In the modern era, when humanity has accumulated a gigantic arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, the question of opportunities and ways to prevent (and then completely eliminate the threat of) a new world war is particularly urgent. This explains the constant interest that the problem of the origin of the Second World War arouses. It is obvious that the study of the policy of the great Powers in the pre-war months has both scientific and political significance in this regard. The monograph of Candidate of Historical Sciences A.D. Chikvaidze is devoted to a detailed analysis of the European policy of the British government in the spring and summer of 1939.
The book makes extensive use of documents from the British Cabinet and the Foreign Office, declassified in 1969. Their careful analysis (together with the use of extensive research literature) allowed the author to draw a number of important conclusions about the policy of the British cabinet on the eve of World War II, and to more fully characterize the specific course of events in this crucial period of history for the fate of the world.
What is the new contribution that A.D. Chikvaidze was able to make to the understanding of the motives and coverage of the practical actions of N. Chamberlain's cabinet on the eve of World War II? How does the reviewed work enrich the existing ideas in Soviet science about the essence of the British government's policy of appeasement of fascist aggressors, which was embodied in the shameful Munich Agreement and the subsequent breakdown of negotiations with the USSR?
Using new documents, the author was able to reveal the essence of the anti-Soviet course pursued by the British and French governments. The deal in Munich, notes A.D. Chikvaidze, "was concluded not by political blind men, but by figures with quite clear goals and aspirations" (p. 98). The crowning achievement of these aspirations was the "channeling" of fascist aggression towards the USSR, and for this purpose the Chamberlain government actually "decommissioned" the Czechoslovak state by the time the Munich Agreement was signed from accounts. This is exactly what the materials of the meetings of the British Cabinet of March 15, 1939, which were first introduced into scientific use in this work, show. A.D. Chikvaidze gives an assessment of Chamberlain's sensational speech delivered in Birmingham that day, which is practically regarded by all Western historians as a "diplomatic revolution", which allegedly meant the departure of Great Britain from the policy of appeasement and the formation of a "new course" in British foreign policy aimed at countering fascist aggression. In fact, Chamberlain's speech, the author emphasizes, by no means marked the beginning of a new foreign policy course; it was a desperate attempt to save the cabinet, to stay in power. "The thread of British foreign policy continued to unravel in the same direction of connivance of aggression" (p.116).
However, as A.D. Chikvaidze shows, after the capture of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, certain changes took place in the foreign policy of England, which did not affect the essence of the policy of appeasement, but introduced some new nuances into it. Де-
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lo is that this and subsequent actions of Hitler indicated that Nazi Germany "decided to redraw the map of Europe alone, removing the Western states from it" (p. 255). It was this circumstance (and not the very fact of the capture of Czechoslovakia) that caused concern in London. Henceforth, the Chamberlain cabinet's hopes for a German war with the Soviet Union were mixed with a sense of dread about the possibility of a direct conflict with Hitler. Across the Channel, it was beginning to be understood that if Berlin did not already consider London, then in the future, as it grew stronger, it would pay even less attention to the "English factor" (pp. 121-122). Hence the changes in forms and methods (but not in the essence!) British foreign policy after March 15, 1939. "London," the author writes, "began to play a double game: on the one hand, it wanted to preserve freedom of action in the event of German aggression against the Soviet Union, and on the other, it sought to enlist the support of as many states as possible (not excluding the USSR) if the blow was directed to the West" (p.116). After March 15, 1939 London actually continued to push Nazi Germany East, but at the same time probed the ground for an agreement with the Soviet Union if Hitler decided to attack the Western powers first. "This," emphasizes A.D. Chikvaidze, "was the alpha and omega of British foreign policy after the capture of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, which can be traced right up to August 1939 and even up to the hour when Europe was plunged into the Second World War" (p.125).
A significant place in the work is given to the analysis of the" policy of providing guarantees " to a number of countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, conducted by the Chamberlain government, and the course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in the spring and summer of 1939. Using new documentary materials and relying on the results of research by Soviet historians, the author convincingly shows that the actions of the British cabinet during this period were not just a series of" blunders and mistakes", but a direct, albeit more hidden, continuation of the traditional political line-inciting Germany against the Soviet Union. "The Chamberlain government was not interested in creating collective security in Europe with the participation of the USSR, but only in talking about it in order to use it for political pressure on Hitler" (p.157). In particular, the author describes in detail the unworthy game of the British cabinet around German claims to the territory of Poland, its attempts to conclude a new agreement like the Munich agreement in order to avoid fulfilling its obligations to provide assistance to the latter. Only Hitler's intransigence prevented Chamberlain from achieving the "success" of his "peacemaking" mission, which, in his own words, he almost brought to an end, forcing the Poles to agree to transfer Danzig to Hitler as a precondition for negotiating other issues (p. 250).
