K. A. LIKHACHEV

Candidate of Historical Sciences Saint Petersburg State University

India Keywords:, Assam, Bangladesh, Bhutan, ethnic separatism, Islamic extremism, terrorism

July-August 2012 India has been rocked by another communal conflict in the northeastern state of Assam. 78 people were killed in a massacre between the indigenous population-tribes speaking the Tibetan-Burmese Bodo language - and Muslim immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh, and 300 thousand "newcomers" left their homes in panic. Panic has reached the country's west coast, where Muslim migrants were beaten up in and around Mumbai. Speaking in Parliament, Indian Prime Minister M. Singh said:: "The unity and integrity of our country is at stake. Inter-communal harmony is at stake"¹. The seven states of North-East India( SWI), especially the most populous of them, Assam, are a traditional hotbed of instability. The unresolved nature of various conflicts and contradictions between local ethnic groups, economic problems and the transparency of borders with neighboring states have led to the persistence of separatist sentiments and increased tension in this region of the state*.

Assamese people are particularly concerned about the large influx of migrants from other states and neighboring Bangladesh. A movement against "outsiders" has emerged in the state under the slogan of protecting the local population ("sons of the earth") from the aliens. It was joined by radical separatist organizations - the United Front for the Liberation of Assam (OFOA) and the Bodo Liberation Tigers, which advocate the creation of a separate state of Bodoland.

In 2005, a truce was signed between the central government and the Tigers. The Bodo tribes gained administrative autonomy in a number of districts, which significantly strengthened their position in the struggle for land against Muslim settlers. "This is not a religious conflict. This is a battle for land and power, " Maulana ^B. Ajmal, a Muslim member of the Indian Parliament, described the conflict in Assam in June-July 2012.2

Despite the severity of the latest outbreak in Assam, the main threat remains separatism of the Assamese Hindus, who make up the majority in this state of 31 million people.

ILLEGAL MIGRATION AND THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMORADICALISM

Throughout the first decade of the twenty - first century, the state remained the scene of a fierce struggle between the central government and the most dangerous secessionist group of the SVI, the United Front for the Liberation of Assam (OFLA). This group was created back in 1979 in the wake of local residents ' protests against illegal migrants. Independence of Assam has always been the main goal of the OFO, which used radical methods of struggle.

In the 1980s, the OFOA, as part of the Indo-Burmese Revolutionary Front, worked together with other dangerous regional separatist groups, including the National Socialist Council of Nagaland and others. In the 1990s, a standoff with the Indian government led to the establishment of links between the OFO and the military intelligence services of Pakistan and Bangladesh.³ And even the fact that there are almost no Muslims among the militants did not prevent the Interagency Intelligence Service of Pakistan (MP) from supporting this terrorist group. By the beginning of the 2000s, the total number of PFOA was estimated to be between 3 and 5 thousand, and the Assamese separatists operated mainly on money received from levies from representatives of medium and large businesses and from participation in international drug trafficking.⁴

As in the 20th century, the main problems for the states of North-Eastern India today are caused by the flow of refugees from Bangladesh, due to the difference in the socio-economic situation in the two countries and the difficulty of controlling long borders. Bangladeshi illegal immigrants in some states even began to pose a threat to the traditional ethnic composition of the local population. For example, in the early 2000s, illegal migrants made up the majority in 4 of the 27 districts of Assam, while in five they made up more than 35%. At this time, there was widespread criticism of the Assam Irregular Migrants Act (AMN) of 1983,5 whose serious shortcomings effectively neutralized the central Government's fight against illegal migration in Assam. As a result, by 2000, out of 300,000 cases opened against illegal migrants, only 10,000 were recognized as such, and only about 1,500 Bangladeshis were deported.⁶

From 1972 to the early 2000s, about 16 million illegal migrants from Bangladesh (mostly Muslims) moved to Assam and other SWI states, which certainly contributed to the growth of the region's Islamic communities. This is worth adding to-

* For more information, see: Kashin V. P. India: roots of regional separatism / / Asia and Africa today, 2010, N 7; Yakovlev A. Yu. India: nationalism does not give up / / Asia and Africa today, 2011, N 2; Likhachev K. A. Etnoseparatism in North-Eastern India: old problems in the new century // Asia and Africa Today, 2011, No. 10 (editor's note).

