The foreign policy of the Polish bourgeois government from the very beginning of the formation of independent Poland (November 1918) was directed mainly to the East. From the very first days of coming to power, the head of state and Supreme Commander-in-Chief Yu. Pilsudski set about preparing a war against the Soviet republics of Lithuania and Belarus, and eventually against Soviet Russia. The Polish government portrayed the Red Army's assistance to the population of Lithuania and Belarus in liberating them from the German invaders and restoring Soviet power as an act of aggression against Poland, a continuation of the colonial policy of tsarism. Official propaganda, in an attempt to intimidate the country's public, claimed that Poland was threatened by an invasion by the Red Army, which was trying to impose the Soviet system on the Poles by force of arms, and that therefore it was necessary to start a war against Soviet Russia and thereby protect the country from a "Bolshevik invasion". The Polish bourgeoisie with criminal levity pushed the country on the path of war, instead of strengthening the state that had emerged in the difficult conditions of economic devastation caused by the war and the German-Austrian occupation. The real aggressive goals of the ruling elite of Poland, namely the annexation of the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine and the overthrow of the Soviet government there, which by the very fact of its existence exerted a powerful influence on the social struggle of the Polish people, were hidden from the public of the country and world public opinion.
Polish society was not united in its attitude to Soviet Russia. The Communist Workers 'Party of Poland (KRPP), the PPS-Opposition (Polish Socialist Party) and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies resolutely exposed the anti-Soviet propaganda of the ruling circles. "The cries of the bourgeoisie and the' fraks '(members of the PPS-fraction. - V. G.) about 'Bolshevik aggression', "the KRPP noted," are lies, the purpose of which is to disguise the aggressive plans of the Polish bourgeoisie."1 The Soviet government understood that the myth of "Bolshevik aggression" found favorable ground in Poland. The Polish people were accustomed to see tsarist Russia as their oppressor, and under the influence of government propaganda they transferred to a certain extent their suspicion and distrust to Soviet Russia. Speaking on October 24, 1919, before the students of the Sverdlovsk University going to the front, V. I. Lenin warned that the imperialists would not be able to get out of the Soviet Union.-
1 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. II, Moscow, 1964, p. 103.
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They try to " inflate the old hatred of Poland for the great-Russian oppressors by trying to transfer the hatred of the Polish workers for the landlords and tsars, which is a hundredfold deserved, to the Russian workers and peasants, making them think that the Bolsheviks, like the Russian chauvinists, dream of conquering Poland. And for a time, they succeeded in this deception. " 2 This was also facilitated by the fact that the ruling circles concealed from the people the repeated statements of the Soviet Government that they recognized Poland's independence without any reservations, that they were interested in establishing diplomatic, trade and economic relations with it, and that they had no intention of violating its borders or interfering in its internal affairs. The Soviet Government made no secret of the fact that it would willingly see a restored Polish state free from the point of view not only of the national, but also of the social one, but it left the solution of this question to the Polish people themselves .3 G. V. Chicherin wrote on this occasion: "With the most active participation of Vladimir Ilyich, we made peace proposals to our neighbors... This was once again the turning point of our foreign policy, which revealed all the incomparable flexibility and political realism of Vladimir Ilyich. We had to reckon with the fact of the final formation of bourgeois national republics next to us. And Vladimir Ilyich firmly and clearly laid the foundation for a policy of peace and friendly relations with our neighbors... making significant concessions for the sake of peace... At the beginning of the negotiations with Poland, Vladimir Ilyich personally had a wonderful idea: "to offer Poland more territory than Clemenceau and Curzon offered it." 4
However, the Polish government left the Soviet peace proposals unanswered and in January 1919, without declaring war, began military operations for the capture of Vilnius. This operation ended in complete failure.5 Unable to continue military operations on his own against the Soviet republics of Lithuania , Belarus, and Russia, Pilsudski turned to the Entente states for help, declaring Poland's readiness to participate in the anti - Soviet campaign of the imperialist powers. Thus, the Polish people were drawn into the war against the Soviet republics by a Government that reflected the interests of the propertied classes. Six years later, the then chief of the Polish General Staff, S. Sheptytsky, said of this war:"First of all, it is possible to learn from its example how a state that has already developed and has a political line based on the properly understood interests of the nation has no right to launch a military campaign." 6
Poland's military actions in the east in the first months of 1919 had all the features of an irregular war. They began in the chaos of the formation of state, political, and military institutions in bourgeois-landlord Poland. The Polish army, which initially relied on volunteers and had only weapons and ammunition that it had inherited from the German-Austrian invaders, already in January 1919 felt an acute shortage of ammunition (especially cartridges for German rifles) and military equipment. Poland had no military industry and lacked its own raw materials. The difficult financial state of the state limited the possibility of purchasing weapons abroad. Before establishing relations with Antan-
2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 39, p. 242.
3 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. vol. 38, pp. 161-162.
4 "Memoirs of V. I. Lenin". Vol. 2. Moscow, 1957, pp. 170-171.
5 W. Gostynska. Polityka polska wobec Litwy i Bialorusi (pazdziernik 1918- styczen 1919). "Z dziejow stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy". T. I. Warszawa 1965.
6 St. Szeptycki. Front Litewsko-Bialoruski. Krakow. 1925, str. 4.
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At that time, the Polish government sought to obtain weapons primarily from Germany .7 As far as possible, Poland tried to buy weapons from the Entente as well. It was for this purpose that Captain Zvislotsky was sent to Budapest in January 1919; General Yu. Gallery 8 . Only as a result of German assistance could Poland launch a war against the Soviet republics of Lithuania and Belorussia in January 1919 .9 However, without the material support of the Entente, the Government was unable to deploy the military forces necessary for this campaign .10
The Polish Government has developed intensive activities in order to gain recognition from the Entente states and to obtain assistance from them in the fight against the Soviet republics. True, there were considerable difficulties on the way to an agreement with the Entente. The Allies, especially France, 11 were primarily deterred by Pilsudski's cooperation with the central Powers during the First World War, as well as by Poland's establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany 12 while the Entente was still at war with it. It was also widely believed among the Allies that the Polish government was leaning towards Bolshevism13 . This opinion was not refuted even by the Polish National Committee (PNK) in Paris, which was in the hands of the bourgeois National Democracy (Endeki) party. The NCP, in a letter to the French Government, certified: "We value such a government (meaning the existing Polish Pepeesov government of E. Morachevsky - V. G.), which opposes Bolshevism, and therefore intend to support it." 14 The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Allies recognized the NPC in Paris as a representation of Poland .15
At the same time, Poland's military actions in the east aroused great interest among the Entente. At the end of 1918 they went to Warsaw
7 On January 13, the representative of the German government in Bialystok, M. Bulman, in a report to the War Ministry in Munich, reported that the Warsaw government had asked Germany "to deliver weapons for the fight against the Bolsheviks" (Deutsches Zentral Archiv (hereinafter - DZA). Potsdam. Bd. 21736, f. 36).
