In 1901, the English financier d'Arcy received a concession to develop oil in Iran. This was the beginning of the largest oil monopoly, British Petroleum Co., one of the seven multinational corporations currently operating in the capitalist world for the trade, production and processing of oil. As the English historian J. R. R. Tolkien rightly pointed out. Jones, the early history of the oil business, including the history of British oil companies, is surrounded by myths, and much remains unclear to this day1 . Jones himself and another English historian, R. Ferrier, have recently published studies on this issue. Although none of them are sensational and not all of the authors ' conclusions can be accepted, the first documentary material they used in the archives of British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell, as well as British government departments and private archives, sheds additional light on the backstage history of the d'Arcy concession 2 .

Attention to the history of the oil business is also connected with the strengthening of imperialist expansion in the Middle East, the origins of which go back to the time when the d'Arcy concession was obtained. Neither then nor later was there any doubt that the British enterprise, along with its economic goals - the development of the oil deposits of Persia, as Iran was then more often called-set political goals that corresponded to the colonial ambitions of England, its desire to establish its dominance over a strategically important area of the Middle East. Everything we know about this concession and the subsequent creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, formed on the eve of the First World War, clearly demonstrates the military-political nature of this action. The British concession, and later the oil company in Iran, was a step towards preparing England for World War II.

As early as the end of the 19th century, the British Admiralty showed interest in the" fuel re-equipment " of the Navy. However, the first experiments on replacing coal-fired engines with oil ones were not successful. Unsatisfactory results of these experiments led to the fact that in the middle of 1901 it was decided to abandon the use of oil fuel for the fleet. Nevertheless, under the influence of the fact of the growing use of oil by naval vessels of other countries, the Admiralty also returned to this issue in 1901. As the First Lord of the Admiralty, Selborne, pointed out in January 1902, the renewed experiments were "extremely important." 3 When discussing the issue of converting the fleet to oil, there were not only engineering difficulties. The Commission noted the weakness of the British position in the oil industry, the lack of reliable sources of oil supply. The desire to take over the oil fields was the most important motive for the d'Arcy concession. On the other hand, the British enterprise in Iran was from the very beginning under the care of the Foreign Office, as the diplomatic service tried in every possible way to strengthen the influence of England there .4
In 1900, an English expedition was equipped to explore oil fields on the Iranian-Turkish border. The results obtained were blah-

1 Jones G. The State and Emergence of the British Oil Industry. Lnd. 1981, p. IX.

2 Ibid.; Ferrier R. The History of the British Petroleum Company. Lnd. 1982.

3 Jones G. Op. cit., p. 10.

4 Hardinge A. A Diplomatist in the East. Lnd. 1928, p. 280.

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This was the immediate reason for the concession negotiations. They were conducted in Paris and London with the assistance of the Director of the Customs Administration of Iran A. Kitabji Khan. In the English capital, the Persian dignitary met W. Knox d'Arcy, a wealthy capitalist who had made a large fortune in gold mining in Australia. Their meetings culminated in a preliminary agreement to grant d'Arcy a concession for oil exploration and production in Iran, provided the deal gets the Shah's approval. For this Kitabji Khan was paid 4 thousand pounds, and in case of successful completion of negotiations, he was promised another 7% of the total amount of the transaction and plus 10% of the shares of the future British oil company in personal ownership .5 To work out the final treaty, d'Arcy sent his secretary A. L. Marriott to Tehran, who received official diplomatic support. Jones claims that Marriott only had the help of British representatives "on the spot", while the Foreign Office declined to provide support .6 However, in fact, even before sending the Marriott to Tehran, d'Arcie asked the Government to direct the British envoy to provide the necessary assistance, and this request was granted. Marriott was carrying with him an order from the Foreign Office to "provide him with such assistance as he may request" so that the envoy would" properly " contribute to "the fulfilment of the objectives of his mission" .7 Immediately after arriving in Teheran, on April 17, 1901, Marriott paid a visit to Ambassador A. Harding, who gave him full support.

The negotiations were not easy. To get the Shah's approval, it was necessary to appease a lot of people from his entourage. On May 12, 1901, Harding informed the British Foreign Secretary, H. C. Lansdowne, that Kitabji Khan was acting "in the most thorough manner", ensuring the support of "all the Shah's chief ministers and courtiers, not even forgetting the personal servant who brings his Majesty a pipe and morning coffee." 8 Five thousand pounds were allocated for this purpose, and when it was found that they were not enough, d'Arcy ordered to double the amount of the bribe, and Marriott gave Kitabji Khan another five thousand. On this occasion, in his diary, Marriott noted:: "The extra £ 5,000 was very useful." They were intended for the Iranian Prime Minister Amin al-Sultan. By extorting money from the British, the Persian authorities referred to the fact that the treaty could cause dissatisfaction with other powers. Marriott wrote that, as he understood "from hints", the Shah himself "would like to receive some amount in cash" and "waited until the concession was signed". According to the draft, he was entitled to a reward after signing the contract, but the shah wanted to get 9 in advance .

British representatives demanded an immediate conclusion of the contract. With the support of official diplomacy, they succeeded in signing the treaty on May 28, 1901. D'Arcy received the rights to explore, produce, transport and sell oil for a period of 60 years. In payment for the concession, he was to give the Shah 20 thousand pounds in cash and the same amount in shares of the oil company, which was to be organized no later than two years later. This company was supposed to pay 16% of the profits to the Persian treasury annually. Exactly two years later, on May 21, 1903, d'Arcy formed First Exploitation Co., which took over the British oil project in Iran .10 Exploration work began before the company was formed. We delivered the equipment and started drilling. By the end of 1903, the total amount of d'Arcy's expenses was 160 thousand pounds sterling. However, we did not get any tangible results, and there were financial difficulties. In July 1903, in a letter to his assistant, J. R. R. Tolkien, Jenkins d'Arcy noted that he would like to have an idea of the prospects for exploration, because "every wallet has its limits", and he knows "the limits of the actual market" very well.-

5 Ferrier K. Op. cit., p. 32.

6 Jones G. Op. cit., p. 131.

7 Ferrier R. Op. cit., p. 33.

8 Ibid., p. 36.

9 Ibid., p. 39.

10 Ibid.

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go wallet"11 . While being treated in Carlsbad, d'Arcy met Admiral J. Fischer, who had come on vacation, who was obsessed with the idea of converting the British fleet to oil fuel. They immediately found a common language. The Admiral, who had developed a reputation as an" oil maniac, " was so interested in d'Arcy's venture that he joked about whether he should go to Iran instead of returning to the Royal Navy base in Portsmouth after his vacation.

