A. Z. ZHEBIN

Candidate of Political Sciences

Korean Peninsula nuclear issue Keywords: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Korean settlement, China's position, Russia's role and place, UN command in Korea

Since the beginning of the 90s of the last century, the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula (JCP) began to occupy a central place in the complex of problems related to the Korean settlement. These problems themselves are both internal (inter-Korean) and international in nature: the peace treaty, the problem of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the security of neighboring states.

The negotiation process on the JCP, which began in 2003, in the format of the" six " (Russia, China, the United States, Japan, the DPRK and the ROK), is designed to find a political solution to the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula. However, there is much evidence that the United States uses this process not so much to discuss the problem of WMD nonproliferation, but rather to realize its own strategic interests in the region.

Many believe that the main reason for the lack of progress on the YAPCP and in resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula as a whole is Pyongyang's "intractability". North Korean leaders, in turn, accuse the United States of not really being interested in truly defusing tensions and achieving reconciliation in Korea.

Indeed, it seems that it is advantageous for Washington to maintain a certain level of tension on the peninsula, since this justifies the preservation of American forward-based forces near the borders of Russia and China for more than half a century, as well as the deployment of missile defense in the region. At the same time, the ultimate goal of the United States is clearly visible - to change the regime in the DPRK and unite the peninsula under its patronage, gaining an important springboard at the junction of the borders of the Russian Federation and the PRC.

"HARD POWER" AS A DECISIVE ARGUMENT

In recent decades, American experts have been actively spreading the concept that the so-called "soft power"plays an ever-increasing role in the modern world. However, in the arsenal of the United States itself, the decisive argument remains naked, undisguised force. Washington's actions in Northeast Asia throughout 2010 clearly demonstrated how easily the United States can return to" gunboat diplomacy": American squadrons consisting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines repeatedly entered the waters of the seas washing the Korean Peninsula. The sharp increase in the role of the "hard power" factor in US policy in the region was the most alarming feature of the situation in Northeast Asia (NEA) in 2010 compared to previous crises in this area.

The United States continues to seek the elimination of the DPRK, as this will allow it to solve several major strategic tasks at once:

- demonstrate to China and its neighboring states that the United States claims a leading role on the Korean Peninsula, which has traditionally been considered a sphere of Chinese influence for thousands of years;

- force Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to become more actively involved in the implementation of US military and political plans in the Asia-Pacific region and around the world;

- mute or even remove the debate in Japan and South Korea about the US military presence in these countries;

- finally, to save the United States from the need to comply with its own obligations under the Beijing joint statement of the" six " of September 17, 2005 (full normalization of interstate relations with the DPRK, lifting sanctions, replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, etc.).

At the same time, unfortunately, it remains almost unnoticed that the above-mentioned US strategy in relation to the peninsula has been effectively blocking the implementation of multilateral economic projects in this region that Russia is interested in for two decades.

By maintaining tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Washington is doing everything possible to prevent Russia from strengthening its position in the Pacific.

WHAT CAN WE EXPECT FROM OBAMA

Many observers pinned certain hopes for further progress in resolving the JCP on the coming to power of the Obama administration in the United States. However, the national security strategy adopted in 2010

* The term 'soft power' was coined by Harvard University professor Joseph Nye in the early 1990s. In his book ' Soft Power. The Means to success in world polities' ("Soft Power. The Means to Succeed in World Politics"), published in 2004, Joseph Nye notes: "We know that military or economic force can force others to change their position. However, sometimes you can achieve the desired results without tangible threats or payouts... Soft power is the ability to achieve what you want based on the voluntary participation of allies, and not through coercion or handouts." According to Nye, in the current era of the information revolution, the attractiveness factor of a particular country may be much more important than the most crushing military superiority.

For more information, see: Mishina S. I. "Beijing's version of "soft power". "Speak softly..."; Rusakov E. M."..Holding a big club in your hands " / / Asia and Africa Today, 2011, N 3 (editor's note).

