E. I. USTINOV

Candidate of Historical Sciences

Middle East, ethno-confessional factor Keywords: mechanisms of containment and provocation of ethno-confessional contradictions

When considering the reasons for the weakening and collapse of a number of authoritarian Middle Eastern states in the second decade of the 21st century, the role of mechanisms to contain interethnic and interfaith conflicts in these processes is of great interest. Why were they insufficient to ensure the sustainability of Middle Eastern societies? What is the role of external forces in disrupting the fragile ethno-religious balance in Arab countries?

The role of the ethno-confessional factor is growing among the socio - political and economic reasons that have led to drastic structural changes in the political landscape in the Middle East, namely: the increase in political instability, the change of individual leaders and ruling regimes, the destruction of statehood, and the tendency to redistribute resources in the region. The probability of religious and ethnic disintegration of Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, etc. increases.

ARAB EAST-A TESTING GROUND?

In recent decades, Arab States in the Middle East, authoritarian in nature and based on the leadership of certain ethno-confessional groups, have failed to develop a universal model of identity that is acceptable to their citizens regardless of their religious or ethnic affiliation. In seemingly integrated societies, the influence of tribal, communal, clan, and confessional structures on all spheres of life has not only been preserved, but also significantly increased.

Global processes of urbanization, expansion of communication opportunities and information flow, and development of world economic relations have allowed these religious groups in the Middle East region, previously excluded from the political process, to actively assert themselves and try to defend their interests on an equal basis with the dominant contingents. They demand their share of the national wealth, the return of the seized lands, the right to dispose of natural resources, and play a more significant role in the political life of the country. The above-mentioned factors, which seem to open the door to integration processes, simultaneously give a strong impetus to the development of ethnic and national identity, sharpen confessional feelings and strengthen the tendency to disintegration. In recent years, there has been an increase in the role of Islam in the sphere of political struggle, the strengthening of the position of representatives of the Shiite trend in Islam and their desire to take historical revenge in the confrontation with Sunnis. Christian influence in Arab societies is also weakening. Ethno-confessional groups, when defending their interests, resort to a forceful solution of the issue.

Fragmentation of the countries of the region seems to be becoming an effective way to redistribute spheres of influence between the world's leading players, who seek to ensure free access to regional energy resources, and, ultimately, their global superiority. It is obvious that stimulating and provoking inter-clan, inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts, as well as various separatist movements, play an important role in the arsenal of their foreign policy and security agencies.

The world's leading forces ' support of a particular ethno-confessional group in the context of the complex ethno-confessional structure of the Middle East states gives them the opportunity to penetrate into the internal problems of the region and manage their dynamics in their own interests. Independent experts believe that the Arab East is becoming a testing ground for ethno-political engineering projects.

ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL STRUCTURES OF THE REGION

The ethno-confessional map of the region has been formed for thousands of years as a result of complex processes of movement, fragmentation and merging of different peoples, and the disappearance of some of them.

and the appearance of others. Currently, the main ethnic groups in the region are Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Persians, Jews, Assyrians, and Tuaregs. In addition, the Middle East is home to diasporas of the Caucasus region (Circassians, Ingush, Armenians), immigrants from the African continent, etc.

The dominant position is occupied by representatives of Islam-Sunnis and Shiites with their numerous sects, schools, as well as groups such as Druze and Alawites. Among the representatives of the Christian faith in the region live: Copts, Greek Catholics, Maronites, Chaldeans, Syro-Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Orthodox, Nestorians, Jacobites, Armenian Gregorians, etc. A significant number of the region's residents practice Judaism.

Each ethnic and confessional group strives to acquire or maintain its own functional niche in society, which largely determines the type of activity of its representatives, the level of their material wealth, and social status. Each group has its own religious and cultural characteristics, ideas about history, political life, and economic development. All elements of the Middle Eastern society are interconnected and interact with the external environment. These relationships include legal, political, socio-economic, socio-cultural, ethno - and socio-psychological aspects.

