THE INTRA-SYRIAN NEGOTIATION PROCESS AND THE SYRIAN POLITICAL OPPOSITION

M. S. KHODYNSKAYA-GOLENISHCHEVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Second Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the UN and Other International Organizations in Geneva

Keywords: Syria, crisis, political settlement, UN, multipolarity

The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate. The Syrian conflict has become one of the most devastating since the 1994 Rwandan genocide.¹ More than 200,000 people were killed, about 8 million internally displaced persons, and more than 3 million refugees. A third of the country's territory has been captured by Islamic State militants.

The inter-Syrian talks in Geneva in early 2014 did not lead to the launch of a comprehensive political process due to the inability of the Syrian opposition delegation to negotiate. Currently, Russia is making attempts to launch a stable inter-Syrian dialogue. At the beginning of 2015, consultations were held in Moscow on the initiative of the Russian side between representatives of official Damascus and opponents of Bashar al-Assad. The next rounds of Moscow contacts are planned. These efforts are especially in demand in the context of an unprecedented surge in the terrorist threat in the Middle East and rampant odious jihadist groups: the Islamic State (IS), Jabhat al-Nusra, etc., which directly threatens the existence of Syria and the security of the region.

In this context, it is interesting to analyze the Syrian opposition parties and movements. It is important to establish whose interests they pursue, which of them can play a useful role in the settlement process, and who seeks to further destabilize the situation in order to achieve narrowly opportunistic goals.

SYRIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Modern-day Syria is characterized by a strong presidential rule based on the army and special services. This political system developed under President Hafez al-Assad (1971-2000) and was largely conditioned by the state of confrontation with Israel and the state of emergency imposed in the early 1960s. ²

The main role in the political and party life of the state has traditionally been played by the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (PASV), founded in Syria in 1947. At the same time, despite the fact that PASV continued to occupy a key place in the political system in the years preceding the beginning of the tragic events in Syria, the party was characterized by a certain de-ideologization, strengthening of pragmatic principles, and reorientation from pan-Arab to internal affairs.³

After coming to power in 2000, Bashar al-Assad set a course for some economic and socio-political liberalization of the tightly centralized state with authoritarian leadership practices, and tried to accelerate the pace of modernization of Syria.⁴ In 2003, the PACE decided to reduce interference in the political and economic life of the country.

Measures were taken to revitalize party activities: in 2009, one of the articles of the charter of the Progressive National Front of Syria (which unites a number of Syrian left-wing parties, including PASV) was changed in such a way as to reduce the too extensive powers of PASV. Many banned parties have resumed their activities. A new PACE Charter was adopted, which included provisions on democratic reforms, human rights, and strengthening pluralism and democracy. The process of improving the government structure has begun. However, with the outbreak of unrest in Syria in 2011, these reforms were suspended.

Nevertheless, there were opposition groups in the country that sought change and offered their vision of ways to reform the Syrian state. Many had branches abroad. These are the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, the National Front for Change and Liberation, the Movement for State Building, the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party, the Democratic Platform, and others. There are many well-known figures in Syria and abroad in the ranks of these and other parties (H. Manaa, H. Abdel-azim, R. Nasser, A. Kheir). Some of them were repressed.

Thus, since the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, The West, which aimed to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, had the opportunity to build cooperation with these forces, which sought de-escalation.-

democratization of public administration. However, all these groups had one "flaw" that did not allow the United States and its allies to interact with them: they firmly opposed military intervention in Syria and did not want to blindly follow commands from abroad.

In these circumstances, having stimulated an outburst of "popular anger" and prepared the rebels, but not getting the desired result quickly, the United States and its allies decided to follow the path tested in many regions of the world. Namely, to create opposition groups abroad and, having supported them financially, politically and in the media, declare them a real, popular political force that opposes the regime and aims to build a democratic and free society. Washington needed people who were ready to carry out its policy in Syrian affairs.

PUPPET OPPOSITION

On October 2, 2011, the Syrian National Council (SNC) was established in Istanbul. France and Qatar were behind its establishment, but this step was supported by the" Group of Friends of Syria " (an informal club of 107 states united to overthrow Bashar al-Assad).

The SNC was formed from representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and so-called "Syrian human rights defenders" based in the West (French citizen B. Kodmani, US citizen R. Ziyade, British citizen A. Monajed, etc.). All these "activists" worked or were closely associated with major British and American foundations (The Council on Foreign Relations, the American Institute for Peace, the Movement for Justice and Development, the Council on Democracy, the Henry Jackson Society, the British Chatham House and the Center for Strategic Studies and Communications, and others), whose goal is to support "democracy and human rights". Since 2006, these organizations have launched a massive campaign to " promote democratic standards in Syria."

