V. P. KIRICHENKO

Candidate of the Institute of Information Technology of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Yemen, political crisis Keywords: Zaydi, Shafi'i, Al-Qaeda

Every year, on May 22, the Yemeni people celebrate National Unity Day. However, in 2012, it was overshadowed by the explosion that occurred the day before in the capital Sanaa in Al-Sabin Square, just at the place where the military parade was supposed to take place. The exact number of victims was not released, but the explosion was so powerful that the remains of the victims were scattered throughout the area. The army leadership announced the death of 63 servicemen who participated in the preparation and rehearsal of the parade.

THE RISE OF AL-QAEDA

Observers noted that the attack occurred 10 days after the start of a large-scale anti-terrorist operation by the Yemeni armed forces against Al-Qaeda militants, which in recent years has intensified its presence in the country. Ansar al-Sharia, a branch of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), claimed responsibility for the explosion in Al-Sabin Square. According to foreign analysts, AQAP is the most active and dangerous of all the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups.

For the first time, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda was mentioned after the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000. 17 sailors were killed, the $¹ billion ship was disabled for two years, and its repair cost the United States $250 million.² In 2008, militants attacked the US Embassy, killing at least 16 people, including an American.

The same organization is charged with attempting to blow up a passenger liner en route Amsterdam-Detroit in 2009. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national who was captured at the time, admitted that he had been trained in terrorist camps in Yemen. In late October 2010, explosives were sent from Yemen to Jewish organizations in Chicago. The special services of Saudi Arabia managed to detect the dangerous stuffing of parcels. They also established that the packages were prepared by the Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. After that, the security forces of Yemen intensified their activities in the southern regions of the country, where it is assumed that the internationally wanted terrorists are hiding.

Until recently, it was not clear who heads the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda: Anwar al-Alwaki, an American citizen of Yemeni origin, or Nasir al-Wuhaishi, a former private secretary of Osama bin Laden.

Anwar al-Awlaki actively called on the Internet Muslim youth of the European Union and America to fight against states participating in the war against Islamists. In the fall of 2010, the US authorities included him in the list of persons who pose a special threat to US interests, and then Washington declared Anwar "terrorist number one". At the end of September 2011, according to the Yemeni intelligence services, he was killed during battles with government forces in Yemen. The fact of the terrorist's death was confirmed by US President Barack Obama, and then by representatives of Al-Qaeda.

As for Nasir al-Wuhayshi, he is one of the top ten most wanted criminals. He became the leader of AQAP after its previous leaders were killed by Saudi intelligence agencies.

AQAP is constantly updated with new action movies. For example, in 2006, 23 extremists escaped from a Yemeni prison and soon joined al-Qaeda³.Several hundred terrorists (mostly Arabs) moved to the country from Afghanistan, as well as Yemenis released from Guantanamo.

In September 2012, the Yemeni authorities announced the elimination of Said al-Shihri, who was considered the second person in the leadership of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Shihri, a native of Saudi Arabia, was released from Guantanamo Bay in 2007 and later joined AQAP. He was killed along with six other militants in an air strike in Wadi Ain in Hadhramawt province. This happened after Yemen allowed the United States to launch strikes on possible bases of al-Qaeda militants in December 2011. It is characteristic that then Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh claimed that the attacks were carried out by the Yemeni military, while in fact they were carried out by the Americans. The fact that the Americans are using drones to suppress AQAP bases indicates that the United States is extremely concerned about the organization's activities in the Arabian Peninsula.

* For more information, see: Nechitailo D. A. "Al-Qaeda" and "Arab Spring" / / Asia and Africa Today, 2012. N 9, 10.

Yemen is an ideal location for Al-Qaeda training camps. This is facilitated not only by the desert and the lack of control over the territory, but also by the presence of a mass of unemployed youth, who, according to recruiters, should join the ranks of the militants, if only because there is no other "job".

