was a rapid radicalization of workers, which had a powerful impact on trade unions and the Labour Party. At the Labour emergency conference on 9 August, a resolution was passed demanding a general strike "to disrupt this war". A confe-

68 The active role of the Entente powers, in particular England, in unleashing the war of the White Poles against Soviet Russia and their responsibility for Wrangel's adventure have already been widely covered in Soviet historiography (see "History of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 5. Moscow, 1960; "History of the USSR from Ancient Times to the present day", Vol. 7. Moscow, 1967; see also N. F. Kuzmin. The crash of the last Entente campaign, Moscow, 1958).

69 "British Documents". Vol. XII, doc. NN 681, 684.

70 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 391. The English commander in Constantinople, General J. Milne, the High Commissioner, Admiral de Robeck, and the head of the British mission in Sevastopol, General J. Milne. The Persians advised Wrangel to "take decisive action as soon as possible", of course "to put himself in a more favorable position in the negotiations" (G. A. Brinkley. Op. cit., pp. 251-252).

71 See V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 51, p. 238.

72 M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p. 71; R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 26 - 31, 60, 245 - 246; H. J. Elcock. Op. cit., p. 144; M. Gilbert. Op. cit., pp. 416 - 417; G. A.Brinkley. Op. cit., pp. 259 - 260.

73 K. B. Vinogradov. Op. ed., pp. 322, 332.

74 "British Documents". Vol. VIII, p. 650.

75 This is also recognized by the authors of: books: T. F. Lindsay, M. Harrington. The Conservative Party 1918 - 1970. L. 1974, p. 29.

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On August 13, a coalition of trade unions and left-wing political organizations demanded recognition of the Soviet Government. Lenin accurately identified the essence of what was happening. "England is afraid of the general strike," he said. Even such ardent interventionists as Churchill and Curzon acknowledged that the English people had stopped the government's hand .77
The period 1917-1921 was, along with the general strike of 1926, the most powerful offensive of the British working class in its entire modern history. Moreover, there was no previous precedent in England for non-parliamentary, workers ' organizations to interfere in the government's foreign policy. The Soviets of Action, which became the mainstay of progressive forces, essentially led to the formation of a "dual power"in the country. Lenin pointed out that in August 1920, "Britain found itself in the same stage of political relations as it was in Russia after February 1917, when the Soviets were forced to control every step of the bourgeois government." 78 The ruling circles of England felt the seriousness of the threat to their rule. Lloyd George pointed out at the Anglo-French conference in Limne on August 9 that if the masses thought that he did not seek peace, it "would cause unrest in the navy, unrest in the working class, and lead to the triumph of Bolshevism in England."79
At the same time, the preparation of punitive forces was underway-on August 17 and 18, Chief of the General Staff G. Wilson had lengthy meetings with his staff and the chiefs of staff of the territorial commands of England, planning a "possible war with the "Action Council"80 . Moreover, according to new archival documents, Mr. Wilson and other reactionary military officials seriously debated the question of " is Lloyd George a traitor?"81 . Blinded by fear of the power of the Hands Off Soviet Russia movement. In the second half of August, in view of the changed situation on the Polish-Soviet front, the British military leadership demanded the expulsion of the Soviet delegation, using as a pretext telegrams intercepted by the British intelligence services from Moscow to London and the Soviet delegation to Moscow on the negotiations in London. Wilson was supported by Admiral Beatty and Air Chief of Staff Marshal Trenchard, the heads of military and naval intelligence and the Counterintelligence Service - General W. Thwaites, Vice Admirals A. Sinclair and B. Thomson, as well as Churchill and a number of cabinet members . Churchill, like other diehards, made no secret of the fact that he saw the expulsion as a prelude to a complete end to negotiations with Soviet Russia .83
In the summer of 1920, a deep connection between London's anti-Soviet plans and its approach to other problems of English politics was revealed. The struggle against the revolution in Russia and its consequences has been at the center of British policy in Europe since 1918. The British ruling circles feared the transfer of the revolution to Europe, especially to Germany, and the latter's rapprochement with Soviet Russia. Immediately after the end of the World War, Britain set out to turn Germany into an instrument of anti-Soviet struggle. 84 However, in the views of Lloyd George and Churchill on realism,-

76 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 51, p. 254.

