This article analyzes the conditions of the occurrence, key ideas and the success factors of temporalism - the dominant position describing God's relation to time in contemporary analytic philosophy. Unlike traditional eternalism, which treats the being of God in terms of time transcendence, i.e., timelessness and the absence of duration, temporalism assumes the existence of God in the past, present and future, i.e., His principal temporality. Despite the fact that the idea of divine eternity as transcendence is traditionally viewed as an integral part of Christian doctrine, key proponents of temporalism - Nicholas Wolterstorff, Richard Swinburne, and Anthony Kenny - sought to prove, first, eternalism's origins in pagan Greek philosophy that is alien to Christianity; second, the incompatibility of the traditional concept of eternity with the fundamental form of biblical

The study was carried out within the framework of the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and with the use of the state support grant allocated by the National Research University Higher School of Economics for leading universities of the Russian Federation in order to increase their competitiveness among the world's leading research and educational centers.

Pleshkov A. Ponyatie "vechnost '"v sovremennoi analiticheskoi teologii: vyzvok temporalizma [The concept of "eternity" in modern Analytical theology: the Challenge of temporalism]. 2017. N 2. pp. 264-289.

Pleshkov, Alexey (2017) "The Concept of Eternity in Contemporary Analytic Theology: The Challenge of Temporalism", Gosudarstvo, religiia, tserkov' v Rossii i za rubezhom 35(2): 264-289.

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thought; finally, strict rationality, and hence better compatibility of temporalism with the achievements of contemporary philosophy. The reanimation of classical theological questions through temporalism, together with openness to the actual philosophical agenda, contributed to the further productive development of subject matter, as well as the consolidation of theology's status as an autonomous and respectable subdiscipline within the English-speaking Academy.

Keywords: eternity, analytic theology, temporalism, time, eternalism, twentieth-century philosophy, contemporary theology.

In the MIDDLE of the 20th century, along with the actualization of metaphysical problems in analytical philosophy, there was also a resuscitation of traditional theological themes.

In the wake of interest in classical metaphysical questions, the analytical philosophy of religion, or analytical theology, has developed rapidly.2 Analytical philosophers also focused on issues related to the conceptualization and analysis of divine attributes. Among them, one of the most important places was occupied by the discussion of divine eternity.

This discussion was based on the traditional interpretation of the concept of" eternity " proposed in the classical texts of medieval authors-Boethius (Cons. V. 6), Augustine (Conf. XI. xiii, 16)

1. On the place of metaphysics in the history of analytic philosophy, see: Zimmerman, D. W. (2004)" Prologue: Metaphysics after the Twentieth Century", in D. W. Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, pp. ix-xxii. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Simons, P. (2013) "Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy", in M. Beaney (ed.) Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytical Philosophy, pp. 710-729. Oxford: Oxford University Press; for the philosophy of religion in the twentieth-century analytical tradition, see: Swinburne R. Philosophy of Religion in EnglishPhilosophy of Religion: An Almanac (2006-2007) / ed. by V. K. Shokhin, Moscow: Nauka, 2007, pp. 89-136; Wolterstorff, N. (2009) "How Philosophical Theology Became Possible within the Analytical Tradition of Philosophy", in O. D. Crisp, M. C. Rea (eds) Analytical Theory. New Essays in the Philosophy of Theology, pp. 155-168. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. Although in the Russian tradition, the philosophy of religion is understood as a much broader field of knowledge, in the English-speaking tradition, the philosophy of religion is often synonymous with philosophical theology (for the prerequisites of analytical theology, see: Swinburne R. Philosophy of religion in the Anglo-American tradition; for criticism of such a narrowing of the meaning and tasks of philosophy of religion, see: Shokhin V. K. Historical genesis of philosophy Religions: the problem and its most probable solution / / Philosophy of Religion: Almanac (2006-2007) / Ed. by V. K. Shokhin. Moscow: Nauka, 2007. pp. 15-88).

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3. The key thesis of traditional eternalism can be formulated as follows: eternity is a unique mode of existence of God, characterized by timelessness and the absence of duration (transcendence), or, referring to the classical formulation of Boethius: "Eternity is the perfect possession of all the fullness of infinite life at once."

The interest in the concept of "eternity" is not solely due to a shift of interests within the disciplinary field; it is also necessary to take into account the influence of new trends in religious thought. Thus, in the middle of the 20th century, the ideas of process theology and later open theism4 Although these two trends are very different from each other, their proponents adhere to the thesis of the fundamental openness of the future. In other words, both trends are characterized by the thesis that divine knowledge about future contingent events is impossible. The development of the ideas of process theology and open theism created a conflict with traditional theism and required, among other things, a rethinking of ideas about the relationship of God to time. Given the fact that many devout analytical philosophers were sympathetic to these trends (especially open theism5), it is not surprising that the problem of eternity turned out to be one of the central ones for them.

3. For the most complete discussion of the problem of time and eternity by medieval authors in Russian, as well as an extensive bibliography, see: Gaidenko P. P. Vremya. Duration. Vechnost ' [Eternity], Moscow: Progress-traditsiya, 2006, pp. 55-97; also: Borodai T. Y. Vopros o vechnosti mira i tryota ego resheniya Foma Akvinsky [The question of the eternity of the world and an attempt to solve it by Thomas Aquinas] // Intellectual traditions of antiquity and Middle Ages (Research and translations) / ed. by M. S. Petrova, Moscow: Krug', 2010, pp. 107-121. Also on the concept of "eon" in the Byzantine tradition: Bibikov M. V. Eon of the New Testament and Early Byzantine: infinity in time and space / / Images of time and historical representations. Russia-East-West / edited by L. P. Repina, Moscow: Krug', 2010, pp. 167-184.