Yemen occupies a strategic position in the southwestern part of the Arabian Peninsula, and from its territory it is easy to control the movement of tankers passing from the Gulf of Aden through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Red Sea. An uncontrolled 1,200-mile coastline in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, and a 1,000-mile land border with Saudi Arabia and Oman that runs mostly through the desert, make Yemen an ideal hideout for al-Qaeda. Militants can move with impunity across Yemen to Somalia, and the poverty prevailing in these countries provides it with a constant influx of new fighters.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN YEMEN

Yemen is the poorest and most populous country in the Arabian Peninsula. According to the 2011 estimate, its population was 24.133 million people. About 50% of the population is below the poverty line ⁴. The high birth rate is particularly characteristic of recent years. If in 2005 72 babies were born every hour in this country, then in 2008 - already 805. The proportion of young people in Yemen is very high: 30.2% of the total population (2010)⁶. Some young people have received higher education, but can't find a job. According to the population growth rate (3.42% per year), the country's population is expected to reach 50 million people in 2030.

The standard of living in Yemen continues to be extremely low. As of March 2011, about 40% of the Yemeni population lived on $2 a day, and a third suffered from chronic malnutrition.

The deportation of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Arabian Peninsula, which was caused by the Yemeni leadership's support for Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990, had a negative impact on the Yemeni economy.⁷ The unemployment rate increased, which, according to some sources, exceeded 35%8.

In addition to remittances from Yemenis working abroad, the country's well-being depends on oil exports, whose reserves have been dwindling recently. Yemen's share in world reserves is 0.16% (350 million tons)⁹. Oil fields are located in the eastern provinces of Shabwa and Hadramaut, as well as in the central province of Marib. The main consumers of Yemeni oil are China, Thailand, India, Singapore and South Africa.

Revenues from oil exports have decreased (about 70% of budget revenues come from this sector)¹⁰. While in 2001 oil exports from Yemen amounted to 338 thousand barrels per day11, in 2010 they decreased to 103 thousand barrels per day12. The trend towards a decrease in oil exports continues at the present time.

Negative socio-economic conditions in the country are causing an outflow of the population from Yemen. Currently, more than 1.5 million Yemenis live outside the country, most of them in the Persian Gulf countries, as well as in Djibouti, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The main reasons for the outflow of refugees are hunger and lack of drinking water, as well as the unstable political situation in the country.

UNITED YEMEN: TRIBAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR

The Republic of Yemen was formed as a result of the unification of two States: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR - North Yemen), located in the west of the Arabian Peninsula, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (NDRJ-South Yemen), in the south and southwest of the peninsula. Unification took place in May 1990.13 However, the existing alliance between the two parts of ^the country is fragile, as it unites different tribes with different religious preferences. Thus, the majority of the population in the south of Yemen is Sunni Shafi, while in the northern parts of the country, in addition to Shafi'is, there are Shiite Zaidis15. There are also Shia Imamite^the. In addition, there is a small community of Shia Ismailis (75,000).¹⁷.

In the east of the country live Ibadis - representatives of the current of Islam, which emerged in the VII century in Iraq and differs from both Sunnism and Shiism. The far east is home to a small number of Sunni Maliki Madhhabs. In the south, in the coastal areas, there are small communities of Sunni Hanifis, Shia Ismailis and Imamites. Remnants of pre-Islamic beliefs remain among some of the Arab tribes.

A tribal community is a closed social structure. Each tribe in Yemen has its own territory, military rites, tribal customs, traditional allies and enemies ¹⁸. In total, there are several dozen tribes and tribal confederations in the country. In the north, tribal confederacies and Hashid and Bakil, Beni Matar, Beni Haris, etc. dominate, in the south (from west to east) - subaihi, Haushabi, Amiri, Yafai, Fadli, Awlaki, etc.

A complex religious and tribal mosaic leaves its mark on the political situation in the country.