77 See W. Churchill. World Crisis, Moscow, 1932, p. 181; see also Curzon's telegram to Paris on August 10, 1920 (British Documents, Vol. XI. L. 1961, p. 477).

78 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 41, p. 283.

79 "British Documents". Vol. VIII, p. 741.

80 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. III, p. 266.

81 Phrases from H. Wilson's diary of July 23, 1920 (ibid., p. 275).

82 See R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. III, pp. 274 - 280, 296 - 300; M. Gilbert. Op. cit., pp. 423 - 430.

83 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 425.

84 V. Churchill. Edict. op., pp. 3, 4-6; "Archive of Colonel House", vol. IV. Moscow, 1944, pp. 89-90.

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There were certain differences between these policies. The Prime Minister tried to prevent the rapprochement of Germany and Russia and the growth of the revolutionary movement, first of all softening the terms of peace with Germany. For him, anti-Soviet considerations were intertwined with the desire to disrupt the plans for establishing French hegemony in Europe, to recreate Germany as a counterweight to France in the classical scheme of the European "balance of power".85 These views were most clearly expressed in a well-known memorandum from Fontainebleau, written by Lloyd George and his advisers on March 25, 1919.

Churchill emphasized a different aspect. In the summer of 1920, he developed an alternative to negotiations with Soviet Russia and an agreement with it, which he saw in the anti-Soviet union of Western powers. Throughout the years 1919-1920, the constant leitmotif of his speeches was a call for the immediate involvement of Germany in the anti-Soviet struggle as a partner and ally. In a memorandum to the Cabinet on August 29, 1920, Churchill wrote that " the best way to make France reasonable is to calm her down. Confidence can only be given in the form of a binding union between Great Britain, France and Germany... What should we demand in return? Obviously, a trilateral agreement between Great Britain, France and Germany on the reconstruction of Europe and the pacification of its eastern regions. This implies a profound revision of the Treaty of Versailles and the recognition of Germany as an equal partner in the future leadership of Europe. " 86 At a cabinet meeting on August 30, 1920, Lloyd George expressed doubts about Churchill's proposals, and O. Chamberlain, the future foreign Minister in the government of S. Baldwin in 1924-1929, supported them. Churchill was still insistent: "Nothing will be impossible if we succeed in binding France, Germany and the United Kingdom together. We will then be able to reconstruct Europe and Russia. " 87
However, the defeat of Belopolyakov and Wrangel in the autumn of 1920 knocked the last trump cards out of the hands of supporters of a military solution. At least at the end of 1920, their bid was beaten. The British ruling circles are once again turning to the concept of negotiations. The second stage of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations begins. But the question of the negotiations and the conditions that England was to seek for them continued to be the subject of fierce struggle in the political circles of the country.

Churchill was fundamentally opposed to negotiating at all .88 In a memorandum to the cabinet on November 16, 1920, he sharply criticized the basic premises of Lloyd George's policy: "Since the Soviet state has taken over all trade, our merchants will not be able to come into direct contact with the ordinary people of Russia, so there will be no healthy "instructive influence" from such contact, and this was originally reported they talked about it as one of the main motives of our policy." To resume trade, Russia's transport system needed to be restored as soon as possible, and Churchill rejected "supplies of goods such as locomotives" because they would "simply strengthen the economy... mode " 89 . Churchill was consistently supported, as in 1919, by the first Lord of the Admiralty, W. Long, who was one of the five most influential conservatives. Military circles expressed distrust of the Prime Minister, as mentioned above.

85 See V. G. Trukhanovsky. Foreign policy of England at the first stage of the general crisis of capitalism (1918-1939). Moscow, 1962, pp. 35-38.