At the Group of Friends of Syria conference in Istanbul on April 1, 2012, the Council was recognized as a "legitimate representative of Syrians and an umbrella organization of the Syrian opposition"⁵. It was also decided to provide him with financial assistance. The intra-Syrian opposition refused to join the SNA, explaining that it disagreed with the fact that the structure supports the idea of foreign intervention.

Foreign sponsors of the Council tried to narrow it down to armed groups. Then, according to their plan, it would be possible to talk about the formation in Syria of "a wide range of armed and political forces" opposing the regime.

Following the advice of its patrons, in early 2012 the SNC established a link with the so-called opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA) formed in Turkey, headed by the fugitive Colonel R. Asaad. Despite the fact that in February 2012 the SNC established a military liaison office with the FSA on the issue of arms purchases, many Syrian opposition figures claimed that the armed rebels did not recognize the authority of the SNC's political leadership and that, in general, relations between the structures were difficult to build.

The SNA has never been able to become a consolidated and authoritative opposition structure. Excessive "pro-Qatar" bias, the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood, aggressive rhetoric-all this led foreign sponsors of the SNA to think about the need to create a more representative and less radical group of the "opposition". US Secretary of State H. Clinton (2009-2013) made it clear to the Syrian National Council that Washington "no longer trusted him because of his inefficiency and weak influence on the processes." ⁶

CONTROLLED BY THE" FRIENDS OF SYRIA GROUP " OPPOSITION

A year and a half after the beginning of the Syrian crisis on November 11, 2012, the "Friends of Syria Group" created the so-called "National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces" (NC) in Qatar. The association consisted of emigrants, was funded from abroad and was unknown to Syrians, most of whom learned about the National Coalition from the media. In the declaration adopted by the newly-minted association, the first paragraph indicated not reforms and human rights, but refusal to engage in dialogue with the authorities and an unconditional course towards the overthrow of Bashar al-Asad7 and the political regime with all its pillars and symbols.

An interesting detail: on the eve of the creation of the National Coalition, the first "stuffing" of information about the violence caused by militants in Syria took place at the suggestion of Western media and NGOs. Before that, Western human rights activists and journalists avoided mentioning the crimes of Bashar al-Assad's opponents, focusing on "regime atrocities." This allowed the newly formed association to solemnly announce during the inauguration that the National Coalition rejects extremism and is aimed at preventing human rights violations. Western human rights activists argued that this is what kind of power Syrians need after "so many decades of tyranny."

Despite the efforts of its sponsors, the National Coalition never became a consolidated political association. There are several reasons for this.

First of all, during the period of its existence, NK was torn apart by administrative leapfrog and endless changes of leadership. On the one hand, soper was projected onto its activities.-

number of external players. On the other hand, it was a conscious line of the " curators "of the National Coalition: in their" personnel reserve " there were always several people who competed for the sympathy of external patrons, were interchangeable and obedient, did not use real authority and completely depended on external sponsors. The first head of the NK (former imam of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, A. M. Khatib) quickly paid the price for being ready to start the internal process of agreeing on the modalities for starting negotiations with Damascus: he was dismissed.

The radical SNA also remained a part of the National Coalition. As a conduit for the interests of the regionals, who did not play the most constructive role in the Syrian events, he turned into a "Trojan horse" that shook the Coalition from within and provoked quarrels between the "pro-Qatar" and "pro-Saudi" groups when the interests of Riyadh and Doha, which were competing in Syrian affairs, collided.

Nevertheless, Damascus was ready for contacts with NK, even despite its aggressive statements. The authorities offered to hold consultations abroad if the association was not ready to come to Damascus.⁹

The fact that the West failed to solve the problem of forming a link between the NK and the moderate armed opposition did not contribute to the strengthening of the National Coalition. The fact is that immediately after the creation of the National Coalition, a wave of its "non-recognition" by armed groups began.¹⁰ In the West, they began to fear that NK, which had no influence in the field, would remain an unpopular homegrown group.

Therefore, in parallel with efforts to give NK the image of a "serious, credible political structure", the search for so-called "moderate groups" that could be combined with this political movement and present all this together as a so-called "democratic front" that opposes the dictatorship and shares Western values continued.

