G. V. SHUBIN, Candidate of Historical Sciences Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Muammar Gaddafi Keywords:, revolution in Libya, military equipment, multiple launch rocket systems, Arab countries

Dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been written about the 2011 Libyan civil war in hot pursuit. Their authors are divided into praising the "victorious rebels who defeated the usurper" and cursing the "bandits who came to power, overthrew the legitimate leader of the country Muammar Gaddafi by the hands of Western European and Arab" soldiers of fortune"with the support of NATO air and ground special units."

Some experts "dig deeper" and describe not only the events that have taken place and their causes - in particular, the poverty of the population of the oil-rich east of the country and the hatred of young people for the ruler who has been bored for more than 40 years, but also the current sluggish civil war and the increasingly clear fragmentation of Libya into small fragments. Many of them pay attention to the huge number of mercenaries from different countries* from both warring parties who participated in the already completed first phase of the civil war, as well as the spread of the conflict to neighboring states - first of all, this refers to the Tuareg uprising in Mali and the creation of a de facto independent state there.

Very few attempt to draw any conclusions from these events about the nature of the military actions and the effectiveness of the various types of weapons used by the parties. But they are often very superficial.

THERE WAS NO" TOYOTA WAR"

It is claimed that in this case there was a "Toyota war "(similar to the "Toyota war" (1986-1987) between Chad and Libya), which once again showed that battles can be won through the active use of heavy machine guns, rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns and old recoilless guns installed on"tech"cars.

The "techies" were first used by POLISARIO partisans in Western Sahara in the mid-1970s. in battles with the armies of Morocco and Mauritania, when an old Soviet rapid-firing four-barrel rocket launcher "ZPU-4" of 14.5 mm caliber was mounted on a jeep. But they only borrowed the tactics of the British special units in North Africa, which, fighting with the troops of fascist Italy, for long-range raids on airfields and fuel depots from 1941 to 1943, used three-axle off-road trucks with heavy 12.7 mm machine guns installed on them, and later jeeps with two 7.71 mm machine guns. However, this tactic was also based on the experience of the First World War of 1914-1918 and the Russian Civil War, and even on earlier experience-the time of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917, when machine guns were placed on roomy staff cars.

Today, the "tech" is the main combat unit of partisan armed groups that conduct surprise raids or fight for independence (like the Tuaregs in Mali). In the desert and semi-desert areas in North-East and North-West Africa and the Horn of Africa, old trucks, SUVs, minibuses and high-terrain buses are used as "technicians". They are equipped with ka machine guns-

* Russian Arabists, just a month after the start of the uprising in eastern Libya in 2011, analyzed numerous television interviews with "rebels" and concluded that more than 89% of them are Arabs, but not Libyan.

7.62 mm calibre and 12.7 mm heavy machine guns or 14.5 mm heavy machine guns. Sometimes, instead of heavy machine guns, rapid-fire twin Zu - 23-2 anti-aircraft guns of 23 mm caliber are installed.

Often, the "techies" are hung with a variety of weapons, ranging from anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGMs), unguided rocket shells (NUR-Sov), anti-zenith missile systems( MANPADS), rapid-fire artillery guns, mortars, belt grenade launchers and "recoilless" (recoilless artillery guns) to multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (known as "Katyusha") and light artillery pieces of various calibers.

Many foreign and domestic military specialists and experts consider the " techies "to be quite effective in combat conditions, low - invulnerable high-speed vehicles-a kind of" force multiplier " that can withstand not only infantry, but also lightly armored vehicles. In fact, the tracked "Shilka" ("ZSU-23 - 4") (four barrels of a 23 mm rapid-fire air defense gun) is capable of destroying or scattering dozens of "technicals" at a distance of more than two kilometers in a short period of time.

Other effective weapons (except attack helicopters and shilok missiles) - now obsolete anti-aircraft rapid-fire guns, including paired ones, of the caliber of 20, 23, 25, 30, 35, 37, 40 and 57 mm. Often they are equipped with self-made metal shields and installed on armored vehicles or on improvised self-made armored vehicles (on the chassis of off-road trucks, heavy jeeps or off-road buses) and are able to quickly "crumble" or disperse large detachments of "techies".

All of the above is true in principle, but the events in Libya cannot be called a" war of "technicals". Libyans - supporters of Gaddafi-almost did not use against the enemy either "shilki" or "technicals" equipped with "shilki", rapid-fire artillery guns, multiple launch rocket systems due to the active opposition of NATO aircraft to such tactics.

AVIATION CAN DO A LOT. BUT NOT ALL OF THEM

Another conclusion that is difficult to agree with is that the war can be won through the widespread use of aviation - mainly fighter-bombers and attack helicopters. After all, it is simply pointless to use tanks and self-propelled artillery units (self-propelled guns) with the advantage of the enemy in aviation.

In Libya, up to 2.2 thousand people were in service (mainly in reserve). tanks and up to 2 thousand armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers. However, independent Russian experts estimate that Gaddafi's supporters lost no more than 190 tanks, mostly T-72s, and more than half of them were disabled not from air strikes, but from ground fire.

However, pictures of 9 burnt-out tanks were published, and it was claimed that all of them were destroyed as a result of air strikes from fighter-bombers or from attack helicopters. However, according to experts, only one tank was hit from the air, and the rest were abandoned by the crews and then burned by the "rebels". According to official reports, another 250 Libyan tanks were destroyed by NATO aircraft, but there was no confirmation of this, at least on the Internet. Most likely, these tanks are simple... they were not, and they did not participate in military operations at all.