Although even before meeting Fischer, the Admiralty's interest in solving the problem of oil supply to England was obvious, the meeting in Carlsbad was the impetus for d'Arcy to apply for financial assistance from the British government, counting on the support of the Admiralty. At the end of 1903, he submitted a corresponding petition, indicating the required amount-120 thousand pounds sterling. But this request was not granted. D'Arcy then called the company's board together, warning them that he had exhausted his resources and was forced to seek outside financial support. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain a loan from the English bank "Joseph Lyons & Co." d'Arcy entered into negotiations with the Paris Rothschilds. He met with Baron Alphonse and Jules Aron, and in February 1904 negotiated with them on the French Riviera, but was unsuccessful. Again he turned to British financiers, this time to E. Cassel, a friend of King Edward VII, and also in vain 12 . He even probed the Americans. But he was given to understand that "nothing can be done until the oil is discovered." 13
Based on these facts, Western literature has created a myth that the "great Martyr" d'Arcy had to spend a life of severe deprivation, constantly begging for money from bankers to make ends meet. One of these books described how for two decades d'Arcy wandered around Iran, kneeling in prayer every evening in front of a crucifix attached to a tent pole. "A shriveled man with a face burned by the sun of the Persian deserts," wrote the author of this book, " worn out, but still believing in God and his idea, d'Arcy again and again offered up the Lord's prayer, continuing to search. From time to time, he came to England to extract new funds from those who financed him. They looked at him like he was an idiot. Every visit to London was humiliating for the old man. " 14 There is not a word of truth in this story. Anyone who takes a portrait of d'Arcy will easily see that his appearance is by no means ascetic. On the contrary, a prosperous self-satisfied person. Above all, d'Arcy had never been to Iran, and no one considered him a mad fanatic. It is true that he invested considerable personal resources in the Persian enterprise, but the British government always came to his aid in times of need.

So it was in 1904. Although the British government refused to allocate money to d'Arcy, it was eager to find funds to continue the work. The Foreign Office sent a message to the British Governor in India, Lord Curzon, asking him to take measures to prevent the d'Arcy company from passing into the hands of foreigners. The colonial rulers of India represented at that time the most aggressive force of the British ruling elite. According to one of the most knowledgeable Russian diplomats in the Middle East, Consul in Baghdad A. F. Kruglov, the d'Arcy enterprise was created "with the secret participation of the Indian government." Therefore, the appeal to Curzon was not accidental 15 . The Commission to study the possibility of expanding British oil holdings, headed by the civil Lord of the Admiralty, E. J. Pretyman, was actively involved in the search for a creditor for d'Arcy. It was composed of expert geologist B. Redwood, who supported

11 Ibid., p. 59.

12 Ibid., pp. 60 - 62.

13 Longhurst H. Adventure in Oil. The Story of British Petroleum. Lnd 1959, p. 23.

14 Zischka A. La Guerre secrete pour le petrole. P. 1933, pp. 15 - 16.

15 Archive of Foreign Policy of Russia of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (AVPR), F. Persian table, op. 1, d. 4169, l. 27, report of February 14 (27), 1902.

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He had a close relationship with d'Arcy and was the highest authority in oil affairs. The Admiralty Commission recommended that Burma Oil, which was a counterparty to the British government, provide monetary support to the British enterprise in Iran. In May 1905, with the participation of this company, a "Concession Syndicate" was formed, which allocated funds for the continuation of exploration work in Iran. So, four years after receiving the concession, and this time with the active support of the British government, funds were found to save the d'Arcy enterprise, which was on the verge of financial collapse.

The company's executives feared that the agreement with Burma Oil might cause difficulties for their subsequent operations. Therefore, following the creation of the" Concession Syndicate", they appealed to the British government to provide the necessary support in the event of any attempt by the Shah of Persia to cancel the concession or interfere with it, as well as if any other State tried to prevent its implementation. The Foreign Office's response stated that the government could not make a "definite statement" about "possible accidents", but that "your associates or any other company organized to acquire and develop the concession can count on support and protection" 16 . This was quite enough, especially since there was no opposition to the British syndicate.

The difficulties came from a different direction. It was necessary to settle relations with the local tribes in Arabistan, where the d'Arcy company went to conduct exploration. The British were already familiar with this problem, because from the very beginning, while working in the Iranian province of Kasri-Shirin, they encountered a hostile attitude of the local population. To protect themselves from attack, the British "surrounded themselves with armed guards and fortified, like a real fort, the location of their houses and machine stores." 17 In Arabistan, it was necessary to enter into a special agreement with the Bakhtiar khans, allocating them 3% participation in all oil enterprises in this territory and a special fee for protecting the company's property. The agreement was signed in November 1905 with the assistance of the local British Consul .18 However, the revolutionary actions in Iran in 1906-1907 showed that the agreement with the Bakhtiar Khans did not provide the necessary guarantees. Riots broke out at the company's development sites, and British employees were attacked. The company was forced to stop drilling operations 19 . Under these circumstances, the British government decided to intervene directly. In 1907, a military unit led by Lieutenant A. Wilson was transferred from India, formally in order to "strengthen the consulate in Ahvaz", but in fact, as an English officer wrote about it, "to protect the drilling party until it finds oil or gives up its enterprise." 20 . In addition, the British gunboat Comet was sent along the Karun River, which, according to the British envoy in Tehran, was sent there "due to the expected unrest in Arabistan." At the same time, British cruisers began patrolling the coast of the Persian Gulf 21 .

So the d'Arcy company was able to continue exploration work. On May 26, 1908, a fountain gushed from a well in Mesjed Soleiman, announcing the discovery of one of the world's largest oil fields. In the run-up to this event, the British company in Iran again experienced serious financial difficulties. The situation seemed so desperate that on May 14, an exploration team in Arabistan was ordered to stop drilling if no oil was found in the well after reaching 500 meters .22 In early April, discussing financial issues-

16 Longhurst H. Op. cit., p. 26.

17 Schwadrau B. The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. Lnd. 1955, p. 18.

18 Ferrier R. Op. cit., pp. 75 - 78.

19 Ivanov M. S. Iranskaya revolyutsiya 1905 - 1911 godov [The Iranian Revolution of 1905-1911]. Moscow, 1957, pp. 130-131.