IS THERE A "MODERATE" ARMED OPPOSITION?

At first, the bet was made on the Free Syrian Army, which is close to the National Coalition. However, by mid-2014, the FSA was demoralized and ineffective (external players who sought to turn the military situation around preferred to sponsor Islamists) and more often served as a base for recruiting new members of terrorist gangs by radicals. Only extremists remained at the disposal of the West.

Then the "friends of Syria" decided to choose "moderates"from them. The Islamic Front was included in this category. In order to discourage criticism of the West that it divides terrorists into "bad" and "good", the "friends of Syria" drew up a so-called "code of conduct" for Islamist groups fighting in Syria, and convinced extremists from the Islamic Front, the Aj-nad al-Sham Islamic Union, and the al-Sham Legion and the al-Furqan Brigades accept it. These gangs have solemnly declared their dissociation from terrorism.

The facade-image nature of this step was obvious, as the jihadists continued to commit high-profile crimes. The most" moderate", in the Western sense, Free Syrian Army coordinated up to 80% of operations with terrorists, including Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front, whose" representatives " NK planned to bring to the International Conference on Syria in Montreux (Switzerland) in ^{January 2014.11}

The task of forming a front of "moderate" Islamist groups and "linking" them to pro-Western political groups in the United States was not fulfilled. The reality was a sharp increase in the number of Islamists. By 2014, a third of the country's territory was captured by the Islamic State, and Jabhat al-Nusra and other gangs were strong in southern Syria. Those who did not work hard enough to create a "caliphate" in the Middle East were gradually "squeezed out" from the battlefield.

Experts recognized that it was the terrorist groups, primarily the "Islamic State", that became the main armed force opposing the government. Their fighters received a more generous allowance, and they had modern weapons at their disposal. IS was proficient in media and propaganda technologies that allowed it to recruit new members, including from Europe and the United States. The IG quickly conquered new territories, and there were no state borders for the group. After seizing vast territories in Iraq, IS then declared the Syrian city of Raqqa the capital of the "caliphate", in Libya it established a stronghold in the city of Derna. IS militants were active in Yemen, Egypt, and the Sahara-Sahel region.

Against this background, Washington continued to debate the possibility of supplying the United States with weapons to the National Coalition for transfer to related groups. Despite a number of steps aimed at militarizing the conflict (American instructors in the border areas of Jordan, the Train and Equip program for training Syrian rebels in Turkey and Jordan, etc.), Washington was still not ready to start massive arms supplies to the militants.

NK was not happy about this. This was especially evident during the inter-Syrian negotiations in early 2014: NK was confident that the fact that it was supplied with weapons during the dialogue with the government would strengthen its position and hide the lack of qualifications of its negotiators. Oppositionists, demanding from external sponsors to-

However, they referred to the fact that Barack Obama "promised" to supply them back in June 2013, but did not keep his word. ¹² The Free Syrian Army was also disappointed. Its former head, General S. Idris, has publicly criticized the West for its unwillingness to support the rebels militarily, which does not allow them to overthrow the regime.¹³

When discussing the possibility of providing weapons to the militants, the US administration was actually slow to do so, even though CIA officers were working in Turkey at the time, whose task was to identify groups that could be supplied with weapons, as well as develop logistics.¹⁴ Some equipment was being transmitted through CIA channels. However, it did not reach full-fledged large-scale military assistance.

We can say that the United States has developed two approaches to the issue of supplying weapons to militants. The first was that it is dangerous to give weapons to groups, ¹⁵ since there is no guarantee that they will not end up in the hands of terrorists. Back in February 2012, speaking at a hearing in the US Congress, Secretary of State H. Clinton said: "...When al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda speaks out in support of the Syrian opposition, we should ask ourselves who we are arming if we decide to supply. " ¹⁶

Many Western experts, who previously held serious political positions, said that it was unrealistic to hope that it would be possible to track the flow of weapons that were supposed to be supplied to so-called "moderate" groups. Former NATO Secretaries General Javier Solana and Jaap de Hoop Scheffer wrote in a joint article that the expectation that the West will be able to "strengthen and then remotely control moderate forces" is optimistic.¹⁷ The active work of the patriotic Syrian opposition with the Americans, which tried to convince the United States that the weapons supplied by Washington would be resold to jihadists, also played a role.¹⁸