86 M. Gilbert. Op. cit., p. 427. Churchill, of course, also meant to force France (as payment for the guarantees provided to it) "to accept English policy in good faith... in relation to Germany" (D. G. Boadle. Op. cit., p. 137).

87 D. G. Boadle. Op. cit., p. 139.

88 R. R. James. Op. cit., p. 159; M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p. 74.

89 M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., pp. 74 - 75.

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An important factor that influenced the course of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations in 1920, and the development of Anglo-Soviet relations in the future, were the colonial interests of England, especially in the Near and Middle East. Influential "Middle Eastern" circles of the British colonial bourgeoisie, whose representatives in the government were Curzon 90 and Milner, tried to use the anti-Soviet intervention in the south of our country in 1918-1919 to simultaneously consolidate their dominance over Persia, extend it to the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and establish control over Baku oil. Curzon emphasized in December 1918: "I think that we do not pay enough attention to the importance of oil and the oil pipeline" (Baku-Batum)91 . This was part of an effort to implement a long-standing program of establishing British hegemony in the Middle East. In the competition that broke out with France and the United States, England was successful. In August 1919, London imposed a bonded treaty on Persia, effectively turning the country into an English protectorate. Curzon considered this "achievement" a personal triumph. In April 1920, at the Entente conference in San Remo, England formally secured a mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia (now Iraq). In the pre-war months of 1914, Germany ceded 75% of its capital investment, or Iraqi oil production, to London .92 In San Remo, England secured the same conditions from France, while the United States was sidelined .93
However, the plans of the British ruling circles to create a Middle Eastern colonial empire collapsed under the blows of the Red Army and the liberation movement of the peoples of the East. The Anglo-Afghan War of 1919 led to the collapse of London's attempts to impose its rule on the Afghan people. There was growing resentment of the English enslavers in Persia, and uprisings broke out in Mesopotamia and Egypt. The multi-million masses of Hindustan were set in motion. In the spring of 1920, the British interventionists completely cleared Transcaucasia, and then were forced to withdraw from Northern Persia.

During 1918 - 1919, there was no consensus in British government circles on the methods of conducting colonial policy. The Liberal Minister for India, E. Montagu, was most strongly opposed to Curzon's ambitions in the Caucasus and Persia. In December 1918, when discussing British policy in the Caucasus, for example, he said:: "As far as India's defense is concerned, I don't think it's necessary for us to think about the Caucasus. I believe that this area is completely out of our interests. " 94 Such an" amazing " position for the Minister of Indian Affairs was explained by the fact that Montagu and the then Viceroy of India, Lord Chelmsford, who was in the midst of the turbulent events of the region, realized before anyone else the power of the national liberation movement of the peoples of the East, which arose under the influence of the revolutionary events in Russia. They called for a more flexible policy, for flirting with nationalism in order to give it an anti-communist orientation, and not to annoy it with the old-fashioned imperialism of Curzon. One of the documents of the British administration in India in the spring of 1919 stated: "Anti-English unrest is taking place in Egypt... We are fighting anti-English riots in India. Putting Persia before this agreement (from 1919-S. L.),

90 For more information about the" Middle Eastern grouping", Curzon's views, and plans to create a Middle Eastern colonial empire, see: G. L. Bondarevsky. English Politics and International Relations in the Persian Gulf basin (late XIX-early XX centuries). Moscow, 1968, pp. 12-57, 115.

91 R. H. Ulima n. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 73.

92 G. L. Bondarevsky. Op. ed., pp. 534-535.

93 "British Documents". Vol. XIII. L. 1963, doc. N 286.

94 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 79.

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we run the risk of provoking a decided outpouring of anti-English sentiment from Cairo to Calcutta. " 95
However, in 1920, when the anti - Soviet puppets of England in Transcaucasia were swept away, and Soviet Russia came into contact with the peoples of the Middle East, the positions of Curzon-Milner and E. Montagu became closer. Both sought to use the Anglo-Soviet negotiations to try to impose a number of demands on Soviet Russia. Thus, by seeking "an end to anti-British propaganda", including the termination of negotiations on the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan treaty, British diplomacy tried to disrupt the establishment of friendly relations between Soviet Russia and its southern neighbors, to isolate the Eastern countries and the Soviet state from each other.

