O. V. KIRYANOV

Correspondent of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, post-graduate student of ISAA MSU

North Korea, Kim Jong Keywords:, reforms, military elite, foreign policy

The young Kim Jong-un, who found himself at the head of North Korea at the end of December 2011, managed to do quite a lot even before the crisis on the Korean peninsula. At least the 30-year-old politician managed to establish himself in the position of the undisputed leader, overturning the forecasts voiced earlier by some experts that "after the death of Kim Jong Il, due to the inexperience and low authority of the heir to the DPRK, it will inevitably drift from a single-handed to a collective style of government or even to chaos, accompanied by uncompromising struggle between various factions of the North Korean elite"¹. Who is now the "most important" in the Juche Country, no one disputes and doubts - it is the young Kim.

In addition to the castling in the style of "Kim son replaced Kim father", some innovations began to appear in the DPRK, which made it necessary to talk specifically about the" Kim Jong Un era", and not a blind continuation of the course of his predecessor. This "wind of change" began to be felt in a variety of areas-from the appearance of North Koreans to domestic politics and the economy.

And here the experts are again vying to argue with each other. Some believe that Kim Jong-un has not done anything serious yet, but only plays on the public with his new, "fresh", but superficial actions, which are mistaken by some for almost an analogue of the Soviet perestroika ². Others believe that the new leader and his entourage have indeed already made a fundamental decision on the need for reforms and started them, especially in the economic sphere.³ And some of the inconsistency of their actions is explained by fears for the stability of the regime and the desire to first "test the ground" and teach the people to change gradually, without rushing headlong into the water.

So what's so new about North Korea's new leader? How can its policies be evaluated? Is it really possible to talk about the beginning of reforms at all, or is there a desire to make minor "cosmetic" repairs, avoiding serious reconstruction of the building of the North Korean economy and society?

NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME...

Regarding possible reforms in the DPRK at the present time, experts have in mind, first of all, the economy, while other innovations are perceived as accompanying "symptoms", and not equal in importance factors.

However, it should be recalled that even under Kim Jong Il, there were certain attempts to change something in the national economy, to make certain adjustments to the work of the country's economic mechanism. When Kim Jong Il died in the second half of December 2011, he left a country where, despite all its slogans about socialism and a planned economy, a spontaneous market economy with elements of capitalism was already spreading at the grassroots level. According to various estimates, more than half of the population of the DPRK survived precisely due to the fact that, in one way or another, it was connected with market trade.

In the DPRK, spontaneous markets appeared and began to grow rapidly. The country's authorities have repeatedly made attempts to combat this, realizing that the population is becoming less dependent on the state machine. However, all the repressive measures did not have any success: they were either ignored immediately or, having committed several high-profile demonstration actions at the first stage, then slowly reduced to nothing. And the country's leadership was forced to accept this, as the public sector continued to remain in a hopeless crisis and could not provide the majority of the population with physical survival.⁴

Such "spontaneous" capitalism, a systemic crisis of the state machine in providing the population with food and real means of subsistence, was accompanied by a number of other important phenomena. In the DPRK, foreign currency is widely used at the household level , primarily US dollars and Chinese yuan. They also tried to fight this, but again without success5.

Corruption among government officials is widespread. For money, it became possible to do, if not everything, then a lot, including free travel around the country and even abroad. And this again meant a weakening of the state system's control over the population.

The matter was not limited to informal and spontaneous steps.

Thus, on July 1, 2002, the DPRK adopted "Special measures to improve economic management". Although there are disputes among experts about their specific content, depth and significance, in any case, they have become an expression of the authorities ' intention to make certain adjustments to the mechanisms of managing the economy in order to get out of the crisis.

Separately, we should mention the attempt of the DPRK leadership to attract foreign capital to the country by creating special trade and economic zones (TEZS) isolated from the rest of the territory. The first such" swallow "was the TAEZ" Rajin-Seonbon " (Rasoy) on the east coast of the DPRK. Then there were other projects of this plan: the inter-Korean technology park in Kaesong, the free economic zone on the North Korean-Chinese border on the islands of Wihwado and Hwang Geumphen ⁶. Later, there were reports about the intention of the DPRK authorities to create a total of eight fuel and energy plants in the country to attract foreign capital, where foreign capital will be attracted as a priority.⁷ Thus, even before Kim Jong-un, there were attempts to reform the country's economy, and market trade and capitalist relations were already well known to ordinary North Koreans, even if they were called somewhat differently.

THE MILITARY WAS SHOWN THEIR PLACE

In politics, Kim Jong-un, by his actions, probably finally proved "who is the boss in the house." His onslaught on the North Korean military elite, which had enjoyed a privileged position under his father, was quite bold and unexpected for many. This was also clearly indicated by the name of Kim Jong Il's official ideological course - songun, which can be translated as "army priority".

However, Kim Jong-un, having received the necessary titles of leader of the party, government, State Defense Committee and commander-in-chief, began to aggressively and actively push the military away from the main levers of governing the country. The culmination of this process was the resonant resignation of the most influential and authoritative military man, whose position seemed unshakable - the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DPRK, Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho.

On July 15, 2012, Ri was relieved of all his posts-Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DPRK, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, Deputy Chairman of the Military Committee of the Workers ' Party of Korea. ⁸ There are still disputes about the real reasons for the displacement, but one thing is clear that the officially announced reason "for health reasons" does not reflect reality.

At the time of his removal, Ri was quite young by the standards of the North Korean top generals: he was "only" 69 years old. A week before his resignation, he accompanied Kim Jong-un during a visit to the Geumsusan Memorial Complex, looking very cheerful. And in general, in the DPRK, it is not customary to remove from posts due to health problems. As a rule, even very sick officials and senior military leaders retained their regalia and positions until their death, even if they were physically unable to appear in public.⁹

The exact reasons for the removal of the main military commander are now difficult to identify, but most likely, he began to interfere with the course that Kim Jong-un began to pursue, to gradually weaken the generals and initiate some changes in the economy.¹⁰ In addition, according to some reports, Ri Yong Ho began to feel very influential or took excessive liberties in front of the leader. So, according to South Korean intelligence, Ri began to express dissatisfaction with the sharp rise of Choi Ryong-hae, who, being a career party employee and having no experience in the military, under Kim Jong-un received the rank of vice marshal and the post of defense minister. In addition, in the hierarchy of power, the North Korean media began to put Choi ahead of Ri, which the latter did not tolerate.

There were also reports that the young Kim did not like the fact that Ri Yong Ho allowed himself to stand next to Kim during the ceremony at the Geumsusan Memorial Complex, when they once again came to pay tribute to the late Kim Jong Il, while everyone else took a step back.¹² As a result, a shift followed a week later. Other experts believe that Ri and his son were involved in corruption ¹³. Anyway, Kim Jong-un and Ri Yong-ho parted ways, and the former was not afraid to immediately get rid of the uncomfortable figure. Apparently, after that, the military lost the desire to somehow contradict the young, but full-fledged leader, if there was such a desire at all.

Ri Yong Ho's removal was the culmination of a process of gradual weakening of the military's power and stripping it of many of the privileges it enjoyed over the other major "power centers" of the DPRK - the party and government.

There were reports from various sources that Kim Jong-un was also restricting the military in another direction. Generals and military structures, in general, began to be excluded from the possibility of earning foreign currency ¹⁴. Until now, according to some experts, the military controlled up to 70% of all foreign currency receipts in the DPRK. They actually owned many firms and foreign representative offices.

Korea, which operated primarily in China. The military controlled much of the export of natural resources, seafood, and other activities that allowed the generals to earn currency and, as a result, feel rich, powerful, and invulnerable. Now, it seems, Kim has begun to deprive the military of such currency feeders, putting these lucrative activities under the control of the government and the party.¹⁵ As a result, the positions of the military, deprived of a significant share of "earnings", are gradually weakening.

An indirect confirmation of the trend towards the gradual removal of the military from the levers of control, while strengthening government and party structures, was the return to key positions in the cabinet of ministers of the "big four technocrats", whom South Korean experts consider supporters of economic transformation in the DPRK. Although their re-entry began before Kim Jong-un, they all came together and strengthened their positions under him.

Park Bong Joo, Roh Doo Chol, Kwak Pom Gi, and Jung Sung Hoon are among the cast members. All of them took an active part in the development of the "Measures to improve Economic Management of July 1, 2002", held important posts in the government of Kim Jong Il, then were transferred to less important positions, but now they have returned to the government with the rank of ministers and vice-premiers.¹⁶ By the way, many experts believe that the authorship of "measures for the new management of the economy from June 28", which made a lot of noise, belongs to the "big four"as well. This group of people is also united by the fact that they are experienced economists and have worked for a long time in production, knowing the specifics of the national economy of the DPRK to the smallest detail. It may well be that this is why they really insisted on the need for any innovations.

In general, as South Korean experts note, middle-and even top-level management positions are gradually being filled by technocrats and economists instead of the military and party employees who were previously there. This can also be interpreted as an attempt by the DPRK leadership, led by Kim Jong-un, to initiate transformation by creating a personnel base for this.