8 Report of Captain Zvislotsky Yu. Pilsudski of Budapest, January 6, 1919 (Archiwum Akt Nowych (hereinafter-AAN). Adiutantura Belwederu, t. 2, k. 5). January 7, General Yu. Haller wrote in a telegram to General L. Zheligovsky:: "The situation of the Polish army in the country is difficult. It is small in number to cope with the task, and does not have enough military materials and funds that I have requested from the allied states for it" (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe (hereinafter-CAW), 123, 8/16, k. 1).
9 W. Gostynska. Op. cit, str. 44 - 48.
10 A. Lados noted in his memoirs a conversation that took place in early 1919 with Yu. Pilsudski, who complained that, " unfortunately, his forces are weak and he cannot attack as the current situation would require. And the expected help of the allies does not come, even with the transportation of the army Haller unforeseen difficulties "(Polska Akademia Nauk (hereinafter-PAN). Zaklad Historii stosunkow polsko-radzieckich. A. Lados. Pamietniki. Maszynopis, str. 96).
11 K. Smogorzewski. Francja i Polska. Warszawa. 1930, str. 41.
12 The Polish government established diplomatic relations with Germany as early as November 1918. On November 21, 1918, Count H. Kessler, the same man who had escorted Pilsudski out of the Magdeburg Fortress, arrived in Warsaw as Ambassador Extraordinary. Under pressure from public opinion and the Entente, the Polish government returned Kessler's credentials on December 15 and forced him to leave Warsaw. However, Kessler's departure did not prevent the conduct of secret Polish-German negotiations directed against the Soviet republics (W. Gostynska. Op. cit., str. 30-36).
13 Memorial note by S. Sheptytsky Yu. To Pilsudski, dated January 10, 1919. "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. II, p. 67.
14 Minutes of the NPC meeting in Paris of November 24, 1918. AAN, KNP, t. 8, k. 16.
15 Minutes of the NPC meeting in Paris on November 13, 1918. Statement by E. Pilz. AAN, KNP, t. 8, k. 3. Report of L. Vasilevsky."Niepodleglosc", 1937, t. XV, str. 413.
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two missions - American and English 16 . In Bern, they met with a Polish government delegation led by K. Dluski, 17 who stopped there for a few days on their way to Paris, and held talks. The tasks that these missions were supposed to perform are indicated by the questions raised by them during the negotiations. The head of the American mission, D. Coolidge, in a conversation with K. Dlusky and M. Sokolnitsky, was primarily interested in the" threat " of Bolshevism in Poland. 18 About the conversation with the British mission M. Sokolnitsky wrote in his memoirs: "They show great interest and sympathy. They are primarily concerned with military issues and the fight against Bolshevism."19 . On arrival in Warsaw, the head of the British mission, Colonel H. Wade, had a secret conversation with Pilsudski. On January 12, Pilsudski telegraphed to Captain Zvislotsky in Budapest: "The British mission... promises delivery of military materials... " 20 . As the eastern campaign unfolded, the Polish government became increasingly aware of its dependence on the Entente. Sokolnitsky, in his memoirs of that period, pointed out that when asked "whether Endeki and Rozvadovsky would call up the Entente, Pilsudski replied:' We are already in its hands; it will do whatever it wants with us. ' "21
In early January 1919, after the defeat of Polish troops near Vilnius, as well as due to a catastrophic shortage of weapons and ammunition, the military situation in Poland worsened. The internal political situation has also worsened 22 . This was anxiously reported to Pilsudski by S. Sheptytsky in a report dated January 10, 23 . As urgent measures, he put forward the following: possible faster establishment of relations with the Entente states in order to obtain military materials from them; organization of a strong army; strengthening the Lithuanian-Belarusian front by transferring all forces to the north-eastern borders. Pilsudski considered the military and political considerations given by Sheptytsky to be correct and repeatedly cited them in correspondence conducted with Paris, Budapest, and in a conversation with V. Baranovsky in Warsaw .24
Establishing relations with the Entente states after the unsuccessful military campaign for the capture of Vilnius, especially after the hopes for German help were not fulfilled , 25 became the most urgent task for the Warsaw government. However, this is not enough-
16 K. Dluski. Wspomnienia z Paryzu od 4.I. do 10.VII.1919. Warszawa. 1920, str. 4.
17 This refers to a delegation headed by K. Dluski sent by Pilsudski in Paris at the end of December 1918 to reach a final agreement with the NCP. Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 M. Sokolnicki. W sluzbie Komendanta. "Kultura" (Paryz), 1953, N 12/74, str. 86.
20 AAN, Adiutantura Belwederu, t. 2, k. 9.
21 M. Sokolnicki. Op. cit., str. 77.
22 The growing dissatisfaction with the Government's policy was evidenced by such events as the workers 'campaign of protest against the arrest of members of the Soviet Red Cross delegation; the Endek coup attempt on the night of January 4-5; government decrees on the introduction of martial law and military field courts; the vote of no confidence in the Warsaw Soviet of Workers' Deputies in the Morachevsky government, and others.
23 See Documents and Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish Relations, vol. II, pp. 66-67.
24 AAN. Adiutantura Belwederu, t. 2, k. 8 - 9; "J. Pilsudski o upadku rzadu Moraczewskiego". "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1958, N 4, str. 1151 - 1154; "Niepodleglosc", 1938, t. XVIII, str. 49.
25 The German government did not allow Polish units to reach Wilno at the end of December 1918. The reason for this was the uprising against Germany, which began in Poznań (the former Prussian part of Poland) on December 27, 1918 (DZA Potsdam. Bd. 21736, f. 23-24; W. Gostynska. Op. cit., s. 36).