4. On the theology of the process in Russian. See: Kimelev Yu. A. Sovremennaya zapadnaya filosofiya religii [Modern Western Philosophy of Religion]. Moscow: Mysl Publ., 1989, pp. 249-262. Также: Rice, R. (1980) The Openness of God: The Relationship of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will. Nashville, Tenn.: Review and Herald; Pinnock, C.H., Rice, R., Sanders, J., et al (1994) The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove and Carlisle: InterVarsity and Paternoster. In Russian literature, these two trends are sometimes mixed (V. K. Shokhin). Editor's note: N. Walterstorff's article "God is Infinite in time" / / Philosophy of Religion: Almanac (2006-2007) / Ed. by V. K. Shokhin, Moscow: Nauka, 2007, p. 224), even though their differences are marked as significant (V. K. Shokhin, Theism or deism? Reflections on Richard Swinburne's Metaphysical Theology. 2015. No. 2. C. 70).

5. Many analytical philosophers of the beginning of the second half of the twentieth century can be called supporters of open theism, even despite the fact that Ter-

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Finally, the discussion of the problem of eternity was also stimulated by sciences close to philosophy. First of all, we are talking about classical philology, which at the end of the first half of the XX century actively and successfully applied the lexicographic approach to the study of temporal (in a broad sense) problems. Quite quickly, this approach begins to be used not only in the analysis of Greek literature and philosophy,but also in the Bible. 6 So, in 1946, the book "Christ and Time" by the influential theologian and biblical scholar Oskar Kuhlmann was published in German, and four years later it was translated into English. Early Christian concept of Time"7. In this work, Kuhlmann examined the images of time characteristic of the New Testament and, using lexicographic analysis, came to the conclusion that there is no reason to consider the idea of eternity as a transcendent time of God's being an "invention" of Christianity. In contrast, according to Kuhlmann, the biblical God exists in infinite time, hence is temporary.8 This work, however, was criticized by another equally well-known philologist, the biblical scholar and theologian James Barr. According to Barr, the question of the Scriptural image of time is not a question of philological criticism or biblical hermeneutics, but of philosophical theology, that is, a discipline primarily philosophical.9
Arguments to the tradition

The discussion between Kuhlmann and Barr showed that the discussion of the problem of eternity needs an updated theoretical framework.-

The term "open theism" was introduced into academic use only in the 1980s and early 1990s (see Sanders, J. (2007) The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence [1997]. 2nd ed, pp. 165-171. Downers Grove: InterVarsity).

6. См. напр.: Lackeit, C. (1916) Aion: Zeit und Ewigkeit in Sprache und Religion der Griechen. Konigsberg; Frankel, H. (1960) "Die Zeitauffassung in der Friihgriechischen Literatur" [1931], in Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens. Literarische und philosophische Studien, 2nd edn, pp. 1-22. Miinchen: Beck; Sasse, H. (1933) "alwv, alwv wc", in G. Kittel (Hrsg.) Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, bd. I, ss. 197-209. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer; Benveniste, E. (1937) "Expression indoeuropéenne de l' 'éternité'", Bulletin de la Société de linguistique de Paris 38: 103-112.

7. Cullmann, O. (1950) Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History [1946]. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press.

8. In the traditional terminology of Boethius - incessancy, perpetuity (sempiternitas).

9. Barr, J. (1962) Biblical Words for Time, p. 149. London: SCM.

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the epistemological framework is even more important than in traditional hermeneutical studies. Nevertheless, at the first stages of discussing the problem of time in general and the concept of "eternity", in particular, analytical theologians very actively used "arguments to tradition" (arguments to Scripture, Tradition, and the classics of medieval theological thought). Thus, in 1970, Nelson Pike's book "God and Timelessness" was published, which examines the existence of the idea of eternity in the Christian tradition.10 Pike, among other things, pointed out the pagan origins of the concept of eternity, which are alien to Christian dogma, and in principle incompatible with such important elements of the Christian faith as, for example, the Incarnation of God. Thus, a peculiar course was set for de-Hellenization, that is, the exclusion of ancient Greek (primarily Platonic and Neoplatonic) influence on the discussion of the relationship of God to time, which can be called one of the trends of temporalism.11
As Richard Swinburne, one of the most influential temporal theologians, points out, although eternalism was the dominant position of medieval theologians from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas, the Christian tradition of thinking about time was not uniform. Thus, eternalism does not find support in the texts of the Old and New Testaments (although some passages from the New Testament are compatible with eternalism, they require a very specific, "philosophical" reading); the idea of a timeless and non-lasting divine being is not found in the Church Fathers before Augustine; there is reason to believe that such influential medieval authors as Duns Scotus and William Ockham rejected eternalism; finally, post-Hegelian Protestant theology (such as that of Paul Tillich and Karl Barth) explicitly rejects the thesis of the timelessness of God.12
Similar ideas were advocated by one of the pioneers of temporalism, Nicholas Walterstorff. In the now-classic article "God is Infinite in Time," he notes that confidence in the timeless-

10. Pike, N. (1970) God and Timelessness. New York: Schocken.

11.In this sense, the mentioned book by O. Kuhlman also corresponds to the spirit of temporalism. It is interesting that it was ancient Greek philosophy, represented by Aristotle, that first developed a radical critique of eternalism (De Cael. II. 1, 283b-284a). Thus, the roots of temporalism are also found in the ancient Greek philosophy criticized by the temporalists.