Modern Middle Eastern society has such distinctive features as: the dominance of public and state property; the predominance of the state-communal form of farming; the preservation and predominance of clan, community, family, sect, and community structures. It is still characterized by persistent multiculturalism, the presence of longer inter-formational periods, civilizational heterogeneity, and the increased role of religion in society and the state.¹ Thus, Islam is the state religion in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Libya; Judaism is in Israel.

The ethno-confessional structures of the region have always sought internal stability, conservative stability, and only what corresponded to the community's interests was fixed in them. The community accepted only what was consistent with the norms of community ethics or tradition, collective, and not individual experience.

DOES "SOCIAL GLUE" WORK WELL?

The integration of ethno-confessional groups into modern society in terms of their external manifestations is slower and less effective in the Middle East. The idea of a "melting pot" is not confirmed here, according to which urbanization, intensive economic development, increased migration and contacts, active social, class and political processes in multiethnic countries open the way to overcoming the very problem of complex inter-community relations. Ethno-confessional problems do not depend directly on the pace and level of economic development, although there is an indirect dependence.

Small ethno-confessional groups, gaining experience of political activity, try to establish themselves as actors in a new political situation in a country or region. On the other hand, the very political struggle in which ethno-confessional groups have been drawn contributes to their cohesion and mobilization.

To understand the events taking place in the region, it is necessary to take into account that, despite the modernization processes and the deepening of the social and class stratification of the population, the traditional way of life has been preserved and is actively evolving there. The interests of the individual community prevail over the interests of the individual. The main interests - ensuring security, getting an education and getting a job - are realized by a person within their own group or community. For example, in the context of the difficult socio-economic situation in the Palestinian territories - the shortage of jobs, the scanty financial savings of the population-the local clan system contributes to the effective redistribution of total resources and income, which ultimately allows each family unit of the community to survive.² Therefore, a person perceives freedom not as personal, free from any prohibitions and restrictions, but as the freedom to use the opportunities and resources of the community in order to bring better living conditions to his community and, ultimately, to himself personally. The concept of justice can also be defined as: what is right is what will benefit the community, clan or clan, and this is generally different from the ideas of Western society.³

In the context of the destruction or decline in the functionality of the state and the low efficiency of law enforcement and public security structures in Iraq, Egypt, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, the struggle of clans, clans, communities, and religious groups for their interests often becomes the dominant factor in their unification, serving as a kind of "social glue".

Middle Eastern clans, communities, and diaspora groups, due to the peculiarities of collective psychology, perceive forced unilateral concessions on their part not as a reality of political struggle, but as an immediate threat to their own identity and, moreover, physical security, and can take the most radical measures to guarantee their well-being. Ethno-confessional groups are characterized by the desire to unite in the event of an external threat. And in the world, there is a tendency to conflict among themselves on various occasions, which is confirmed by the Arabic saying: "My brothers and I are against my cousin, my cousin and I are against a stranger."

When assessing the influence of the ethno-confessional factor on the development of the situation in the Middle East region, it is important to take into account,

that many ethno-confessional groups are going to create their own illegitimate security structures. For example, the security agencies of the Palestinian National Authority (PA) currently do not have a monopoly on the use of force in their territories. Some Palestinian families and clans contain armed groups in their structure, demonstrating in some cases a potential challenge to the security forces of the PA. The activities of such power groups are mainly aimed at protecting the economic interests of the clan, protecting its leaders. They cover up smuggling activities and contacts with Israeli criminal groups, kidnap journalists for ransom, or set up checkpoints to collect funds for travel through the territory of the clan. Such actions, although not a trend, were sometimes masked by Islamist slogans4.

Power groups of Palestinian clans are usually equipped with modern weapons, communications equipment and vehicles. The service of members of the Palestinian family in the personnel structure of the security forces of the PA allows the head of the clan to count on their access to weapons, as well as the fact that in case of emergency, the family can rely on additional armed potential in their person.

The presence of illegitimate security structures in the Palestinian environment, despite their effectiveness in resolving clan and clan conflicts, directly undermines the attempts of the PNA leaders to create a Palestinian state and in many cases is a serious destabilizing factor in the region.