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This could not be achieved without reaching an agreement with the NCP. The price of such an agreement was to replace the Pepe government of E. Morachevsky with a coalition government .26 On January 3, 1919, he arrived in Warsaw from the United States. Paderewski. As its chairman, R. Dmowski, informed the members of the PNK at a meeting on December 15, 1918, Paderewski went to Poland on a special mission, officially as a representative of the PNK, with the following message: "We should strive for a compromise with the left." 27 The interest of the US government in the internal situation in Poland and its interference in its internal affairs are evidenced by the reports of the head of the American food mission in Warsaw, W. Kellogg, to G. Hoover. After negotiations with Pilsudski, and then with Paderewski, Kellogg advised keeping Pilsudski at the head of state on the condition that Paderewski would become Prime Minister of the Polish government. On Hoover's recommendation, President Wilson authorized Kellogg to make a statement to Pilsudski that "the Americans will not provide any assistance to Poland if this concept is not implemented." 28 This view was shared by the British government. Under pressure from the Polish General Staff and allied missions, especially the American one, Pilsudski agreed to have Paderewski head the government. In a letter to Dlusky dated January 17, he said: "The problem of Entente aid has become the most burning issue, hence the need for the Paderewski cabinet, through which, I hope, this assistance can be obtained." 29
On January 16, the Morachevsky government resigned. Paderewski, who formed the new government, assumed the functions not only of Prime Minister, but also of Foreign Minister .30 With the formation of the new government, misunderstandings and disputes between the Warsaw government and the NPC in Paris were removed. On January 23, Paderewski notified the Entente states that he had created a government "at the call of General Pilsudski and in agreement with the NCP." 31 The Entente Governments expressed satisfaction with the changes in Poland .32 President Wilson, on the recommendation of Colonel E. House, was the first to recognize the Polish government on January 30 .33 France did it on February 23, England on the 25th, Italy on the 27th 34 . With the creation of the Paderewski Government, the main obstacle to establishing relations with the Entente states was removed. The goal that the Polish government sought-to get help for waging war with the Soviet republics - was achieved.
On the basis of a secret agreement (concluded on December 23, 1917) between France and England on the division of spheres of influence in the territories of
26 In a letter to K. Dluski dated 17 January, Pilsudski reported: "A fatal shortage of ammunition... and above all, the complete emptiness in the state treasury forced me to speed up the decision on the... cabinet " ("Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1958, N 4, s. 1153).
27th meeting of the NPC in Paris on December 15, 1918. AAN, KNP, t. 8, k. 30 - 32.
28 "The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover. Years of Adventure 1874 - 1920". T. I. N. Y. 1951, pp. 356 - 357.
29 "Kwartalnik Historyczny", 1958, N 4, str. 1151.
30 "Monitor Polski", 17.I.1919.
31 See M. Seyda. Polska na przelomie. T. II, Warszawa. 1927, str. 555.
32 R. Lansing's telegram to I. Paderewski, January 26, 1919. Monitor Polski, 27. I. 1919; S. Pichon's telegram to I. Paderewski, January 30, 1919. "Monitor Polski", 31.I.1919.
33 Colonel House wrote to W. Wilson: "Now that Paderewski has formed a government in Poland that obviously enjoys the support of Pilsudski and other prominent leaders, I would suggest that you, on behalf of the United States, immediately recognize this de facto government. I believe that in this matter we should set an example" ("Colonel House's Archive", vol. IV. Moscow, 1944, p. 207).
34 "Sprawozdanie stenograficzne Sejmu Ustawodawczego RP", 24.II.1919, szp. 295; 28.II.1919, szp. 384.
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In the former Russian Empire, France pledged to assist Poland in the fight against Soviet Russia. This commitment to France was recalled by D. Lloyd George on July 6, 1920, in response to the reproach of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs St. Patek said that Britain did not sufficiently assist the Polish government in the fight against the Bolsheviks .35 The Entente viewed Poland's military actions against the Soviet republics as an integral part of the Allied armed intervention against the Soviet government in order to restore the old order in Russia, as well as to prevent the socialist revolution in the West. However, there were differences of opinion regarding Polish territorial claims in the east. The position of the US government on the borders of the future Polish state was formulated by President Wilson in paragraph XIII of his message to the Senate of January 8, 1918: "An independent Polish state must be created, which will include territories with an undisputed Polish population." 36 Compiled in October 1918 by W. Lippmann and F. Cobb on behalf of Colonel House, the commentary to paragraph XIII of Wilson's message read:: "In the east, Poland should not receive any land dominated by Lithuanians or Ukrainians." 37 England's position did not differ from that of the United States. Lloyd George summed it up in these words: "Poland should not absorb a population that is not and does not want to be Polish." 38 A different position was taken by France, which sought not only to create a strong Poland, but also to restore a united and indivisible Russia within its borders before 1914 (with the exception of the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland). However, for her, too, the question of Poland was a bargaining chip in negotiations with the allies on the more important issue of reparations. This position of France was revealed during the preparation of the armistice treaty with Germany by the Entente Supreme Military Council. "White" Russia went even further in its demands on the issue of Poland's borders. Hoping for the restoration of a "united and indivisible Russia", Kolchak and Denikin not only rejected Poland's territorial claims in the east, but also demanded the inclusion of the native Polish region of Chelmschyna in Russia, hoping to leave Poland only the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland .39 Despite these differences, both the Entente and the Russian White Guards were interested in the participation of the Polish armed forces in the anti-Soviet intervention.
The Polish government was aware of the negative attitude of the Allies, especially England and the United States, to its territorial claims in the east of the country, but it was not able to ignore them.-
35 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. III, Moscow, 1965, p. 130.
36 A. Gelberg. Prawo miedzynarodowe i historia dyplomatyczna. T. II. Warszawa. 1958, str. 12. On March 3, 1919, Wilson informed the Council of Four at the Paris Peace Conference that when he received I. Paderewski and R. Dmowski at the beginning of September 1918, he told them :" We must agree on what Poland means. They then showed me a map showing that their claims were huge in all directions. I told them: "In my opinion, Poland should cover all territories occupied exclusively by the Polish population "(Les Deliberation du Conseil des Quatre 24 mars-28 juin 1919. Notes de l'officier interprete Paul Mantoux". P. 1955, p. 282.
37 "Colonel House's Archive", vol. IV, p. 157.
38 D. Lloyd George. The Truth about Peace Treaties, vol. 2, Moscow, 1957, p. 195.
39 "Hoover Library and Institution of War, Peace and Revolution". Stanford (Calif.). M. N. Siers Archives, w. 81; "Polska w swietle postanowien rzadu omskiego. Protokoly posiedzen specjalnego Komitetu przygotowawczego do rokowan pokojowych z 4. I. i 6. I. 1919 roku". "Studia z najnowszych dziejow powszechnych", 1963, N 3, s. 216 - 227.
40 Pilsudski wrote: "The Entente - which is also not a secret-sought a solution to the Russian problem much more than one or another solution to the Polish questions" (J. Pilsudski. Pisma zbiorowe. T. VIII, p. 152).
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The Government of the Soviet Union agreed to participate in the intervention and to provide military assistance to fight the war with the Soviet republics. Pilsudski was determined to implement the Eastern plan by armed means, which provided for the creation of a federal state under the hegemony of Poland, which would include Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and even Latvia and Estonia. These great-power aspirations meant the "third solution" of the" Russian " question: "neither the preservation of the Bolshevik regime, nor the restoration of reactionary Russia"41 . Later , the legitimacy of this position of the Polish government was repeatedly questioned by the allies, 42 as well as by the Kolchak government in Omsk, which was represented in Paris by the so-called Russian Political Council .43 The difference of opinion among the Allies and the subordination of the" Polish "question to the" Russian " question became apparent from the very beginning of the conference.
The problem of Poland's participation in the anti-Soviet intervention of the Entente arose even before the official opening of the Paris Peace Conference (January 18)44 At a meeting of the Entente Supreme Military Council, convened to discuss the conference procedure. At the request of Marshal F. Foch, his "Note on the Situation in Poland" of January 11 and the attached draft of new terms of the peace treaty with Germany concerning Poland were considered. Foch said that the situation in Poland is dangerous, because there is still a war going on there. The military confusion in this area is a threat to the whole of Europe, and the situation must be changed immediately .45 To this end, he proposed to complete the formation of Haller's Polish divisions in France and send them to help the Polish army. In order to ensure the passage of Haller's troops by sea through Gdansk - Torun, which Germany opposed, it was necessary, according to Foch, to occupy this road with two allied divisions, using in this case Article XVI of the armistice agreement at Compiegne, 46 and under their cover to transfer troops to Poland. Foch's proposal was supported by Zh. Clemenceau, while Wilson and Lloyd George were opposed, fearing that Haller's troops would be used by the Poles to pursue territorial claims in the east, rather than to fight the Bolsheviks. 47 In this regard, the issue was postponed until the general policy towards Russia is considered. The Council of Ten returned to the question of Poland on January 21 at the initiative of W. Wilson, who recommended an affirmative answer to Paderewski's request to supply the Polish army with weapons and ammunition to fight the Bolsheviks and send an inter-Allied commission to Warsaw to study the situation on the ground. And this time, the debate on Poland was postponed until the end of the discussion on the "Russian question", which began with the opening of the conference.-
41 T. Komarnicki. Rebirth of the Polish Repubfic. A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe. 1914 - 1920. L. 1957, p. 469.
42 Pilsudski, wrote Lloyd George, "disregarded equally the opposition of the Military Council (Entente-V. G.) and the exhortations of President Wilson" (D. Lloyd George. Edict. soch. Vol. I, p. 270).
43 See S. Sazonov's letter to P. Vologda on March 20, 1919. Proletarian Revolution, 1921, No. 1, p. 126.
44 B. E. Stein mistakenly believed that the question of Poland was first raised at a meeting of the Council of Ten on January 21 (B. E. Stein. "The Russian Question" at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920). Moscow, 1949, p. 184).
45 "Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919" (далее - PPC). T. III. Washington. 1943, pp. 477 - 479.
46 of Article XVI read:: "The Allies will have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on the eastern borders, either via Danzig or via the Vistula, in order to be able to supply food to the population and in order to maintain order" (PPC. T. II, p.4).
47 PPC. T. III, pp. 471 - 472.
48 "Colonel House's Archive", vol. IV, pp. 206-207.
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The meeting of the Council of Ten was held on 16 January and continued on 21 and 22 January 49 . During the meeting, the Italian delegate S. Sonnino offered to listen to the former Danish Ambassador to Russia G. Skavenius, who was in Paris at the time. The latter suggested that the Allies use the Polish armed forces for an armed intervention in Russia after their appropriate equipment. "In Poland," he said, " there are a hundred thousand excellent soldiers, but they have neither weapons nor uniforms." Following Skavenius ' information, President Wilson read out a report from his emissary in Stockholm, W. Buckler, who was sent there on January 8 to meet confidentially with the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, M. M. Litvinov. During these negotiations (which took place on January 14-16), when Buckler remarked that the Russians wanted to attack Poland, Litvinov replied that they had no imperialist intentions towards Poland and that they only sought to grant it an unlimited right to self-determination. 50
On January 22, at a morning meeting, the Council of Ten began to consider the question of Poland. Discussions were resumed on Foch's note of January 11, as well as Wilson's proposal of January 21 to supply the Polish army with weapons and ammunition. Foch described the difficulties encountered in implementing his intention. Germany did not agree to the passage of Haller's army through Gdansk and Torun, demanding passage through Germany by rail. In this regard, Foch asked Germany to give guarantees on behalf of the Entente that Haller's troops would be used only for the fight against the Bolsheviks, and to decide on sending two allied divisions to occupy the Gdansk-Torun road. When asked by A. Balfour whether Poland was really threatened by a Bolshevik attack at that time, Foch answered evasively: Foch also supported Paderewski's request for the expulsion of an inter-Allied commission to Warsaw. In his opinion, this commission was supposed to replace the American and British missions in Warsaw 51 . A. Balfour was the first to take the floor in the debate. He was forced to state that among many difficult issues for the Supreme Soviet, the most difficult one is to force the Poles to adopt a "narrowed" territorial program. Balfour had anticipated that the Allies would have to enforce it. The fact is that the Polish government, taking advantage of the break between the end of the war and the beginning of the peace conference, began to implement its demands, encroaching in the east on territories that were outside the borders of the former Russian Poland and to which it in many cases had no rights. In his opinion, the allies should have turned to Poland and warned it against unauthorized actions.: she had to wait for the decisions that the peace conference would make on this issue. Balfour did not speak out against "helping" the Polish government and combining missions in Poland, but he believed that this issue should be fully prepared. In this regard, he offered to temporarily refrain from sending Haller's troops. Wilson supported Balfour's view. For his part, he offered to supply the Polish government with military materials to equip the 600-800-thousandth army. Clemenceau agreed to this suggestion, as Foch's intentions concerning the immediate-
49 PPC. T. III, pp. 581 - 593, 634 - 639, 642, 676 - 677; D. Lloyd George. Edict. soch. Vol. I, pp. 286-316.
50 PPC. T. III, pp. 290, 583 - 584, 629 - 660; D. Lloyd George. Edict. op. t. I, p. 291, 292, 296 - 297, 317 - 318.
51 PPC. T. III, pp. 670 - 675.
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The plan to send Haller's army to Poland was not approved by the Allies. At the same time, he drew attention to Paderewski's suggestion that an inter-Allied commission should be sent to Warsaw to report to the peace conference on the situation in Poland. Lloyd George supported Clemenceau, specifying that, in his opinion, " the commission should include not only the military, but also politicians. Sonnino added that the inter-Allied commission should persuade the Polish government to limit its military actions to "resisting the Bolsheviks." 52
At a meeting of the Council of Ten on January 24, at the suggestion of the British delegation, the text of a message presented by Wilson to the States of Central and Eastern Europe was approved, which called on them to stop trying to take possession of the disputed territories until the relevant resolutions were adopted by the peace conference. The Council of Ten instructed the French delegate, S. Pichon, to prepare draft directives for the inter-Allied commission, which was to go to Warsaw .53 The list of members of this commission was approved at a meeting on January 25. The Soviet entrusted the leadership of the organization to the former French Ambassador in Petrograd, J. Nulans. The last step meant the victory of Foch's concept and France in the question of Poland .54
At the meeting on January 29, the head of the Polish delegation (also known as the Endek leader), R. Dmowski, presented the territorial requirements of the Polish government. He suggested that the starting point for establishing the borders of the Polish state should be the situation that existed in 1772, before the first partition of Poland. Then the territory of Poland, he said, stretched east to the Dnieper and Dvina. This was possible thanks to the annexation of Lithuania. Now, since Poles do not constitute the majority in Lithuania, despite the fact that Lithuanians are closely related to Poland, it would be possible to reduce Polish possessions in this country, leaving most of Russia. You can leave not only Lithuania, but also Ukraine outside the borders of the Polish state. Poland is concerned about the anarchy that prevails in these eastern territories of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in order to ensure harmony and order within its state, it is ready to renounce them. 55 Dmowski closely linked the problem of Poland's eastern borders with the anti-Soviet policy of the Polish propertied classes. Having approved Dmovsky's report, the Supreme Soviet began discussing draft directives for the Nulans Commission. After a lengthy discussion at two meetings - on January 29 and February 1 - the directives were approved. The Nulans Commission was instructed to: "1. Send comprehensive information about the actual situation of Poland from the military, political, religious and food points of view. 2. Warn the Polish Government against the policy of unauthorized return of territories. 3. Explore the possibilities of delivery to the Polish government-
52 Ibid., pp. 674 - 675.
53 Ibid., pp. 715 - 717.
54 . The commission consisted of: Prof. R. Lord and Gen. Kernan from the United States, E. Howard and General A. Carton de Viart from England, D. Montagne and General Romay-Logen from Italy, General A. Nissel and J. Nulans from France.
55 AAN. KNP, t. 9, k. 35-44; PPC. T. III, pp. 772-782. On January 24, President Wilson's adviser S. Bonsall held talks with Dmowski about the problems of Poland and Eastern Europe. The report of this conversation is given by L. Gerson: "Dmowski seems to dream of a Polish state stretching like old Poland, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in which the main role would be played by brave knights and beautiful ladies, that is, the very people who go to Cannes in winter and Baden-Baden in summer, and whose claims to a luxurious life are so great that their slaves in the country would have to work very hard to satisfy them" (L. Gerson. Woodrow Wilson und die Wiedergeburt Polens 1914 - 1920. Wurzburg. 1956, S. 186).
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to provide the necessary means to maintain order within the country and to protect it from any external aggression " 56 . The tasks of the commission corresponded to the intentions of the Polish government, which agreed, in exchange for military assistance from the Entente, to take part in the anti-Soviet intervention of the Allies .57 In accordance with the recommendations of the Council of Ten Commissions, Nulansa had to determine by what means this plan could be most successfully implemented.
On February 12, the Nulans commission arrived in Poland. Members of the commission paid visits to Pilsudski and Paderewski. On February 18, Pilsudski gave a dinner in the Belvedere in honor of representatives of the allied states. Welcoming the members of the inter-Allied commission, he stressed that the Polish ruling classes want to remain loyal allies of the Entente. 58 On February 18, Kurier Polski published an interview with Nulans, a correspondent of this newspaper, regarding the Allies ' policy on Poland. Nulans said that an important step "is the achievement of a truce and the cessation of hostilities on the Ukrainian front. For this purpose, a mission headed by General Barthelemy, which includes military personnel and members of our commission, left for Lviv... Of course, "Nulans continued," We will not seek an armistice with the Bolsheviks; on the contrary, we are trying to give the Poles an opportunity... so that they can more easily defend themselves against the invasion of the Bolsheviks." It was in this context that the Nulans Commission in Warsaw operated. Reconciliation with Poland's western neighbors was supposed to be a prerequisite for organizing a general anti-Soviet campaign.
The arrival of the Nulans commission in Warsaw coincided with the resumption of Polish military operations on the Eastern Front. The Supreme Command of the Entente forces, especially Marshal Foch, decided already in January 1919 to replace the German troops on the Eastern Front with Polish ones. The Polish-German negotiations on this issue, which had been interrupted at the end of December 1918, were resumed at Foch's request in early January .59 On behalf of the Supreme Command of the Polish Army, the negotiations were conducted by Captain J. Gonserowski, and on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - L. Koljankowski. On the German side, Government Commissioner M. Bulman and representatives of the military command participated in the negotiations. The first meeting between Gonserovsky and Bulman took place on January 9 in Hrodna 60 . Bialystok was designated as the place of negotiations (they were held in secret).