12. Swinburne, R. (1993) The Coherence of Theism [1977], pp. 225-226. Oxford: Clarendon Press.. См. также Pike, N. God and Timelessness, pp. 180-187.

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It is based on the priority imposed by Plato and the Platonic tradition of unchanging being over changing becoming. 13 The belief in the timelessness of God thus implies the abandonment of the fundamental form of biblical thought in favor of ancient Greek philosophy:

Instead of accepting the conclusion that God does not exist outside of time, because He changes in His knowledge, acquires new memories, and plans for the future, one can try to maintain the belief that God is timeless [ ... ] But it seems to me that this would mean rejecting the view of God as a Redeemer God, rather than a Redeemer God. to refuse this would be to give up the most important thing in the bible's description of God.14
Despite the importance of the attribute of immutability in the Western theological tradition, Walterstorff finds only two passages in the Bible that speak of the immutability of God.15 Moreover, both contexts do not presuppose the "ontological immutability" of God, but rather speak of His unchangeable character. As William Lane Craig will later point out, the attempt to justify the eternity of God through His immutability is the justification of a weak thesis that is in question, through an even weaker and less well-founded thesis. 16
Strong and weak immutability

For Nicholas Walterstorff, pointing out that the immutability of God is problematic in itself and a weak foundation for traditional eternalism is one of the main conclusions. Swinburne, in his seminal work "Coherence of theism", begins to consider the question of the eternity of God from the point at which Walterstorff stops. First of all, Swinburne suggests distinguishing between the strong and weak thesis of non-self-determination.-

13. Walterstorff N. God is infinite in time [1975] / / Philosophy of Religion: Almanac (2006-2007) / Ed. by V. K. Shokhin, Moscow: Nauka, 2007, p. 214. A similar position is taken by Richard Swinburne (Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism, pp. 226-228).

14. Walterstorff N. God is infinite in time. p. 221.

15. 15. Mal 3: 5, 6 and Psalm 101: 24-29.

16. Craig U. L. Divine Eternity [2009] / / Oxford guide to philosophical Theology / Comp. Flint T. P., Rei M. K. Moscow: Yazyki Slavyanskoi Kul'tury, 2013, Pp. 230-231.

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the changelings of God. "Weak immutability" implies that God does not change in the sense of character. In other words, when we speak of the immutability of God in a weak sense, we mean that the properties of God remain unchanged - at any given time, He is all-good, all-knowing, etc. However, sometimes the immutability of God is understood in a much stronger sense, according to which God cannot change in principle.

Reading the Bible, as Swinburne points out, leads us to believe that in certain situations it is God who changes, because it is He who acts at certain times. From the point of view of eternalism, the answer is possible: although God acts at a certain time, this action corresponds to his eternal plan. For example, the fall of Constantinople occurred in 1453, but God always assumed that it would fall in 1453, meaning there was no time when God did not assume that this event would occur in a particular year. But what if we are talking about a certain reaction of God to an event in time, for example, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah? According to eternalism, the answer is that God always intended the destruction of cities if there were not at least ten righteous people in them, and always did not intend the destruction of cities if there were at least ten righteous people in them. Thus, God's response, although seemingly temporally conditioned, can be interpreted sub specie aeternitatis: God always assumes that an event will occur if a person acts in one way, and that another event will occur if a person acts in another way.

This view, according to Swinburne, is not entirely adequate. First, in this context, the description of the interaction between man and God must always be understood non-literally; second, God does not have knowledge about the past, present and future, but every thought of God is always the same, which again requires a certain non-literal reading; third, and this point is very important For Swinburne, the strong thesis of immutability suggests that God cannot perform an action at a given moment unless it has been planned from time immemorial. But in this way, God becomes dependent on decisions already made, which in turn limits his absolute freedom.17
17. Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism, pp. 222-223. Here, however, Swinburne implicitly implies a temporal conceptualization of the concept of "freedom".-

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Ultimately, as Swinburne points out, we have no reason to hold on to a belief in the "strong immutability" of God, since such a position is either incompatible with other attributes of God, or constantly requires reference to the metaphorical and analogical use of language. It is important to note that Swinburne does not oppose an allegorical reading: "Although the theist may sometimes justify using words in an analogical sense, too frequent appeals to the analogical meaning of words will make the statements in which these words are used empty in content." 18 The threat of losing the meaning of theological statements is too great a price for the "eternal" trump card in the sleeve of the theologian - an arbitrary and constant reference to the non-literal meaning of words.

In addition, a strong thesis about the immutability of God appears only in the texts of Christian authors of the third and fourth centuries, with the obvious influence of Neoplatonism. Following Walterstorff, Swinburne believes that the belief in the superiority of static and unchanging being over procedural and changing existence cannot be justified by anything other than pagan platonic dogma.19 Thus, eternalism rests on the shaky foundation of divine immutability, which, in turn, rests on an ancient Greek philosophy that is alien to Christianity.

In other words, the restriction of God's absolute freedom is "guessed" from the point of view of temporal beings.

18. Ibid., p. 230. Separately, the question of the language of theology is discussed by the author in the fourth chapter of the book: Ibid., p. 51-73.