(NSS) The US dollar indicates the continuity of B. Obama's policy with the policy of the George W. Bush administration.¹

The key provisions of the previous strategy, according to which the United States should maintain military superiority, while reserving the right to use force unilaterally to protect American interests, have not been changed. Finally, this strategy considers "promoting democracy" as one of the main objectives of American foreign policy. We can see how this task is implemented in practice in the case of Libya ².

Remarks by President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry According to the report of the Secretary-General of the United States on U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region, the United States continues to prioritize bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, and some other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, which serve as the foundation for "American participation and leadership in the region."³

The American strategy in the Asia-Pacific region is aimed at maintaining its military and political superiority there, acquired after the Second World War. To this end, the Obama administration intends to increase rather than reduce its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and strengthen military and political alliances with a number of countries in ^the region4.

STRATEGIC PATIENCE POLICY

With regard to the DPRK, the Obama administration has chosen a course called "strategic patience". In fact, this vague name hides nothing more than a rejection of attempts to normalize relations with the DPRK, to resolve the nuclear problem. According to the authors of strategic patience, there is no point in holding serious talks with the current leaders of the DPRK, since the North Korean regime is doomed anyway. At the same time, this course also includes the implementation of a set of measures designed to bring closer the inevitable, according to its authors, collapse of the existing system in the North of the peninsula.

The hope for success of "strategic patience" is based on two premises. First, Washington expects that the deteriorating health of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il and his possible departure from the political scene in the coming years will cause a power struggle and even a split in the leadership of the DPRK. This, in turn, should lead to a loss of control and destabilization of the political situation in the country.

On the other hand, the UN sanctions broadly interpreted by the West, combined with additional restrictions imposed unilaterally by the United States and its allies, are designed to make it as difficult as possible for even legal foreign economic and trade activities of this country and complicate its economic situation. All this, in the end, should cause discontent not only among the broad strata of the DPRK population, but also among a part of the party and economic nomenclature. In fact, we are talking about attempts to create B. The DPRK has a classic revolutionary situation in which the upper classes will not be able, and the lower classes will not want to live in the old way.

However, the events of 2010 showed that Pyongyang managed to stabilize the situation in the upper echelons of power. In September 2010, the country hosted a conference of the ruling Workers ' Party of Korea (WPK), where the composition of the central party bodies was updated. They include a number of figures designed to become the mainstay, and not at all rivals, of the future leader of the country, for the role of which Kim Jong - un, the third son of the current leader, seems to be preparing.

It should also be noted that the policy of "strategic patience" does not simply mean abandoning attempts to move the problem of the Korean Peninsula from a dead end. In fact, it has led to increased instability in the region. This is recognized even by some of the pillars of the American foreign policy establishment, including former Obama adviser on Asian issues D. Gross5.

Published in 2010 by the Obama administration, the new regular "Review of US Nuclear Policy" removed the DPRK from the list of countries to which the Americans are ready to provide so-called negative nuclear guarantees, i.e. a promise not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. According to the Center for American-Korean Policy (USA), this means that the DPRK may become the target of an American preemptive nuclear strike.⁶ This approach is no different from the concept of preemptive nuclear strikes against undesirable States adopted by the administration of J. R. R. Tolkien.George W. Bush in 2002.*

The calculation is based on the systematic creation of an international environment favorable for justifying the tightening of the policy towards the DPRK. The events of 2010, when the situation on the Korean Peninsula sharply worsened, showed how this tactic works.

* Negative nuclear safeguards are given to States that have signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The administration of J. R. R. TolkienPresident George W. Bush, in fact, refused such guarantees for non-nuclear countries. B. Obama restored them, but the DPRK has already become a nuclear country (editor's note).

How justified are Washington's claims about the "North Korean threat"?

Most experts agree that with the current balance of power on the peninsula and in the world, taking into account the combat capabilities of the armed forces and the state of the DPRK economy, the deliberate initiation of a major conflict by Pyongyang is excluded.