The decisive factor that influenced the German government's resumption of negotiations with Poland was the inevitability of the retreat of German troops from the Eastern Front, which were increasingly influenced by the ideas of the October Revolutions in Russia and were unsuitable for fighting the Bolsheviks .61 The evacuation, originally planned by the Germans for the end of March, had to be postponed to mid-February 62 . However, the Polish government, which
56 PPC. T. III, pp. 838 - 840; "Conference des preliminaires de paix Commission Interalliee de Pologne. Proces-verbaux et rapport" (далее - "Commission Interalliee de Pologne"). P. 1919, pp. 193 - 194.
57 See the memorandum of the Polish Military Attache in Bern, O. Gurki J. To the Gallery of February 7, 1919. "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. II, pp. 88-98.
58 J. Pilsudski. Pisma zbiorowe. T. V. Warszawa. 1937, str. 58.
59 W. Gostynsk a. Op. cit., str. 35 - 36.
60 DZA. Bd. 21736, f. 36.
61 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", Vol. II, p. 89. This is also indicated by W. Brockdorf-Rantzau in a telegram to the German command on the Eastern Front dated January 1 (ibid., p. 55).
62 " Demobilization of the troops of the Eastern Front, where at the time of the armistice there were more than 700 thousand people, planned by Gen. It can be completed by mid-February" (ibid., pp. 89-90).
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It hoped to attract Germany to cooperate in the struggle against the Soviet republics, but it missed an advantageous moment and, instead of exploiting Germany's predicament in connection with the Posen uprising, made far-reaching concessions to the Germans. The defensive nature of Pilsudski's policy towards the Polish western lands and aggressive actions in the east, according to the Polish historian J. Kukulka, were explained by the fact that " the ruling propertied classes of Poland formed foreign policy in accordance with their own, and not national interests. The fact that large-scale property in the eastern lands was mainly in the hands of Poles was undoubtedly the main reason for such a different attitude of the ruling classes towards these lands."63 This explanation seems insufficient to us. The decisive influence on the foreign policy of the Polish government was, along with the material factor, an ideological one - class hostility to the state of the workers and peasants, the desire to destroy the Soviet republics, which by their existence had a revolutionizing influence on the Polish masses. Hence the common desire of the ruling circles with the Allies and with Germany to overthrow the Soviet Government. For its help in the fight against Soviet Russia, the Polish government made far-reaching concessions to the Allies and Germany .64
On February 5, representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Staff signed an agreement with representatives of the German government and command on the Eastern Front" concerning the withdrawal of German troops from the territory of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus through Poland. German troops in Lithuania and Belarus were replaced by Polish troops in order to resume military operations against the Soviet republics .65 The political meaning of the agreement of February 5, 1919 was as follows: the German troops and the occupation authorities, who, under the armistice agreement with the Entente (Article XII) of November 11, 1918, remained in Eastern Europe to perform police functions, transferred these functions to the Polish authorities. In accordance with this agreement, the Podlaskie group of Polish troops under the command of General A. Listovsky occupied Terespol and Brest-Litovsk on February 9, and Kobrin on February 10. After the transfer of Bialystok to the Polish authorities on February 11, Polish troops entered Volkovysk on February 13. 66 On February 14, a communique of the General staff of the Polish army appeared in the press; " On February 13, Paul-
63 J. Kukulka. Niektore aspekty miedzynarodowej polityki Pilsudskiego wobec ziem litewsko-bialoruskich (w pierwszej polowie 1919 r.). "Studia z najnowszych dziejow powszechnych". T. II. Warszawa. 1982, str. 49.
64 On February 12, 1919, after a conversation with Pilsudski and Paderewski, M. Buhlmann informed the Bavarian Ambassador in Berlin, K. J. Schulz. On February 8, the Polish government presented a draft Polish-German agreement: "Both nations declare that the question of the territories that are the subject of dispute between them can be resolved on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination or submitted to a peace conference. Both nations declare that they will fight against any manifestation of Bolshevism and support each other in this struggle "(Documents and Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish Relations, vol. II, p. 100). In directives issued by the Nulans Commission in Warsaw, the Council of Ten recommended that the Polish Government refrain from any military action directed against Germany (Commission Interalliee de Pologne, p. 194).
65 " Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations, vol. II, pp. 85-89. The agreement was written in German. It was first published in Polish translation in 1938 (see Bellona, 1938, zesz. 4 - 6, s. 85 - 89).
66 St. Pomaranski. Pierwsza wojna polska (1918 - 1920). Zbior komunikatow prasowych Sztabu Generalnego WP (za czas od 26.XI.1918 - 20.X.1920). Warszawa. 1920, str. 33, 35, 36.
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Russian troops entered Volkovysk, where they occupied the section of the front left by the Germans against the Bolsheviks. " 67
In mid - February 1919, with the help of the Entente, Polish troops resumed military operations against the Soviet republics of Lithuania and Belarus; on March 13, they occupied Slonim, and on March 17, Pinsk. Resuming military operations on the Lithuanian-Belorussian front in February, the Polish general Staff counted on the help of the Entente, without which it could not hope for success .68 The Inter-Allied Commission in Warsaw, in telegrams dated February 15 and 21 to Paris, requested that Haller's army be sent to Poland as soon as possible, along with full military equipment and significant ammunition reserves, since, as it pointed out, Poland's martial law required "the immediate implementation of these steps." The military assistance of the Entente made it possible to bring the Polish army to almost 200 thousand soldiers in April 1919 .69
The assistance that the Allies provided to the Polish Government70 was closely related to the role that they intended Poland to play in their plans to fight Soviet Russia. A note prepared by the General Command of the Entente armies on this issue was presented on February 17 at a meeting of the Entente Military Council by W. Churchill. 71 About the role of Poland, it said: "The encirclement of Bolshevism, which began from the north, east and south, should be supplemented... in the West, by restoring Poland, which is militarily capable of defending its existence... The restoration of Poland should be a matter for the Polish army. France can organize this army and, with the assistance of Allied sea transport, transfer 6 infantry divisions formed in France." In conclusion, the note stressed that Poland can serve as a springboard for an anti-Soviet armed action, provided that the allies provide it with appropriate assistance. Clemenceau, as F. Carr, Lloyd George's adviser on the "Russian problem", stated in a note to Lloyd George dated February 17, believed that it was necessary to "erect a barrier along the current border in order to isolate ourselves from the Bolsheviks, since we do not have the strength to do anything else"72 .The plan was returned to the Council of Ten on 25 February, having been justified by Foch during the debate on the transfer of Haller's troops from France to Poland. 73
Contradictions between the Entente states and the Polish government on the question of Poland's eastern borders were being pushed back