19. Swinburne notes that there may be another psychological justification for this belief. A person tends to think of his life as a constant collection of "elements", each of which cannot be repeated. Even if we can repeat some important event of our past, even if we can recreate all its circumstances, it will inevitably be different (at least numerically). In addition, a person grows older and weaker over time, new events arouse less interest in him, and memories of old ones are erased. This sense of degradation is incompatible with the idea of an all-perfect being, and therefore man clings to the idea of the timelessness of God. However, as Swinburne points out, an omniscient being can call up a fragment of the most distant past with all its clarity at any moment. The omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence of God, coupled with immutability in a weak sense, suggest that, despite the temporality of God, his experience of time is qualitatively different from that of man, and therefore he is unfamiliar with the experience of time as decline, destruction, and distress (Ibid., p. 226-228).

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Divine Knowledge

Another important problem directly related to the question of divine immutability is the problem of God's knowledge of temporally conditioned facts. Already in the early 1960s, Arthur Norman Pryor, the creator of temporal logic, raised the question of God's knowledge of future contingent events. Pryor suggests formalizing the "God is omniscient" thesis as follows:"For all p, if p is true, then God knows p." He goes on to point out that if the verb "know" in this utterance does not have a temporal form (tenseless), then "ultimately, what God knows is limited to those truths, if any, that are themselves timeless"20. Thus, God can't possibly know what He knows. to know, for example, that I finished working on this article today, as this knowledge is time-bound. But he probably knows that three times three equals nine (mathematical laws and truths), that two contradictorial propositions cannot be simultaneously and in the same sense true (logical truths and laws), or that energy is equal to mass multiplied by the square of the speed of light (physical truths and laws).

Nevertheless, Nicholas Walterstorff points out that, in accordance with the view shared by the overwhelming majority of theologians, God knows the past, present, and future. 21 Accordingly, God knows that something has happened in the past, that something is happening in the present, and finally that something will happen in the future22 Obviously, it is impossible to have knowledge that an event is happening in the present until that event has started happening, otherwise it would be knowledge of the future. It is also impossible to have knowledge that an event has occurred-

20. Prior, A.N. (1968) "The Formalities of Omniscience" [1962], in Papers on Time and Tense, p. 29. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

21. Walterstorff does not specify which modern theologians he is referring to. However, for medieval eternalists, the question of knowing the past or the future is a conceptual error in our language. As Boethius writes: "So, if you want to understand the primordial being, which knows everything, it is more correct to define its knowledge not as a foreknowledge of the future, but as an infallible knowledge of the endless present. As a result, it is better to call it not foresight, but Providence, which sees everything from the lowest to the highest from a height" (Cons. V. 6). It is worth noting that the reference to the limitations of language in the discussion of eternity and the eternal is already found in Plato (Tim. 38a-b).

22. Walterstorff N. God is infinite in time, pp. 219-220.

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the child is in the present when the event has already ended, otherwise it would be knowledge of the past. Thus, if we accept that an event has a beginning and an end, we must recognize that our knowledge of that event is also temporally conditioned.

In other words, "the temporality of an event [...] affects the act of knowing it, giving it the character of temporality"23. This applies both to direct knowledge of the present, and to knowledge of the past (recollection) and future (foresight). Taking into account the fact that God knows our past, present, and future, we must conclude that at least some actions (knowledge here is understood as a special case of action)are performed by God. They are temporal. However, according to the definition proposed by Walterstorff at the beginning of his article, "x is eternal [in the sense of transcendence of time, timelessness. - A. P.] if and only if x does not have any elements that are part of the time series"24. Therefore, if God has knowledge of temporally determined facts (that something has been, is, or will be), then he cannot be eternal. This conclusion leads us to recognize that God cannot be unchangeable. The very fact that knowledge of temporal events is temporal suggests that the knowledge of God has three phases: God first foresees an event with necessity, then knows about the event that is taking place, and finally remembers it indelibly. 25
Richard Swinburne develops this idea, but in a theoretical framework characteristic of the analytic philosophy of time. When discussing the question of divine knowledge, he suggests distinguishing between indexical and non-indexical facts26. This difference is based on the fundamental incommensurability of the A-theory and B-theory of time.

23. Ibid., p. 220.

24. Wolterstorff, N. (2010) "God Everlasting" [1975], in T. Cueno (ed.) Inquiring about God. Selected Essays, pp. 137. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

25. Walterstorff N. God is infinite in time. p. 220.

26. Swinburne, R. (1994) The Christian God, pp. 90-93. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

27. См.: McTaggart, J.E. (1908) "The Unreality of Time", Mind 17: 457-474. Also see: Dzyuba S. V. Unreality of time: arguments of D. E. McTaggart // Bulletin of AmSU, 2003, issue 20: Humanities, pp. 7-9; Dzyuba S. V. Ontology of the V-theory of time and the hypothesis of the psychophysiological nature of the flow of time // Bulletin of the Amur State University. 2006. Issue 34: Humanities.

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facts are always related to some specific context; non-indexical facts are indifferent to the context and its changes. Accordingly, B-theory operates on non-indexical facts (for example, "Socrates was born earlier than Plato" - it makes no difference whether it is said by a first-year student of the Faculty of Philosophy today or a contemporary of Plato, the statement in any case refers to the same "fact"); A-theory operates on indexical facts (for example, " Today a first-year student declared that Plato was born before Socrates" - this statement can refer to events spaced out in time, depending on when this "today" occurs).

Although at first glance it seems that A-theory and B-theory are two different ways of describing a single and common temporal experience, in reality these two theories cannot be seamlessly reduced to each other. For example, the statement "I am hungry now" and the statement "the author of this article is hungry on February 5, 2016" obviously refer to two different events, since the bare fact of having a certain state (or event) at a certain moment can in no way be reduced to my sincere desire to have a snack right now. As Swinburne points out, some knowledge requires "indexicality", such as knowing that something is happening right now (or, to put it more precisely, what I want to eat right now).28.