In addition, in South Yemen, it was believed that the central Government's distribution of oil revenues from the former NDRF was unfair and did not meet the interests of the South. The situation was further complicated by the fact that, after the unification of the country in 1990, the highest state institutions of the Russian Federation were formed.

posts began to be occupied by immigrants from Northern Yemen, which caused discontent among residents of the south of the country. All this led to the Yemeni civil war in 1994.

Ali Salem al-Beidh, Secretary General of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), which ruled the former NDRJ, started the split in the state. He stated that 150 members of ^the YSP19 were killed after the unification, and demanded an explanation from the country's leadership about the spending of funds received by the government from oil exports. By November 1993, it was reported that armed groups of the former YAR and NDRYW had begun preparing for combat operations. In January 1994, representatives of the main political parties signed an agreement in Amman, Jordan. It provided for a certain decentralization of power, and also contained a promise to review the constitution and economic policy. However, efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully proved ineffective, and on April 27, 1994, a battle took place in the Amran area between armed groups of the former YAR and the NDRYJ. Further clashes engulfed the neighborhoods of Aden and Damar, rockets were fired at targets in Sana'a, Aden and some other places. After the Southerners suffered a series of defeats, the fighting was concentrated in the area of Aden.

On May 21, 1994, Al-Bayd proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRJ) in the south of the country. President Ali Abdullah Saleh did not recognize this declaration and declared a state of emergency, ordering the continuation of the offensive on Aden. The UN in its resolution No. 924 demanded a cease-fire and sent a commission of inquiry to the country. However, Aden was captured on July 7, 1994, and the fighting ceased.²⁰ But the political situation in Yemen continued to be difficult.

In 1997, the religious and political organization "Al-Shabab al-Mu'minin" ("Orthodox Youth") was established. Its activists called in mosques in the Yemeni capital Sanaa and several other cities for jihad against Israel and the United States, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, demanded the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and sharply criticized the policy of the ruling regime. ²¹ Gradually, the organization's relations with the Yemeni authorities escalated into open confrontation.

The fighting launched on 18 June 2004 by Hussein Badruddin al-Houthi, one of the founders of Al-Shabaab al-Mu'minin, and his Zaydite supporters from the Houthi Tribal Confederation, has engulfed many districts and regions of the northwestern province of Saada.²² According to official government figures, more than 800 people (473 of them military personnel) were killed and 2,588 wounded in the fighting between June and October 2004 alone. Among the dead was H. B. al-Houthi himself, who was replaced as the leader of the movement by his brother Abdul Malik. The damage caused to public and private property during the fighting amounted to $600 million.²³ According to the UN, more than 250,000 people have fled their homes in the five-year conflict between the Government and rebels in northern Yemen.²⁴

The Yemeni leadership accused Iran of financing the Houthi tribal uprising. However, there was no direct evidence for this. As for the Zaydite Ulema, most of them were convinced that the movement led by al-Houthi was influenced by the ideas of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, which was led by Ayatollah Khomeini.

There are several points of view regarding the sources from which the rebels received weapons. Some experts believe that the Houthis received weapons from Iran, although this has never been proven. There have been cases of rebels buying weapons from government forces.²⁵

Supporters of al-Houthi demanded that Yemeni President A. A. Saleh provide them with the opportunity to participate in the work of local self-government bodies, allocate funds for the economic development of the province of Saada, and provide material compensation for damage suffered by local residents during the fighting.

There is also a view that the Houthi uprising was caused by the fact that Zaydism was attacked by the Sunni Salafi^. 26 The Salafists are supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Since the beginning of the 70s, the latter's influence has grown steadily, which forced the Yemeni authorities to make concessions to the Salafis.