Meanwhile, family ties among Palestinians have a certain influence on the system of formation of the security authorities of the Palestinian Authority. Nepotism in the PNA special services contributed to the fact that rivalry between clans was continued in the struggle of various security services of the autonomous region for influence on the chairman of the PNA and was one of the reasons for the inconsistency of the actions of the PNA security structures.⁵ Similar practices have been observed in Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Lebanon and other Arab countries.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFRONTATION

The complexity of the course of ethno-confessional processes in the Middle East can be perceived by a superficial analysis as a stagnation of Middle Eastern society, the absence of any development in its bowels. To a certain extent, this was true, since the region's polyethnic nature dictated the need to create complex mechanisms for maintaining ethno-political stability, cumbersome systems for curbing the ambitions of individual ethnic minorities and diaspora groups. Systems for resolving disagreements and conflicts of interest were largely rigid and inflexible. Making any adjustments to them is, on the one hand, painfully perceived by participants in regional ethnopolitical processes, and on the other, it can seriously destabilize interethnic communications, the algorithm of which has been formed for centuries and has proven its ability to stabilize relations between the dominant ethnic groups, ethnic minorities and diasporas.

The complexity and multi-dimensionality of interethnic communication in the Middle East has always been fraught with the danger of rapid and profound social destabilization and the sudden revival of long-standing contradictions. Ethnic and confessional conflicts in the region are based on both modern and historical causes. Their deep origins are connected with inter-communal socio-economic inequality, the peculiarities of contacts between numerous groups of different cultures in the past. An acute conflict situation can result in even minimal changes in established interethnic relations. Ethno-confessional confrontation begins in conditions when representatives of various clans, communities, clans, and diasporas begin to grossly violate or penetrate each other's vital spheres. There is competition for the same types of resources and sources of income: land, trade, entrepreneurship, jobs in the state apparatus, elected positions, etc. - up to control over the state itself, i.e. to political power.

A striking example is the situation in Syria, where interfaith balance in the country was managed to be ensured mainly by force. The root of the problem is the fact that the multi-million-strong country, where 74% of the population is Sunni, is ruled by the Numailatiya clan headed by B. Asad from the Matawira tribe of the Alawite (Nusayrit) community, which accounts for about 7.5% of the population.⁶ The principle of distributing the highest positions in the party and state apparatus in the country, including the army and special services, in favor of Alawites, along with other socio-political reasons, caused representatives of other significant faiths to be extremely dissatisfied with the existing regime. As a result, a long-simmering conflict based on ethnic and confessional contradictions is transformed from partisan actions into a civil war.

In this regard, the situation is no less dramatic in the Arab countries of the African continent, for example, Sudan, which is characterized by a complex ethnic and religious characteristic, where only the number of tribes reaches 570 people. An analysis of recent armed conflicts in South Sudan shows that their essence lies not in the different cultural traditions and moral attitudes of numerous tribes, but in the procedure for distributing natural resources and income from their sale among tribal leaders, which does not meet their expectations. Temporary family, tribal and other alliances are formed in disputes over access to water, oil and pasture, and this is not always the case

members of a single ethnic group. Violence has spread to all sectors of society, including women, children and the elderly.

Ethnic and confessional conflicts are more likely to arise when new minority political leaders appear who are able to seek a greater share of political power in the center and some form of autonomy at the local level. They are ready to dissolve their former ideological and political alliances, questioning the legitimacy of the existing system of States, defending the right to self-determination of a minority as an equal member of the international political system.

Changes in the ethno-demographic situation in the region due to migration processes or differences in the growth rates of individual groups, which disrupt the existing system of stratification and ethnic division of labor, also lead to an aggravation of intergroup rivalry. The acceleration of socio-economic development, especially in the early stages of industrialization, increases rather than weakens ethnic particularism, exacerbating competition for resources and the distribution of benefits and privileges.⁸

It is important to pay attention to the practice and individual internal political steps used by the Arab authorities to try to level ethnic and religious contradictions. Under authoritarian regimes, stability was achieved by implementing measures such as identifying the interests of the dominant ethno-confessional group and the state (Syria, Bahrain); forcing the assimilation of minorities, especially linguistic ones, such as Berbers in Libya and Algeria; mechanical displacement of the population (relocation of Arabs to the Kirkuk area in Iraq); the introduction of virtually one-party systems (the Party of Arab States). Baath in Syria and Iraq); ban on the activities of ethno-political or confessional organizations (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt); education of minorities in the spirit of state patriotism.