O. Chamberlain and the financial circles behind him demanded full recognition by the Soviet Government of all debts, including the obligation to pay compensation for nationalized property .96
New documents from the British archives show that the final decision to bring the negotiations to an end was made only in mid-November 1920. During the meetings of November 17 and 18, the motives that prompted England to come to an agreement with the RSFSR were described in detail. At the meeting on November 17, Bonar Lowe spoke after R. Horn, Curzon and Chamberlain: "I agree with Horn... You can't talk endlessly and not make agreements. We are facing serious unemployment... If we do not reach an agreement, we will have no means of putting political pressure on Russia... What's the use of saying that we won't trade because we can't get our old debts paid?"97 . Lloyd George said :" We are making a decision of the utmost importance... Our hatred encourages us to say that we would rather hurt ourselves than do good to them. But we must first take care of our own interests, because there are bad times ahead. I've met a lot of entrepreneurs, and they even scared me with their forecasts for the next 18 months. Bonar Lowe and I met with Rylands, the chairman of FBP 98, and he was unable to refute the opinion expressed by the entrepreneurs. No orders are received. Consumers don't want to buy. We may be facing the worst period of unemployment that any of us has ever seen. The Russians are willing to pay in gold, but you don't want to sell. We trade with cannibals in the Solomon Islands. In the course of the last few days, an order for £ 10 million has been offered to the British Government, provided that it is carried out in this country. .. If we refuse, it will leak out that we refused because of Persia and Tashkent and because we hate the Bolsheviks, while we allocate 4 or 5 million pounds for the unemployed. " 99 Of the £ 10 million, half will go to the workers ' salaries. This will continue to be talked about, and it will add to public discontent. " 100
Lloyd George then moved on to the issue of "propaganda": "It is pointless to say that if there is no propaganda for the next six months, you will enter into an agreement. By then you will be in the depths of a trading depression and you will be forced to enter into a trade agreement-

95 "Persia Series". Pt. XXV. Notes, p. 20.

96 M. V. Glnnу. Op. cit., pp. 68, 74.

97 PRO. Minutes, Cabinet 61/20, 17 November, 1920; Cab. 23/23, p. 97/4.

98 The Federation of British Industry is the governing body of British monopolistic circles.

99 Minister of Labor T. McNamara clarified that 5 million pounds have been allocated to subsidize the unemployed.

100 PRO. Minutes, Cabinet 61/20, 17 November, 1920; Cab. 23/23, p. 97/4.

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the building. Our industrialists are in favor... I hope you will allow Horn to negotiate on the basis of the July 1 draft agreement. If we try to expand it, we will move away from it... If we make the conditions preliminary, it will mean that we are not ready to trade as long as the Soviet government exists." This, as you know, was the crux of the matter. "I have heard predictions about the fall of the Soviet government over the past two years. Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel-all failed, but I don't see any immediate prospects for the fall of the Soviet government,"Lloyd George concluded.

However, another meeting was required to make a decision. On November 18, Curzon was supported by O. Chamberlain, Churchill, and Montagu. Chamberlain again pointed out: "The leading banking houses are totally opposed to this agreement." Balfour generally supported Lloyd George. Lord Birkenhead, another influential Conservative figure, although with reservations, also spoke in favor of the agreement. Although Churchill, Curzon, Milner, and Long voted against it, the decision noted that by a "significant majority" the cabinet agreed to "instruct the Secretary of Commerce to conclude a trade agreement with Russia."102
The struggle over the negotiations in the British government and the debate on November 17-18 confirmed the weakness of the opponents of the agreement. In criticizing Lloyd George, they failed to contrast his line with a realistic alternative policy. Their recommendations ran counter to the reality of things in England.