The second point of view followed the opposite logic: in order to strengthen the "moderate fighters" who, according to the West, were supposed to defeat the "bloody regime", as well as to force Russia - "friend of Assad" - to think ¹⁹, it was necessary to arm the rebels; with the help of such "incentives" it would be possible to unite the ranks of non-jihadist groups, the radicals would they are marginalized, and the National Coalition will be brought to power with the support of the "moderates". Supporters of arming anti-Assad groups noted that this would allow the regime to be overthrown "in weeks, not months,"and therefore" save civilian lives. " ²⁰

Of the Western states, France was particularly insistent on supplying weapons to the militants. French Foreign Minister L. Fabius convinced the allies that if weapons are not given to "moderate" groups, then Syria will inevitably fall into the hands of Islamists. Feeding "non-terrorist" formations, according to the minister, will allow them to gain a foothold in the so-called "liberated areas" and expand their influence.²¹ It wasn't until August 21, 2014 - when the Islamic State had already taken over entire provinces in Syria and Iraq, and the Western community was looking for ways to fight the jihadists who threatened the region and Europe - that he admitted in an interview with Le Monde that Paris supplied the militants with weapons with the knowledge of the EU and the United States.

If there was a debate in the West about the feasibility of arming the rebels, then some states in the region looked at it more "freely". The Arab League (LAS) adopted a resolution stating that the Syrian people will be provided with "all forms of assistance required"²² to enable them to defend themselves. In the Turkish city of Adana (100 km from the border with Syria) Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have set up a center to directly supply the Syrian armed opposition with weapons and communications equipment. ²³

Periodically, there were reports of ships with weapons for militants entering the Turkish port of Iskanderun. You can recall the detention by the Lebanese authorities in the spring of 2012 of the Lutfulla-2 ship with weapons, or the story of the Libyan ship Intisar, which delivered 400 tons of ammunition there in January 2013. All this was done, of course, with the tacit consent of the West.²⁴ There is no doubt that the lion's share of these weapons - whoever they are intended for - is currently in the hands of the Islamic State and the most radical groups.

NC AGAINST PATRIOTIC OPPOSITION GROUPS

The mistake of the Americans was that they constantly "encouraged" the National Coalition. The United States put pressure on the UN Secretary-General's special Representatives for Syria, K. Annan and L. Brahimi, trying to force them to work only with her and ignore other opposition groups. The West and its allies lobbied for NK representatives to participate in numerous international forums on Syria, and invited them to attend meetings of the Friends of Syria Group. In Turkey (in Gaziantep), a so-called "provisional government in exile" was created with the National Coalition, headed by A. Tuma, which the "friends of Syria" apparently planned to bring to Damascus after the "fall of the regime" or give it control of the areas of Syria captured by the militants.

By focusing on the implementation of only part of the Geneva Communique (the formation of a Transitional Governing Body), by threatening tough sanctions against Damascus if this is not done, ²⁵ the West also sent the wrong message to the opposition, focusing their attention on the prospects of getting posts in the new government, and not on the prospects of obtaining positions in the new government.

on the need to find a political solution to the crisis. The West also advised the National Coalition not to agree to participate in the political process until the situation" in the field " changes in favor of the militants.

For the National Coalition, Western analysts, with the help of NGOs, developed projects for the development of post-Assad Syria, thereby stimulating the growth of its appetites. One of the most resonant documents was the study "The Day After Project", which proposed a full-scale redrawing of the country's power system with an emphasis on destroying state foundations. The implementation of such a scheme would be a way to bring pro-Western oppositionists to the leadership of a weakened and decentralized state, while their subsequent work under external leadership.²⁶

In the context of a fierce internal conflict, promises to the opposition from the West of high state posts in the post - Assad Syrian government served as an incentive to continue the armed confrontation and deprived the opponents of Bashar al-Assad of the motivation to negotiate-after all, the NK hoped that the regime would soon fall. And one can understand the disappointment of the National Coalition when, after the use of toxic substances in Syria in 2013, instead of the bombing of Syria promised by Washington to the opposition (after all, the United States announced that B. In September 2013, a diplomatic solution was reached in the form of a Russian-American agreement on the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal under the control of the UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Despite the fact that the United States was a party to the agreements on the chemical demilitarization of Syria, NK issued a statement saying that the Russian-American agreements on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons are harmful, since they encourage the use of chemical weapons. Assad's bloody campaign continues ²⁷.