Salafist criticism of Zaydism in mosques and the destruction of Zaydite tombstones in the province of Saada (where the Zaydite Imamate was established in the tenth century) caused discontent among the latter, who increasingly felt themselves marginalized. This led to a confrontation between the Zaydite Houthis and the Yemeni government.²⁷

In February 2010, the parties began to agree on the terms of the peace agreement. On March 20, 2010, the President of Yemen announced the end of the war with the Zaidis. A. A. Saleh, speaking about the normalization of the situation in the province of Saada, said that the Zaidis began to implement the agreements reached between them and the Yemeni government. In particular, the Zaydites cleared roads, removed traffic checkpoints, abandoned combat positions and captured administrative centers in Saada province, and released 177 hostages and prisoners of war.²⁸

The Government, for its part, agreed to release the arrested rebels and promised not to infringe on the civil rights of Shiites. In addition, it was promised that representatives of the Houthis will be part of the newly created committees to monitor the implementation of the truce conditions. The Government proposed the establishment of five committees in various districts of Saada governorate.²⁹

AGGRAVATION OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS AMID THE " ARAB SPRING

In January 2011, the political situation in the country again sharply worsened. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets of the Yemeni capital demanding the resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Yemeni government. There have been shootings in a number of locations, which is not surprising, as Yemeni authorities estimate that more than 60 million firearms are in illicit traffic in the country - three for every ³⁰ residents.

The growth of Yemeni protest activity was influenced by the coup d'etat in Tunisia, which was followed by anti-government protests in almost all Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa.

Many experts believe that the elite of southern Yemen played an important role in the political crisis of 2011-2012. Russian researcher M. Sapronova writes about this: "The South Yemeni elite (mainly Shafi'is) was left out of the political process and was severely disadvantaged due to the unfair distribution of finances in favor of the north and the monopolization of the main trade areas by the presidential family... It is the Shafi'is, who demand the secession of the south, who are the main opposition force in the current events. Saleh's attempt to pass on power to his son, Ahmed Saleh, brought together groups dissatisfied with his policies. They were joined by the president's inner circle, who apparently decided to change the leader within their clan. " ³¹

Back in 1993, an alliance was formed between the pro-presidential General People's Congress Party and the Yemen Reform Bloc (Islah) party. This alliance fought against the YSP, i.e. the Southerners. The combined efforts of the two parties are also explained by the fact that President Saleh belongs to the Sayusan tribe, which is part of the Hashid confederation, and Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of Islah, was the leader of this tribal group at that time*.

On February 26, 2011, it was reported that two of Yemen's most influential Zaydi tribal unions refused to support the country's president and went over to the opposition. In particular, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, the leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, defected to the opposition.

He announced his withdrawal from the General People's Congress, the ruling party in Yemen, whose candidate was President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Another tribal confederation, the Bakil, also opposed the regime32

In the second half of March 2011, Major General Ali Mohsen Saleh Al-Ahmar, the President's half-brother, announced his defection to the opposition. "We, "he said in a video message broadcast on Al Jazeera," declare our support for the peaceful revolution of young people and their demands, and continue to serve to ensure the security and stability of the capital. Yemen today faces a serious crisis due to unconstitutional and illegal actions of the authorities, policies of marginalization and lack of justice. " ³³

Saleh al-Ahmar was followed into the protest camp by about 60 officers and three generals. In addition, ^the current government was opposed by some Yemeni diplomats accredited in foreign countries34.

On March 20, 2011, Saleh dismissed the Yemeni Government, but the demonstrations continued. On March 22, 2011, the country's president promised to leave office before the end of the year, handing over power to the military.

From the very beginning of the crisis, neighboring countries have made efforts to resolve the situation in the country. In particular, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf (GCC) developed an agreement, the signing of which was scheduled for May 18, 2011.The document provided for the peaceful transfer of power from the president within 30 days in exchange for protection from prosecution. However, the agreement was disrupted, as the Yemeni president refused to sign it. The deadline for signing the agreement was postponed to May 22, 2011. ³⁵

The president's actions caused a new wave of discontent in the country and caused the uprising of the Hashid tribal confederation to begin on May 23, 2011. A number of media outlets reported that the Hashidis seized the head office of the state airline Yemenia during the fighting. In addition, representatives of the most influential tribal confederation in the country seized the building of the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the building of the official SABA news agency.