During the debate on November 17-18, Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Horne, Balfour (whose position was supported by some ministers connected with the internal affairs of England - Fisher, Barnes, Addison, McNamara) described in detail the economic and domestic political motives that pushed for the conclusion of an agreement with the RSFSR. The need of the British economy for trade with Russia was emphasized by the beginning of a severe crisis in 1920-1921, which was most pronounced in England. The industrial production index (1913 taken as 100) fell from 90.5 in 1920 to 61.5 in 1921. The volume of foreign trade decreased by almost 40% 103 . A memorandum of November 22, 1920, by G. Maxet, an employee of the Russian Department of the Foreign Office, emphasized that industries "desperately need new markets." 104 The crisis caused massive unemployment. According to official data alone, the number of unemployed people increased from 318,000 in August 1920 to 2 million by mid-1921 .105 The industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, especially in the old industrial areas of the North and Midlands, and the Manchester Guardian newspaper, which expressed their views and traditionally supported the Liberal Party, called on the government to quickly conclude an agreement. And the opportunities for British industry were considerable. The Soviet country was just beginning to restore its economy, but even then it was ready to place large orders "immediately upon the conclusion of a trade agreement between the two governments" for multi-year supplies of steam locomotives, other railway equipment worth 10 million pounds annually, machine tools, automobiles, metals, textiles. In response, it offered exports of timber, flax, manganese ore, oil and petroleum products 106 .

101 Ibid., p. 98.

102 Ibid., Cabinet 62/20, 18 November, 1920; Cab. 23/23, p. 102.

103 V. G. Trukhanovsky. The foreign policy of England, p. 22.

104 "British Documents". Vol. XII, p. 809.

105 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. III, p. 434.

106 See L. B. Krasin's LETTER to Lloyd George dated October 4, 1920 ("Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. III, doc. 123, pp. 228-232).

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Mass unemployment and the" dirty " colonial war in Ireland aggravated the social situation in the country .107 Relapses of interventionist policies have sparked a powerful labor protest movement. The normalization of relations with Soviet Russia and the solution of the country's economic problems through unhindered trade with Russia remained one of the main political demands of the British working-class movement. Therefore, moderate English politicians attached the utmost importance to softening the social climate in England .108
The struggle between the two trends in the British government delayed the resumption of negotiations until the end of November 1920, 109 although the basis of the agreement was worked out in mid-summer 1920 by exchanging notes on June 30-July 7. All this time, the Soviet Government and the Soviet delegation in London have been working tirelessly to resume negotiations and achieve real progress .110 After the decision of the British cabinet on November 18, the struggle in English political circles did not stop. Opponents of reconciliation with Soviet Russia tried to exert maximum influence on the wording of the agreement text.

It is known that Lloyd George's position as head of government in 1918-1922 largely depended on the support of the main force of the coalition - the Conservatives .111 Lloyd George found the support of moderate Tories-Balfour, Horne, Birkenhead. However, when the leading group of Conservative ministers-Curzon, Chamberlain, Long, Milner - opposed the prime minister's line, Bonar Law, an influential Conservative leader, played a key role in the balance of power within the government. Bonar Law supported Lloyd George. However, the differences between the two groups concerned the choice of the policy direction of England, in determining the goals of the government was unified. It was not by chance that Lloyd George immediately made serious concessions to the right wing of his cabinet after receiving the agreement in principle. To "help" Horne, Lloyd George created a commission consisting of Curzon, Montagu and Churchill.

Horn's revised draft agreement of November 25 (presented to L. B. Krasin on November 29) contained significant changes and amendments proposed by the commission and mostly adopted by Horn. They mainly concerned the principal provisions of the preamble and the article on the recognition of debts. The British side followed its tactic of including in the trade agreement extremely important political points in which it was interested, while at the same time not wanting to conduct political negotiations for the conclusion of a final peace and de jure recognition of the Soviet government. The obligation to refrain from hostile activities and propaganda was specified only for the Soviet government, which was asked not to conduct such activities "against British interests or the British Empire, especially in the areas of the Caucasus and Asia Minor, Persia, Afghanistan and India... also to deter Russian citizens from any such actions or propaganda." On the issue of debt recognition, the new wording now stated that "all claims of each of the parties or its citizens

107 R. R. James. Op. cit., p. 161; Glenny also notes that the Prime Minister had to deal a lot with "industrial unrest" at the end of 1920 (M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p.73). Gilbert examines in detail the Irish crisis in 1919-1920 (M. Gilbert. Op. cit., pp. 443-471).