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE

However, these measures not only failed to eliminate the causes of ethno-confessional contradictions and disagreements in the Middle East, but in 2011 led to the opening of inter-ethnic and especially inter-confessional conflicts, outbreaks of mass violence, and the aggravation of separatist sentiments, which pose a threat to the stability of the political system and the territorial integrity of States.

As a result, the growing role of Islam in the sphere of political struggle has become a steady trend. This is confirmed by the successful activity of the moderate Turkish pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP), the victory of the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas in the parliamentary elections in 2006, and the transformation of the Lebanese radical Shiite movement Hezbollah into a full-fledged political party. The latter managed to win a significant share of seats in the country's parliament in the 2005 elections in the Amal bloc, as well as winning all municipal elections in Shiite areas south of Beirut. Its representatives also joined the Lebanese Government.

Representatives of political Islam also managed to achieve serious success in Egypt, which is due to the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the elections to the lower house of the Egyptian Parliament (People's Assembly) and their representative M. Mourey as President of Egypt. These achievements are likely to allow Islamists to determine the country's future development path and create its laws, including a new constitution.⁹ Egyptian President Morsi, as the first tactical steps to build his own strategy, has already dismissed the entire former military leadership, headed by the Minister of Defense and the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, and made attempts to control the press. To this end, former directors and editors-in-chief of a number of leading publications were replaced in Cairo with new ones from among like-minded people. In addition, the most significant circumstance is the desire of the new Egyptian president to concentrate the levers of legislative and executive power in his hands, thereby expanding the possibilities of Islamists for large-scale political maneuvering in the future.

No less significant direction of ethno - confessional development of the region is the strengthening of the positions of representatives of the Shiite trend in Islam. The impetus for this was the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 by the forces of the Western coalition led by the United States. The balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites has shifted in favor of Shiites. The political system formed in the country, based on the mechanical transfer of the principles of Western democracy to Iraqi soil, allowed Shiites, who make up more than 60% of the population, to take a dominant position in the political arena. This resulted in an increase in Iran's information and material support for Shiite movements in the region. There has been a strengthening of the position of Shiites in Lebanon and, above all, the Hezbollah movement, which has become for the Lebanese a kind of symbol of the ability of the Arabs to successfully resist Israel.

Shiites actively defended their rights in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. The most acute struggle of Shiites for access to power structures was observed in Bahrain, where representatives of this branch of Islam make up 70% of the country's population, and their parties were effectively banned from participating in parliamentary elections.

Recently, the threat of the spread of separatist sentiments by Shiite communities in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, especially in some provinces where 90% and 50% of the population is Shiite, has forced the leadership of these countries to resort to harsh repressive measures against the opposition, including arrests of activists, dispersal of demonstrations, etc.

It is characteristic that the alliance of Western countries stubbornly ignored

consideration of the topic of Shiite unrest in the friendly Arab countries of the Persian Gulf in the international arena and in the media. This situation is undoubtedly due to the strategic alliance of the United States and Great Britain with the states of the Persian Gulf and, first of all, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The West deliberately suppressed the facts of extrajudicial arrests of Shiites, their dismissal from government posts, boycotting their businesses, damaging mosques, and conducting a secret campaign to naturalize Sunnis from other Gulf countries and grant them Bahraini citizenship.¹⁰

ETHNIC AND CONFESSIONAL MINORITIES

Among the most significant trends in the ethno-confessional development of the Middle East region, we should also highlight the weakening of the position of representatives of Christianity. On the one hand, the share of Christians in the population of Arab countries has begun to decline due to the higher birth rate of Muslims and the continued conversion of some Christians to Islam. On the other hand, experts note an increase in the number of Christians leaving Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and the PA for the United States and Western European countries due to the extremely negative atmosphere that is developing around them. Fears in Christian communities across the region have been heightened by increasing threats of sectarian violence, kidnappings of their representatives for ransom, murders, and the destruction of churches and their property.