In conclusion, the author raises the question: why did England at one time (March 31, 1939) still "provide guarantees to Poland at the very moment when Hitler seemed to have finally turned to the East"? Why did Great Britain later "enter the war after the German invasion of Poland"? After all, "if London wanted Fascist Germany to attack the Soviet Union, it could not have failed to know that the way to the Soviet border lay through Polish territory" (pp. 257-258). By providing guarantees to Poland and a number of other countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the spring of 1939, the Chamberlain government hoped to use them as a lever of political pressure on Hitler in order to encourage him to conclude a bilateral German-British agreement on the division of spheres of influence that would benefit the British ruling circles. If such an agreement was reached (negotiations on it were intensively conducted in deep secrecy in July - August 1939 in parallel with negotiations with the USSR), the British government was ready to withdraw its guarantees to Poland (pp. 152-157, 228-237). As for the situation that arose after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the actions of the British cabinet were explained by its desire to preserve for some time the unfavorable prospect of a war on two fronts for Hitler. "With the loss of Poland, the balance of power in Europe will change... it would have been completely broken in favor of fascist Germany, and Britain was by no means going to stand face to face with this dangerous enemy." At the same time, the author rightly notes that " London, as from-
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Obviously, he did not stop playing the double game even after the attack on Poland, was ready to sacrifice it, apparently counting on the fact that Hitler agreed to an agreement with the USSR only to lull Moscow's vigilance and deliver an unexpected blow to the Soviet Union " (p. 258).
And if the Anglo-German agreement was never concluded, if events took a turn contrary to the plans of the Chamberlain government, then the reason for this was rooted in the "significant divergence in goals" of London and Berlin. Although both capitals sought to crush the socialist state, they thought to achieve this in different ways. London wanted Hitler to fulfill the" general will "of Western" civilization "(that is, the bourgeois class) and, bogged down in the expanses of Russia, preserve the political balance in Europe that was beneficial for England; the Nazis at this stage sought complete domination of the European continent, with Britain excluded from solving any issues in this part of the world" (ibid.).
As a result of his analysis, A.D. Chikvaidze convincingly showed that the ruling circles of England (as well as France and the United States) did everything in their power to revive the German military machine and direct it against the USSR. "And of course, London, Paris, and Washington had nothing to do with the fact that this machine got out of their control and worked in a slightly different direction" (p.259). The ruling circles of England had to experience a heavy disappointment, and this was natural. "With its foreign policy, it not only failed to contain the process of losing influence, but also helped to accelerate it" (p.254). The policy of appeasement turned against its creators, but humanity had to pay a heavy price for this.
The monograph contains an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy strategy and specific actions of the British cabinet on the eve of World War II. The author introduced new documentary materials into scientific circulation and managed to draw a number of conclusions that clarify and develop the ideas that have developed in Marxist historical science about the role of British imperialism in unleashing the war and about the entire dynamics of events in the most critical period of the pre-war period. At the same time, A.D. Chikvaidze gave a strong critique of the concepts of bourgeois historians on these problems, including the latest works of English authors, who often interpret documentary materials in the spirit of traditional apologetic and anti-Soviet constructions of bourgeois historiography.
In all key points, the author's concept seems to be correct and raises no objections. At the same time, the book contains some inaccuracies in the assessment of the circumstances and motives of the actions of a number of prominent English figures of that period. Thus, it is hardly correct to think that Chamberlain, in pursuing a policy of appeasement, "proceeded from the classic formula of the English bourgeoisie, which was established by that time, according to which it is preferable to see German fascists in London than English communists" (p. 61). In the 30s of the XX century, the English bourgeoisie did not face such a choice, and the real the socio-political situation in the country hardly gave grounds for "formulas" of this type. A.D. Chikvaidze in this case does not refer to sources, but even if it is possible to find a corresponding "formula" in them, it should be regarded as a rhetorical exaggeration, and not as a reflection of the true views and fears of the British bourgeoisie and Chamberlain personally. And the author does not need such "formulas", because he was able to clearly and convincingly reveal the real motives that guided the actions of the British government.
The book does not always give a sufficiently clear description of the political qualities of Chamberlain and his ministers. A.D. Chikvaidze writes that in the pre-war events "nothing or almost nothing can be explained by the blindness of the British government. Downing Street knew exactly what they wanted and feared" (p. 105). At the same time, the work constantly emphasizes the political shortsightedness of the British cabinet and its then leader; the views of the latter are even contrasted with what "every sane person" saw in 1939 (p.140). Perhaps it should have been said more clearly that Chamberlain and his ministers, fully aware of the immediate consequences of their foreign policy actions (such as the inevitable death of Czechoslovakia after the Munich agreement), nevertheless failed to foresee their natural end result, which was very far from the goals they set for themselves.
The monograph repeatedly refers to W. Churchill, who acted as one of-
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it is known, with criticism of a number of actions of the Chamberlain government. This is well shown in the paper. It is hardly possible, however, to consider the author's idea that "Churchill did not at all deny the possibility of establishing a 'strong power' and, frankly, a fascist regime, if this would correspond to the interests of the ruling class and the British Empire so dear to his heart "(pp. 51-52). It seems to us that there are no sufficient grounds for raising the question of Churchill's motives and motives in this way.
Finally, the author admits an inaccuracy when he writes about "American interference in European affairs", barely covered by the "fig leaf of isolationism" (p. 64).
Isolationism was a very complex political phenomenon and acted primarily not as a demagogic cover, but as a kind of manifestation and form of appeasement policy in the American version. Therefore, it is hardly correct to contrast isolationism with "American intervention", that is, the role of US imperialism "in reviving an economically and then militarily strong Germany" (ibid.).
In conclusion, we once again note the value of A.D. Chikvaidze's research on one of the most important and topical problems of world history.
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