It is obvious that North Korea is not able to conduct any large-scale offensive military operations, especially without external support. She can't expect that kind of support right now.

WHY DID HATOYAMA LEAVE?

What the United States is willing to do for the sake of dominating the region was especially clearly shown by the conflict in US-Japanese relations that occurred in 2010. During the election campaign, future Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama promised to close one of the most discontented US military bases in Okinawa. However, later, due to statements about the increased North Korean threat, Hatoyama was forced not only to agree that the base would remain, but also to resign.

The uncompromising position of the United States on the issue of its bases has shown that in order to maintain military and political influence in the region, the United States is ready to exert pressure even on states that Washington calls its "allies" and "friends".

THE CHINESE FACTOR

The events of 2010 also showed that the situation on the peninsula and the prospects for its evolution can only be understood in the context of the US-China partnership and rivalry, as well as the balance of these components in the relations of these powers. In recent years, the peninsula has become one of the largest hubs of US-China contradictions. Some experts even believe that in the future it may turn out to be a testing ground for forces between the PRC and the United States.

Despite the most powerful pressure from Washington, Beijing's actions demonstrated the obvious fact that for the PRC, both for military-strategic and prestige-political reasons, the elimination of the DPRK, especially by force, is completely unacceptable. Such a development would lead to the withdrawal of the US armed forces and their allies to the 1,360-kilometer land border with China, seriously undermine the prestige and foreign policy positions of the PRC in Asia and around the world, and seriously hinder the implementation of Beijing's plans to return Taiwan to the "bosom of the motherland".

For thousands of years, Korea was under Chinese influence, and only at the beginning of the last century did China lose its dominance over the southern part of the peninsula. From the point of view of the Chinese way of thinking, Chinese history, this period is nothing compared to the past and future millennia. These are the categories that Chinese leaders think in.

The caution with which the Americans behave on the peninsula is precisely due to the fact that, unlike Iraq or Libya, the Chinese factor is noticeably present in Korea. It is clear that the United States avoids a direct clash with a country with a population of one and a half billion people.

Beijing's position on the incident with the South Korean corvette Cheonan, which sank during a patrol in the Yellow Sea in March 2010, and the artillery duel between the North and South on the island of Yeonpyeongdo in November 2010 caused disappointment in Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. This disappointment was so great that the United States and its allies seem to have given up on hopes of winning China over to their side on North Korea and turned their eyes to Moscow.⁷ This was caused in particular by the fact that, as you know, Moscow condemned the North Korean shelling of the island of Yeonpyeongdo and the death of people during this incident.⁸

In addition to increasing pressure on the DPRK, Russia's support for the position of the United States and its allies should, according to the authors of this new combination, lead to China's isolation in the Korean issue and in the NEA as a whole, and thus make it difficult for it to protect both the DPRK and its own interests on the peninsula.

However, in the light of the above-mentioned interests, Beijing will probably continue to try to use all the political and diplomatic arsenal and economic resources at its disposal to ensure the survival of the DPRK. At the same time, the PRC will do everything possible to encourage the North Koreans to exercise restraint in their foreign policy and push Pyongyang to make economic changes that would ease the political and economic burden of the PRC's support for this country.

China has a wide arsenal of tools, including secret agreements with the DPRK, to keep North Korea in its sphere of influence. Beijing is the only ally of Pyongyang that retains the military-political treaty of 1961, the 50th anniversary of which both sides recently celebrated widely.

The North Koreans ' intransigence in the confrontation with the United States and South Korea seems to be explained, at least in part, by Pyongyang's understanding that China's geopolitical interests will eventually force it to keep the DPRK "afloat".

On the other hand, the leaders of the DPRK, who do not want to find themselves in the place of Milosevic, Hussein or Gaddafi, prefer the traditional, rather "soft" Chinese protectorate, proven by thousands of years of experience.

As a result, an unstable balance has now developed on the peninsula. The United States does not dare to use force near the borders of the PRC and the Russian Federation, and Beijing, as shown by the visit of Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to Pyongyang in 2009 and three trips of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to China over the past year and a half, intends to keep the DPRK as a buffer state separating China from the-

south of the 38th parallel in Korea.