20 Wilson A. T. South West Persia. A Political Officer's Diary 1907 - 1914. Lnd. 1941, p. 18.

21 Ivanov M. S. Uk. soch., p. 131.

22 Ferrier R. Op. cit., p. 88.

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However, the company's managers noted that "money is exhausted" and "work should be suspended" until new funds are found to continue it. The issue was also considered by the board of Burma Oil, which informed d'Arcy that it might "have to decide whether he should not immediately give up operations in Persia altogether." However, on May 19, an agreement was signed under which the d'Arcy company received an additional 40 thousand pounds until May 20, 190923. A week later, a powerful oil fountain gushed from a depth of 378 m. However, this event did not cause a boom in the stock market, and the question of financing d'Arcy's company remained a difficult problem.

Leaving in 1905 Tehran, Envoy A. Harding expressed doubt that the oil company will succeed 24 . Nevertheless, the diplomatic service continued to support d'Arcy, considering his venture politically important. While not directly involved in the financing of the company, the British government found ways to provide it with the necessary funds through private channels controlled by it, such as Burma Oil, through which other imperial plans of Great Britain were carried out. In the second half of 1908, intensive negotiations began on the reorganization of the d'Arcy company and its financing system. Not only d'Arcy's own desire to guarantee the future of his company, but also a number of other factors forced him to hurry with this decision. The Persian side, represented both by the central authorities - the Shah and his courtiers, and by the British company's local counterparts, the Bakhtiar Khans, was looking forward to receiving their share of the revenues due from the discovery of the oil field. This was due to the initial concession agreement, as well as subsequent agreements with local tribal leaders. Otherwise, you could lose the privileges you received. Moreover, German banks also sought oil concessions in Iran. The German military threat hung over England like the sword of Damocles 25 .

Representatives of Burma Oil were also eager to reorganize the d'Arcy oil company. They wanted to secure a place in the management of the company corresponding to their participation, in order to guarantee themselves income from the exploitation of newly discovered deposits. For various reasons, d'Arcy's relationship with the Burma Oil board was far from perfect by then. Representatives of the latter would like to eliminate the situation where they played a subordinate role. D'Arcy demanded that "he be consulted on every issue", while the Burma Oil people sought the opposite - to deprive "his original right to free control over their interests" .26 After intense negotiations, an agreement was reached on March 25, 1909, which led to a radical reorganization in favor of Burma Oil. While remaining on the board of the newly organized Anglo-Persian Oil Company, d'Arcy ceded his rights under the concession. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company took over all the shares of the old companies, with the exception of the package transferred to the Shah and his ministers, which, however, was soon bought out. As for d'Arcy, he received in compensation for expenses incurred 170 thousand shares of Burma Oil worth about 900 thousand pounds, as well as the honorary post of director of the company. 27
D'Arcy was involved in the creation of the new company, but lost his former influence. In a private letter, his wife complained of being "disappointed" that "my husband's name was left out altogether." 28 The British oil company in Iran has been transferred to other, more reliable hands. In terms of its financial resources and political connections, Burma Oil was disproportionately more influential than D'Arcy's company. On April 14, 1909, the creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with a capital of 2 million pounds was officially announced.

23 Ibid.; Jones G. Op. cit., pp. 138 - 139.

24 Ferrier R. Op. cit., pp. 72 - 73.

25 Halgarten, G. Imperialism before 1914, Moscow, 1961, pp. 381-382.

26 Ferrier R. Op. cit., p. 102.

27 Elwell-Sutton L. Iranskaya neft [Iranian oil]. To the history of "power politics". М. 1956, с. 30 - 31; Tugendhat Ch. Oil: the Biggest Business. N. Y. 1968, p. 66.

28 Ferrier R. Op. cit., p. 98.

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there are 1 million of them. ordinary shares of £ 1 each were divided between Burma Oil (570,000), Concession Syndicate (400,000) and Lord Strathcona (30,000), who became chairman of the company's management Board. Another 1 million was intended for the sale of preferred shares (with increased income) for members of the management board, this operation was taken over by leading British banks. However, the most solid of them, the Bank of England, refused to participate in the operation, citing the fact that it is not engaged in industry. Then they turned to the next most important London bank, the National Provincial Bank, and also to the Scottish Bank in Glasgow, taking into account the special role of Scottish banks in the business life of England. The Imperial Bank of Percha in London, which served as a tool for British penetration into Iran, was also added to this list.

The first batch of preferred shares in the amount of 600 thousand f. st. and issued for the same amount of 5-percent bonds were sold out instantly. The amount received from this subscription far exceeded the funds needed for the direct needs of the enterprise. Therefore, part of the money was temporarily invested at an interest rate in one of the Jutland corporations. The main funds were used to expand oil development in Iran. In addition, the company announced its intention to connect its fields with the Persian Gulf via a pipeline, on the coast of which it planned to build a large oil refinery at the mouth of the Karun River on Abadan Island. The next subscription for shares and bonds of the company was announced in October 1911 for the same amount of 300 thousand pounds sterling. Crowds of businessmen flocked to the bank offices where subscriptions were made. The premises of the Scottish Bank were literally besieged. An eyewitness noted that there had never been "anything like this" before. It was hard to get into the bank building. There were queues at each window. Subscription to shares of the Anglo-Persian Company exceeded the set amount by 15 times. The results of subscriptions to bonds were more modest. There, the excess was only one and a half times 29 .

What was the reason for this hype? First, a large sum of money was allocated for advertising to fuel the speculative frenzy. Second, the main shareholder of the Anglo-Persian Company, Burma Oil, said that it guarantees a solid return on preferred shares for three years. Since Burma Oil itself paid a 30% dividend to its shareholders over the previous three years, this spurred interest in the new venture. Finally, and thirdly, the rumor about the proximity of the Anglo-Persian Company to the Admiralty, which allegedly decided to give it large orders for the supply of oil fuel for the British fleet, was strongly exaggerated. The company's organizers tried to strengthen their relations with the Admiralty in every possible way. To this end, it was decided to invite the Chairman of the Admiralty Petroleum Fuel Commission, Lord Pretyman, to join the board, on whose initiative Burma Oil once financed the d'Arcy enterprise. However, this invitation was not accepted.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company also did not agree to include such influential people in political spheres as Lord Cromer, who had just left the colonial service in Egypt, Lord Milner, the former British High Commissioner to South Africa, and others. I had to settle for the fact that the chairman of the board was 89-year-old Lord Strathcona, who was recommended by the Admiralty. The latter admitted that he had taken up this post only for "imperial" reasons, having received a promise that the company would be provided with "all possible assistance" from the government. He was formerly a director of the Canadian Pacific Railway, President of the Bank of Montreal, and later British High Commissioner to Canada. The board members are former Vice-Governor of Burma X. Varna and Prince F. Tak. The rest of the seats were taken by businessmen: Burma Oil Director K. Wallace became Vice President and business manager, and the president of the same company, J. P. Morgan, became members of the management Board. Cargill and dick