108 See the Maxet Memorandum (British Documents, Vol. XII, pp. 808-810).

109 A number of bourgeois authors recognize this as the real reason for the delay in negotiations (see M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p. 73; G. A. Brinkley. Op. ciL, pp. 271-272; R. H. Ullman. Op.cit. Vol. III, p. 399).

110 See Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. III, doc. 105, 128, 170, 171.

111 T. F. Lindsay, M. Harrington. Op. cit., pp. 27, 32 - 38.

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to the other side" will be addressed in the upcoming peace treaty mentioned in the text 112 .

The British proposals contained neither a clear position on the issue of ending the blockade of Russia, nor conditions for the sale of precious metals by the Soviet Government, 113 nor guarantees that until the mutual settlement of claims by both sides at a future peace conference, the property of the Soviet Government would not be confiscated or seized in England at the request of former creditors or owners .114 In essence, the new draft reflected all the prerequisites and requirements put forward by opponents of continuing negotiations. This meant a serious departure of England from the framework agreed on June 30 - July 7 and indicated a tightening of its position.

The Soviet government, in a note dated December 4, 1920, rightly pointed out that "despite all its desire to resume trade with Britain, it does not agree to go beyond this agreement (June 30 - July 7, S. L.) or to change at least one point in it without properly conducting political negotiations, at which both sides agreed to continue their trade with Britain." the parties could formulate their point of view on the basic principles and meet each other's wishes through mutual concessions, as the Russian Government once again stated in its note of November 9. " 115
England sought to impose its own conditions, hoping to use the acute need of our country for industrial equipment to restore its economy as soon as possible. After a meeting on December 21, 1920, at which the Soviet representative expressed a natural negative reaction to the new British demands, the British cabinet expressed the opinion that "at present, the conclusion of an agreement is hardly likely".116 England continued to drag out the negotiations.

It took all the skill and patience of Soviet diplomacy and the firmness of principle of the Soviet Government to bring them to a conclusion on an agreed basis that would take into account the interests of both sides. Finally, on March 16, 1921, R. Horn and L. B. Krasin signed the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement.

The preamble of the agreement, which was political in nature, contained an important provision that in order to further regulate economic and political relations between the two countries, a "formal general peace treaty"would be concluded. The parties undertook to "refrain from hostile actions" and conduct any official propaganda against each other outside their own borders. The conditions for the resumption of economic relations between the two countries largely incorporated the proposals that were persistently put forward during the negotiations by the Soviet side. The agreement emphasized that the parties will not impose blockades against each other and will immediately remove all obstacles to the resumption of trade between them. The agreement provided for the exchange of official representatives who would enjoy diplomatic privileges to conduct trade and issue visas.

112 "British Documents". Vol. VIII, pp. 869 - 878.

113 As for gold, the Bank of England bought it (except for gold from South Africa) at an arbitrary price - 77 shillings and 9 pence an ounce, instead of the world market price of 116 shillings. Thus, Soviet gold would be sold at a forced discount of 33% ("British Documents". Vol. VIII, p. 868).

114 "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR", vol. III, doc. 196, pp. 351-353; doc. 231, p. 400-402.

115 Ibid., doc. 207, p. 368.

116 M. V. Glenny. Op. cit., p. 80.

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Along with the agreement, Declaration No. 117 on the recognition of claims was signed, which indicated that all claims of one party and its citizens against the other party would be resolved in a formal contract, which was mentioned in the preamble of the agreement. The same applies to the statement of the Soviet Government recognizing in principle the obligation to pay compensation to individuals for goods or services provided to Russia, but not paid for, as well as to a similar statement of the British Government.