Finally, Washington overestimated the potential of the National Coalition, while underestimating the Syrian people. The Americans expected that after the conflict broke out and they declared Bashar al-Assad "illegitimate", high-ranking Syrian politicians and military personnel would "run away from the ship". Based on these considerations, the United States, Great Britain, France and Turkey qualified the National Coalition as the "sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people", hoping that all "doubters" will defect to it for the purpose of "self-preservation". The same was done by LAS ²⁸, although some of its member States dissociated themselves from the relevant decision of the League.

This haste was a mistake. By declaring that the National Coalition represents all Syrians, the "friends of Syria" deprived themselves of a political maneuver. Now they were forced to lobby the NK without regard to whether it enjoys support, while at the same time not allowing the patriotic Syrian opposition to enter the political process, which could strengthen the negotiating positions of Bashar al-Assad's opponents.

The result of such an ill-conceived line is well illustrated by the behavior of some states that supported the National Coalition under US pressure at the beginning of the crisis. At the Arab League summit in Kuwait City in the spring of 2014 (previously, the Arab League gave the NK a seat for Syria, and the rostrum for the speech - to the chairman of the NK A. The flag of the National Coalition was replaced with the flag of the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR), and A. Jarba was asked not to be in the hall where the summit was held. In the fall of 2014, the head of the Arab League, N. al-Arabi, made it clear to NK that in the changed conditions it would be better to forget about its claims to Syria's place in the League.

Due to the unwillingness of an increasing number of states to thoughtlessly support the anti-Assad policy based on aggressive principles, the "Friends of Syria Group"also began to lose members. As time passed, out of the 107 members of the "Group", only 11 states (the United States, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and some others) were ready to continue the course of promoting the unpopular and radical National Coalition unconditionally. These countries, which had spent a lot of financial and political resources on NK, could no longer refuse to support it. And they have closed the possibility of building constructive relations with the patriotic internal opposition for themselves.

The Geneva process of negotiations between the government and the opposition in early 2014 became a kind of litmus test in terms of the competence of the National Coalition and its ability to play a serious role in Syrian affairs. After the Russian-American initiative on an inter-Syrian dialogue was put forward in Geneva in May 2013, 9 months passed before the start of negotiations in January 2014. And this is despite the fact that almost immediately after reaching agreements between Moscow and Washington on the need to convene an International Conference on Syria and immediately start an inter-Syrian dialogue, Russia successfully worked with the Syrian government in favor of its agreement to come to the talks.

But the National Coalition during all this time put forward conditions: ^the creation of humanitarian corridors, the departure of Bashar al-Assad, the withdrawal of Hezbollah from Syria. For 9 months, Washington allegedly worked with the National Coalition in favor of its arrival in Geneva and the formation of a delegation. The price of this "waiting" was thousands of Syrian lives that were lost due to the delay in launching a dialogue to end the violence. At the same time, Western partners-

they referred to the fact that NK has little negotiation experience ³⁰, it needs time to acquire the appropriate skills. This tactic caused outrage even among a number of Western politicians - after all, it was possible to wait indefinitely for ^the "perfect" moment to start a dialogue.

The real reason for the delay was something else. First, the National Coalition has been torn apart by internal "showdowns"all this time. Secondly, despite the wide range of forces opposing Bashar al-Assad, the Americans, who undertook to form a delegation for negotiations, were not going to bring anyone but NK to Switzerland. They needed a team of individuals under their control to sit opposite the government delegation, who would be engaged in promoting Washington's interests during the dialogue.

In this regard, the United States has put forward a condition for all other opposition groups: if they want to participate in the negotiations, they must agree that they will attend them under the" umbrella " of the National Coalition. Despite American pressure and even attempts by some regionals to bribe parties, moderate opposition movements refused the demand to submit to the NK. After all, the Coalition was created by foreign sponsors after the crisis began, was not a serious political organization capable of proposing a settlement plan, and was the only association that called for bombing attacks on Syria.

The internal opposition demanded to involve it in negotiations on equal terms. It considered it necessary for the joint opposition delegation to develop a single negotiating strategy that could be promoted during the dialogue with the Government. This would strengthen the positions of Bashar al-Assad's opponents and reduce the dependence of the opposition delegation on outside influence.³²

Aware of their share of responsibility for the outcome of the inter-Syrian dialogue, these parties prepared for negotiations. The National Coordination Committee has developed recommendations, the implementation of which would make the Syrian state system more transparent and efficient. As an option, consider the possibility of transforming the SAR from a presidential to a parliamentary republic ³³. The Committee proposed a truce for the duration of the negotiations.³⁴ This possibility was also seriously considered by the authorities.³⁵

The National Democratic Alliance of Syria has proposed a reform of the Syrian state apparatus in the direction of greater accountability to society.³⁶ He also developed a draft of the new constitution of the SAR ³⁷.