29 Ibid, p. 110.

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its director J. Hamilton, as well as Ch. Greenway, W. Garson, and W. N. d'Arcy. Although Pretyman refused to join the board of the company, its founders intended to put a notice in the prospectus that they were connected with the Admiralty. The latter's executives considered the ad unnecessary, "strongly" objecting to public statements that it was the Admiralty that drew the company's attention to Iran. However, the prospectus made reference to the fact that the development of oil fields in Iran is of "great importance to the British Navy" and that the Admiralty is looking forward to the possibility of "significant contracts" for the supply of fuel to the fleet 30 .

With the organization of the company, a new stage of activity of the British enterprise in Iran began. The discovery of oil fields and the successful sale of securities on the English stock Exchange created a favorable prospect. However, in Iran itself, there were many difficulties associated with plans to build new facilities and resolve old conflicts. In his letters to England, the project manager, J. B. Reynolds, gave a long list of urgent cases. Most of them were of an engineering nature. But the company's actions were also impossible without a new political agreement with the tribes in whose territory oil production was carried out, the construction of a pipeline and the construction of an oil refinery were planned. Reynolds noted that maintaining relationships with the local population is "not an easy job" and that it is necessary to achieve "more satisfactory" relationships with local residents.31 Since the old agreement with the Bakhtiar Khans was undermined by the British intervention, the presence of a British detachment in the fields was a source of constant irritation. The British Vice - consul in Arabistan, D. Lorimer, who was responsible for overseeing d'Arcy's company, noted that after the arrival of the detachment from India, a "completely phenomenal state of calm" was established, which he hoped would continue as long as the detachment "remained here." In June 1908, during a visit to London, Khan Sardar Asad filed a complaint with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ch. Harding. Although Harding expressed hypocritical surprise to Assad that England, "a friend of the Bakhtiars," "had to send troops from India" to protect their subjects, he later warned d'Arcy that the British force would be withdrawn. Harding believed that "calm had been established", despite Consul Lorimer's insistent advice not to rely on "good will on the part of the Khans". If a company needs security, Harding said, it should bear the cost of maintaining it. The British detachment remained in Iran until July 1909. But its maintenance was charged to the company, which was charged £ 175 a month.

The troops were withdrawn after a new agreement with the Bakhtiar Khans came into force, signed by Reynolds with the assistance of the English doctor M. W. Young on March 15, 1909. Under the terms of the contract, the company paid 600 pounds a month to the local security team. This amount was deducted from the khans ' remuneration established in the original contract. At a meeting with Sardar Asad, Reynolds informed him that the British troops would be withdrawn if he agreed to a new treaty. Such consent was obtained 32 . More difficult negotiations were to be held with Sheikh Mohammad Khazal, who headed a federation of tribes living in the pipeline and oil refinery area. Khazal's domain was a kind of state within a state, and he was a feudal king who enjoyed considerable autonomy over the central government .33 In 1903, the Shah confirmed his rights by a special decree. Harding offered Khazal support in 1902 and 1903 in exchange for a promise of commercial privileges to Khazal.

England skillfully exploited the contradictions between the central government

30 Ibid., pp. 105, 111.

31 Ibid., p. 119.

32 Ibid., pp. 126 - 128.

33 Longrigg S. H. Oil in the Middle East. Lnd. -N. Y. 1961, p. 21.

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and local feudal lords, deliberately inciting them. In addition to the official diplomatic service, through which British businesses were carried out in Iran, a network of semi-official political residents was formed, who had close relations with the local tribes and also supported British influence in the interior of the country. Such a resident in the Persian Gulf region was Major P. Z. Cox. In early 1908, Sheikh Hazal asked him to renew British guarantees. He said that the future is fraught with trouble due to the opening of the Mejlis and the prospect of creating a "so-called constitutional government", which "under the pretext of reforms will try to clip its wings." Khazal's services were needed by the British oil company in Iran, and the Foreign Office assigned Cox to assist him. The British resident conveyed to Khazal that England was ready to respect his prerogatives, and in July 1909, the sheikh signed an agreement with the Anglo-Persian Company, granting it the right to build an oil pipeline 230 km long and lease the territory for the construction of a factory in Abadan. The British promise to Khazal was rather ephemeral. But under the terms of the agreement, the company agreed to pay him a rent of £ 650 a year for the first ten years and £ 1,000 in subsequent years. Upon signing the agreement, Khazal received a 10-year advance of 6,500 pounds and a loan of 10,000 pounds sterling. He pledged to provide security for the Abadan oil pipeline and plant, for the maintenance of which he was promised payment on approximately the same terms as under the agreement with the Bakhtiar khans .34
The agreement with Khazal and the Bakhtiar Khans was important for the British in itself, and also because of their opposition to the Shah's government. This was the traditional British policy of "divide and rule", which in Iran was a tool for turning the country into a semi-colony. British policy so obviously violated the country's sovereignty that even from the benches of the English Parliament, an opposition representative said that deals with local authorities lead to a weakening of the power of the central government. 35 Despite the hype surrounding subscriptions to the company's shares and bonds, the coming years have already shown that its financial position is not so strong. Moreover, it was again critical and forced the British government to provide a large amount of assistance to the company. England took this step for a number of reasons: They were still associated with the desire to obtain reliable sources of oil supply. These were the same motives as those used in obtaining the d'Arcy concession. But in the face of increased international tensions and increased military preparations, Britain sought to strengthen its strategic position in the Middle East. And most importantly, the issue of supplying oil to the British naval forces has become more acute than ever.

By 1912, the British Navy had about 200 thousand tons of oil in its storage facilities. It was quite a lot, but in the event of war (provided the transition to liquid fuel) is not so much. According to preliminary estimates, the annual oil consumption in the conditions of military operations should have been about 1 million tons, which was later confirmed by 36 . The fact of insufficient oil reserves was compounded by the lack of guarantees of regular supplies, which was the main obstacle to the transfer of the British fleet to oil. The Russian naval agent in London, L. B. Kerber, noted that "the lack of liquid fuel in the bowels of England itself and the fear that during the war there would be a shortage of oil" almost forced the government to keep the coal-fired heating system .37 However, the naval arms race required the reconstruction of military vessels, increasing their speed and maneuverability. Therefore, the transfer of the fleet to oil fuel has become a kind of imperative.