Sir Anthony Kenny, another of the most authoritative and influential representatives of temporalism, discusses the question of indexical and non-indexical facts in terms that later became traditional: he speaks of judgments that have and do not have the form of time (tensed and tenseless propositions). The conclusion Kenny draws from this analysis is typical of the proponents of the temporalist concept of eternity. Although a temporally conditioned judgment and mo-

С. 3-7; Markosian, N. (2014) "Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [http:// plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/time/, accessed on 16.05.2017].

28. Based on this distinction, Swinburne revisits tradition. He notes that Christian theologians from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas preferred to describe time "in terms" of B-theory. However, they didn't have a good reason to stick to this approach. Some philosophers, such as Duns Scotus, did not see temporal dimensions simply as a psychological effect characteristic of human existence, but considered them to be real characteristics of the world, the same for both God and man. In this sense, they turned to a more dynamic and more appropriate A-theory for describing a personal God (Swinburne, R. The Christian God, pp. 92-93).

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The propositional content can be "translated" into a proposition that does not have the form of time, and the propositional content will inevitably shift (if not completely change). In this case, knowing what has happened, is happening, or will happen implies a certain position in time and a change in the knowledge carrier itself. As Kenny points out, a belief in divine omniscience (and the traditional view, as already noted, assumes that God also knows temporally conditioned facts) implies a rejection of the belief in divine immutability, as well as in His timelessness.29
Causality and transitivity

This also raises the problem of God's knowledge of events and his meaningful response to human actions. The biblical God is a God who forgives, edifies, and punishes, which certainly implies his response. But the reaction itself implies the presence of some action that acts as a reason for the response or decision 30. If God forgives or punishes someone at a certain point for doing something, then that act precedes divine forgiveness or punishment. If God warns of the necessity to perform or not to perform an act, then this act should or should not be performed after the divine warning.

To say that God forgives or punishes someone in advance, that is, before committing an act, or that God warns about the need to commit an act at the same time as it is committed, is internally contradictory. Again, if we do not understand divine "forgiveness," "punishment," or "warning" as something quite different from forgiveness, punishment, and warning in the ordinary sense of these words. This argument is based on a particular image of God that is characteristic of Scripture, which makes it similar to the "arguments to tradition"discussed above. However, along with the decline in the importance of this type of argument by temporalists, the development of-

29. Kenny, A. (1979) The God of the Philosophers, p. 48. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

30. См. Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism, pp. 221-227; Wolterstorff N. God Everlasting, pp. 145-153.

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A theoretical framework justifying the impossibility of an eternalist understanding of God's response is also developed.

In The Christian God, Swinburne elaborates on the causal theory of time, which is based on Hume's thesis that cause must precede effect in time.31 Swinburne formulates his tentative position on this issue: the past can determine the present, and the present can change the future, but the present cannot be the cause of changing the past, just as the future can change the present or the past. He devotes quite a lot of time to substantiating this seemingly trivial thesis, which is explained by the philosophical context. In the second half of the twentieth century, the problems of causal loops, backward causation, and finally time travel have become increasingly popular in analytical philosophy.32
Swinburne's argument here is characteristic of opponents of inverse causality. First, it rejects the logical possibility of causal loops. The causal loop is understood by Swinburne as a time-closed chain of events in which event x is the cause of event y, y is the cause of event z, and finally z is the cause of x. The problem is that, according to the principle of transitivity, the effect acts as the cause of its own cause. Swinburne suggests a reasoning: suppose that at the moment of the event z, God changes the laws of nature in such a way that it makes the existence of y conditional on x impossible. In this case, z becomes the cause of x, x does not become the cause of y, and z is thus not accomplished, thereby canceling the very existence of x. In fact, Swinburne's explanation concerns not causal loops, but the so-called "grandfather paradox". According to this paradox, a time traveler travels to the past (z) and kills his grandfather (x) before his father (y) is born. In this way, the time traveler acts as a human being.

31. Hume D. Traktat o chelovecheskoi prirode [A treatise on human nature]. Volume 1. Moscow: Mysl', 1996, pp. 225-227.

32. См.: Dummett, M. (1954) "Can an Effect Precede its Cause", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 28, Supplement: 27-44; Lewis, D. (1976) "The Paradoxes of Time Travel", American Philosophical Quarterly 13: 145-152; Mellor, D.H. (1981) Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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reasons for your own non-existence 33. Based on this reasoning, Swinburne clarifies his position: the past is not so much a period of time that has a causal influence on the present, but a period of time that cannot be caused by the present.34
According to Swinburne, the relationship between temporality and causality in a human-specific conceptual scheme can be explained not only by the logical impossibility of reverse causality, but also through the mental mechanisms of perception and memory:

An event is past if we remember it now or if we perceive it now. But the perception of a perceived event or a personal recollection of a recalled event must be causally determined by the perceived or recalled event... Nothing can be considered a "perception" or "memory" if these causal relationships are absent. This basic principle of causal theories of perception and memory is obviously correct. Thus, the concepts of perception and memory link for us the concepts of the past and the future through the concept of causality. In order to define something as a perception or memory, it is already necessary to integrate into the causal fixity that makes such a definition possible.35
This rootedness of the temporal orientation of causation in the very mental structure of a person, according to Swinburne, explains the unsatisfactoriness of the" non-payer's argument " (bilking argument), proposed by Michael Dummit 36. Let's assume that (a) we have the basis of the abi-

33. A classic example of a causal loop is an old time traveler who gives a young self instructions on how to build a time machine. A young time traveler uses this instruction to create a time machine (it takes a long time and he has time to grow old) and goes back in time to transmit the instructions to the young self. Unlike the described situation with the murder of the traveler's grandfather, there is no obvious paradox here. However, in a causal loop situation, it is impossible to determine who creates a time machine and when - it always exists (see: Lewis, D. The Paradoxes of Time Travel, p. 149).