Experts have concluded that official reports of successful NATO air strikes on ground targets in Libya are almost three times exaggerated. The North Atlantic Alliance also acknowledged this, claiming, however, that NATO aircraft disabled more than 500 units of armored vehicles of the Gaddafi regime. But is it worth being proud of such results after more than 29 thousand combat and reconnaissance sorties of military aircraft? Moreover, even if we are guided by official reports, the Gaddafi regime lost less than 10% of all armored vehicles and less than 8% of all heavy weapons in the course of military operations.

Russian experts also drew attention to the fact that the losses of armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and armored vehicles, as well as Soviet multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) BM-21 ("Grad"), Czechoslovak multiple launch rocket systems RM-70 and towed artillery (D-30 and M-46) were several times higher. many times less than the losses of tanks and self-propelled artillery units (Soviet "Hyacinth", Italian "Palmaria" and Czechoslovak "Dana"), which surprised the professional military, since in heavy ground battles everything usually happens exactly the opposite.

It seems that light Libyan armored vehicles, trailed artillery and MLRS managed to hide from air strikes, and the Libyans often simply abandoned tanks and self-propelled guns on the battlefield due to malfunctions or lack of diesel fuel.

The French media enthusiastically described how their combat sa-

Rafale fighter jets-from a high altitude* and from a distance of 10 km destroyed two Libyan tanks with guided missiles. However, Russian experts from aerial reconnaissance images determined that these tanks, firstly, were simply abandoned by the crews, and, secondly, they were T-62 tanks, the production of which was completed in the USSR in 1975, i.e. tanks of long-outdated models.

By the way, the Libyan military could easily shoot down the Rafali if they used mobile Kvadrat air defense systems with a missile range of up to 22 km and up to 12 thousand meters in height, which are capable, although at the limit of their capabilities, but still "reach" enemy aircraft. Russian military experts do not understand why they did not do this.

LESSONS FOR THOSE WHO STILL HAVE TO FIGHT

It is difficult to understand why both belligerents widely used "secondary use" of machine guns removed from armored vehicles damaged in battles or unguided rocket projectiles removed from damaged or incapacitated helicopters and combat aircraft, as well as launchers from the BM-21 and RM-70 multiple launch rocket systems. In any case, there was no particular need for it.

Often, the launchers from the Katyushas, which were knocked out in the engine or in the cabin, were simply moved to other trucks, as well as to any available equipment, including Toyota and Nissan SUVs, which are very common in Arab countries.

The experience of the Libyan civil war has shown that without tanks and self-propelled artillery units, as well as multiple launch rocket systems and long-range trailed artillery, it is impossible to capture heavily fortified positions and cities prepared for a long siege. In addition, the chances of success in a military confrontation are significantly increased due to the use of mobile air defense systems with a range of missiles at an altitude of more than 12 thousand kilometers. m and at least 25 km horizontally. With their help, you can destroy even old, but still combat-ready jet fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships that remain in service with the armies of many African countries.

It also turned out that modern combat aircraft of Western European countries are not very effective in the fight against both long-range (with a range of several hundred kilometers) mobile air defense systems, as well as small-and medium-range mobile systems (up to 50 km), as well as short-range missile and gun systems (up to 20 km). km).

Sea-based cruise missiles are effective only when firing at outdated stationary (fixed) "long-range "S-200 Vega air defense systems. But they were in service in Africa only in Libya, and half of them, stationed in the west of the country, were captured by the rebels at the very beginning of the civil war. The remaining Libyans did not dare to be the first to use AWACS (long-range radar detection aircraft) and tanker aircraft, since they were quickly destroyed or disabled by American cruise missiles.

The outcome of the war against Gaddafi was significantly affected by the lack of modern anti-ship missiles with a range of up to 300 km. In the interests of security, it is absolutely necessary to have such missiles in the arsenal of any country rich in fuel and energy resources.

Strange as it may seem, during the civil war, Libya lost only a small part of the weapons it had at that time. In particular, only about 200 - 220 tanks and self-propelled artillery units.

In other words, up to 1,900 tanks (armed with 100, 115 and 125 mm guns), up to 300 self-propelled artillery units (122, 152 and 155 mm calibres), up to 500 artillery pieces (105, 122, 130,152 and 155 mm calibres) are currently in service with the country that is splitting into parts. up to 300 multiple launch rocket systems (not counting BM-21 MLRS and 152 mm wheeled howitzers "Dana"), and up to 400 towed multiple launch rocket systems, up to 200 "shilok" (23 mm caliber), up to 100 rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns (23, 57 and 100 mm caliber), hundreds of large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns (caliber 12.7 and 14.5 mm) and recoilless artillery pieces (caliber 105, 106 and 107 mm), up to 2 thousand grenade launchers, and up to 1.8 thousand armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and combat reconnaissance and patrol vehicles) in varying degrees of combat readiness (some of them have already been "pulled apart" to neighboring countries).

Such stocks of military equipment (with well-organized supplies of spare parts and ammunition) will last for many months of constant combat operations.

* With tens of thousands of Strela-2M and Igla-1 MANPADS in service, the OSA-AKM mobile wheeled air defense system, and the Strela-10 tracked mobile air defense system, Libya has long prevented NATO aircraft from flying at altitudes below 5,000 feet. m and deliver targeted strikes.

Permanent link to this publication: