This article is devoted to the Kurdish policy of the Young Turks and their relations with the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun party. After the Young Turks came to power (July 1908) and declared a constitutional regime, all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire were considered equal. This change in the status of minorities in the empire had a strong impact on the Kurdish tribes that formed the Hamidian regiments during the reign of Abdul Hamid II. In the first years of their rule, the Young Turks, in cooperation with the Armenian Dashnaktsutyun committee, began to eliminate all elements of the old regime in the eastern provinces, especially the Hamidian regiments, for which they abolished their privileges. Dissatisfied with this policy of the authorities, Hussein Pasha (the leader of the Haideranli tribe) and his comrades emigrated to Western Iran in order to seek Russian patronage. Fearing unrest and a Russian-backed Kurdish uprising, the Young Turks adopted a more moderate policy towards the Kurdish tribes.

Keywords: Kurdish issue, Young Turks, Dashnaktsutyun, Hamidian regiments, Haideranli tribe leader Huseyn Pasha.

THE COMMITTEE FOR UNION AND PROGRESS' POLICY TOWARDS THE KURD HAMIDIYE REGIMENTS IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1908-1912)

After Young Turks s coming to power and the proclamation of the constitutional regime all the nations of the Ottoman Empire were proclaimed equal. This drastic change concerning the minorities of the empire had a strong impact on the Kurdish tribes which have enrolled at the Hamidiye Regiments in the Eastern provinces during the era of Abdulhamid II and have committed armed robbery and violence against the Armenians, usually without any impunity by local administrations. In the early years of the new regime, the ruling Young Turk party in cooperation and even alliance with the Armenian Committee of the ARE embarked upon elimination of the all adherents of the old Abdulhamid regime, including Hamidian regiments. They nullified the many privileges of the regiments and began to punish their leaders. Completely disgruntled with such policy of the ruling party, Huseyin Pasha, the chief of the Hayderanli tribe, emigrated to the Western part of Iran with his fellows aiming to get Russian patronage which substantially alarmed the Young Turks. Concerning about Kurdish unrest with the support of Russia, the Young Turks implemented more moderate policy toward the Kurdish tribes.

Keywords: Kurdish problem, Young Turks, Hamidiye regiments, Huseyin pasha.

TIBET ABAK-Post-graduate student at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Tibet.abak@gmail.com.

Tibet Abak - PhD Candidate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, Tibet.abak@gmail.com.

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The adoption of the Constitution of the Ottoman Empire on July 23, 1908, and the rise to power of the Young Turk Unity and Progress party were key moments for radical changes in Turkey and the Middle East. During this period, the national policy of the Young Turk government had a significant impact on the formation and fate of various ethnic and national communities in the Ottoman space, which at the same time underwent a significant political transformation as a result of numerous uprisings. Anatolia and especially the eastern provinces of Turkey, which were located in close proximity to the Iranian and Russian borders, became the central area of important social changes, where the predominantly Kurdish and Armenian populations lived.

The new constitutional regime of the Young Turks, which promised liberal reforms after the policy of absolutism and pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909), foreshadowed revolutionary changes for the eastern provinces. However, the consolidation of the new regime here was difficult, since the new policy of constitutionalism often clashed with the interests of the privileged strata of society and supporters of the old absolutist regime of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, primarily with the Hamidian regiments, which were created by the sultan's decree in 1892 on the basis of Kurdish tribes in order to protect the eastern borders of the empire and nationalism.

The Young Turks in the initial period of their rule (from July 24, 1908 to July 9, 1912) were forced to fight their political opponents inside the country. This struggle was carried out first by the method of"carrot and stick". The flight to Iran of Kor Hussein Pasha, one of the most influential Kurdish leaders of the Hamidian regiments, as well as the efforts of the Young Turk government to return this leader to their homeland, were an important step in strengthening the Young Turk power, which will be described below.

This paper examines the transformation of Young Turk politics in the eastern provinces in the context of events related to the rejection by the Hamidian regiments, consisting mainly of Kurds, of the new government represented by supporters of the constitution and the restriction of the sultan's power.

EARLY DAYS OF THE YOUNG TURK REGIME

The first Turkish Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) was proclaimed in 1876, but two years later, in 1878, under the pretext of starting a war with Russia, Abdul Hamid II canceled it and dissolved the parliament (Majlis) convened on its basis. After that, for many years the country was under the absolute rule of the sultan, which caused a negative reaction from the political opposition that was forming at that time. Consisting mainly of Ottoman intellectuals who gathered in various European cities, the opposition forces used the slogan "Freedom, equality and justice"in their struggle against the Sultan's absolutist regime. Members of the movement, which was later called the Young Turk movement, spread their ideas through newspapers and magazines. Soon the opposition joined forces with other opponents of the sultan, most of whom were colonels of the Turkish army, and founded the Unity and Progress party. In July 1908, they rebelled in Macedonia against Abdul Hamid II and forced him to restore the Constitution. This was the beginning of a new regime, widely known in Turkish historiography as the "Second Constitutional Period". Although the sultan remained on the throne until April 27, 1909. The actual management was transferred to the "Unity and Progress" Committee (hereinafter - KEP), which determined the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers, and then almost the entire Mejlis.

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The main goal of the CAP was to save the empire from collapse. Although at first glance the reason for the military uprising in Macedonia in July 1908 was opposition to the absolutist rule of Abdul Hamid II, the behind-the-scenes motive was in the interests of European powers aimed at dividing the inheritance of the Ottoman Empire. This was especially evident at the negotiations in Reval in June 1908 between the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and the British King Edward VII. Their result was a project of an autonomous administration under the leadership of a Christian governor for Macedonia (Zurcher, 2010, p. 117). According to the Izvolsky-Harding project, named after the foreign ministers of Russia and England, the Macedonian governor was to be appointed only with the consent of the major European powers.

The Young Turks, considering the project an attempt to divide the empire [Ahmad, 1969, p. 3] and claiming that Abdul Hamid II was "selling the country to foreigners", spread revolutionary ideas among the Muslim Turks in Macedonia and the officers of the 3rd Ottoman Army. The Russian Consul in Skopje, Orlov, noted the extraordinary success of Young Turk propaganda among Ottoman officers and wrote that 75% of them joined the revolutionary committee "Unity and Progress" (Petrosyan, 1971, p.285). Thus, although the opposition ideas against Abdul Hamid II were first voiced through the press by Young Turks who fled to Europe and propagated liberal ideas, as a result of the uprisings in July 1908, most of those who came to power were from among the Ottoman officers [Kirakosyan, 1989, p.101].

Officers trained at the Military Academy using European methods sought first of all to create a powerful modern army. They saw the only way to save the empire from collapse in the idea of "ittihad-y anasir", i.e. in ensuring the unity of all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire. According to the ideology of Ottomanism, all the peoples of the empire: Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Arabs and others-were recognized as equal before the constitution and laws, and Ottoman citizenship was considered the basis of their identity [Tunaya, 1984, p. 369; Hanioglu, 1981, p. 209; Mardin, 2008, p.265-279].

CENTRALIZATION AND OTTOMANIZATION POLICIES UNDER THE YOUNG TURKS

When the Young Turks were still in opposition to the Sultan's regime, a heated discussion developed about the need for a policy of decentralization. In particular, this discussion was the central theme of the Congress of Young Turks, which met in Paris on February 4-9, 1902. Here the committee was divided between the groups of two activists of the Young Turk movement: Ahmed Riza and Prince Sabahaddin. The former supported the integrity of the empire and centralization, while the latter supported decentralization and a federal state. After the congress, Prince Sabahaddin and his associates formed the Private Enterprise and Decentralization Committee, and Ahmed Riza and his circle formed the core of the CEP.

KEP activists believed that the unity of peoples can only be achieved through a policy of centralization and ensuring that all provinces of the country are subordinated to a single state will. The formation of this opinion was influenced by the fact that 2/3 of the committee members were officers [Zurcher, 2010, p. 118]. Most of the members of the CEP Central Committee, being originally from the Balkans or Western Anatolia [Kansu, 1995, p. 242; Zurcher, 2010, p.314-315], gained extensive experience in the fight against Macedonian partisan formations. Therefore, they had a negative attitude to the ideas of decentralization.

When the Young Turks were in opposition to the Sultan's regime, they worked closely with the Armenian revolutionaries to overthrow the sultan and implement the idea of Ottomanism in the empire. The Armenian Dashnaktsutyun Committee was a staunch ally of the Young Turks in the fight against Abdul Hamid II. Their close cooperation took place in the early days of the constitutional regime, when a contract was signed between the two sides,

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who accepted the Armenian demands for administrative, judicial and economic reforms. The agreement was published in the official newspaper of Dashnaktsutyun "Azatamart" (Tyrkova, 1916, p.64). The leaders of the Young Turk committee, first of all Enverbey and Talaat Bey, visited Armenian churches, schools and cemeteries and made speeches dedicated to the memory of the Armenian Fedayas1 who fell in the struggle against the Sultan's regime, thereby emphasizing the Turkish-Armenian friendship [Kirakosyan, 1989, p. 135].

Dashnaktsutyun members attached particular importance to cooperation with the Young Turks and the protection of the Constitution. One of the leaders of the Dashnaks in Istanbul, E. Aknuni, in the early days of the 1908 regime, said:" One of the most important tasks of Dashnaktsutyun should be the protection of the Ottoman constitution, friendly work with Ittihad (i.e. KEP) " [Kirakosyan, 1989, p.157]. Although the Armenians ' demands were to reorganize their districts for autonomous existence in accordance with the principle of decentralization, they tried to achieve this goal through the necessary reforms from the KEP party that came to power. Therefore, the Young Turks, who placed the prevention of any external interference in the internal affairs of the country at the center of their policy, valued the alliance with Dashnaktsutyun and considered ensuring the loyalty of Armenians to the empire as an element of the policy of Ottomanization.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW SYSTEM IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES. CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN HAMIDIAN REGIMENTS AND ARMENIANS

The Eastern governorates 2 were subject to the active implementation of the pan-Islamist and absolutist policies of Abdul Hamid II. The Sultan, like the Young Turks, believed that the future of the empire was in danger, and tried to prevent its collapse. The Ottoman Empire was constantly retreating from European space. Anatolia had its own obstacles in ensuring stability and security, first of all - the increased activity of Armenian revolutionaries since the 1880s, as well as Russia's support for the creation of an autonomous Armenia in the east of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds who lived in Eastern Anatolia were the only element that the sultan was able to rely on in this territory. In the eastern provinces, they formed the dominant part of the population along with the Armenians, but because of their Sunni-Muslim identity, the Kurds were undoubtedly loyal to the Sultan-Caliph. Witness of the events K. N. Smirnov wrote on this occasion: "The situation in the eastern provinces did not inspire confidence, as the Armenians were ready to revolt almost at any moment, while the Turks were a minority in the eastern vilayets (provinces). In this situation, the only way out for the state was to trust its" religious brothers "- the Kurds" [Smirnov, 1904, vol. XVII, N 4, p. 317]. Therefore, at the end of the 19th century, Abdul-Hamid II established paramilitary regiments from the most influential Kurdish tribes, which became known as Hamidiyskiye (1891) .3
Even during the establishment of the Khamidian regiments, their leaders, having received the highest ranks, orders and privileges, such as exemption from certain taxes and permission to carry weapons in peacetime, enjoyed state protection and support [Gryaznoye, 1907, p. 23-24; Smirnov, 1904, p. 317; Green, 1896, p. 213-224; Klein, 2002, p. 133]. J. Kline describes the creation of regiments as " repeated tribal training."-

1 The term "fedai" at that time meant Armenian revolutionaries.

2 Since 1864, the eastern provinces have consisted of Van, Bitlis, Erzsrum, Diarbskir, Mamuretulaziz, and Sivas.

3 A Russian researcher at the beginning of the 20th century recorded that the following tribes were enlisted in the Khamidian regiments: Haideranli (Van Province), Makurli (Van Province), Shevishli (Van Province), Milanli (Van Province), Takurli (Van Province), Gassananli (Erzurum Province),Zarakanli (Erzurum Province), zilanli (Erzurum province), adamanli (Erzurum Province), belikli (Erzurum Province), shayananli (Erzurum Province), karaiapakhi (Erzurum Province), gibranli (Bitlis Province) [Gryaznoye, 1907, pp. 23-24].

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calling the Emirate" [Klein, 2002, p. 125]. Each regiment and tribes registered in these regiments acquired a superior position relative to other tribes and led a semi-independent way of life. 4 F. F. Gryaznoe noted that at the time of its creation, there were 32-33 Hamidian regiments, and each had 250-300 horsemen, so the total number of them was 12-15 thousand. [Gryaznov, 1907, p. 25, 28]. Another contemporary observer, H. F. B. Lynch, counted about 2 thousand of them during the Eresurum parade of 1892 and added that this number was much lower than the planned number of Hamidian Kurds (Lynch, 1910, pp. 543-544). However, the number of regiments gradually increased and reached 63 at the beginning of the 20th century [Bruinessen, 2003, p. 287].

Abdul Hamid II, by creating the Hamidian regiments, initiated an irreversible process. They were organized against a possible Russian attack from the Caucasian front, as well as against the insurgent activities of Armenian revolutionaries. V. A. Gordlevsky wrote about these regiments that "it was a buffer directed against Russia" [Gordlevsky, 1913-1914, p.460; Klein, 2002, p. 72-73]. The regiments, using their privileges and political power, began to organize attacks on Armenian villages. Contemporaries of the period recorded many such performances of the Hamidians. During his trip to the provinces of Van and Bitlis, Lynch got acquainted in detail with the situation of Armenians. Speaking about the Armenian villages in Van, he said that the Kurdish leaders of the Hamidian regiments economically exploited the peasants; in addition, they looted many villages in front of the local administration [Lynch, 1910, pp. 22, 33, 331]. The Russian Vice Consul in Van and Erzerum, V. F. Mayevsky, claimed that during his trips covering most of the eastern provinces (Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diyarbakir and Mosul provinces), he witnessed anti-Armenian activities of the Kurds. After describing in detail how the attacks on the villages were carried out, V. F. Mayevsky described the disastrous state of the evacuated villages [Mayevsky, 1904, p. 78, 80-81].

It should be noted that all the attacks and clashes were carried out not only on the initiative of the Hamidian tribes, but also by the activities of the Armenian revolutionaries - attacks on the Ottoman local leaders and the Muslim population, which also provoked hostility between the Kurdish tribes. However, Hamidiye attacks were usually not limited to the supposed villages where Fedai might be hiding (Mayevsky, 1904, pp. 212-213). Some researchers claim that it was the Khamidian regiments that prevented the creation of an Armenian state in the eastern provinces (Kodaman, 1987, p. 60). However, it can be noted that they, on the contrary, complicated the Armenian issue, created a dangerous situation, provoked retaliatory attacks by Armenian fedayas to a greater extent, and, without recognizing the authority of local authorities, weakened the policy of centralization.

Hamidian regiments, corresponding to their name, obeyed only Sultan Abdul-Hamid II. They did not recognize any other state authority and were hostile to the local administration, i.e., to the governors, county chiefs, village elders, and the entire bureaucratic apparatus (Kodaman, 1987, p.56). Appointed by Abdul Hamid II to reorganize the Hamidian regiments, the Inspector General of Anatolia, Marshal Shakir Pasha, and the commander of the 4th Army, Marshal Zeki Pasha, reported in a joint report that order is not established in the Hamidian regiments, discipline is not ensured, and the tribes do not recognize the authority of their superiors appointed from regular army officers [Kodaman, 1987, p. 51-52]. The main reason for this attitude was that the regiments enjoyed extensive privileges, and their crimes went unpunished. H. Lynch explains this fact in connection with the Armenian question as follows:

4 joules. Klein notes that Hamidian tribes organized attacks on non-regimental tribes [Klein, 2002, p. 172-173].

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"The policy of the Ottoman government has yielded many results. A brave Kurd, receiving Russian rifles and carrying ammunition, goes on the offensive against Armenian villages. If he is caught and handed over to the local administration, he will not recognize the civil court and will demand to be tried by the chief of his tribe. The Kurd whose request was accepted, as a rule, received an amnesty. Thus, the accusations against him remain unpunished" [Lynch, 1910, p. 545].

J. Klein also emphasizes this aspect and notes that the provision of weapons by the state for the regiments and the granting of privileges and orders were assistance in the illegal actions of the Hamidian regiments and all the accusations of the Kurds were forgiven, thus the state became an indirect participant in the crimes of the Hamidian tribes [Klein, 2002, p. 154].

According to the prevailing opinion, the most powerful Hamidian tribes at the beginning of the 20th century were the Milli, Khasananli, and Haideranli (Kodaman, 1987, p.53). These tribes, with their armed forces and extensive sphere of influence, dominated other, smaller tribes and took possession of many villages. Despite the fact that their illegal actions provoked reactions and protests from the local population [Klein, 2002, p. 147], the state administration did not take serious measures to prevent these actions, because the "brothers in religion" Kurds were the only support of the state in the eastern provinces. The government of Abdul Hamid II considered the Armenians as an" internal enemy "of the empire; in such a situation, from the sultan's point of view, it was unacceptable to take steps against the Kurdish tribes or punish them, since it was possible to lose the Kurds' loyalty to the throne. As noted in the reports of British and French diplomats, the state feared a Kurdish uprising if they lost their loyalty to the Sultan [Klein, 2002, p. 163]. Russian Colonel I. V. Averyanov wrote about this:

"Having recently dealt with the Armenian issue, it is natural that the Turkish administration is afraid of arming the Kurds against itself with some drastic measures; among the general and deep hatred of the Turks of Armenians, Yezidis, Nestorians and Kyzylbashs, Sunni Kurds who are co-religionists with the Turks are still the most politically reliable population of Kurdistan; only among the Kurds of the Kurdistan Region, the Kurds of the Kurdistan Region are The Turks may seek support for their power in the East of Asia Minor " (Averyanov, 1900, p. 290).

When the Young Turks came to power in July 1908, they were faced with a troubled political situation in the eastern provinces and an unresolved Kurdish-Armenian issue. Hamidian regiments were the main cause of unrest and distrust in the region, which was an obstacle to the "unity policy" ("ittihad-y anasir") declared by the Ittihadists. Attacks by the Hamidians on the Armenian population aroused the discontent of the European powers and prepared the ground for external intervention, which the Young Turks did their best to avoid. In addition, the regiments ' loyalty to the Sultan, not to the state, was contrary to the liberal principles and slogans of the Young Turk committee. Thus, the elimination or centralization of the Hamidian regiments was extremely necessary for the regime that came to power.

After the constitution was announced, supporters of the old regime felt their status threatened. Between July 1908 and the reactionary, unconstitutional uprising of April 13, 1909, the struggle in the Ottoman state apparatus continued, and KEP tried to establish his own regime. Servants and spies of Abdul-Hamid II were dismissed from the organs, and officers of the old regime were forced to resign [Mandelstam, 1915, p. 10]. In addition, the Young Turks began to transform the old system and attempt to modernize the country. For example, when modernizing the army, they tried to establish German training methods and abolished breaks for religious rituals [Zurcher, 2010, p. 80]. The new regime, trying to take control of the ulema, prepared a bill that implied that if students in madrasas could not pass exams within a certain time limit, they would be called up for military service.

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the service. In general, the Young Turk committee sought to liberate administrative and social life from the rule of Islam and Sharia law.

This policy created discontent among the Ulama, whose interests clashed with the new regime [Mandelstam, 1915, p. 15]. Discontent was also reflected in social life. Reactionaries attacked supporters of the Young Turks who walked the streets with their wives, sisters, or daughters (Mandelstam, 1915, p. 15). Clerical opposition to the CEP grew rapidly. The murders of some of the Sultan's former supporters, especially the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Serbesti, Hassan Fehmi, on April 7, 1909, and the fact that the perpetrators were not found, roused a significant number of reactionaries to fight against the government.

Tensions between the old and new regimes soon reached a climax, and an uprising broke out in the capital on March 31 (April 13), 1909. The rebels were mostly old regime officers from the Istanbul garrison. Their mastermind was Dervish Vakhdeti, whose articles were published in the Islamist newspaper Volkan. Having temporarily taken control of the city, the rebels demanded the abolition of the constitution, compliance with Sharia law, the expulsion of Young Turk leaders from the country and the dismissal of officers who support the new regime from the army. The rebels were hostile to non-Muslims and demanded that Christian deputies and ministers leave the Mejlis (Mandelstam, 1915, p. 14). This anti-Christian and reactionary mood and power vacuum immediately affected the rest of the country. For example, bloody clashes between local Armenians and Muslims took place in Adana, which resulted in the massacre of many Armenians [Sarkisyan, 1972, p.258; Kirakosyan, 1989, p. 157]. Order and security in the capital and provinces were established only after the departure of the Young Turk leaders of the "Army of Action" detachment. The "Army of Action" moved on Istanbul and, after fierce fighting, took control of the city, restoring the power of the new regime. On April 27, Abdul Hamid II was deposed from the throne. The Majlis appointed his brother Mehmed V as the new sultan. Thus, the Young Turks won the first battle with the clerical opposition. But in the eastern provinces, they were expected to be more united in reactionism and inveterate problems.

INNOVATIONS IN THE EASTERN PROVINCES OF THE EMPIRE AND THE CENTRALIZATION OF HAMIDIAN REGIMENTS

When the Young Turks came to power, the state power in the eastern provinces was so limited in its capabilities that A. Tyrkova, a contemporary journalist of that period, calling the Kurdish leaders "feudal beys", reported that it was impossible even to collect taxes from the Kurds [Tyrkova, 1916, p. 67]. The only ally of the new regime in the region was the Dashnaktsutyun Committee, which represented the interests of the overwhelming majority of Armenians. Both sides agreed that the remnants of the old regime, especially the Hamid leaders, should be eliminated. This caused sharp discontent among the Kurdish leaders. The Kurdish-Muslim population, not believing in equality between Muslims and non-Muslims, did not accept the equal status of Armenians and Muslims declared by the Constitution before the law [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.7716, l. 82].

Thus, by cooperating with Dashnaktsutyun, KEP made a sharp turn away from the policy of flirting with supporters of the old regime in the east of the country and joined its fate with the Armenians. Karekin Pastyrmajian, a member of the Dashnaktsutyun party in Erzerum in 1908-1912, told a Russian correspondent (A. Tyrkova) that "the Young Turks burned all the ships of the past, that there is no turning back, and if a reactionary group comes to power, it will be their end" (Tyrkova, 1916, p.67). Vramyan Arshak, editor of the Azatamarta newspaper and Dashnaktsutyun newspaper, emphasized his focus on constitutionalism in an interview with the same journalist

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the Young Turk Committee and noted that the new government, which has received a very bad legacy from the administration of Abdul-Hamid II, seeks to establish a constitutional and legal regime [Tyrkova, 1916, p. 76]. Further stating that the Dashnaks rely on the constitutionalists, who, in his opinion, are the" left wing " of the CEP, Arshak considered Talaat Bey, Javid Bey, Haji Adil Bey and Nazim Bey to be the most trusting persons among the Young Turks and said that if the Young Turks are defeated in their new policy, the Armenians will be the most trusting. they will also find themselves in a difficult situation [Tyrkova, 1916, p. 79].

The most important promise of the Young Turk government to the Armenians was the solution of the land issue. As a result of the emigration of many Armenians to different countries, primarily to Russia, as a result of clashes with the Kurds, their remaining lands and property were confiscated and seized by Kurdish tribes. Then, after the restoration of the Constitution of 1908, the majority of Armenians who had certificates of ownership of land plots and property demanded the return of their lands. The Kurds, who during the period of the Abdul-Hamid reaction were accustomed to consider any demand of the Armenians illegal, refused to return the mentioned lands to their former owners [Tyrkova, 1916, p. 66].

In order to resolve this issue, the CEP, in agreement with Dashnaktsutyun, assembled a land reform commission. However, the Young Turks clashed with the opposition on this issue, which consisted not only of Hamidian leaders, but also of owners of large land plots in the committee itself [Tyrkova, 1916, p.66]. To resolve the land issue, the Young Turk committee relied on the Dashnaks, and also sought the patronage of influential leaders and notables who had authority among the Kurdish tribes. In addition, some authorities, such as Sayyid Abdulkadir, the son of the Kurdish Sheikh Obeidullah, who raised an uprising in 1880 for the creation of an independent Kurdistan, since the end of 1909, went to the region and, by order of the government, gave advice to the Kurdish and Armenian populations that both sides should avoid any conflict with each other and that the occupied lands should be and the property was returned to the actual owners [BOA. DH.SYS, Dosya No. 23, Vesika No. 1 (cipher from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the provinces of Van, Erzurum, Bitlis, Mamuretulaziz, March 28, 1910)]. However, the land issue remained unresolved for many years.

In the early years of the constitutional regime, the Young Turks gave priority to the issue of Hamidian regiments. As mentioned above, the inevitable elimination or centralization of irregular regiments became obvious to the Kurdish leaders. The regiments represented centrifugal semi-independent forces inside the country and, while dominating certain territories, committed many crimes against Armenians and other civilians, while remaining unpunished. The Government, represented by the CEP, began to punish the leaders of Hamidian regiments who committed such illegal actions under the old regime. This has yielded some results, but there have been numerous clashes between tribes whose leaders opposed this policy and government forces.

A striking example is the revolt against the new regime of the Mili tribal leader and one of the most loyal Hamidian leaders, Sultan Ibrahim Pasha (Istoriya Kurdistana, 1999, p. 206). Dominating a wide area between Urfa and Diyarbakir and commanding a force of about 5,000 men, Ibrahim Pasha was eventually defeated and killed by the Ottoman military, which was a serious blow to the Hamidian regiments [Schastye..., 1908, pp. 46-57; Klein, 2002, p. 212]. Shortly thereafter, in 1910, the Hamidian regiments were reorganized [Klein, 2002, p. 218]. First of all, their name was changed: now they were called "light cavalry regiments". New rules were established to strengthen control from the center, namely: the appointment of inspectors for tribes, the appointment of regimental commanders from the center.

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regular army and the service of these officers in regiments for four years [Summary of information..., 1911, N 2, p. 17, 19]. New standards were established to enforce discipline:

- determination of the number of regiments in the required standards;

- prohibiting members of Hamidian tribes from wearing military uniforms and weapons in peacetime;

- appointment of regimental officers from tribal chiefs only to those who served in the regular cavalry and, after passing the examination of a special commission, received a diploma from the Ministry of War;

- punishment in case of non-execution of orders and any abuse of authority;

- do not allow the use of tribal traditions as an excuse to avoid punishment;

- all persons, including the highest and lowest ranks, are subject to military laws in the event of a crime during the war, and in peacetime in the event of any illegal action - to civil courts [Summary of information..., 1911, N 2, p. 14-15, 27, 31, 34-35, 43].

It was decided that those Kurds who plunder property and steal livestock of the peaceful rural population and, moreover, kill residents, will be prosecuted and punished according to the law, "as it was done earlier in relation to Macedonian robbers" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 10].

EVENTS SURROUNDING HUSSEIN PASHA OF THE HAIDERANLI TRIBE

Kurds, especially those who were enlisted in the Hamidian regiments, felt a threat to their status and position after the Young Turk revolution and therefore actively cooperated with supporters of the old regime [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 11 vol.]. The Kurdish leaders of the regiments participated in secret negotiations with each other. Hastily arming and providing ammunition to their tribes, the Kurdish leaders did not hide their dissatisfaction with the new regime, and as a result, an uprising was prepared [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 3824, l. 8]. According to information received from Anatolia by the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District of Russia, "the Kurdish movement against the Young Turks and their allies the number of Armenians increased more and more every day" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 21ob.].

Hussein Pasha, the leader of the Haideranli tribe, was one of the leaders of the opposition-minded Kurdish tribes. His tribe lived in the provinces of Van and Erzerum, and one of the strongest Hamidian regiments was formed from it. Promoted to general in 1892, Hussein Pasha was a staunch supporter of the old regime. Its influence extended to other tribes located in the northern part of the eastern provinces near the Russian border.

The main activity of the Haideranly tribe was robberies and robberies, so it had wide captured territories with a lot of livestock, and the tribe itself was quite rich [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 30]. Researcher X. Lynch, during his trip to the region, had the opportunity to meet Hussein Pasha and asked him why the people of his tribe do not engage in agriculture. To this, Huseyn Pasha replied that in an area where there are no transport roads and a market, it is impossible to have income from such work [Lynch, 1910, p. 27]. The hostile attitude of Hussein Pasha towards Armenians was noticed by his contemporaries, but not only the Kurds and their Muslim brothers, the Turks, but also some Armenians obeyed him [Summary of information..., 1912, N 7-8, p. 6].

The government of Abdul Hamid II did not interfere in the activities of Hussein Pasha at the time. This fact is explained in the report of the Russian Caucasian Military District of January 5, 1910, as follows::

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"Under the old regime, the Kurds who served in His Majesty's cavalry were always considered; they were courted, awarded ranks, including general's; their violence and looting were often overlooked by the Turkish authorities, partly because they were aware of their powerlessness before them, and partly because it was too unprofitable to arm them against them yourself. In the fight against the Armenian revolutionaries, the Kurds always supported the Turkish government, and in the event of a war with Russia, they could also provide significant assistance to the Turkish army " [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 26].

Hussein Pasha, along with three Kurdish leaders named Emin Pasha, Teymur Pasha and Mehmed Sadiq Bey, in the number of 6 Hamidian regiments, emigrated from Turkey to Maku (Iran), in order not to return back and accept Russian citizenship. The reason for this emigration was that the Hamidian regiments were reorganized, an alliance was concluded between the Young Turks and Armenians, and the persecution of Kurdish leaders who committed crimes against Armenians and civilians under the old regime was carried out. An important role was played by the appeal of Huseyn Pasha in the autumn of 1909 to the governor of Erzurum, Jalal Bey, in order to clarify the accusations of Armenian looting and violence against his tribe. After that, having made sure that the Young Turk government supported the side of the Armenians, the Kurdish leader made the final decision to emigrate to Iran [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 27].

The events surrounding Hussein Pasha in the eastern provinces of the empire are described in detail in the reports of the Russian plenipotentiaries in the Caucasus. The Governor General of Russia in the Caucasus, I. I. Vorontsov-Dashkov, in a telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire dated March 9, 1910, explained the reasons for emigration as follows::

"The main reason for the decision of the Kurdish tribe to leave Turkish citizenship was the order of the Turkish government to abolish the Hamidiye cavalry and attract Kurds to serve military service on the same grounds as the rest of the population of the empire, depriving the Kurdish governors and the entire Kurdish population in general of their former privileged position. In addition, the Kurds are also concerned about the return to the Armenians of the lands from which they displaced them in the last decade of the last century, and the order to attract the Christian population of Turkey to serve military service " [AVPRI, F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N 517/2, d. 3572, l. 12ob.].

As can be seen, the main reason for Hussein Pasha's displeasure was that, being non-Muslims, Armenians were constitutionally equal citizens with Muslims. In addition, the Young Turks began to make active attempts to resolve the land issue and return their captured lands to the Armenians, while the privileges of Kurdish tribes enrolled in Hamidian regiments were canceled. Another Russian report cited the alliance of the Young Turks with the Armenians and the persecution of Kurdish Beys for crimes against the latter as the reasons for the aggravation of relations with the Kurds:

"Local Armenians, who have become the main and most implacable enemies of the Kurds over the past few decades, have suddenly turned from disenfranchised Raya into full citizens. Feeling their strength, they, in alliance with the Young Turks, began to take out the old, old grievances on the Kurds. Naturally, the more powerful a Kurd became, the more charges were brought against him; many Kurdish officers from less powerful families were imprisoned, and others, including Hussein Pasha, were investigated. Having concluded a close alliance with the Armenians, they (the Young Turks) decided to completely ignore the Kurds and punish them for all their previous sins " [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 26ob. -27].

Similar opinions were expressed in Ottoman dispatches. After the emigration of Hussein Pasha, a telegram was sent from the closest province of the Ottoman Empire to Iran, Van, to the Department of Internal Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, stating that the reasons for the Kurdish leader's opposition to the new regime were:

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government policy in the land issue and the abolition of benefits for Hamidians. After that, the telegram pointed out how "the Kurdish leaders during the period of tyranny (i.e., the old regime) oppressed the Armenian people, dominated them", it was reported that the lands and livestock of Armenians were confiscated under far-fetched pretexts, and their lives and property were always under threat. However, after the announcement of the Constitution, the situation changed, and the Kurdish leaders, " realizing that their authority and domination was over and the property and land that they had illegally seized would be returned to their true owners, began to constantly organize joint meetings in order to cause riots and revolt, so as not to lose their former influence and power." There were reports that some Kurdish tribes in Ottoman territory, having established contact with Hussein Pasha, who was in Iran, regularly discussed the general situation with him [BOA.DH.MUI, Dosya No. 77-2, Vesika No. 18 (From the Van province to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, April 21, 1910)].

The answer to the question of why the anti-constitutional Kurdish leader and his comrades, after crossing the border of Iran, settled in Maku, is also very interesting. According to the agreements between Britain and Russia in Reval (1907), the northern and northwestern parts of Iran were part of Russia's sphere of influence [McDowall, 1996, p. 83], while St. Petersburg began to use significant centers of western Iran, such as Maku and Khoy, as a base for military and intelligence operations against the Ottoman Empire. Russian strategists tried to control Anatolia from here [Reynolds, 2011, pp. 57-58]. Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman or Iranian territories, especially those located near the border, occupied an important place in the Caucasian and Anatolian politics of Russia, which, having entered into negotiations with the Kurdish tribes and partially attracting some of them to its side, at the beginning of the XX century.planned to use the "Kurdish card" against the Ottoman Empire in the event of a possible war. Since Russian officials considered war with the Ottoman Empire inevitable, subjugating the Kurds to their influence and using them in the near future was of no small importance to Russia's interests. Back in the first half of 1908, it was planned to create an irregular military force from the Kurdish tribes. Developed by the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District of Russia, this plan was ratified by the Ministry of War [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7693, l. 27].

So, Hussein Pasha emigrated to Maku, counting on such a policy of St. Petersburg, and asked him to be accepted into Russian citizenship and Russian service. Khan Maku, being an opponent of the Iranian central government, met the Kurdish leader very hospitably. He himself invited the Hamidian Kurds to settle in Maku, thus seeking to ensure their security against the Iranian troops [AVPRI, F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N 517/2, d. 3572, l. 1].

Russia was wary of Hussein Pasha's demands to settle with his tribe near the Ottoman border, as this might attract the attention of the Turkish government. Therefore, it was supposed to settle him somewhere in the North Caucasus [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 30ob.]. As for the resettlement of his entire tribe, the Caucasian General Administration and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not approve such a plan because the settlement of such a large tribe inside Russia could cause damage regional security. Moreover, there was not enough free territory available for such settlement [RGVIA, f. 2000, on. 1, d. 7716, l. 47-48]. Nevertheless, it was desirable for Russia to keep Hussein Pasha and a limited number of his tribesmen close to its borders. He was only required to make a request to settle in Russia and accept Russian citizenship for himself and his family in the amount of up to 200 people [AVPRI, F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N 517/2, d. 3572, l. 12ob.]. As the Minister S. D. Sazonov noted, through Huseyn Pasha, the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N 517/2, d. 3572, l. 12ob.] the influence could be strengthened over all the Kurdish tribes in the region.

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One of the most troubling issues for Russia was the problem of incessant attacks by Kurdish tribes on the Christian (namely, Armenian and Nestorian) population. Petersburg, which sought to ensure security and order in northern and northwestern Iran, was determined, using the authority of Huseyn Pasha, to stop the attacks of Kurdish tribes in Urmia on the Christian population [AVPRI, F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N517 / 2, d. 3572, l. 9-9ob.]. As for the military point of view, it was reported that the Haideranli tribe, playing a large role in the formation of Hamidian regiments in Erzerum and northern Van, provides the state with an entire cavalry squadron, so attracting this tribe to the Russian side for military purposes in a future possible war with the Ottoman Empire would be very useful [AVPRI, F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913, op. N 517/2, d. 3572, l. 14].

During Hussein Pasha's stay in Maku, there were rumors about a possible uprising under his leadership with the involvement of Iranian and Ottoman Kurds, which greatly worried the Young Turk government [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 13 vol.]. The reports of the headquarters of the Russian Caucasus Military District also noted that the Kurds, along with Huseyn Pasha, are hostile to the Young Turk government and are on the verge of an uprising [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 27ob.]. Especially in the Bazyaid Sanjak of the Erzerum province, the Kurdish movement grew and expanded, and in the southern part of the province, the Kurdish movement was growing. The struggle against the new regime was promoted in the surrounding towns and bazaars [AVPRI, f. Politarchiv, 1907-1914, op. N 482, d. 380, l. 20]. In a report dated March 5, 1910, it was reported that Ryza Tela Bey, a representative of the Haideranli tribe, had arrived in Karakilis in the Erzerum province, as well as other Kurdish leaders, who organized a meeting with other leaders. Then four participants of this meeting were sent to Maku, and several participants, led by Ryzai Bey, went to Van; messengers were also sent to Mush. There was information that Seyid Abdulkadir, being the main organizer of these secret meetings, acted together with Hussein Pasha, and they were preparing for a Kurdish revolt in the spring of 1910 [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 18ob]. All these actions were characterized in reports as " reactionary"carried out against the new Young Turk regime. However, it was noted that members of the local administration also turned out to be reactionaries and therefore did not "take any measures, simply approving the predatory activities of the Kurds, while the Armenians were alarmed by such circumstances" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 19].

HUSSEIN PASHA'S RETURN TO HIS HOMELAND

Against the background of these events, Huseyn Pasha unexpectedly turned to the governor of Van and expressed a desire to return if his previous crimes were forgiven. However, the governor informed him that it was not in his power to comply with such a request and that Hussein Pasha should apply directly to the central government in Istanbul [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 22]. After that, negotiations began between members of the Young Turk central government and representatives of Hussein Pasha in order to facilitate the return of the Kurdish leader [RGVIA, f. 2000, on. 1, d. 7716, l. 61]. Even Khan Maku, who sent telegrams to the Sultan and the Ottoman parliament, demanded that the Kurdish leaders be allowed to return to their homeland, while guaranteeing security and an impartial trial. However, the leader did not receive any response from Istanbul to his request, so the governor of Erzerum personally invited him and his comrades to return to their homeland [AVPRI, F. Politarchiv, 1907-1914, op. N 482, d. 380, l. 19a].

The rapid return of Hussein Pasha was facilitated by a change in domestic and foreign policy of the Young Turks. A new regime that carried out a repressive policy-

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Tiku, in relation to the Kurdish leaders, since July 1908, took a compromise path. Appealing to all Kurds who had taken refuge in Iran, the Government offered to return them within 30 days, otherwise all titles given to them during the reign of Abdul Hamid II would be revoked and all their property confiscated; it also stated that if they returned to Ottoman territory, the Kurdish leaders would be pardoned from persecution for their crimes. illegal actions [RGVIA, f. 2000, on. 1, d. 7716, l. 69-69ob.]. After such conditions were put forward, the return of the Haideranli tribe to their homeland began. However, the Armenians and KEP representatives in Erzerum and the surrounding area were very dissatisfied with the fact that the KEP leaders in Istanbul tried hard to persuade Huseyn Pasha to return to the Ottoman Empire, as they believed that in this way the authority and influence of Huseyn Pasha among the tribes in the region would grow even more [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 69ob.].

As for the reason that forced the Young Turks to find a compromise solution to this problem, it lies in the internal and external political situation. First of all, the period when Hussein Pasha emigrated to Iran was critical for the Young Turk regime. There was a strong opposition to the constitutional system in the country, ready to overthrow the government at any moment. There were rumors that reactionary circles, including officers of the old regime, in many provinces, and first of all in Istanbul, would initiate a movement in defense of sharia law by the fall of 1910 [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 81 vol.]. The Young Turks also faced great difficulties in their foreign policy. Ottoman forces were moving to various regions where uprisings broke out, in particular Albania and Yemen, and the government did not want to face a Kurdish uprising as well. Russian officials noted that the Albanian uprising was particularly reflected in the eastern provinces and that the Kurds, taking advantage of the disorder, began to take a hostile position towards the local Armenians [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.3778, l. 331].

The return of Hussein Pasha to the territory of Turkey caused a response in the country. Who returned with him from Iran in early June 1910. Haji Timur Pasha, Mehmed Sadiq and other Kurdish leaders received a warm welcome from the governor of Van. But the local population, who suffered under the old regime from the attacks of the Kurdish leader, especially the Armenians, were concerned about this situation and considered the warm welcome a threat to their interests. Local KEP officials stated that the government was afraid of a Kurdish uprising and did not want to face another issue like the Albanian one, and advised the Armenians not to make other demands and to be happy that the Kurdish attacks were over [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 70]. As a result, all property and land were returned to Huseyn Pasha and in July 1910 he settled in the village of Zon'ik, located near Patnos [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.7716, l. 74].

CHANGE IN THE EASTERN POLICY OF THE YOUNG TURKS

Internal and external events forced the leaders of the Young Turk committee to seek more pragmatic solutions, such as agreements with active supporters of the former absolutist regime. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1909, the reactionary uprising of April 13, 1909 (known as the March 31 Hijri uprising), the uprisings in Albania and Yemen in 1910, and the preparation by supporters of the old regime to overthrow the Government had a strong impact on the Young Turks. Moreover, Russia's relations with the Kurdish tribal leaders and its efforts to win them over have tied the government's hands on the Kurdish issue. It was obvious that if KEP tried to eliminate or punish the Kurdish leaders, they would seek patronage from their northern neighbor, which would mean a de facto protectorate of Russia over the Kurds.

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In such a situation, the revolt led by Hussein Pasha was very dangerous for the future of the new regime. Therefore, the Young Turks, having abandoned the persecution and punishment of the Kurds, switched to a moderate policy in order not to force the Kurdish leaders to act against the new regime. This path resonated with Hussein Pasha, who, on behalf of the Haideranli tribe, pledged allegiance to the new regime on July 23, 1911. Some Kurdish leaders, together with Hussein Pasha, telegraphed the Sultan in honor of the anniversary of the proclamation of the Constitution, stating that "7 million Kurds, if necessary, in order to protect the constitution, are ready to shed their blood in defense of the motherland" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.7716, l. 266].

Finance Minister Javid Bey also visited the Kurdish leaders who did not recognize the central authority in Istanbul during his trip to Erzerum and Van provinces. In the report of the Russian Headquarters of the Caucasian military district dated September 3, 1911, it is written that Javid Bey, talking with the Kurdish leader, exerted pressure on him, as a result of which Hussein Pasha became a member of the KEP [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.7716, l. 265]. After Erzerum, a visiting Van Javid Bey gave a speech in which he argued that the Young Turks had moved from liberal ideas and the policy of constitutional unity ("ittihad-y anasir") to a more authoritarian and pan-Islamic regime. In his speech, stating that the first concern of the Government after the Constitution was announced was to build a strong army against internal and external enemies, Javid Bey said that this goal was successfully achieved. He expressed confidence that the government, while establishing schools for 20 years, will try to create the necessary cadres of teachers and mullahs, and they will contribute to the development of the country and the spread of pan-Islamism inside and outside the Ottoman Empire [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 267-267ob.].

Javid Bey's emphasis on pan-Islamism was the result of KEP's strenuous efforts to attract Kurds to the Porte's side after the suppression of an unconstitutional rebellion in 1909, actively using an Islamic identity. The need for such a policy was noted at the secret congress of the Young Turks in Thessaloniki in 1910. Talaat Bey, one of the main leaders of the Young Turks, a member of the CEP central committee and Minister of the Interior, said in his speech that despite the fact that Muslims and non-Muslims are recognized as equal by the Constitution, Sharia and the mood of the Muslim population do not allow for true equality between them and before the" Ottomanization " of all the peoples of the empire, it is impossible to such an equality (Dadrian, 1985, p. 180).

This policy is reminiscent of the reign of Abdul Hamid II, and here the Armenian issue has once again become a bargaining chip. Propaganda about the "religious brotherhood" was also conducted in order to take control of the Kurds and ensure their loyalty to the government, while turning a blind eye to the robberies and attacks on Armenians, which increased, as a result of which the loyalty of Armenians to the center decreased, suggesting that the KEP actively supports the Kurds. The Russian Commissioner, in his report of August 13, 1911, described his observations as follows::

"Of course, there is only one way for the Young Turks to win over the Kurds, relying on Islam as a common religion, along with giving the Kurds the necessary freedom of action against the Armenians. The latter were well aware that the agreement of the Young Turks with the Kurds and the growing friendship between them threaten them with new troubles, and this, of course, cannot but worry them" [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d.7716, l. 268].

Young Turk officials and leaders, along with the need for religious propaganda, discussed the distribution of rewards and titles among Kurdish leaders. A secret telegram from the Interior Ministry in the provinces of Erzerum, Van, Bitlis and Mamuretulaziz mentioned Russia's efforts to win the loyalty of Kurdish leaders, including awarding them orders, money and gifts. Although it was stated that

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Attacks by Kurdish leaders on Armenian villages must be stopped, and at the same time, it was advised to strengthen the loyalty of Kurds by caring, supporting and, if necessary, awarding them orders and monetary awards. The telegram stressed the need for the government to take measures to provide explanations to Armenian notables and intellectuals on this issue. [BOA.DH.SYS, Dosya No. 23, Vesika No. 1 (From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Mamuretulaziz, February 15, 1911)].

However, in practice, it was impossible, on the one hand, to award Kurdish leaders with ranks, money and orders, and on the other - to ensure a balance of interests between Kurds and Armenians. Therefore, after the return of Hussein Pasha to Turkey, starting from the first half of 1911, robberies and attacks by Kurds on the local population continued, as it was under the old regime [RGVIA, f. 2000, op. 1, d. 7716, l. 257]. This circumstance caused dissatisfaction of the Dashnaktsutyun committee. At the congress of this organization, it was noted that persons convicted of robbery and murder gradually get away with everything, and the CEP does not take an interest in the opinion of the Dashnaktsutyun committee in such matters and does not hold discussions with them. The congress called on the government to implement democratic reforms in the interests of the Armenian people; it stated that if the government did not fulfill its promises of reform, relations with the Young Turks would be severed [Kochar, 1988, pp. 192-193].

The deterioration of relations between KEP and Dashnaktsutyun was also noted by Russian officials in the region. The Russian Vice-Consul in Van, SP. Olferev, informed the Ambassador in Istanbul in August 1911 that KEP's relations with Dashnaktsutyun had changed dramatically and hatred between the Ottoman government and non-Muslims had re-emerged [Kochar, 1988, p. 94]. In addition, the actual land issue remained unresolved. The Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, sending a letter to the government, expressed its protest in connection with the resettlement of Muslim emigrants and Kurds to Armenian lands and the seizure of Armenian property, churches, monasteries and even cemeteries [Kirakosyan, 1989, p.143].

In 1912, Hussein Pasha was appointed commander of the 16th Light Horse Regiment stationed in Patnos, which caused discontent among both Armenians and Kurds who suffered from his attacks. Thus, the amnesty and soon the awarding of one of the main allies of the old regime by the Young Turks were the result of the aforementioned political situation. When the British military attache, Major W. Tirel, asked a member of the central committee of the Ittihadist party about the reason for appointing a Kurdish leader as a light cavalry commander, he received the answer that the Young Turks themselves regret such actions, but this fault lies with foreigners, especially with Russian authorized persons who bribe Kurdish leaders, and therefore the government, in order to keep In order to keep them away from the influence of St. Petersburg, it is forced to offer positions to such individuals as Huseyn Pasha [Somakian, 1995, p.53].

Thus, Hussein Pasha, the leader of the Haideranli tribe, went from being an opposition to the Young Turk regime and KEP to becoming a loyal supporter of the Young Turks. This process proves that during the period of the CEP's rule, their active political transformation took place. After the proclamation of the Constitution, the Young Turks, who began to persecute and punish the Kurdish leaders for their previous crimes, were forced to choose a different path due to the possibility of a Kurdish uprising by Hussein Pasha. During the uprisings in Albania and Yemen, the Young Turk government was also very concerned about Russia's efforts to secure the loyalty of some Kurds and the possibility of using their support in the event of a war with the Ottoman Empire. Despite the fact that KEP was allied with Dashnaktsutyun, in order not to lose the loyalty of the Kurds - the most significant Muslim element-

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In the eastern provinces, the Young Turks soon began a policy of seeking a compromise with the Kurds, as a result of which, after a while, they essentially returned to the policy of Abdul Hamid II, which was based on awarding and bribing Kurdish leaders with money, ranks and privileges.

ARCHIVE MATERIALS

AVPRI-Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire. F. Embassy in Constantinople, 1907-1913. On. 517/2. D. 3572. F. Political Archive, 1907-1914. Op. 482, D. 380.

RGVIA - Russian State Military Historical Archive. F. 2000. Op. 1. d. 7716, 3824, 7693, 3778.

BOA (Ottoman Archive under the Prime Minister's Ministry).

DH.SYS (Political Department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Dosya No: 23, Vesika No: 1.

DH. MUI (Administration of General Correspondence under the Ministry of Internal Affairs), Dosya No: 77-2, Vcsika No: 18.

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Izz zhizni Kurdov [From the Life of Kurds] / / Izvestiya Kavkazskogo upravleniya Russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva, Vol. XXII, Issue 4, 1913-1914. Tiflis, 1914.

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