On June 3, 2011, President Saleh was wounded in an attack on a mosque located near the Presidential Palace. In addition to him, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, several politicians and the Chairman of the Parliament were injured. Three people, including the imam of the mosque, were killed. Yemeni authorities have blamed the Hashid tribal confederation for the attack. However, its representatives denied these accusations.³⁶

In a speech broadcast on Yemeni television after the mosque attack, Saleh said that the Hashid tribal confederation had nothing to do with the "youth revolution."³⁷ It is clear that in making this statement, Saleh wanted to explain the aggravation of the situation by the actions of his political rivals.

Al-Liqa' al-Mushtaraq, an association of Yemeni Opposition Parties ("The Joint Session Party) announced on 6 June 2011 that it supported President Saleh's transfer of power to his deputy, Abd ar-Rabbu Mansour al-Hadi38.

Saleh resigned in November-

* After the death of Abdullah al-Ahmar in 2007, one of his sons, Sadiq al - Ahmar, became the head of Hashid.

re 2011, handing over power to Vice President al-Hadi. This step helped defuse the political crisis. On 21 February 2012, al-Hadi was elected as the new President of Yemen.³⁹

The new president said that one of the most important tasks of his government will be "to continue the war against Al-Qaeda." The Yemeni government has stepped up security measures around energy facilities after declaring war on militants.

Against the background of the worsening political situation in Yemen, the confrontation between the Houthis and government forces resumed at the end of 2011. Zaydi rebels also clashed with Sunni fighters from Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda.⁴⁰ In September 2012, 12 people were killed in clashes between Salafists and Zaydites in Yemen.⁴¹

The reason for the confrontation was that the Zaydites were dissatisfied with the appointment of supporters of the Salafi-backed Islah party to administrative positions in the northern provinces of Yemen. Relations between the followers of these trends of Islam remain extremely tense.

* * *

An analysis of the events that have taken place in Yemen over the past two years shows that the religious situation in the country is not the main factor of political instability in Yemen. The main reason for the difficult situation in the country is the socio-economic crisis. The situation in Yemen is also affected by the tribal structure of society and the economic contradictions between the northern and southern parts of the country. The combination of these factors caused a wave of protests among the population and led to a change in the leadership of the republic. Another threat to political stability in Yemen is the activation of AQAP. Obviously, the new authorities of the country will have to make considerable efforts to combat this group.

¹ http://www.foxnews.com/story /0,2933,333612,00.html

² http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/profiles/uss_cole_bom-bing.htm

³ geopolitika.lt?artc-4481

⁴ http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2008/0355/mir01 .php

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ http://www.haver.com/comment/comment.html?c= 11013lc.html

^{7 Some aspects of socio-economic development of the Republic of Yemen at the present stage.} Arab countries of West Asia and North Africa (Recent history, economy and politics). Issue 3 [Ed. by B. G. Seyranyan, A. O. Filonik]. Moscow, 1998, p. 105.

⁸ ITAR-TASS. Pulse of the planet. Middle East and Africa. 9.03.2011, p. 6.

⁹ Russian Energy Agency. 14.09.12.

¹⁰ http://www.alsaudiarabia.com/14494-yemen-oil-export-revenues-decline-268b-in-10-months/

¹¹ http://aspousa.org/2010/01 /yemens-oil-deadly-decline-rate/

¹² http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=YM

¹³ For more information, see: Zgersky D. Unity of opposites? // New time. 1990, N 23.

¹⁴ The Shafi'i version of Sunnism was born at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries. It was named after an outstanding jurist, theologian and scholar of Muslim tradition, Muhammad al-Shafi'i (767-820). The Qur'an and Sunnah are considered by Shafi'is as a single source of legal regulations. In comparison with the Hanifi madhhab (legal system), Shafiism avoids complicated logical analysis by making a judgment by analogy, and in comparison with the Malik Madhhab, it does not require detailed knowledge of the legal complex of the Madinah community.