34. Swinburne, R. The Christian God, pp. 82-83.

35. Ibid., pp. 84-85.

36. Dummett, M. "Can an Effect Precede its Cause". An influential critique of this argument: Black, M. (1956)" Why Cannot an Effect Precede its Cause", Analysis 16: 49-58.

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assume that action x is a retro-cause of z (retro-cause means the cause that occurs after the effect); (b) we don't have the usual causal explanation for z; (c) therefore, if we want z to happen in the past, we are perfectly rational about doing x in the present.37 Obviously, if x is indeed the retro-cause of z, then it is logically impossible for z not to occur when x is committed. According to Swinburne, Dummit's argument does not prove reverse causation at all. It only shows that in the absence of our knowledge of the real cause of z, we can assume that x is its retro-cause. But in this case, there is no real causality, there is only a random coincidence of the presence of z and the further performance of the action x, because if z really took place, then x can no longer "cancel" z.

Thus, Swinburne notes that reverse causality presupposes either (a) causal loops, which leads to a contradiction, because in this case an event is logically possible that prevents its own cause and, accordingly, cancels its own existence; or (b) it is a groundless "re-qualification" of ordinary causality, because the later " cause"it can never really affect the fact that there is an earlier "investigation". "The logical impossibility of reverse causality is explained by the causal theory of time - only what happens later can be causally determined," Swinburne summarizes.38
Anthony Kenny also addresses the problem of causality. Moreover, his theoretical framework is rooted in the analysis of the arguments of his predecessors (both classical and modern authors). Unlike Swinburne, Kenny accepts Dummitt's argument about the logical possibility of the inverse problem.-

37. Dummit suggests the following thought experiment (somewhat adjusted). Let's imagine that every time I click my fingers (x) before opening an email I received from my lender. And every time I perform this action, the envelope does not contain an invoice for payment. Of course, my lender does not put the invoice (z) in the envelope before I receive the envelope. However, if I do not have complete information about the event, and I do not have alternative explanations for why the invoice does not appear in the envelope, I can quite rationally assume that my finger click (x) is a retro reason for my lender (z) not putting the invoice in the envelope.

38. Swinburne, R. The Christian God, p. 90.

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cause and effect relationship 39. However, like Swinburne, Kenny notes that it is driven by a particular person's conceptual preferences. If someone claims that an action x is a retro-cause of y, then we can always reduce it to the more familiar expression "y preceding x in time is the cause of x".

Nevertheless, Dummit's approach allows us to problematize our view of causality. How can we distinguish between cause and effect if we exclude the possibility of reference to time, to "earlier" and "later", to the past and future? Kenny writes:

Sometimes we think of the passage of time and history as a book that is open on one page-the present. This representation is used differently by determinists and indeterminists. From one point of view, the future is a book that has already been written, but the book is only open on the current page, and we don't see what follows until we turn it over. From another point of view, future pages are not written yet - at least, they contain numerous spaces - and only when we turn the pages, thanks to our free actions, do we fit the text into the spaces [...] According to Dummit's point of view, not only the subsequent pages of the book, but also the previous ones, contain empty spaces: not only can we scroll forward and fill in the blanks, but we can also go back one or two pages to fill in the blanks there, too.

However, for Kenny, such a "supplement" of the past, the logical possibility of which is justified by Dummit, is possible only under one condition. Even if we do not consider a history book as having a plot and purpose, but at least as a related text, and not a set of random words, then the reverse causal relationship can only be an exceptional and rare phenomenon. Dummitt's approach does not imply bidirectional causality, but rather the logical possibility of singular and strange retro-causes in a world where causality is due to the "natural" passage of time from time to time.-

39. Kenny refers to a later work: Dummett, M. (1964)" On Bringing about the Past", Philosophical Review 73: 338-359.

40. Kenny, A. The God of the Philosophers, p. 108.

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go to the future. Otherwise, the very distinction between past and future would be impossible, or at least blurred, just as in the case of eternity, which is simultaneous to every past and future. 41
This kind of" blurring " of time dimensions, characteristic of eternalism, leads to another important problem - the transitivity of time. Richard Swinburne points out that, according to the classical definition of eternity, God sees every human action not as past or future, but as present, here and now. Thus, every past (t1), every future (t3), and every present (t2) event in human history is simultaneously the eternity of God (t). But if t is simultaneous with time t1, t2, and t3, then by the transitivity principle t1, t2, and t3 are simultaneous with each other. Thus, every past event occurs simultaneously with every present and future, which leads to the impossibility of differentiating time. The only way to resolve this contradiction is to point out the special status of divine simultaneity, which is different from simultaneity in the ordinary sense of the word.42
Anthony Kenny puts this argument in a much more elegant rhetorical form:

The very concept of timeless eternity, which assumes that all eternity is simultaneous to every part of time, seems fundamentally incoherent. Thus, simultaneity is usually understood as a transitive relation. If A occurs at the same time as B, and B occurs at the same time as C, then A occurs at the same time as C [ ... ] But from the point of view of St. Thomas, my typing of this article is simultaneous with all eternity. In addition, from this point of view, the great Fire of Rome is simultaneous with all eternity. Consequently, while I am typing these very words, Nero is heartlessly chirping on violin 43.