67 Ibid., str. 36.
68 The numerical strength of the Polish army on February 1, 1919, according to the information of the General Command of the Entente armies, was: "On the Bolshevik front-20 thousand people; on the Ruthenian front-20 thousand people; on the fronts of Poznan and Silesia-20 thousand-23 thousand people; inside the country (in the stage of organization) - 42 thousand people ....In France-6 infantry divisions" ("From the history of the civil War in the USSR". Collection of documents and materials in three volumes. 1918-1922. Vol. II. Moscow, 1961, pp. 13-14). The Supreme Command of the Polish Army, in an order of February 14, 1919, promised "better equipment of soldiers with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, underwear, shoes, sanitary equipment and food in connection with the expected influx of these materials from the Entente countries in the very near future" (A. Przybylski. Dzialania wstepne w wojnie polsko-rosyjskiej 1918 - 1920. Warszawa. 1928 str. 19, 21 - 22).
69 "Commission Interalliee de Pologne", pp. 211, 465.
70 Poland's debt to the Allies for "assistance" during the Polish - Soviet war in 1919-1921 amounted, according to E. Rose's calculations, to $ 265.2 million, including $ 166.3 million to the United States, $ 63.1 million to France, $ 18.4 million to England, and $ 7.8 million to Italy. Poland's debt to the United States on the issue loan amounted to $ 18.2 million. "Almost all of our foreign debts (by 1922), - states E. Thus, they originate in 1919 and 1920" (E. Rose. Bilans gospodarczy trzech lat niepodleglosci. Warszawa. 1922, str. 170, 172).
71 "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919. Russia". Washington, 1937, pp. 71-72. "From the history of the Civil War in the USSR", vol. 2, pp. 5-8.
72 D. Lloyd George. Edict. op. t. I, p. 323.
73 PPC. T. IV. Washington. 1943, pp. 120 - 126.
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everything is more in the background. The development of events in Russia has brought to the fore the problem of including Poland in the anti-Soviet interventionist campaign of the Entente. On March 6, the Supreme High Command of the Allied Forces submitted a note to the Entente Military Council on the Foch Plan, taking into account the positions of the allied states at the peace conference on the "Russian question" and the proposals of the Polish delegation at the peace conference concerning Poland's participation in military operations against Soviet Russia. The introduction to the note mentioned the need to continue the armed intervention, taking into account its features, at a new stage. The note listed the forces that should be counted on in this action: "1) the Russian forces, 2) the forces of the great powers of the Entente, 3) the forces of the states neighboring Russia." The main emphasis was placed on the strength of the states neighboring Russia: "Finland, the Baltic provinces, Poland and Romania as Russia's immediate neighbors; Serbia and Czechoslovakia due to ethnic kinship and economic interests; Greece... they should have... provide the necessary forces for the struggle against Bolshevism. " 74
It was a plan of intervention, which assumed that the White Guards in Russia would come to the aid not of the allied troops, as it was until then, but of Polish, Finnish, Romanian and others. Poland was supposed to become a springboard for this new anti-Soviet action, given its geographical location and the presence of a strong army. The participation of the Entente powers in this anti-Soviet campaign was supposed to be reduced to defining the borders of Eastern European states, organizing an allied command to lead military operations, and providing assistance to the USSR . The Foch Plan, which had repeatedly raised doubts among the Entente powers, especially Britain and the United States, was accepted by them this time. It is significant that they entrusted W. Churchill, a supporter of this plan, with the task of presenting their point of view .76
What were the reasons for the change in Allied tactics? First, the inability to continue the intervention in Russia only by its own forces. Secondly, the Foch Plan provided for a new form of intervention with the help of troops from neighboring states under the military leadership of allies. This new form of intervention, approved by the Allies, met with resistance from "white" Russia, which feared that the Entente might recognize the right to self-determination of the marginal peoples of the former tsarist Russia as participants in the intervention. On March 9, the Russian Political Council in Paris issued a statement to the peace conference, in which it demanded that the Allies should not make any decisions concerning the nationalities of the former tsarist Empire without the participation of a representative of Russia (i.e., "white" Russia - V. G. ) .77 The national policy of" white " Russia, supported by the Entente states, did not cause any problems.-
74 "From the history of the Civil War in the USSR". Vol. 2, pp. 8-15; PPC. T. III, pp. 773-775; AAN, KNP, t. 9, k. 35-38.
75 D. Lloyd George. Op. op.vol. 1, p. 319. As reported in Foch's note, " Pilsudski stated that he is able to mobilize an army of 12 infantry divisions in 3 months. We can, therefore, expect that Poland, with the material support of the Entente, will be able to intervene in Russia with an army of 250 thousand people" ("From the history of the civil War in the USSR", Vol. 2, pp. 9, 11, 13, 14).
76 D. Lloyd George. Op. op. vol. 1, pp. 326, 328-329. On March 28, Churchill, in a letter to Foch, among other things, reported: "I agree in the most general form with the considerations that you outlined to me during our meeting regarding the Russian problem as a whole; I am doing and will continue to do everything I can to support them and achieve their implementation" (From the History of the Civil War in the USSR, Vol. 2, p. 36).
77 "From the correspondence of V. N. Maklakov with the National Center" ("Red Archive", 1929, vol. 5 (36), p. 20).