WHAT CAUSED THE" LOUD " ACTIONS OF PYONGYANG?

Many of the DPRK's moves are interpreted by the Americans and South Koreans as manifestations of its inherent aggressiveness. However, there is reason to believe that Pyongyang's recent "high-profile" actions are caused not so much by its aggressiveness as by a desire to draw the attention of the world community to the Korean problem. Pyongyang wants, firstly, to show the futility of trying to talk to it from a position of strength, and secondly, to force the United States to recognize the DPRK's right to exist, not to interfere with the provision of economic and financial assistance to it by other Western countries and international financial organizations.

The history of the nuclear and missile crises in Korea and the armed clashes between the North and South in the Yellow Sea confirmed that Pyongyang did not seek to escalate these conflicts and made concessions at the first opportunity to "save face". The most recent and very clear example of this is the decision to abandon "retribution" to the South Koreans, who on December 20, 2010 demonstratively conducted repeated live firing from the island of Yeonpyeongdo in the direction of the adjacent sea area bordering the territorial waters of the DPRK. As you know, such shootings that took place almost a month earlier - on November 23 last year-became the "reason" for the shelling of the island from the territory of the DPRK.

Recent conciliatory steps by the DPRK confirm this conclusion. After an unsuccessful two-year wait for diplomatic initiatives from the Obama administration, Pyongyang tried to revive both the Six-Party talks and the inter-Korean dialogue in early 2011.

At the same time, Pyongyang concluded that in the event of a complete surrender of the nuclear arsenal without reliable security guarantees, China's support alone may not be enough to preserve the existing regime. In addition, the rapid and widespread "opening up" of the country, including active exchanges and cooperation with the ROK and the West, is dangerous for the political and economic foundations of the existing system in the DPRK. Recent developments around Libya only confirm these concerns. It is also important for the North Korean leadership that maintaining a certain, albeit controlled, level of tension is an important condition for mass mobilization and maintaining internal political stability.

Therefore, Seoul, which is trying to convince Pyongyang that the Republic of Korea should become such a guarantor, and all other members of the" six", the North Koreans make it quite clear that the cessation of the military component of the DPRK's nuclear missile program is out of the question. Pyongyang's refusal to make the so-called "nuclear issue" a subject of negotiations with the ROK confirms that the DPRK still intends to ensure its security through agreements with the United States.

WHAT LESSONS HAS PYONGYANG LEARNED FROM THE EVENTS IN LIBYA AND OTHER HOT SPOTS?

Events in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, and now North Africa have had a twofold impact on Pyongyang's behavior. On the one hand, they force the DPRK leadership to listen more carefully to the concerns expressed in the world about the international behavior and domestic policy of this country. On the other hand, the North Koreans concluded that these events indicate the inability of the UN, its Security Council, and the international community as a whole to prevent or stop attacks by the United States and its partners on sovereign states with regimes that do not suit Washington.

Pyongyang believes that the current coercive measures taken by the West against Libya would hardly have been possible if this country had not abandoned its nuclear program several years ago. Commenting on the events in North Africa, the representative of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, in particular, noted that now the whole world is clearly exposed to the fact that the so-called "Libyan option of abandoning the nuclear program", sweet promises about "security guarantees" and "improving relations" are in fact a deception that, after voluntary disarmament, opens up the possibility of a new nuclear program. the road of aggression.

As Pyongyang stressed, "the path of army priority chosen by the DPRK is fully justified, and the DPRK's defensive military power created along this path serves as a deterrent force that prevents war and protects peace and stability on the Korean peninsula." ⁹

It can be expected that the DPRK will continue the line started in 2006 on the "Indian-style" solution of the JCP, insisting on the need to abandon double standards in the field of nuclear and missile nonproliferation.