Appointed First Lord of the Admiralty at the end of 1911, W. Churchill put forward this issue as the most important condition of the British naval program. & -

34 Ferrier R. Op. cit., pp. 121 - 126.

35 Parliamentary Debates, 17.VI.1914, vol. 63, pp. 1165 - 1166.

36 Churchill W. The World Crisis 1911 - 1914. Lnd. 1923, p. 171.

37 TSGAVMF of the USSR, f. 418, op. 1, d. 3277, l. 38, report of May 20-June 3, 1909.

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the use of petroleum fuel would make it possible to build faster ships and equip them with heavier weapons .38 Churchill called the advantage of using petroleum fuel "invaluable." "On identical ships," he noted, " oil provided a greater increase in speed compared to coal." In addition, the use of oil increased the range of ships by 40%: oil-powered ships could replenish fuel reserves at sea by pumping from tankers, they could remain at their bases without having to constantly send a quarter of the ships to the ports of refueling with coal, consuming fuel in both directions. "The use of oil," Churchill emphasized, "allowed ships of any type to have more firepower, providing higher speed with a smaller size and cost." 39
The question of switching the fleet to oil was debated in the context of growing Anglo - German antagonism. Germany's fleet construction program has intensified the naval arms race. England said that the construction of each German battleship will respond with the creation of two new ones. The British naval program provided for the construction of super-powerful vessels, the combat characteristics of which could be improved if the transition to oil was made. Many British vessels of the lighter type-destroyers and submarines-have already switched to oil. In 1912, the total number of such vessels operating or on the eve of launching reached 150. In one and a half to two years, this figure was supposed to double 40 . The core of the British naval program was the construction of a high-speed squadron of superdreadnoughts, during the laying of which in April 1912, Churchill raised the question of the need to transfer the naval forces to liquid fuel. He did not immediately win the support of the British cabinet, but eventually managed to win over the majority after enlisting the support of King George V. Even among the members of the Admiralty at first, not everyone agreed with his point of view unconditionally. However, even here Churchill managed to gain the upper hand. He was strongly supported by Admiral J. Fischer, who resigned in 1910 from the very post that Churchill now held. Immediately after Churchill's appointment, the "oil maniac" turned to the new head of the Admiralty, strongly recommending that the issue of transferring naval forces to oil be resolved. Otherwise, he warned, German battleships equipped with oil engines "will pull the nose of our turtles" 41 .

Churchill and Fischer had known each other for a long time. Fischer said that he" desperately " loved Churchill, although their relationship was not always smooth .42 In any case, they shared a common point of view on this issue. Therefore, in June 1912, Churchill sent a letter to the retired admiral asking him to head a specially created Royal Commission, noting that this mission needed "the strength and energy of a big man." "You must find oil," it said, " and indicate how it can be stored economically, how it can be purchased regularly and cheaply in peacetime, and how it can be obtained with complete confidence in time of war. And then, without sparing any expense, develop the best way to use oil fuel on current and projected vessels. " 43 Proposals were expected from the commission. Churchill gave Fischer the opportunity to "crack the nut," as he put it, although he warned that the commission would be "deliberative, not executive." It was supposed to "collect facts and draw conclusions from them" without touching on "policy issues or ways to implement them" .44
38 Trukhanovsky V. G. Winston Churchill, Moscow, 1982, p. 126.

39 Churchill W. Op. cit., p. 129.

40 Marder A. J. From the Drednaught to Scapa Flow. The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era 1904-1919. Vol. 1. Lnd. 1961, pp. 269-270; Parliamentary Debates, 17. VII. 1913, vol. 55, p. 1466; TSGAVMF of the USSR, f. 418, op. 1, d. 2645, l. 24, report Russian naval agent in England dated December 2 (15), 1912.

41 Churchill R. S. Winston S. Churchill. Vol. II. Lnd. 1969, p. 1927.

42 Trukhanovsky V. G. Uk. soch., pp. 103, 125-126.

43 Churchill R. S. Op. cit. Vol. II, p. 590.

44 Ibid.

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Fischer knew d'Arcy, and he also knew Mr. Deterding, with whom, during his time at the Admiralty, he had signed a contract to supply oil to the British Navy. "Anglo-Persian Company" has not yet started commercial activities, the first batch of its oil appeared on the market only in 1913. So Fischer started with Deterding, whose company, Royal Dutch Shell, he considered even "more powerful and aggressive" than the huge American trust, Standard Oil. In a letter to Churchill, Fischer called Deterding "the greatest man" who represented, in his words, Napoleon and Cromwell in one person. You should not "quarrel" with him, you should "please" him, Fischer said. He was ready to rely entirely on Deterding. Churchill took a more reserved stance .45 Deterding really had a lot of power. He was connected with the City and expressed his willingness to cooperate with the Admiralty. But his interests extended far beyond the privilege of being an oil supplier to the Royal Navy. In August 1912. Deterding warned his British partners :" We must not go too far in our chauvinism", meaning that the whole world should be the sphere of interests of Royle Dutch Shell. Just at this time, he was buying up the Rothschild oil companies in Russia and leading an offensive to seize the US oil fields, competing with J. D. Rockefeller. Deterding openly set out his goals before the Fischer Commission in early 1913, saying that he had always been motivated by the desire to " get as much profit as possible." He advised the Admiralty to build reservoirs in different parts of the world, where his company was ready to discharge oil on pre-agreed terms, of course, with guaranteed profits .46
In 1902, Deterding's partner M. Samuel, who headed the British Shell company, which later, together with the Dutch Royal Dutch Shell, formed the Royal Dutch Shell Trust, suggested that the British government, out of "patriotic" feelings, give all contracts to the Admiralty and include a representative of the government with the right to vote on the board of the company. Ten years later, after the merger with Deterding, Samuel reiterated that he was ready to supply oil to the British Navy, provided that the Foreign Office" unconditionally " supported Royal Dutch Shell's businesses "in different parts of the world." However, Deterding did not want his trust to be "Anglicized" and disavowed Samuel's declarations. "I am entirely an internationalist," 47 he later wrote to one of his contractors. It was also known that Deterding maintained close relations with Deutsche Bank, in particular with E. G. Staus, who represented the bank's oil interests. It was the connection with the Germans that was one of the reasons for the Admiralty's distrust of Deterding.