From the point of view of common sense, temporal relations are transitive. If two events are simultaneous, then the third event is,

41. Ibid., p. 109.

42. Swinburne, R. The Coherence of Theism, p. 228.

43. Kenny, A. The God of the Philosophers, pp. 38-39. Kenny first made this argument in his article Kenny, A. (1969)" Intellect and imagination in Aquinas", in Kenny (ed.) Aquinas. A Collection of Critical Essays, pp. 273-296. London.

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If it occurs simultaneously with one of the first two, it will also occur simultaneously with the second one. If the eternity of God is simultaneous with any event in human history, then the historical sequence of events itself becomes impossible. But the history of the world is an integral part of God's creation, which means that God simply cannot be eternal, in the sense that eternity is understood by traditional eternalism.

Inconsistency of the concept of "eternal life"

Another" conceptual inconsistency " that the temporalists draw attention to concerns the concept of "eternal life". Thus, the British logician and philosopher William Neal in the early sixties strongly criticized the concept of "eternal life" in his article " Time and eternity in theology "44. Neal drew attention to the fact that in colloquial language, eternity is understood as nothing more than infinity in time, for which he assigns the term "all-time"."(sempiternity). Nevertheless, in some specific philosophical contexts, eternity is understood as a state that transcends time and duration, eternity in the metaphysical sense of the word.

As long as eternity is attributed to certain abstract objects, theoretical constructs (such as numbers or laws, or, according to Neil himself, Plato's ideas), the internal inconsistency of the concept remains invisible. But if we are talking about a theological context where eternity is a predicate of the divine being, and the concept of "eternity" refers to the divine eternal life, this internal contradiction becomes obvious.45 It is impossible to imagine life otherwise than as a kind of life activity (life acts). No matter how we understand the word "activity" (act), it always implies duration, processality. But processality necessarily implies the availability of time. So we arrive at

44. Kneale, W. (1960) "Time and Eternity in Theology", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61: 87-108.

45. William Neal mistakenly believes that Plato's ideas are" abstract", which are certainly endowed with life. Nevertheless, his wife and colleague Martha Neale, in her article "Eternity and Omnipresence", notes that the internal relationship of the Greek word ainn with the idea of life implies that the concept of "eternity" is also incoherent in ancient Greek authors (Kneale, M. (1968) "Eternity and Sempiternity", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:223-238).

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to the contradiction: when we speak of eternity, we mean timeless (and therefore non-permanent) life, but life itself is unthinkable outside of time and duration.

This idea of the internal inconsistency of the concept of eternity is most fully developed by Richard Swinburne. Discussing the nature of time, he puts forward the principle of the duration of being, according to which everything that happens, every event that exists - including the very existence of a substance with its properties-occurs in time intervals (periods of time) and never - at a certain instant of time (instant of time), or is analyzed in terms of what happens in time intervals. Instants are points that limit the periods during which something happens [ ... ] An interval is the interval between two such instants. The intervals may last for different times, such as two hours or three days 46.

Swinburne points out that when we describe certain objects or their attributes, we always mean a certain duration, but never a moment without duration. 47 If we say that x is equal to t, then this means that t is a certain interval of time between the instants t' and t', but we do not mean that t - is an indivisible and non-continuous instant. Indeed, if we say that x is happy in t, but we also mean that he was not happy either before t or after t, that is, x is happy in an "interval" with zero duration, then this is no different from the fact that x was sad all the time.48 Thus, intervals are long-term infinitely divisible elements of time, whereas non-long-term moments are not divisible by time.-

46. Swinburne, R. The Christian God, p. 72.

47. Despite his pronounced anti-Platonism and shared commitment to the de-Hellenization of Christian theology, Swinburne's argument seems almost a periphrasis of Plato's argument about "instantaneity" (τααίφνης) in Parmenides (155e-157b).

48. Swinburne also considers some specific contexts of the use of "moment", for example, the concept of instantaneous acceleration (instantaneous velocity). It is obvious that instantaneous acceleration also operates precisely in time intervals, and not in moments devoid of duration (Swinburne, R. The Christian God, p. 73).

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They are used as a necessary condition for differentiating time intervals 49.

Thus, the idea that God is transcendent to time and duration is contradictory and incoherent. The traditional notion of the "instantaneity" of God runs counter to the principle of a lasting being: if God exists, in Boethius ' words, "all at once" in an indivisible and non-lasting moment, then attempts to attribute certain attributes to him are meaningless, and the very existence of God in this case is no different from His non-existence.

* * *

The temporalist view of the divine nature became a very influential concept in analytical theology in the 1960s and 1970s, and today temporalism is the dominant position among analytical philosophers. While the existence of physical objects, created being, is limited in time, only God is eternal, existing always, that is, during, throughout all time. The eternity of God implies that there is no past t1 in which God does not exist, just as there is no future t2 in which He will not exist. In other words, the divine eternity is nothing but infinity in time. The idea that God is all-time, not timeless, is a "simple, naive, and primordial view" of divine eternity.50 This position is not only implicit, but, according to some temporalists, explicitly expressed in the Bible and in some authors significant for the Western theistic tradition (both medieval and modern), but also to a much greater extent than traditional eternalism, it corresponds to the conceptual framework of modern philosophy.