This position of Pyongyang was largely provoked by the actions of the United States itself, including its nuclear deal with India and the agreement of the member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - an agreement that received very mixed assessments from the international community, which supports compliance with the non-proliferation regime.

At the same time, the DPRK's persistent attempts to engage in a direct dialogue with the United States (trips to Pyongyang in 2009-2011 by former US Presidents J. R. R. Tolkien and others).President Donald J. Carter and Bill Clinton, New Mexico Governor B. Richardson, and a number of other steps) indicate that the DPRK's position remains based on the policy of normalizing interstate relations with the United States. Thus, the DPRK leadership expects to significantly reduce the threat to the regime from outside, if not completely eliminate it, and gain access to funds from international financial institutions, Western investments, new technologies, and markets. Only in this case it will become

modernization of the economy and the country's survival in the modern world is possible.

SEOUL'S POSITION

Apparently, the tough stance of South Korea is due, among other things, to the fact that South Korean leaders believed in the imminent collapse of the regime in the DPRK. Seoul is closely monitoring information about Kim Jong Il's deteriorating health, growing economic problems and food difficulties, exacerbated by UN sanctions and additional restrictions on the DPRK imposed by the United States and its allies. One of the latest signs of a truly serious situation in the country is the request of the Speaker of the DPRK Parliament, Choi Tae-bok, to the United Kingdom to provide food assistance to his country, which he addressed to the authorities of this country during his visit to the United Kingdom, which took place in April 2011 at the invitation of the UK-North Korea inter-party group of the British Parliament. At the same time, South Korea is unlikely to risk taking any steps that could seriously endanger peace on the peninsula. First, most South Koreans place too much value on their economic achievements and one of Asia's highest standards of living. Second, Seoul cannot take any military action on its own without Washington's knowledge or direction. The fact is that since the Korean War, there has been an agreement between the United States and the ROK, according to which the armed forces of South Korea in the event of a large - scale conflict on the peninsula are subordinated to the American general-the commander of the US military contingent stationed in the ROK. Moreover, he automatically gets this right already when declaring the third degree of combat readiness.

At the same time, the South Korean leaders have so far categorically refused to negotiate and provide state assistance to the DPRK, to resume trade and economic cooperation in full, while at the same time increasing the pressure on the North by force, forcing it to redistribute resources in favor of defense.

If you allow a new, young leader (Kim Jong-un is not yet 30 years old) If you establish yourself in power in a more or less calm environment, then you may have to wait for the next transfer of power for 30 to 40 years. The very idea of this is unbearable for those in the United States and South Korea who, back in 1994, hoped for a power struggle in the leadership of the DPRK after the death of Kim Il Sung and, as a result, for the collapse of the regime, and now they are trying in every possible way to achieve the same goal, while the successor, in their opinion, has not yet the power pyramid.

However, the initial stage of inheriting power has another aspect. And it consists in the fact that the political reputation of the possible future leader of the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, fully allows the United States and its allies to deal with him. Why not invite him to start with what is called a "clean slate" and look for possible compromises together? But Washington and Seoul seem to have completely different plans. It is much easier and more profitable, from the point of view of the US geopolitical interests mentioned above and the ROK's calculations for the collapse of the DPRK, to push a novice leader into the trenches of the cold war, as they did with Kim Jong Il in the 90s of the last century. Then, in October 1994, three months after Kim Il Sung's death, he signed a very difficult Framework Agreement with the United States. However, Washington, as the American negotiators who later prepared it admitted, did not even think to fulfill its obligations under this document, counting on the rapid and inevitable collapse of the regime. In this regard, the claims of the North Koreans that the nuclear choice was actually imposed on them by the Americans do not look so baseless.

THE ROLE OF RUSSIA

Russia has sufficient experience and capabilities for major diplomatic initiatives in the Korean direction. Since 2000, our practical actions seem to indicate an awareness of the truth that we have suffered through decades of illusions and mistakes: in relations with the two Korean states, Russia should proceed from the assumption that distortions in our approaches in favor of one of them will inevitably reduce our ability to influence Korean affairs and lead to a decline in interest in us as a partner for both Korean sides and other participants in the settlement.