It should be noted that Bangladeshi illegal immigrants made up more than 85% of the population in the areas of residence located in the forest and mountainous areas of Assam7. In December 2004, the Supreme Court of India ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation and the Image India Foundation, a non-governmental legal organization, to investigate the extent of the influence of migrants from Bangladesh on the election results in India. As a result, it turned out that Bangladeshis won the majority of votes in 50 out of 126 constituencies in the key state of Assam for SWI. Such results, in the context of increased extremist activity in the region, inevitably raise the question of the danger of spreading Islamic radicalism in the territory of North-Eastern India. The development of Islamic extremism among illegal refugees from Bangladesh in SWI, according to the Supreme Court, could pose a serious threat to the socio-political situation throughout India.

It should be added that local Islamic radical groups also operate in Assam: Harakat-ul Jihad Islami, the Muslim Liberation Front of Assam, the United Muslim Tigers for the Liberation of Assam, the Islamic Security Forces, etc. However, the scale of their activities is relatively modest. In addition, the goals of these groups in the early 2000s were to fight for social equality: to preserve 30% of vacant places for Muslims in the field of education and work, to ensure the safety of Muslim communities, to return thousands of unjustifiably excluded Muslims to the electoral lists, etc. terrorist activities ⁸. In short, the danger from the socio-political activities of Assamese Islamic extremists was incomparable to the danger posed by large ethnic separatist groups in the state.

MP, IWRG AND INDIAN SEPARATISTS

There are different opinions about the extent of foreign intelligence agencies ' influence on the situation in Assam in the 2000s, but it is likely that their role was significant. The Indian authorities have repeatedly and with good reason claimed support for various terrorist groups from the Interdepartmental Intelligence of Pakistan and the General Directorate of Military Intelligence of Bangladesh (GUVR). The long-term goals of the MP, according to the Indian special services, are to destabilize the situation in Assam and in the neighboring states of the region by supporting the most powerful terrorist groups (OFLA, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), etc.). This, in turn, should have a negative impact on India's defense capability.

The arrival of a bloc of Islamist parties to power in Bangladesh in 2001 determined the general course of the country's leadership towards cooperation with radical Islamists in Pakistan and strengthened the link between the MP and the GUWR. This connection was established long before the change in Bangladesh's political course in the late 1980s. ⁹

In the early 2000s, traces of Interagency Intelligence activity in Pakistan were discovered again in the states of SVI. In 2002, the Indian security services managed to arrest two MP agents in the Assam capital of Dispur. During the interrogation, it turned out that their main task was to create and train terrorist cells in Bangladesh from Bangladeshis who were preparing to move illegally to India. The cells were supposed to remain "dormant" for the time being and activate only after the corresponding order from Pakistan was transmitted "along the chain" ¹⁰. At the same time, MP actively lured Assamese youth from poor families to camps located in Bangladesh, where young "jihadi warriors" were trained in military and sabotage work.¹¹ However, in the past decade, betting on islamoradicalism in Assam has not worked. Therefore, local separatist groups remained the main vehicle of the MP's interests in India.

OFO'S IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY

In the 1980s, Assamese separatists repeatedly positioned themselves as opponents of illegal migrants from Bangladesh. In fact, calls for an armed struggle against the dominance of foreigners and for the independence of Assam in most cases covered up criminal activities aimed at financially enriching separatist leaders.