The Anglo-Soviet Treaty was a document of great historical significance. Britain, one of the strongest capitalist powers, thereby recognized Soviet Russia de facto. It also meant recognizing the collapse of the policy of armed struggle against the Soviet government with the aim of overthrowing it. The anti-Soviet front of the imperialist Powers, aimed at the political and economic isolation of the young socialist state, was broken through. As the first treaty concluded with a capitalist Power, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1921 was at the same time an example of the practical implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation.

On the part of bourgeois researchers, however, there is a clear tendency to present the 1921 agreement as unilaterally beneficial for Soviet Russia or simply belittle its significance. Bourgeois historical science tries to distort the history of Anglo-Soviet relations with the help of such falsifying concepts. Indeed, more than half a century of historical experience confirms the thesis that the 1921 agreement "was not an introduction to the era of harmony and cooperation" between the two countries. But Western authors try to find the reason why the potencies and opportunities laid down in the agreement were not realized for the benefit of the peoples of England and the USSR in politics... The Soviet state. In their works, there are unsubstantiated claims that it allegedly "did not fulfill" certain conditions of the agreement, and most importantly, the Soviet peace policy is perversely interpreted as a temporary, opportunistic phenomenon, the thesis is made about the alleged "lack of a clear goal among the Russian leaders", about some inevitable unfriendly nature of relations between the USSR and the"parliamentary democracies"118 .

This interpretation is nothing more than a concrete manifestation of the widespread denigration by bourgeois propaganda and science of the policy of peaceful coexistence consistently pursued by the CPSU and the Soviet state. This interpretation is in tune with the modern theses of reactionary Western ideologues about the "unilateral benefit" of defusing tension for the USSR, about its supposedly opportunistic approach to the policy of detente. General political arguments about the distant year 1921 bring us, therefore, to the forefront of the political and ideological confrontation of today.

The real reason for the difficulties in Anglo-Soviet relations was that it was precisely the influential circles in Britain that were sharply hostile to the Soviet state, considered the agreement no more than a "temporary settlement with the provisional government", 119 and did not abandon new attempts at confrontation with Soviet Russia. The struggle between two tendencies in the politics of the English bourgeoisie-

117 For the text of the agreement and declaration, see Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR, vol. III, doc. 344, pp. 607-614; see also doc. 345, pp. 615.

118 R. H.Ullman. Op. cit Vol. III, p. 454; M. V. Glenny. Op. cii., p. 31; J, S. Silverlight. Op. cit., p. 366; W. N. Medliсott. Op. cit., p.. 84;.E. L. Woodward. Op. cit., pp. 418 - 449.

119 R. H. Ullman. Op. cit. Vol. III, p. 454.

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The trend towards the USSR can be traced throughout the subsequent history of Anglo - Soviet relations.

Difficulties could not but arise because the ruling circles of the Western powers tried to use the development of relations with the Soviet state to interfere in its internal affairs. An indicator of the mood in London in the spring of 1921 is the report of a special parliamentary commission, in which the" fundamental precondition "for granting loans to the RSFSR was"an end to the policy of political repression at home (?!) and aggressive Bolshevik propaganda abroad" 120 . In 1921, not only Churchill, Curzon and other proponents of a military solution to the" Russian question", but also such figures as Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Horn, introduced an element of opportunistic calculation into their policies, seeking to use trade as a means of fighting the Soviet government. However, the current of moderate politicians was not uniform. Even then, there were realistic figures in the British government who emphasized the possibility and expediency of establishing mutually beneficial Anglo-Soviet relations. Both the RSFSR and Great Britain benefited from the development of equal cooperation based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs. British industry was gaining new markets, which was of great importance in the context of the severe economic crisis of 1921. Favorable conditions were created for the subsequent full normalization and development of versatile Soviet-British relations. In this, as time has shown, England objectively needed no less than the Soviet country.

120 "Report of the Committee to Collect Information on Russia". Russia N 1 (1921), Cmnd. 1240, p. 114.

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