In general, hostility to Christians is due to the general tension prevailing in the region. However, violence against Christians can also be attributed to the desire of radical Islamists to limit their ability to participate in parliamentary elections and, thus, to limit the potential to protect and defend group and community economic interests.

At the same time, it is known that the standard of living of Christians is somewhat higher than that of Muslims. Representatives of the Christian minority, thanks to their traditional desire for education, hard work and group solidarity, have gained strong positions in business, achieved material prosperity, and occupied prominent positions in local law enforcement agencies, the army, and the administrative apparatus. The situation around Christian communities is aggravated when Salafists threaten to restore the collection of jizya, a poll tax levied on all non-Muslims, including Christians. The introduction of a special tax for non-Muslims is perceived, for example, by Islamists as a natural step towards the formation of a new Egyptian legislation based entirely on Islamic law. As a result, the optimism that emerged after the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" associated with the hopes of improving the situation of ethnic and religious minorities is being extinguished in Arab countries. In the future, the issue of protecting and preserving political and economic positions, as well as the status of full citizens of their countries, is becoming increasingly acute for Christian communities.

EXTERNAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TOOLS

Speaking about the role of external forces, it is important to emphasize that they do not so much create interethnic and inter-confessional conflicts involving clan, community, and diaspora structures, but rather use existing "frozen" contradictions and disagreements to "melt" and apply them. The only question is what are the ultimate goals of aggravating the situation, as well as what forces, means, methods and to what level of conflict these contradictions will be stimulated and provoked.

An analysis of a series of anti-state protests and coups in 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa shows that, despite the external spontaneity of these processes, there are elements of external governance. This is indicated by the phasing and clearly defined organizational components of the management of current events.

The transformation of political regimes followed a single pattern: unrest in North Africa and the Middle East began suddenly. Economic, social, and political difficulties accumulated within societies, as well as unresolved issues of individual ethno-confessional groups in achieving autonomy or sovereignty, access to power in the center, use of natural resources, and opportunities for enlightenment and education contributed to a sharp aggravation of conflict situations.

External forces - the United States and Western European countries-took into account and actively used the fact that power in many Arab countries is clan-based and largely bureaucratic. The real ideology in most Arab countries was the cult of personality or the authority of the head of state, and its essence was reduced to the apologetics of stability. The local elite has closely intertwined their economic interests with the interests of Western commercial structures, and to a certain extent, the influence of Western liberal values has increased among educated youth. In recent years, pro-Western non-governmental organizations and mass media have dramatically increased their activity in the region. Relative, rather than absolute, well-being played a crucial role in disrupting apparent stability: in most Arab countries, there was a significant gap between expectations of wealth growth and reality, and social inequality reached dramatic levels.

On May 19, 2011, the US President announced a new concept regarding US policy in the Middle East in the near future ¹¹. In exchange for the Arab countries ' consent to carry out radical reforms, American economic assistance is offered. It involves the mobilization of efforts

international financial institutions (including the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), write-off and restructuring of public debts, as well as support for universities, research centers and civil society institutions. Thus, the essence of the American approach is once again reduced to imposing political and economic reforms on Arab countries according to their own "recipe".

The West used network-centric warfare technologies as a tool for using ethnic and religious contradictions to destabilize the situation in Arab countries.¹² American control provided training and funding to organizers of protest actions in Arab countries for several years before they began.

Western foreign policy agencies and news agencies assumed the role of supreme arbiter over the "revolutionary" process, declared only the actions of the opposition legitimate, even if it violated the law, and declared illegitimate measures taken by the authorities to protect themselves.¹³ As a result, the destruction of the leader's image by information attacks led to the collapse of the traditional value system.