Ideological concepts of the OFA in the XXI century formally osta-

While remaining the same, the struggle against "foreigners" for the "interests of Assamese people" became exclusively anti-Indian in nature. The separatists ' arsenal of tools included the practice of brutal reprisals against illegal workers. But now the attacks were exclusively targeted at Indians: more than 150 victims between 2000 and 2003 were exclusively from the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.

The main goal of the OFO is to terrorize the part of the Assamese population that traditionally identifies with India, and not with "independent Assam". These are primarily native Hindi speakers. In addition, it is the Hindi-speaking population that dominates the Assam economy in the field of highly skilled labor, which naturally causes discontent among the marginal strata of the Assamese population, which make up the majority of militants.¹² In the context of the incessant migration of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to Assam, the OFLA militants should have carried out similar actions against Bangladeshi refugees. But nothing like this happened in the 2000s. This selective policy of killing Indians by Indians only serves to emphasize the existing relations of the OFA with the MP and the IWRG by this time. Part of it was the Front's levy of a "mandatory tax" on Indians living in Assam since 2006.

The presence of its own bases on the territory of neighboring states with India has always been a definite advantage for the OFO in clashes with Indian law enforcement forces: after all, in case of failure of the next action, it was always possible to hide from prosecution and wait out. But in December 2003, a large-scale joint Indian-Bhutanese anti-terrorist operation "All clear" was conducted on the territory of Southern Bhutan. The OFO suffered heavy losses, although it was able to regroup using its bases in Bangladesh and Myanmar. In addition, the extremists managed to move some of their bases to the north-eastern districts of Assam and open new camps in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. As a result, the central Government of India was unable to consolidate the success achieved on its territory.

As Indian intelligence later learned, MP also provided financial support to the OFO at the same time. This made it possible to use mercenaries to carry out terrorist attacks, as the immediate size of the group was significantly reduced. In early 2004, 25 OFLA fighters were transferred to the Pakistani part of Kashmir, where they were trained in the use of modern weapons, advanced explosive techniques, as well as counterintelligence and disinformation techniques.¹³

The problems faced by the OFO after the defeat in Bhutan forced the group to act more cautiously in order to reduce its losses. Since that time, most attacks have been carried out on a "hit-and-run" basis, often in hard-to-reach forest areas of border areas.

In the middle of the last decade, the strategy of the OFO, in addition to shooting Indian migrants, included three directions. First, the concept of attacking "easy targets" - unguarded objects or civilians-was formulated.¹⁴ Secondly, the use of explosives, often locally made in India, was primarily intended for carrying out terrorist attacks, which also reduced the risk of losses during terrorist attacks and increased the number of victims. Third, special units were created from people who have external differences from the local population. Such units, in the form of the Indian Army or paramilitary forces, engaged in looting and violence in rural areas.¹⁵ The goal of the latest innovation was to compromise government forces.

NEGOTIATION TRICKS

In the spring of 2004, OFO leaders offered the authorities a truce and agreed to conduct informal negotiations. At the same time, New Delhi agreed only after removing such preconditions as negotiations in a third country and the participation of the UN as a mediator. The only accepted condition is a mandatory discussion on the independence of Assam16. Naturally, the central government viewed the negotiations as a positive trend caused by the weakening of the grouping. Although the summer months were not marked by significant results in the negotiation process, the truce was still maintained.

However, on August 15, 2004-India's Independence Day-a massive explosion occurred at a market in Dhimaji, killing 16 people.¹⁷ Largely because 10 of the victims were schoolchildren, the attack caused a huge public outcry. The entire Assamese press, numerous non-governmental organizations and community councils condemned the perpetrators of the attack.