The negotiating program was presented by the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party, which focused on ensuring the rights of Kurds while respecting the principle of territorial integrity of the country. They were joined by other ethnic and religious minorities concerned about the prospect of jihadists coming to power. The Union of Syrian Christians has proposed measures to prevent a mass exodus of Christians from Syria.³⁸

However, the Americans did not include any of these parties in the opposition delegation, declaring them "puppets of the regime." Washington was particularly dissatisfied with the National Coordination Committee (because of its serious expert and negotiation potential, which can put the National Coalition in a negative light during the dialogue) and the Kurdistan Democratic Union Party (because at one time it refused to join the Syrian National Council, as it was asked by the head of the SNC, A. Kurdistan. Sida and former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at a meeting in Erbil).

It all ended with a team consisting only of representatives of the National Coalition, which had recently been shaken by another split: the Syrian National Council left it, coming to Switzerland to negotiate with the government.

It was the fact that the opponents of Bashar al-Assad were represented by their weakest part that led to the fact that the negotiations had to be interrupted: the negotiability of the delegation from the National Coalition was extremely low, the goal of the coalition was not to negotiate, but to reject all the proposals of the government delegation and then during press conferences to brand the regime.

Russian diplomats, in non-public contacts, explained to their American colleagues that the latter's tactic of unconditionally promoting the National Coalition would lead to the failure of negotiations, since the delegation from this emigrant structure would not be able to represent the aspirations of all the movements uniting Bashar al-Assad's opponents, that NK does not enjoy authority among Syrians and is little aware of the country's problems.

Such a flawed composition of the opposition delegation carried great risks from the point of view of implementing future agreements. All patriotic groups were left out of the dialogue. A voice in negotiations with the government was supposed to be given to the opposition, who had been fighting for many years for the implementation of their views. And one could understand why they did not want to join a delegation consisting of people who adhered to aggressive approaches that were contrary to the interests of the state.

The Americans "punished" the internal opposition for its views, not allowing them to negotiate. As time has shown, this turned out to be "sideways"for Washington. The delegation of the National Coalition showed itself to be a weak and unconstructive bloc during the negotiations. In particular, she refused the offer of the SAR government to declare its readiness to jointly fight terrorism.

RUSSIA AND THE SYRIAN OPPOSITION

Under these circumstances, influential groups of the Syrian internal opposition "reached out" to Russia, because they needed an external force that could help their voices "break through", and they knew that Moscow was ready to contact all parties aimed at finding ways of a political settlement.

It is known that opponents of official Damascus have repeatedly appealed to the Americans, who themselves volunteered to form a delegation of the Syrian opposition and bring it to the negotiating table in preparation for Geneva-^2.39 However, we always received one answer - either with the National Coalition, or you can forget about participating in the negotiations. Most respected opposition parties could not accept leadership in the political process of an organization that called for bombing its own country.

Russia was in a better position. Without creating "pocket" structures, it opened the door to constructive associations and established interaction with them. Representatives of all opposition groups, and even NK, came to Moscow. The exchange of views with major opposition forces was necessary to better understand what is happening in and around Syria and, accordingly, to develop an effective strategy for inter-Syrian reconciliation.

All this, of course, irritated the West, which began to look for conspiracy subtexts in Moscow's actions and came to the conclusion that Russia was supporting its own henchmen in order to split the ranks of the opposition.⁴⁰ In fact, the West was not satisfied with the fact that Russia became the only major player in the Syrian direction that did not break ties with either side, which allowed it to play an effective role in the political settlement.

Russia maintained a constant channel of communication with both sides of the conflict. No one else had such advantages. The United States and its allies have limited their field of maneuver. And while regional states in Syria pursued their own interests related to the forced change in the balance of power in the Middle East, the West, which continued its rhetoric about the so-called promotion of democratic values in Syria, drove itself into a corner. He could not refuse, without losing face, to support the Coalition, which never managed to turn into a consolidated party and gain allies inside Syria.