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Contentment is precisely among the peoples of those countries - Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - which, in accordance with the Foch Plan, were obliged to come to the aid of the White Guards in their armed struggle against Soviet power. This was the root of the weakness of the Foch Plan and one of the reasons for its failure .78 The Allies ' adoption of the Foch Plan ended the discussion at the peace conference on the form of intervention in Russia. The method of indirect intervention - using neighboring states, primarily Poland, as a weapon of struggle against the Soviet government-won out. The Polish Government's efforts to obtain aid from the Entente to wage war against the Soviet republics of Lithuania and Belarus were crowned with success.
The project of using Poland as the main base for an offensive against Soviet Russia was openly supported in the country only by reactionary circles-Endeks and conservative elements of Pilsudczyk. The Endek organ Gazeta Warszawska wrote that Poland should immediately conclude a political and military alliance with the Entente. There is no need to flatter yourself that the latter is interested in Poland for its own sake. The Allies are only interested in one thing: the fight against Bolshevism, the war with Soviet Russia, and only if Poland gives herself completely to this war can she expect any reward. "Not only ethnographic Poland, but in general the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (i.e. Lithuania, Belarus, etc.) create the basis for operations of the Western powers against the Bolshevik hydra, as if providing the rear of the Allied armies..."79. The majority of the Polish public, mainly workers and peasants, opposed interference in the internal affairs of Russia and participation in the armed anti-Soviet intervention of the Entente. Their protest was forced to express deputies from the PPP, the National Workers 'Union," Polski stronnitsva Ludowa", "Vyzvolene" and "Piast" even in the Legislative Sejm. Without speaking out in principle against the war in the east and against the alliance of Poland with the Entente in order to restore Poland to the borders that existed before its first partition, that is, before 1772, they spoke out against Poland's participation in the anti-Bolshevik intervention in Russia .80
The Communist Workers ' Party resolutely opposed the anti-Soviet intervention and the alliance of Poland with the Entente. The Party Council (that is, the enlarged Plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) in February 1919 considered the requests of the Polish government addressed to the Entente as an attack on the "freedom of the nation" 81 . The point of view of the Communists was supported by the PPP-opposition and the Soviets of Workers ' Deputies of Poland. On March 4, the Warsaw Soviet of Workers ' Deputies protested against the policy of the Paderewski Government towards the Soviet republics .82 It was supported by the Councils of the largest industrial centers. This question was raised by the Communists at a meeting of the Second Conference of Soviets
78 See V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 39, pp. 325-326.
79 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. II, p. 765.
80 "Sprawozdanie Stenograficzne Sejmu Ustawodawczego RP", 22-25. II. 1919 szp. 109-235; 27. III. 1919 szp. 1148-1149, 1151, the Polish emigrant historian B. Andreus wrote on this occasion: "With the exception of the conservative and some reactionary groups, which at that time did not have any significant influence on the Polish public, the Russian Revolution could not but be greeted in Poland with a feeling of great relief and joy. This was especially emphasized in the centers of Polish workers 'and peasants' thought." Polska "kapitalistyczna interwencja" w stosunku do ZSRR, 1919 - 1920. R. 1945, s. 17.
81 "Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations", vol. II, p. 104.
82 "Rady Delegatow Robotniczych w Polsce. Warszawska Rada Delegatow Robotniczych. Materialy i dokumenty". T. I. Warszawa. 1962, str. 264 - 272.
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Workers ' Deputies of Poland, which took place on March 5 and 6 in Warsaw. The meeting decided to call a general strike in protest against the policy of the Paderewski government and to include in the slogans of the strike demands: to stop military operations against the Soviet republics-Lithuania, Belarus and Russia, and to start peace negotiations with them with the participation of representatives of the Soviets. 83 Under these slogans, a general strike was held in Poland on March 12-13, despite the fact that the PPP leadership called on workers to refuse to participate in it .84 The workers 'and peasants' masses condemned Poland's accession to the Foch Plan, 85 which threatened Poland with the loss of independence, because there was no doubt that if the counter-revolution had won in Russia, the existence of an independent Poland would have been threatened. T. Komarnicki, a Polish emigrant historian, states that Pilsudski was aware of this, but " decisive a factor in determining his attitude to this problem was disbelief in the possibility of Russian white formations conquering Russia, a disbelief that testifies to Pilsudski's deep realism. " 86 But it is unlikely that a government that bases its policy on the" properly understood interests of the nation "could be guided in determining its foreign policy by such a" decisive factor "of a psychological nature as" disbelief", especially when this policy threatened the independent existence of Poland, and this hardly indicates the" deep realism " of the country's ruling circles. It is well known that Poland was saved from the repeated loss of independence in 1919 by the struggle of the Soviet people, who defeated the troops of "white" Russia, and the initiative of the Polish communists, primarily Y. Markhlevsky, who managed to convince the Polish government at that time of the need to suspend military operations that provided assistance to the White Guard armies .87
83 H. Bicz. Rady Delegatow Robotniczych w Polsce w 1918 - 1919. Moskwa, 1934, s. 284.
84 J. Holzer. Polska Partia Socjalistyczna w latach 1917 - 1919. Warszawa. 1962, s. 333.
85 The Polish Army was to be led by the Entente command. On June 14, 1919, a military convention was concluded on this issue between Poland and the Allies ("From the History of the Civil War in the USSR", Vol. II, p. 53).
86 T. Komarnicki. Czy Pilsudski uratowal bolszewizm? "Wiadomosci" (L.), 26.VII.1956, N 31 (539).
87 V. Gostinska. Польско-радянські переговори в червні-грудні 1919 р. та їх значеня в розвитку подій громадянської війни. "Український історичний журнал", 1961, N 11, стр. 71 - 78; Ф. Тых, Х. Шумахер. Julian Marchlewski. M. 1969, pp. 311-324; J. Marchlewski. Przedmowa do polskiego wydania "Ksiegi Czerwonej". M. 1921; ejusd. Rosja proletariacka i Polska burzuazyjna. Pisma wybrane. Warszawa. 1956, s. 754 - 758; W. Gostynska. Rola Juliana Marchlewskiego w tajnych rokowaniach polsko-radzieckich (czerwiec-lipiec 1919 r.). "Z Pola Walki", 1966. N 2/34/, s. 23 - 40; ejusd. Tajne rokowania polsko-radzieckie w Mikaszewiczach (sier-pien-grudzien 1919 r.). "Z Pola Walki", 1967, N 4/40/, s. 53 - 78.
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