At this historical stage, the West is carrying out a superstructure-level transformation in the countries of the Arab East that does not affect the basis of society. Technologies of network-centric and network wars are used, taking into account the existing ethno-confessional contradictions and disagreements, economic, social and political prerequisites.

The purpose of this influence is to weaken and chaotize the countries of the region, aimed at preparing them for their subsequent use in the big geopolitical game. The transformation of authoritarian regimes in the Arab states as a result of such an impact can lead to fragmented societies, divided into opposing ethno-confessional groups, led by weak new authorities, including those with a destroyed system of security and law enforcement agencies.

LESSONS FOR TOMORROW

Summing up the above, we outline the following stable trends in the ethno-confessional development of the Middle East region at the present stage:

The first is the growing role of Islam in the political struggle;

the second is the strengthening of Shiite positions in Islam and the desire of their representatives to take revenge in the confrontation with Sunnis;

The third is the weakening of Christian influence in Arab societies;

the fourth is the desire of ethno-confessional groups to resolve the issue of protecting their interests by force, including by creating their own illegitimate security structures;

The fifth is the active provocation and stimulation by Western countries of local ethno-confessional contradictions in their own interests.

* * *

A long-term settlement of interethnic and interfaith conflicts in the Middle East region, which can ensure the deepening of socio-political integration of a multiethnic society, the adoption of common political values and the formation of a similar political culture, can be achieved by constitutional protection and protection of the interests and rights of all ethno-confessional groups, the redistribution of resources and benefits in favor of backward ethnoregions. But the most important thing is to work on ways to enable minorities to participate as real partners in political and economic decision-making. These measures would increase the likelihood of mutual adaptation and accommodation of ethno-confessional interests.

The Middle East traditionally occupies an important place in the system of Russian national interests. Threats to the security of our country related to the spread of religious radicalism, extremism, terrorism and separatism often originate in this region. As a rule, these negative manifestations are the result of unresolved local ethno-confessional contradictions.

Finding out the true causes of ethno-confessional conflict situations in Arab countries, the forms and methods of activity of their participants, the role of external forces, as well as the degree of influence of these factors on Russian reality makes it possible to form an idea of events in the Middle East and helps to defend our interests and strengthen our positions there.

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² Interethnic conflicts in the countries of the foreign East / Edited by A. A. Prazauskas. M, Science. 1991, pp. 33-34.

^{Mapoilo A.} 3 "Date revolutions": elements or "controlled chaos" / / Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 2011, N 5.

^{Ryabov P. P.} 4 The situation in Bahrain: An Analytical Review, Moscow, Institute of the Middle East, 2011 - http://www.nmes. ru/rus/stat/2011/09 - 10 - 11b.htm

^{Glenn E. Robinson.} 5 Palestinian Tribes, Clans and Notable Families - http://www.nps. edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/Onl ineJournal/2008/Sep/robinsonSep08.htmI

⁶ Structural ethno confessional maps of the Middle East countries http://www.joshuaproject.net/countries.php? rog3=IZ

⁷ Sudan. Encyclopedia of countries of the world. Economics, Moscow, 2004, p. 795.

⁸ Inside Gaza: the challenge of clans and families // Crisis Group Middle East Report, N 71, December 20, 2007, p. 3.

⁹ Muslim Brotherhood tops Egyptian poll result // Aljazeera. January 22, 2012 -http://www.aljazeera.eom/news/middleeast/2 012/01/2012121125958580264.html

^{Nixon R.} 10 U.S. Groups Helped Nurture Arab Uprisings // The New York Times. April 14,2011.

¹¹ Barack Obama: "Remarks at the Department of State", May 19, 2011 -http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.ph p?pid=90397&st=&stl=#axzzluYmQFgGl

¹² Na voine ne kak na voine [Na voine ne kak na voine] / / Itogi, No. 17, 23.04.2012 - www.itogi.ru/exclus/ 2012/17/176984.html

¹³ Planning considerations for international involvement in the Palestinian security sector. 2005, p. 46 - 47 - www.strategic-assessments.org

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