According to temporalism, the desire to protect and preserve eternalism, which treats divine eternity as the transcendence of time and time, is only a prejudice of philosophical consciousness, due to the influence of ancient Greek.-

49. In this argument, Swinburne adapts the metaphysics of Aristotle's time, although he prefers to talk about the inability of ancient and medieval authors to work with continuity in a coherent mathematical way.

50. Swinburne, R. The Christian God, p. 137.

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the influence of Russian thought on the entire Western culture. In this sense, the tendency to de-Hellenize Christian theology becomes a specific feature of temporalism, even though some of the ideas that are characteristic of the proponents of this concept are found to be consonant with the ideas of Aristotle (and even Plato).

A number of factors explain the success and the very possibility of temporalism as an independent position within analytical theology. First of all, this is the academic and, more broadly, intellectual context that developed in the mid - twentieth century in the West. As already mentioned, along with the actualization of metaphysical problems in analytical philosophy, classical theological questions are also legitimized. In addition, under the influence of process theology and open theism, there is a significant "adaptation" of religious ideas to the needs of time, which is expressed in the anthropomorphization of God, 51 which also determines the revision of the relationship of God to time. Finally, the cultural context is also influenced by the interest in the problems of time and the eternal in related fields - the history of philosophy, history, and philology.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to explain the rise of temporalism solely in terms of the timeliness of its emergence. Here it is necessary to identify two important content components of this heyday. The first is an interest in tradition and one's own "disciplinary" past. Contrary to the popular notion that analytical philosophy is not interested in the history of philosophy and in the historical and philosophical perspective, 52 analytical philosophers are quite focused on the study of tradition and the classics, even if their "set" of classical authors may differ from the" set " of Col.-

51. As V. K. Shokhin aptly notes: "The deviant forms of modern theism proceed from the task opposite to that solved by traditional theology [ ... ]: not to help a person in his ascent to God, but to "help God" in the adaptation required of Him to human desires and ideas. At the same time, the comparatively weak and compromising (in its" editing "of classical theism) version of the theological anthropomorphization of God can be designated as" open theism", and the strong and uncompromising (in a break with the entire" metaphysical heritage") version can be designated as process theology" (Shokhin V. K. Theism or Deism? Reflections on Richard Swinburne's Metaphysical Theology. 2015. No. 2. C. 70).

52. Zenkin S. N. Humanitarian classics: between science and literature / / Classics and classics in social and humanitarian knowledge / ed. by I. M. Savelyev, A.V. Poletaev. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2009, p. 283.

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53. Active reference, though most often from a critical point of view, to the classical texts of medieval authors seems to be not only an effective strategy for including analytical theology in the richest intellectual tradition, but also an important mechanism for including authors of past centuries, sometimes forgotten, in the current discussion, which means inspiring a new life in ancient times. texts.

The second is openness and interest in contemporary philosophical discussions, that is, an interest in one's own disciplinary present. Contrary to the prevailing view in modern Russia that theological disciplines are closed and even hermetic, analytical theology shows remarkable adaptability and inclusion in a broad intellectual context. This is noticeable both at the "thematic" level - as it was shown, representatives of temporalism actively refer to the key developments of modern analytical philosophy (modern philosophical theories of time, questions related to causality, the problem of free will, etc.), and at the "stylistic" level - they actively use, for example, methods of formalization, thought experiment. This correspondence to general philosophical "trends" allowed temporalism (and indeed analytical theology in general) not only to become part of the current discussion, but also to be institutionalized in Western Academia.

Actually, the institutional aspect is another significant factor in the success of temporalism. Thus, given their specialization within analytic theology, the central figures of this paper - Nicholas Walterstorff, Richard Swinburne, and Anthony Kenny-can be called classics of temporalism; however, authors such as Nelson Pike, Peter Geach, Alvin Plantinga, Arthur Pryor, Peter Van Inwagen, and many others shared a temporalist interpretation of the concept

53. One of the editors of the Blackwell Handbook of Analytical Philosophy, Aloysius Patrick Martinich, describes modern analytical philosophy as follows:: "[Modern analytical philosophers are those who] would have been doing philosophy, like Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein, if they had been doing philosophy when Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein were doing it" (Martinich, A. P. (2001) "Introduction", in A. P. Martinich, D. Sosa (eds) Companion to Analytical Philosophy, pp. 5. Oxford: Blackwell). It is worth noting that such differentiation of classics depending on geographical, national and "school" affiliation is characteristic of the humanities in principle (Savelyeva I. M., Poletaev A.V. Classical Heritage, Moscow: HSE, 2010, pp. 181-191).

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forever. Many of these authors were at the origins of analytical theology as an autonomous and respectable subdiscipline of modern philosophical knowledge: they played a major role in the formation of the influential "Society of Christian Philosophers" (The Society of Christian Philosophers, 1978) and the publication of the key journal for Western philosophy of religion "Faith and Philosophy" (Faith and Philosophy, 1984).

Temporalism posed a serious challenge to eternalism, which was traditionally perceived as an integral part of the Christian faith. Instead of the idea of eternity as a timeless and timeless mode of God's existence, the temporalists proposed a concept of divine infinity in time, which, from their point of view, is much more consistent with both the philosophical conceptualization of the all-perfect being and the very form of biblical thought. Although the proponents of traditional eternalism tried to prove its rational validity throughout the 1960s and 1970s, their voices went largely unnoticed. The most important reaction and major intellectual event within analytical theology was the concept of neo-externalism proposed in the 1980s and early 1990s. But this is already a topic for further research.

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