The optimal model for balancing Russian interests in the triangle with the DPRK and the ROK is probably a system of relations between Russia and each of the Korean states, which would exclude the possibility of any of them using their bilateral ties with Moscow to the detriment of its relations with another Korean state.

It was this approach of Russia at the beginning of the past decade that prompted other participants in the Korean settlement to more actively search for political solutions to both the problems of their bilateral relations with the DPRK and issues related to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on the Korean peninsula.

Subsequently, Russia was able to play an important and sometimes decisive role in finding a number of solutions during the six-party talks. In 2010, it was the efforts of Moscow, along with Beijing, to normalize the situation after the incidents with the corvette Cheonan and around Yeonpyeong Island that prevented the outbreak of a" big war " on the peninsula.

One of the most acute unresolved problems remains the so-called problem of the abduction of a dozen and a half Japanese people by the special services of the DPRK in the 70s and 80s of the last century. On the one hand, Tokyo's claims on this issue are more than legitimate. On the other hand, for some reason, the Japanese side "forgets" about the atrocities committed by militaristic Japan in Korea, atrocities for which it never gave an account and which it never compensated North Korea and its citizens. Tokyo prefers not to mention either

nor about compensation for hundreds of thousands of residents of the north of the peninsula who were forcibly taken away during World War II for slave labor both in Japan itself and in the territories captured by the Japanese, about tens of thousands of Korean women who were sent to brothels of the imperial army.

This position has only reinforced Japan's arrogant and distinctly racist approach to the issue of"abductees." Still, the fate of one and a half dozen sons and daughters of the "Sun Goddess" nation is incomparably more valuable than the lives of hundreds of thousands of Koreans, who in Japan have always been considered and continue to be perceived in the mass consciousness as representatives of the lower race.

UN COMMAND IN KOREA-A THREAT TO PEACE

The events of the past and this year on the Korean peninsula make experts once again pay attention to an almost forgotten aspect of the UN's role in Korea, namely, the decisions of the UN Security Council 60 years ago, adopted in the early days of the Korean War. In fact, they have been abused for more than half a century in order to legitimize the use of the UN flag by US troops. At one time, on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, about the legality of which there are various opinions, the UN Command in Korea was created.

The fact is that during this period, Taiwan took the place of the newly formed PRC, and Moscow, in solidarity with Beijing, boycotted Security Council meetings when a Kuomintang member presided there. It happened just in the days of the beginning of the Korean War. As a result, the UN Security Council managed to adopt resolutions, the content of which Moscow and Beijing now prefer not to recall, but the consequences of which, it seems, they have not fully calculated.

As a result, the United States effectively usurped the name and authority of this organization, using it to justify its policy on the peninsula. An example of such usurpation is, in particular, the unilateral conclusions of the United States and its allies in the Korean War, which are members of the so-called UN Command in Korea, about the incident on Yeonpyeong Island, presented in March 2010. To the Security Council and the international community as an opinion of the UN ¹⁰.

However, the danger of maintaining the current situation with the UN Command in Korea is much more serious. The fact is that the commander of the US forces stationed in the Republic of Korea is also the commander of the UN forces in Korea. This is another Cold War anachronism. Both Korean states have been members of this international organization for almost 20 years, and it turns out that it is only in a state of military truce with one of them. Of course, these troops are not controlled or accountable to the UN Military Staff Committee or any other UN body. From the moment of its creation to the present, it is headed by successive American generals.

Looking at examples from the history of American foreign policy, it cannot be ruled out that the United States and its allies may organize an incident in Korea similar to the one that occurred in 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, which was later used as a pretext for launching full-scale US participation in combat operations in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. This is the only way to explain the deliberately demonstrative shooting from Yeonpyeong Island in December 2010, conducted with the participation of the American and South Korean military and designed for a forceful reaction of the North Koreans, the response to which was quite predictable.