It should be noted that the Assamese media is mostly sympathetic to the OFO. Local newspapers, radio and television often either do not report on terrorist attacks carried out by Front fighters at all, or present the consequences of terrorist attacks in a favorable light for extremists.¹⁸

As a result, none of the groups claimed responsibility for their actions. OFOA, which had previously called for a boycott of Independence Day, denied any involvement in the attack. But after analyzing the details of the tragic event, most Indian experts agreed that no other group could have carried out this terrorist attack. ¹⁹ One way or another, the OFO, which supposedly advocates for the interests of Assamese people, has at least temporarily lost public support. The government curtailed the negotiations and took a course of military action. Most likely, it was this temporary "marginalization" of the OFO against the background of a confrontation with the law enforcement forces that led to a decline in its activity at the end of the war.

2004-early 2005 However, the question of whether the leaders of the group really wanted to negotiate, or whether it was just a tactical move due to the current situation, remained open.

In all likelihood, this period of lull in the OFO's actions was interpreted by New Delhi as an indicator of weakness. In such circumstances, the resumption of negotiations from a position of strength could stabilize the situation in Assam, and possibly even further weaken the group's combat potential during the period of forced inactivity. On May 27, 2005, an official letter was sent from the Office of the Prime Minister of India to representatives of the OFA offering a truce and inviting them to negotiate. But there was no response. Most likely, the message was simply not believed. On the other hand, it is very likely that peace was not part of the separatists ' plans at this stage. The fact is that this" break " in principle benefited the group. By mid-2005, its core consisted of approximately 800 trained and armed fighters. And the activists who did not receive special training added more than 1.5 thousand people to the total number of members of the group ²⁰. In early August, the OFO violated the truce: three gas pipeline explosions took place, attacks on law enforcement forces on the border with Arunachal Pradesh, and the manager of a tea company was killed.

The government's response was a new large-scale special operation, tentatively called "Red Rose", which began on August 25 with the participation of the combined forces of the army, the Assamese Police and the Indo-Tibetan Border Forces. The three-day operation was aimed at clearing the border areas of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh and, according to the Indian authorities, "was successful"²¹. However, the law enforcement forces did not provide further details. Indirectly, the success of the operation was confirmed by the fact that the OFO reduced its activity and returned to negotiations with the government.

This time, the leaders of the OFLA, ostensibly to give" constructiveness " to the peace process, initiated the creation of the People's Consultative Group (NGC) on September 8, 2005, consisting of prominent political and public figures in Assam22. New Delhi also attached great importance to these negotiations. Even Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took part in them in October, and he met with representatives of NGK ²³.

Despite the high level, the negotiations were not successful. The greatest achievement was the agreement of OFA leaders not to interfere with the Assam Legislative Assembly elections in the spring of 2006. However, in January 2006, it became known that OFA militants extorted 5 million rupees from the largest Indian oil refining corporation Oil and Natural Gas Corporation in exchange for a promise not to carry out terrorist attacks on its facilities. The company's management refused, and the OFO responded by carrying out a series of bombings of infrastructure facilities belonging to the corporation ²⁴.

New terrorist attacks and the intransigence of the NKG led to the fact that by May 2006, after the third round of negotiations, the negotiations finally reached an impasse, ²⁵ and the central government decided to resume the anti-terrorist operation. But now the OFO fighters were not going to sit out. They have carried out a large number of explosions of oil and gas pipelines, railways, bridges, and have repeatedly attacked military patrols.²⁶

Another escalation of the conflict ended unexpectedly: on August 13, 2006, the anti-terrorist operation in Assam was halted halfway to completion. Apparently, the central authorities failed to fully take control of the situation and decided to take a time-out. Indirect evidence of this was the wave of terrorist attacks that swept the state in the summer, which did not decrease under pressure from government forces. The actions of the latter were sharply criticized in the non-state media.

The extremists supported the unexpected truce. However, this time the strategic initiative was on the side of the militants. At the end of September, a representative of the OFO said that the declared peace was not a response gesture to the cessation of operations of Indian troops, but only an opportunity to regroup forces. Indeed, during the truce, OFO fighters continued to extort money from large companies. On September 23, the manager of a large tea company who was abducted by militants was killed after refusing to pay a ransom of 1 million rupees for his release.²⁷

The killing caused panic among his Assamese colleagues and once again showed that the authorities were not in control of the situation. Under these circumstances, the Government was forced to re-tighten its position, and the NCG was no longer considered a necessary link in the negotiation process. It was obvious that the OFA had deliberately disrupted the negotiations, and the NCG's mediation had become a tool for manipulating the central government rather than improving the negotiation process. Although during the negotiations, the central government met the demands of the OFO and released five well-known field commanders of the group from prison.

After the final breakdown of the negotiations, the OFO continued to carry out terrorist attacks - attacks on military personnel, explosions of gas pipelines, etc. For example, on November 5, 2006, two explosions occurred in markets in Guwahati, killing 14 people. A total of 149 people died in Assam from May to mid-December 2006 as a result of terrorist attacks carried out by the OFO.²⁸

PEAK OF THE CONFRONTATION

In 2007, as before, the victims of the OFA were exclusively Hindu-speaking Indians, but not Bangladeshi migrants: all 60 workers shot that year were from Bihar. ²⁹ On the eve of the 60th anniversary of India's independence, armed OFA militants seized the city.

two houses belonging to Assamese businessmen, ethnic Indians, and shot all the people who were there, accusing them of "using the resources of Assam with impunity and perverting the local culture" ³⁰.

At the same time, OFO leaders were concerned about the crisis of the Islamist bloc in Bangladesh and decided to renew long-standing ties with Nepalese Maoists.³¹ The OFOA's alliance with the Maoists, which had gained a foothold in Nepal by early 2007, was intended to provide new opportunities for terrorists to hide from persecution outside Indian territory.

Then, in 2008, a new wave of violence swept through Assam. The most high-profile terrorist attack occurred on October 30, when a series of nine explosions in different cities of the state claimed 83 lives. Although the authorities initially suspected OFLA militants or radical Bangladeshi migrants, after a series of arrests, members of the Bodoland National Democratic Front (NDFB), also active in Assam, confessed to carrying out the attacks. It is noteworthy that at the time of the terrorist attack, the NDFB was in a state of truce with the central government and strongly denied any involvement in these tragic events.³² However, data obtained from participants in other terrorist attacks suggested that the NDFB conducted them in order to somehow force the completely stalled negotiation process. OFO also provided the Bodov militants with everything necessary to carry out terrorist attacks and safely withdraw ³³, aiming to re-involve the NDFB in a confrontation with the government. This may be why, despite the evidence against the NDFB, the central Government extended the truce with the group ^for another six months on January 6, 200934. Most likely, New Delhi chose this course in order to prevent the final breakdown of the truce with Bodo militants and their joining the OFLA, even despite the protracted and generally unsuccessful negotiations with the NDFB.

Meanwhile, the OFO continued to regularly commit terrorist acts involving explosives. Between November 2008 and April 2009, the Assam bombings killed 107 people and injured 449 others.³⁵

In 2008, a new split of the OFO occurred. This was the second episode of this kind: in the mid-1990s, former members of the OFO united in the group "Surrendered OFO" (SOFOA). The SOFOA fighters fought on the side of the government forces for some time, but since they were of little use, they were later released to their homes. Now the opposition group OFOA - "For Negotiations" (OFOA PO) has split off. June 24, 2008 it announced a unilateral cease-fire. However, at that time, only field commanders of several small militant groups were included in the OFA PO.³⁶ Therefore, at first no one believed that a split could reduce the potential of the entire terrorist movement. On the other hand, the presence of disunity within the group could not but play into the hands of the central government.

DEFEAT OR A TEMPORARY LULL?

The further escalation of violence in Assam has raised the question of the need for the Indian government to conduct a new large-scale military campaign against the separatists. Increased cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka in 2007-2008 led to a large - scale operation of Indian forces in Northeast India in the spring of 2009, which was supplemented by a large-scale anti-terrorist operation in Bangladesh in the same summer. This double strike seriously weakened all the secessionist groups of the SWI states that have bases in Bangladesh. There is no exact data on the losses of the OFO in manpower, but it is certain that the groups lost most of their bases, as well as lost control of territories in Bangladesh.

Despite the defeat and hundreds of separatist fighters who surrendered in September 2009, the OFLA remained the only group that found the strength to launch a series of retaliatory attacks against government forces. Thus, in mid-November, extremists burned the oil tanks of a freight train, and on November 27, two explosions in the Nalbari district killed 8 people and injured 60. Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram explained these attacks by saying that the OFO leadership is trying to hide the confusion caused by the tough and effective fight against it37. Apparently, this was true. This was confirmed by the fact that on December 1, two of the leader's closest aides and

The founders of Paresh Barua's OFOA group, Chitraban Hazarik and Shashadhar Chowdhury, surrendered to the Indian Border Security Forces on the Tripura-Bangladesh border.³⁸

As a result, the split of the United Front for the Liberation of Assam deepened. Now most of the separatists are members of the OFO-PO faction. By the way, in the Indian press it is often referred to simply as OFOA, to emphasize that now the entire group has abandoned violent methods. The new OFA was led by a prominent militant leader, Arobinda Rajkhowa, who agreed to lay down his arms and negotiate for the first time in the group's history without a precondition for Assam's independence. ³⁹ On February 10, 2011, an OFA delegation consisting of 8 main leaders of the group, led by A. Rajkhowa, came to New Delhi for talks with Interior Minister P. Chidambaram.- Delhi.

According to the Indian South Asian Terrorism Research Portal, the Indian authorities are even ready to change some provisions of the country's ^constitution to solve the existing problems in Assam40. But the main thing is that, more than 30 years after the start of the armed confrontation, official negotiations on the settlement of the conflict have begun between the central government and representatives of the main part of the separatist group.

The faction of the most radical militants led by Paresh Barua has so far remained loyal to the previous methods of fighting the central government of India and distanced itself from the negotiations. The group claimed responsibility for the attack on March 15, 2011, when the INC headquarters in Assam was blown up (injuring 5 people).⁴¹. However, the negotiations taking place in New Delhi were not disrupted: neither the resources nor popular support of the faction was clearly enough. In July 2011, the Pro-Negotiation OFO faction announced a unilateral and indefinite cease-fire.⁴²

Although it is too early to talk about the final victory of the central government over the OFO, the possibility of a peaceful solution to the long-standing conflict is taking real shape. At the same time, the conflict between two other communities - Bodo and Muslim - has shown how fragile the hopes for peace in Assam are.

^{Yardley Jim.} 1 Panic Seizes India as a Region's Strife Radiates // The New York Times, 17.08.2012.

² Ibidem.

³ United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/terroristoutfits/ulfa.htm

⁴ United Liberation - http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ulfa.htm

⁵ The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) (IMDT) Act (1983) - http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/document/ actandordinances/IMDT.htm

^{Goswami N.} 6 Illegal Migration in Assam: A Concern for India's National Security. May 4, 2006 - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrate-giccomments/IllegalMigrationinAssam_NGoswami_040506

^SaikiaJ. 7 Islamist Militancy in North East India. New Delhi: Vision Books Pvt. Ltd., 2004, p. 23 - 24."

⁸ Ibidem.

⁹ < i>Krishna Dhar M. Assam: The Bangla hand - http://www.rediff.com/ news/2007/jan/19guest.htm

^{Saikia J.} 10 Op. cit., p. 22.

^{Amarjeet Singh M.} 11 The ISI's Supervisory Role in Assam // Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses - http://www.idsa.in/ idsastrategiccomrnents/TheISIsSupervisoryRoleinAssam_MASingh_071106

^{Raman B.} 12 ULFA terrorism in Assam: the Hindu Mercenaries of Jihadis - http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers21/paper2089.html

^{Kumar A.} 13 Operation Red Rose in Northeast: Another Blow to ULFA as Peace Overture Fails // South Asia Analysis Group Paper N 1529 - http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papersl6/paperl529.html

^{Kumar A.} 14 Assam: Desperate ULFA Strikes Soft Targets // South Asia Analysis Group Paper N 2093 - http://www.saag.org/common/ uploaded_files/paper2093.html

^{Kumar A.} 15 Assam: ULFA's Intensified Terror before Independence Day // South Asia Analysis Group Paper N 2332 - http://www.south-asiaanalysis.org/papers24/paper2332.html

^{Kumar A.} 16 Assam: Preparing for the 'Peace Talks' // South Asia Analysis Group Paper N 1578 - http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/ %5C.papersl6%5Cpaperl578.html

^{Talukdar S.} 17 16 killed, 40 injured in Assam blast // The Hindu, ¹⁶.08.2004.

^{Raman B.} 18 Wake-Up Call from West Bengal and Assam -http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers21/paper2034.html

^{Kamboj A.} 19 Explosions in Assam: An Assessment // Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategicco-mments/ExplosionsInAssam_AKamboj_220606

^{Raman B.} 20 Wake-Up Call...

^{Kumar A.} 21 Operation Red Rose ...

^{Kumar A.} 22 Assam: Preparing for the 'Peace Talks'...

²³ PM Meets Peoples' Consultative Group of Assam -http://pmindia.nic.in/prelease/pcontentasp?id=332

^{Kumar A.} 24 Assam: Peace Talks with ULFA or Counter-insurgency Operation? // South Asia Analysis Group Paper N 2271 -http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers23/paper2271.html

^{Kamboj A.} 25 Explosions in Assam...

^{Raman B.} 26 Wake-Up Call...

^{Kumar A.} 27 Assam: Peace Talks with ULFA...

^{Kumar A.} 28 Assam: Desperate ULFA Strikes...

^{Raman B.} 29 ULFA terrorism in Assam...

^{Kumar A.} 30 Assam: ULFA's Intensified Terror...

^{Kumar A.} 31 Assam: Peace Talks with ULFA...

^{Kumar A.} 32 Serial Blasts in Assam: Are Planners and Perpetrators Different? // Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/SerialBlastsinAssam_AKumar_241208

^{Goswami N., Gogoi D.} 33 The October 30 Terrorist Attacks in Assam - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/TheOctober30TerroristAttacksinAssam_NGoswami%2C%20DGogoi_14ll08

³⁴ Goverment extends ceasefire with NDFB till June 30 -http://www.andhranews.net/India/2009/January/6-Govt-extends-ceasefire-82448.asp

³⁵ 107 killed in blasts in Assam in 6 months // The Times of India, 6.04.2009.

^{Amarjeet Singh M.} 36 Changing Face of Bodo Insurgency // Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses - http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategic-comments/ChangingFaceofBodoInsurgency_MASingh_12010 9

^{Gogoi T.} 37 Faced with counter insurgency operation, ULFA cadres step up atrocities in Assam - http://www.andhranews.net/India/ 2009/November/27-Faced-counter-insurgency-41866.asp

³⁸ Surrender of ULFA leaders, a step in the right direction: Chidambaram - http://www.andhranews.net/India/2009/December/l-Surrender-ULFA-leaders-42551.asp

³⁹ ULFA softens demand on Assam independence - http://in.reuters. com/article/2011/01/03/idINIndia-53891120110103

⁴⁰ India Assessment - 2011 - http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/india/index.html

⁴¹ ULFA blows up Congress HQ in Assam; Is it peace talk? -http://news.oneindia.in/20ll/03/15/assam-ulfa-congress-hq-blast-peace-talk-election-aid0101.h tml

^{Kumar V.} 42 Centre welcomes ULFA ceasefire // The Hindu, 13.07.2011.

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