By outlawing the Syrian president and relying on the National Coalition, the West was faced with a situation where Bashar al-Assad not only did not lose popularity, but also easily won the elections in the summer of 2014, and the United States and its allies were forced to continue promoting NK, which by 2015 was a sad spectacle. However, otherwise it would mean for the West to admit its inability to adequately assess the situation and that, having once again intervened in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, they did not bother to assume that the country's population is able to independently determine its priorities and does not need outside advice. The picture was also supplemented by the fact that the United States and its allies were actually fighting a war in Syria on the side of the "illegitimate", in their opinion, Assad, helping the government to fight the "Islamic State".

In the matter of regime change in Syria, the West has used proven methods. The strategy focused on supporting selective opposition movements and campaigning to move to the "right side of history". However, the West could not create a "fifth column" in advance in Syria: the political system and the work of security agencies in the country were built in such a way as to minimize external destructive interference in the internal life of the state. As a result, the patriots of the country were in a stronger position, and not those who were eager for power with the help of foreign patrons.

RUSSIA'S POSITION

As for Russia, its work with the parties to the conflict in favor of a negotiated settlement is bearing fruit. Moscow's consistent position on the need to launch a dialogue between representatives of Damascus and the sane part of the Syrian opposition, during which the Syrians themselves will determine the future of their state without prompting from outside, is shared by an increasing number of players. This is evidenced by the positive reception of the Russian initiative to organize inter-Syrian consultations in Moscow in early 2015 on the part of Damascus, most of the Syrian opposition organizations and interested states.

The opponents of Damascus agreed with the Russian logic that they should unite not on the basis of the leadership of one of the organizations, but on the basis of a common ideology, which should focus on the sovereignty of Syria, its territorial integrity, and the need to fight terrorism. The agreement of two documents - the Moscow Principles and the Appeal to the International Community - based on the results of contacts in the Russian capital in January 2015, for the first time in 4 years of conflict, was a sign of the readiness of Syrians to follow this path.

I would like to hope that the Russian initiative will allow us to gradually reach the main goal in the context of the political process-the organization of full-fledged inter-Syrian negotiations on all settlement issues, at which the delegation of the Syrian opposition will be represented.

be truly representative , as required by the Geneva Communique of 30 June 2012.

Only a comprehensive dialogue between Syrians will stop the bloodshed and start working on creating an all-Syrian front to confront the "Islamic State" that threatens the country and the region. Without fighting the jihadists, it is impossible to solve the problem of preserving Syria, and this should be understood by external players, who are required to reconsider their attitude towards official Damascus and assist the Syrian authorities in countering terrorism - as is happening in Iraq.

Such a review has already begun: Western journalists began to write that B. Assad can be part of the solution to the Syrian crisis ⁴¹. In January 2015, John Kerry, speaking about the head of Syria, for the first time in 4 years of conflict, called him "President Assad" ⁴². In February 2015, a delegation of French parliamentarians visited Damascus.

* * *

The sooner the "friends of Syria" understand that terrorism is the main threat to the Middle East, the more it will be possible to consolidate all sane Syrian forces on a common platform and give the patriotic opposition a chance to take a real part in efforts to end violence and build a secure, secular and stable Syrian state.

¹ La Syrie, Pire Crise Humanitaire Depuis le Rwanda Selon l'ONU // Le Monde. 18.08.2014.

^Akhmetov 2 Mirglazami prezidenta Sirii Hafeza Asada. M. Mirglazami prezidenta Sirii Hafeza Asada. M. (in Russian)

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⁵ Chairman's Conclusions Second Conference of The Group of Friends of the Syrian People, 1 April 2012, Istanbul. 1 April 2012 - http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chairman_s-conclusions-second-conference-of-the-group-of-friends-of -the-syrian-people-1-april-2012-istanbul.en.mfa

^{6 Some results of the conference of the Syrian} opposition in Doha - https://www.iimes.ru

⁷ Nass ittifaq Doha li insha' al-iatilaf al-wataniy likuwa Saura wa al-Muarada al-Suriya (Doha Agreement on the Formation of a National Coalition of Syrian Opposition and Revolutionary Forces). Doha, 2012.

⁸ Syria: a Priority for New Opposition Group: Curb, Condemn, Investigate and Punish Abuses by All Factions http://www.hrw.org/ru/node/111360

^{Steele J.} 9 Syrian Minister Offers to meet Opposition Leader Overseas // The Guardian. 13.02.2013.

¹⁰ Syrian Insurgents Reject West-Imposed Coalition, Declare Own Islamic State - http://www.rt.com

^{Vinograd C.} 11 Syria rebels: Islamic militants nabbed our weapons - http://bigstory.ap.org/article/syrian-rebels-islamists-welcome-peace-talks

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¹³ L' Embargo Sur les Armes Vers la Syrie ne Penalise Que les Opposants au Regime Assad // Le Monde. 27.02. 2013.