It seems that serious consideration should be given to putting an end to the abuse of the UN flag and name in Korea by a Power whose true attitude to the role and authority of this organization was so clearly manifested during the preparation and implementation of aggression against Iraq and a number of other countries.

ON RUSSIA'S COOPERATION WITH CHINA AND THE TWO KOREAS

Successful cooperation between Russia and China on Korean issues that directly affect the security interests of both Russia and China can become an important factor in strengthening trust between our countries and coordinating their actions in the international arena. Moscow's consideration of China's position is particularly valuable for Beijing in light of the PRC's apparent unwillingness to be alone in the UN Security Council in the confrontation with the United States and its allies on both the JCP and a number of other issues.

In its relations with the DPRK, in full compliance with the new interstate treaty and the spirit of the joint declarations signed in Pyongyang and Moscow in 2000 and 2001, Russia maintains regular consultations with its North Korean partners on these issues. At the same time, the North Koreans are given to understand that the degree of Russian support for certain steps of Pyongyang will be directly proportional to our awareness of its true intentions. The latter is particularly important for ensuring predictability of Pyongyang's behavior, which in the past has sometimes been completely unexpected for Moscow on the peninsula.

As far as Seoul is concerned, the high level and intensity of bilateral political dialogue and investment cooperation and trade with the Russian Federation, which has been noticeably revived recently, clearly outstrip the achievement of a common vision of the security situation in the region. Seoul's disregard for Moscow's calls for restraint during the 2010 inter-Korean incidents, its apparent sabotage of the six-party talks, which Russia advocates resuming, the ROK's chronic unwillingness to participate in joint economic projects in the DPRK with Russia, and, finally, the resuscitation of joint work on missile defense with the United States - these are just some examples of what, contrary to the broadcast declarations south-

According to Nokoreans about the "strategic partnership", Russia remains a secondary partner for the Republic of Korea, from which they expect mainly wider access to our energy and other resources. The only truly strategic, and not just a partner, but an ally for the current administration of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the United States.

All of the above points to the fact that the conflicting foreign policy priorities and domestic political circumstances of the countries involved in the settlement are the geopolitical calculations of the United States, the well-known position of the People's Republic of China, and their concerns

North Korea's security, Seoul's pre-conditions, the different approaches of the parties to the methods of solving the so - called missile and nuclear problems of the DPRK, and Japan's unilateral claims on the issue of "abducted persons" make a quick and comprehensive solution to the problems of the peninsula at this stage unlikely.

^{Zhebin A. Z.} 1 Peculiar denuclearization. Nezavisimaya gazeta. Diplomatic courier. 02.02.2009.

^{Obama's NSS:} 2 Promise and Pitfalls. The Council for Foreign Relations. The New York Times, 28.05.2010.

³ President Obama on Issues Affecting Asia-Pacific Nations. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. November 14, 2009. Remarks by President Barack Obama. Santory Hall. Tokyo. Japan; Regional Architecture in Asia: Principles and Priorities. Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Rodney Clinton. January 12, 2010. Department of State. Office of Spokesman.

⁴ The US plans to increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region - www.newsinfo.ru 30.10.2010.

^{Goodby J.E., Gross D.} 5 Strategic Patience Has Become Strategic Passivity. December 22, 2010 - http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/strategic-patience-has-become-str ategic-passivity

⁶ Kim Hyun Wook. Nuclear Posture Review and Its Implications on the Korean Peninsula. Center for U.S. -Korea Policy. May 2010, No. 5.

^{Lee Sunny.} 7 Russia Emerging from the Cold. Asia Times, 11.02.2011.

⁸ Transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's speech and answers to media questions at a joint press conference with Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergey Martynov following the joint meeting of the Russian and Belarusian Foreign Ministries in Minsk, November 23, 2010. 1628 - 23 - 11 - 2010 - httpj//www.mid.ru

⁹ Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denounces US Military Attack on Libya. KCNA, 22.03.2011.

¹⁰ UN probe finds NKorea violated pact. Washington Examiner, 10.03.2011.

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