Later, speaking about the government's approach to the problem of supplying the fleet with oil, Churchill noted that its policy is "dual", having a "temporary" and "main" line. The "temporary" line provided for the conclusion of contracts to " ensure the regular and sufficient supply of our fleet over the near future at moderate and sustainable prices." This category included contracts with Royal Dutch Shell. As for the "main" line, it was for the Admiralty to become an independent owner and producer of its liquid fuel reserves. "We must become owners," Churchill said,"or at least be able to control the owners of the sources, at least in terms of the necessary supplies." 48 The Admiralty's "main" line was to solve this problem with the help of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. On October 11, 1912, the Board of the latter sent a memorandum in which it proposed that the Admiralty sign a contract for the annual supply of 500 thousand tons of oil at preferential prices. The British government was to allocate funds to increase the company's capital by £ 2 million, which would be used for the construction of oil pipelines,

45 Ibid.

46 Jones G. Op. :it, p. 45.

47 Ibid.

48 Parliamentary Debates, 17.VII.1913, vol. 55, pp. 1474 - 1479.

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additional oil refining facilities and construction of tankers for sea transportation. The government was asked to appoint one or two representatives to the company's management board. Commenting on this appeal, C. Greenway wrote to d'Arcy that "the whole matter was thoroughly discussed by the Foreign Office and the Admiralty" and that they "came to the unanimous conclusion that it was absolutely necessary to keep the oil field in Iran under British control" 49 . However, more than a year passed before the agreement took place.

The Foreign Office and the Admiralty were hesitant. After reviewing the memorandum, the Admiralty expressed doubt whether it was worth the risk of investing 2 million pounds in a British enterprise on foreign territory. Anglo - Persian executives threatened to merge with Royal Dutch Shell if the Admiralty refused to approve the proposed project. In that case, the Admiralty said, it would enter into a contract with another company. Such a statement of the question caused sharp dissatisfaction in the Foreign Office. "I don't like the position of the Anglo-Persian Company," said a senior Foreign Office official, L. Mallet. He called her behavior " ultra-imperialist." Foreign Secretary E. Gray warned that the company was supported based on its British affiliation. If it enters into an alliance with Royal Dutch Shell, "it will certainly not be able to count on His Majesty's Government to provide the same assistance as in the past." 50
Both sides, the government and the company, were interested in each other. So the negotiations continued. The Admiralty was taking a growing interest in them. But for a positive outcome, he needed to overcome internal opposition. Criticizing Churchill's proposed naval program, the opposition was skeptical about his plans to convert the fleet to oil. In addition to opposition in the Cabinet and Parliament, Churchill encountered opposition within the Admiralty from Lord Beresford, who had previously commanded naval forces in the English Channel. During a parliamentary debate on July 17, 1913, Beresford said that the government should not enter into any contracts until it received the opinion of its own expert geologists on the state of a particular field. This speech was the immediate reason for sending a special Admiralty commission to Iran in the autumn of 1913, which, according to Churchill, consisted of "the best experts in oil and geology" .51 Admiral E. Slade, a former director of Admiralty intelligence, a proponent of oil rearmament of the fleet, who later became a director of the Anglo-Persian Company, was appointed head of the commission. The commission consists of Prof. University of Birmingham, consultant to the Colonial Office on petroleum issues, later also one of the leaders of the company J. R. R. Tolkien. Cudman and two geologists.

In January 1914, the Slade Commission presented a report suggesting that the Anglo-Persian Company should be "financially assisted" by ensuring government participation in determining its " overall policy." "We strongly recommend," the report said, " that the Admiralty take control of the company... and all necessary measures have been taken to ensure that the company remains an independent British entity. " 52 Following the results of the commission's work, the Cabinet of Ministers decided on February 18, 1914, to purchase the Anglo-Persian Company. On May 20, the Admiralty signed an agreement with her, according to which the company's capital doubled from 2 to 4 million pounds sterling. The Government has acquired a majority stake worth 2.2 million pounds. This sum was invested in exchange for a 30-year contract to regularly supply Persian oil to the British Navy at a reasonable price. The company's management board consists of two government representatives who have the right to "veto" all strategic issues .53
49 Ferrier R. Op. cit., p. 169.

50 Ibid., p. 175.

51 Parliamentary Debates, 17.VI.1914, vol. 63, p. 1141.

52 Blue Book. Navy (Oil Fuel). Lnd. 1914, p. 26.

53 Ibid., pp. 3 - 7, 15 - 22.

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The purchase of the Anglo-Persian Company marked a significant milestone in the history of the British oil company in Iran. As we have seen, official diplomacy secured the d'Arcy concession from the very beginning. The Diplomatic Service took care of the company in subsequent years, organizing financial support for it. Although the British government did not directly participate in the financing of d'Arcy for a long time, it showed a constant interest in the fate of the enterprise. Therefore, in 1907-1909, military forces were sent to Iran, and the British station in the Persian Gulf region was used to settle relations with local tribes. After the discovery of oil fields and the formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1900, the British government further increased attention to the fate of this enterprise. The decision taken in 1914 to acquire a controlling stake in the company and introduce its official representatives to the company's management board logically completed the line that England had been following from the very beginning with regard to the oil concession in Iran.

The agreement signed with the Anglo-Persian Company was subject to ratification by Parliament. During the discussion there, there was a sharp clash between the government and the opposition, behind which it was easy to guess the forces that were bypassed in this deal, first of all Royal Dutch Shell. Representatives of the Anglo-Persian Company for a long time tried to defame the leaders of the Anglo-Dutch trust Deterding and Samuel, constantly throwing various information to the government about their unreliability. From the very moment the Anglo-Persian Company approached the government with an offer of monetary support, it began to fan the hype about the "threat" from Royal Dutch Shell. Speculating on antitrust phraseology, the management of the Anglo-Persian Company opposed the two largest oil trusts - Royal Dutch Shell and the American Standard Oil, which owned numerous branches in the international arena. She accused them of seeking to destroy the British enterprise in Iran. In a memorandum to the Foreign Office in October 1912 Greenway claimed that since the formation of the Anglo-Persian Company, Shell has made "intensified attempts" to establish control over it. If the government does not prevent this, Deterding's company will establish a monopoly on the oil fuel trade, raise prices and thus hit the UK budget. For commercial reasons, the agreement with Shell was supposedly very beneficial to the Anglo-Persian Company, but they decided to abandon it allegedly out of patriotic feelings. "This may be somewhat hard for financiers to believe," Greenway wrote to the Foreign Office in November 1912, " but it is true: the interests of the empire matter to our government... extremely much." About the same thing he said at a meeting of the Admiralty Commission: "If we strike a deal with Shell, we will get a large sum of money and become a prosperous concern. If we abstain, we would like to receive some compensation. We need guarantees and a contract that will give us a moderate return on our capital under all circumstances." Later, in June 1913, the board of the Anglo-Persian Company warned the Foreign Office that it would not be able to "maintain its independence" if the government did not provide financial support to the company and the Admiralty did not sign a contract with it to supply oil for the fleet .54 We have already seen how the Foreign Office and the Admiralty responded to such demands and threats.

By systematically pressing the government, the Anglo-Persian Company sought to denigrate its competitors in every possible way. She emphasized that Royal Dutch Shell was a "foreign" company; that it was under the influence of Kaiser Germany, the main enemy of Great Britain (an allusion to Deterding's collaboration with Deutsche Bank). "If we fall into Deterding's hands," Greenway told the Admiralty Commission at the end of 1912,"we will be under the direct control of the German government through Royal Dutch Shell." At the same time, he referred to the company's "best information".

54 Jones G. Op. cit, pp. 151 - 152.

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up-to-date information". At the end of January 1913, Greenway hurried to inform the Admiralty that Germany had approached the Anglo-Persian Company itself with an offer to supply liquid fuel to the German Navy, but the latter, following its "patriotic duty", rejected this offer .55 Of course, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty knew the true value of all these claims. The" threats "and" dangers "reported by the Anglo-Persian Company were greatly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the propaganda hype it created served its purpose, for in the end, the government decided to place the "main" bet on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, rather than on Royal Dutch Shell.

This goal was achieved not only by propaganda methods, although they also played a role. In any case, the arguments put forward by the Anglo - Persian Company appealed to the imperial circles of Great Britain. Explaining in Parliament the reasons for the agreement and the millions of pounds allocated for its implementation, Churchill attacked Royal Dutch Shell. The Admiralty was allegedly subjected to a "prolonged and persistent onslaught of oil trusts", the most terrible of which was the Anglo - Dutch one. Wasn't Royal Dutch Shell trying to swallow up the Anglo - Persian Company to nail the Admiralty? The" acquisition " of the company was, he said, vital to the national interests of England, to protect it from trust robbery. A number of deputies led by Samuel opposed the ratification of the agreement with the Anglo-Persian Company, pointing out the insecurity of its possessions due to international rivalry in the Middle East. It would be more appropriate, in their opinion, to rely on an oil company that operated within the British Empire (meaning, of course, Royal Dutch Shell). Samuel reproached Churchill for ignoring other British companies. Why, for example, did you choose Iran over Egypt, where a branch of Royal Dutch Shell had already been established? If the Admiralty had applied to the Egyptian branch of the Anglo-Dutch Trust, the latter, he said, "would have been able to secure much larger supplies than contact with the Anglo-Persian Company." 56
The government easily repelled these attacks, assuring Parliament that British positions in Iran were not in danger. The contract with the Anglo-Persian Company is the only way to break out of the" ring " of oil trusts that seek to use the monopoly in order to maintain high prices. In a vote in the House of Commons, 254 MPs supported the ratification of the treaty, while only 18 voted against 57 . When Greenway asked Churchill the next day how he had managed to achieve such impressive results, he replied that it was mainly due to "an attack on monopolies and trusts." 58 The British press portrayed Churchill almost as a "trust destroyer", although in fact there was no reason for this. Using the techniques of antitrust demagoguery, Churchill, even in the course of a parliamentary speech, despite all his passion, made a curtsy to the Royal Dutch Shell. He said that he did not intend to discredit the company, with which the government "never quarreled", to which Samuel replied with the remark: "Of course!". Churchill acknowledged that Shell representatives expressed their willingness to "provide services to the Admiralty, to protect the interests of the British Navy and the British Empire", but only "for a certain fee"; the only difference is the prices .59
Churchill accused the trusts of deliberately inflating prices, although a year earlier, in a memorandum to the government, the Admiralty practically defended the actions of the trusts. It pointed out that the rapid increase in demand for liquid fuels has led to the emergence of "formidable designs on the part of a relatively small population".

55 Ibid., p. 152.

56 Parliamentary Debates, 17.VI.1914, vol. 63, pp. 1137, 1222.

57 Ibid., pp. 1151 - 1153, 1178 - 1189, 1250.

58 Ferrier R. Op. cit, p. 199.

59 Parliamentary Debates, 17.VI.1914, vol. 63, p. 1150.

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a large number of rich associations in order to establish control over the oil market, raise prices and maintain them at a high level." At the same time, the Admiralty seemed to justify the actions of the trusts, stating that the reasons leading to higher prices and market "tension" are "very strong" and "natural and automatic". "We are engaged in intense military disputes with representatives of Shell," one of the high - ranking figures of the Admiralty F. Hopwood noted at the same time, " but I always try to stay on good terms with them, because I believe that we need their material "(oil - AF)60 . Churchill also did not want to destroy this relationship. It is not without reason that he personally excluded Deterding from his attacks in Parliament, to whom, after the debate ended, he sent a copy of the transcript with a postscript through his brother, which indicated that his name was deliberately not mentioned. Most importantly, the Admiralty has maintained its previous contracts with Royal Dutch Shell, regularly renewing them after the deadline. Moreover, Churchill gave instructions to seek contractual relations with Deterding on a long-term basis .61
To the accompaniment of antitrust statements, the British government signed an agreement with the Anglo-Persian Company, which paved the way for the creation of one of the largest existing multinational corporations, British Petroleum Co. At the beginning of the 20th century, in the context of the rapid growth of monopolistic associations, direct state participation in a large commercial and industrial enterprise looked unusual. This was then an unprecedented case, although for England such a decision had its own reasons related not only to the problem of providing oil to the naval forces. Military preparations, the growing conflict between the Entente countries and the Austro-German bloc stimulated the maturation of the latest forms of oil business. It should be emphasized that in the future the military factor had a great influence on the structure and character of industrial corporations. On the eve of the First World War, Britain was lagging behind such advanced countries of modern capitalism as the United States and Germany, where the rule of trusts and cartels was already established, in terms of the development of monopoly associations. The more backward forms of capitalist organization in England were compensated by the colonial monopoly. However, in the context of the increasing internationalization of the world economy, British corporations began to experience certain difficulties. They turned out to be weaker, and the British government sought to support them with state support measures. In this sense, we should also consider the financing of the "Anglo-Persian Company", which was to face the most powerful commercial and industrial associations on the world stage-oil trusts. Financial assistance to the company was the highest manifestation of state support in the context of the impending World War. This formally economic measure had a pronounced political connotation.