¹⁵ The Zaydites are followers of one of the moderate Shiite sects. The name of the sect is derived from the name of Zayd ibn Ali, grandson of Husayn, brother of the fifth Shia Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 732). Zeid led an Alid rights revolt in 739, but died the following year. The descendants and followers of Zeid managed to attract the inhabitants of the southwestern coast of the Caspian Sea to their side and founded a Zeidite state in Tabaristan, Deilem and Gilan in 864, which lasted for about three centuries. In the tenth century, a theocratic Zaydi state (imamate) emerged in Yemen. In addition to Yemen and Northern Iran, the Zaydite dynasties ruled Morocco in the eighth and tenth centuries. But only in Yemen was Zaydism able to take root and become an ideological weapon of a powerful religious movement.

¹⁶ Imamites is the umbrella term for various Shia sects that believe that the spiritual or political leadership of a community, as well as power in the Caliphate, is transferred from one imam to another by "clearly pointing" one of them to the other.

¹⁷ Ismailis - one of the main branches of Shiite Islam, which emerged in the middle of the eighth century. Ismailism emerged as a result of the aggravation of class contradictions, which were expressed in the strengthening of the power of feudal lords and the growth of the tax burden. The popular (mostly peasant) uprisings that broke out were of the nature of a sectarian movement that demanded universal justice and social equality, which was to be achieved by establishing a just government.

^{Gerasimov O. G.} 18 The Yemeni Revolution of 1962-1975, Moscow, 1979, p. 16.

¹⁹ The Middle East & North Africa 2001. L. 2000, p. 1248.

²⁰ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/yemenl.htm

^{Nechitailo D.} 21 The Ghost of Imam Zeid. Yemen's Shiites set to take historic revenge - http://religion.ng.ru/problems/2010 - 01-20/5zeid.html

²² "Al-Hayat": Events in Saada (Yemen). Starting with a stand-up against their allies, the Houthi rebels turned to a "Khomeini" attack on society - http://i-r-p.ru/page/stream-trends/ index-20952.html

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ http://ria.ru/world/20100211/208658605.html

^{Kirsanov E. E.} 25 The situation in Yemen: Iran vs. Saudi Arabia - http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2009/05-ll-09.htm

²⁶ Salafi adherents of the as-Salafiyya movement-a common name for Muslim reformers of various eras who advocated the return to Islam of the "righteous ancestors" (as-Salaf Assalihun) by getting rid of "innovations" (bidat), which over time distort the original true faith and the social order based on it.

²⁷ Подробнее см.: Von Bruck G. Regimes of piety revisited: Zaydi political moralities in republic of Yemen // Welt des Islams. Leiden, 2010. Vol. 50, N 2, s. 185 - 223.

²⁸ http: //ria.ru/world/20100320/215461998.html?id=

²⁹ http://ria.ru/world/2010021 l/208658605.html

³⁰ http://wek.ru/obshestvo/61855-jemenskij-plemena-vyshli-na-tropu-vojny.html

^{Sapronova M.} 31 Civil war is possible in Yemen-http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/documentl84640.phtml

³² http://lenta.ru/news/2011/02/26/yemen/

³³ ITAR-TASS. Pulse of the planet. Middle East and Africa. 22.03.2011, p. 15.

^{Tarasenko P.} 34 Yemeni president crushed by protest -http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1605896

³⁵ http://www.regions.ru/news/contries/2356953/

³⁶ http://ria.ru/arab_ye/20110603/383907382.html

³⁷ http://ria.ru/arab_ye/20110603/383976178.htm

³⁸ ITAR-TASS. Pulse of the planet... 7.06.2011, p. 5.

³⁹ ITAR-TASS. Pulse of the planet... 9.04.2012, p. 13.

⁴⁰ http://ummanews.com/news/umma/4619---25-.html

⁴¹ http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/54465

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