¹⁴ The New York Times. 21.06.2012.

^{Hubbard B.} 15 US Faces Dilemma in Support for Syria Rebels // International Herald Tribune. 20.04.2013.

¹⁶ Statement by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry A. K. Lukashevich on the issue of arms supplies to the Syrian opposition. Russian Foreign Ministry. March 2, 2012 - www.mid.ru

^{Solana J., Scheffer J.de H.} 17 Geneva Talks Hold the Only Key to Syria// International Herald Tribune. 12.06.2013.

¹⁸ Hayatu at-tansiq al-wataniyyah li kuwaat-tagyir ad-dimukr-ty. Bayan sykhafiy. Dimashk (National Coordinating Committee for Democratic Change. Media statement). Damascus, 2013.

¹⁹ Arming the Syrian Rebels is Justified // Financial Times. 15.06.2013.

^{Rifkind M.} 20 A Call to Arm Svria's Rebels // The New York Times. 8.08.2012.

^{Erlanger S.} 21 France Calls for Pledged to Syrians to be Honored // International Jerald Tribune. 29.01.2012.

²² Jamia duali al-arabiya. Al-audaa al-khatir fi suriya (League of Arab States. "Dangerous Developments in Syria"), 2013.

^{Doherty R., Bakr A.} 23 Secret Turkish Nerve Centre Leads Aid to Syria Rebels - www.reuters.com

^{Fisk R.} 24 Syrian War and Hypocrisy // Independent. 29.07.2012.

²⁵ x. Clinton: The US is ready to move on to considering tough actions against Syria - www.interfax.ru

²⁶ The Day After Project: Supporting a Democratic Transition in Syria - www.thedayafter-sy.org

²⁷ The US-Russian Negotiations on Chemical Weapons Elimination in Syria - http://www.mid.ru

²⁸ Ialyat Doha. Iztimaa jami al-aduwal al-Arabiya ala mustawah al-kimma (Doha Declaration. Arab League Summit). Doha, 2013.

²⁹ Comment of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Foreign Ministry on the decision of the General Assembly of the National Coalition of Coalition and Revolutionary Forces to participate in the International Conference on Syria - www.mid.ru

^{Mabillard B.} 30 L'Opposition Sous Pression // Le Temps. 14.02.2014.

^{Solana J., Scheffer J.de H.} 31 Op. cit.

³² Mubadara al-Kahira li saut muwahid lil-muarada al-suriya fi al-mu'atamar al-dawliy haulya Suriya (Geneva 2) (Cairo Initiative for Developing a Common Approach for the Syrian Opposition during the International Conference on Syria (Geneva 2). Cairo, 2013.

³³ Misak al-wataniyyah al-suriyyah. Hayatat-Tansiq al-wataniyeh (National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. "The National Syrian Pact: proposals for negotiations with the Government"). Damascus, 2013.

³⁴ Bayan al-hitamiy lil-mu'atamar al-wataniy li inkaz Suriya (Final statement of the National Conference for Saving Syria). Damascus, 2012.

³⁵ Statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov following a conversation with Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Syria K. Jamil and State Minister for National Reconciliation of Syria A. Haidar. Moscow, August 21, 2012 - www.mid.ru

³⁶ Mashroua al-marhalah al-intikaliyah wa at-tashriayyah. At-tad-jammu al-dimukratiy al-muwahhad ("Draft legislative reforms in the transition period". National Democratic Alliance of Syria). Paris, 2013.

³⁷ Projet de Constitution Syrienne. Reunion Democratique Unifie. Paris, 2013.

³⁸ Report on the Situation of Syriac Christians in Syria. Syrian National Council of Syria. Damascus, 2013.

^{Malbrunot G.} 39 Les Etats-Unis Acueillent des Opposants Syriens Proches de Moscou // Le Figaro. 27.02.2013.

^{Mabillard B.} 40 La Russie Place Ses Affides Pour Atomiser l'Opposition Syrienne // Le Temps. 12.11.2013.

^{Petite S.} 41 Quand Bachar el-Assad Devient Frequentable // Le Temps. 28.01.2015.

^{Tisdal S.} 42 US Changes its Tune on Syrian Regime Change as ISIS Treat Takes Top Priority // The Guardian. 25.01.2015.

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