The political aspect of the British oil venture in Iran was evident from the moment of obtaining the d'Arcy concession and was fully manifested in the contract with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company of 1914. The British government used the company as a tool of its policy in the Middle East, and not only in Iran. An example is the negotiations on the creation of a "Turkish Oil Company", the final stage of which coincided with the government's decision to finance the"Anglo - Persian Company". At the insistence of the Foreign Office, the Anglo-Persian Company was allocated a stake in the Turkish Oil Company " 62 . The initiative to negotiate a concession in Turkey belonged to the German Bank, which believed that the right to develop oil was assigned to it by a contract for the construction of the Baghdad Railway. However, the British also beat the Germans here. In April 1909, the "National Bank of Turkey" was formed, created by a group of influential British financiers led by E. Cassel.

60 Jones G. Op. cit., pp. 171 - 172.

61 Gerretson F. C. The History of Royal Dutch. Vol. IV. Leiden. 1958, p. 293.

62 Kent M. Oil and Empire. British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900 - 1920. Lnd. 1976, pp. 89 - 112.

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On the advice of the British government, the post of president of the bank was first offered to the former envoy in Tehran, A. Harding, who was at the origin of the British oil concession in Iran. After Harding declined, H. Babington-Smith, the British representative in the Ottoman Debt Administration (an organization created by the creditor countries to control Turkish finances), was recommended for the post63 . The new president was acquainted with the head of the Deutsche Bank A. Gwinner, and through him - with the German Chancellor T. Bethmann-Hollweg. They entered into negotiations and as a result of difficult vicissitudes, with the assistance of the famous oil broker G. Gulbenkyan, in October 1912, they came to an agreement on the creation of the "Turkish Oil Company". It was agreed that the capital of the company will be 80 thousand pounds. st. and that the "German Bank" will receive 25% of the shares, and the "National Bank of Turkey", i.e. the British financiers represented in it-35%, the remaining 40% - "at the choice" of Gulbenkian, who offered 25% to Deterding, leaving behind 15%. Babington-Smith 64 became the company's president . At the end of 1913, the British government offered the "National Bank of Turkey" to transfer its share to the "Anglo-Persian Oil Company". A similar order was passed to Deterding. This demand infuriated him, and Deterding declared that he would "never accept it." 65 At the beginning of 1914, a conference of interested parties was convened in London, and on March 16, a new contract was signed, according to which the company's capital was doubled, and 50% of the shares were transferred to the Anglo-Persian Company .66
Following Fischer's advice not to quarrel with Deterding, Churchill ordered that the 25% stake owed to Royal Dutch Shell be retained. Deterding appreciated the gesture and sent a letter of thanks to Churchill:"If I can ever be of any use to you, I will be immensely happy to do so without hesitation." 67 The Admiralty continued to sign contracts with Royal Dutch Shell. Under these circumstances, the British government decided that the participation of the "German Bank" would not pose a threat, and therefore did not object to the Germans leaving 25% of the shares. As for Gulbenkian, whose ingenuity was due to the agreement on the creation of the "Turkish Oil Company", he was completely taken out of the game at this stage. He was not allowed to participate in the negotiations, and as compensation for his previous "merits", the Anglo-Persian Company and Royal Dutch Shell allocated him 5% of their shares, which is where Gulbenkyan's well-known nickname "Mr. 5%" came from. As a result of negotiations, the largest stake and the final say in the affairs of the "Turkish Oil Company" were in the hands of the "Anglo-Persian Oil Company". This is exactly what the British government wanted.

Why did Germany so easily settle for a secondary role, even though it initially sought to obtain the oil concession in Turkey on its own? Apparently, in the highest German spheres, they then hoped to pave the way for an agreement with England in order to ease the sharpness in relations between the two powers. 68 Shortly after the signing of the agreement on the Turkish Oil Company, the Turkish government officially announced that it would grant a concession. However, the significance of this agreement was practically negated in April 1914 by the Admiralty's agreement with the Anglo-Persian Company. In the Reichstag and from the pages of German newspapers, there were calls not to give England an advantage in the naval arms race. During another Sunday yacht trip, Kaiser Wilhelm II, in the presence of Admiral A. von Tirpitz, attacked the director of the Deutsche Bank, Gwinnner, accusing him of only contributing to the supply of "valuable petroleum fuel to foreign fleets." 69
63 Hardinge A. Op. cit., p. 565.

64 Hewins R. Mr. Five Per Cent. The Story of Qalouste Gulbenkian. N. Y. 1958, p. 75.

65 Ibid., p. 81.

66 Ibid., pp. 83 - 84.

67 Jones G. Op. cit., p. 172.

68 Lemke H. Die Erdolinteressen der Deutschen Bank in Mesopotamienin den Jahren 1903 - 1911. -Jahrbuch fur Geschichte, Brl., 1981, Bd. 24, S. 67 - 72.

69 Gerretson F. C. Op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 283.

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The actions of the British government in relation to the "Anglo-Persian Oil Company" did not arouse enthusiasm on the part of England's allies in the Entente. They also complained that the British were using the company as a tool of their politics. The French ambassador in London, P. Cambon, for example, when informing his government about the actions of the Admiralty, expressed fears that "in the future, a significant part of oil production may end up in British hands." 70 After Parliament ratified the agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on June 17, 1914, it became law. The funds provided by the agreement were allocated on August 5, 1914, the day after the outbreak of the First World War, which was deeply symbolic, since the preparation for war was, as we saw, one of the reasons for the purchase of the company, the foundation of which was laid by the d'Arcy concession.

This was an important milestone in the evolution of British imperialism. It is no coincidence that the purchase of an English company in Iran is considered "the most profitable operation in the history of the British Empire"71 . This acquisition of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company has been compared to Lord Disraeli's purchase of shares in the Suez Canal. Such a comparison is valid, because it puts two events on a par, each of which marked a specific stage in the imperial policy of Great Britain.

70 Documents diplomatiques francais ser. IIIe, P., 1936, t. 10, p. 430, Cambon-Doumergou, 27 May 1914.

71 Elwell-Satgon L. Uk. op., p. 36.

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