MICKEY MOUSE AS A MIRROR OF NORTH KOREAN REFORMS

Quite serious differences between Kim Jong-un and his father are noticeable in his external behavior and some actions, which was also perceived by many experts as another confirmation of the beginning of the "wind of change" in North Korea.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-un appears much more frequently in public. He has already made several appearances on North Korean television, including a New Year's speech, which Kim Jong Il refused to do at all.

During trips for "local leadership", the young Kim, at least outwardly, demonstrates his accessibility to the people, his desire to communicate with ordinary people. He is always surrounded by people, while Kim Jong Il is usually shown either alone or with his entourage. Kim Jong-un embraces soldiers, children, workers, allows female soldiers of the women's battalion to take his arm in front of photographers, etc. ¹⁷ That is, purely in terms of external behavior, the new leader strongly contrasts with his predecessor.

Much attention of foreign experts was attracted by a concert shown on North Korean central television, where Kim Jong-un was present with a then - "stranger" who turned out to be his wife. During the concert, Walt Disney cartoon characters were shown, including Mickey Mouse, etc. All this was accompanied by famous Western hits, clips from the movie "Rocky IV" and you-

the performance of a North Korean female ensemble, where female performers first appeared in mini-skirts ¹⁸. In the days of Kim Jong Il, it was impossible to imagine that the entire ruling elite of the DPRK would go together to watch a concert with Mickey Mouse dancing to " ideologically harmful music."

Можно также отметить определенные послабления, которые сделали для внешнего вида женщин Северной Кореи. Вождь разрешил им теперь носить брюки, сережки, модные туфли на "платформе" и ездить на велосипеде¹⁹. Все это при Ким Чен Ире не приветствовалось.

Although it would be a great exaggeration to call these innovations fundamental reforms, they indicate some changes and show the presence of previously non-existent moments in the behavior of both the leader and the country as a whole.

As for the political sphere, experts paid special attention to the fact that the DPRK authorities quickly and unequivocally recognized their fiasco with the launch of the launch vehicle in April 2012.It was reported that the failure occurred for technical reasons, and engineers are working to fix the problems ²⁰. In the past, Pyongyang has never acknowledged failures to launch its launch vehicles. In the past, in such cases, it was stated that everything went well, satellites entered orbit and broadcast songs in praise of the leader from it. Although even then the DPRK was accompanied by failures. And with a successful launch eight months later, the North proved that it had "worked on bugs" in good faith.

A "FIRST LADY"APPEARS IN NORTH KOREA

Separately, it should be said about the wife of the new leader of the DPRK - Ri Sol Ju, who has already become one of the most recognizable figures in the North Korean elite for Western journalists. It really is, in itself, perhaps one of the most striking and effective proofs of new trends in the style of behavior of the top leadership of the DPRK. When she appeared publicly with the leader in July 2012, it was initially assumed that this was most likely Kim's younger sister, since it was not customary for the leadership to take their wives to official events before. But her repeated appearances and demeanor gave reason to say that, perhaps, the DPRK authorities officially introduced the young leader's wife ²¹. As a result, it really turned out that this is the real "first lady" of the DPRK, who, moreover, began to play an active role in her husband's public life. She does not hesitate to publicly coquettishly take the arm of her husband - "the great all-conquering general Kim Jong-un", she laughs loudly with him, she accompanies him everywhere, she always appears in new stylish outfits, she has very good taste, and in general she is very beautiful.

In general, as the international media unanimously recognized, the DPRK now has a full-fledged "first lady"²². Before that, both under North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il, it was not "customary" to take their wives to official events, to put it mildly. In fact, what the leaders ' wives did, or even what they looked like, was a closely guarded secret. But not now.

It even turned out that the girl had previously come to South Korea for the Asian Games as part of a support group for athletes from the DPRK and gave interviews to local journalists. ²³ Then she was remembered for her confident manner of conversation and ability to calmly hold herself in the center of attention.

Although Ri Sol Ju stopped being around her husband in September and October 2012, prompting rumors of her pregnancy, ²⁴ she had previously accompanied Kim Jong Un almost everywhere-from poultry farms and steel mills to military units and front lines of defense. Since December, Lee again began to appear in public with her husband, although less often and less "effectively". According to American basketball player Denis Rodman, who met with Kim Jong-un and his wife in Pyongyang, they had a ²⁵-year-old girl.

Some South Korean experts even began to draw parallels with R. M. Gorbachev. They note that Lee has a strong character, does not go into the shadow of her husband and attracts attention. Each time she appears in new, stylish outfits, demonstrating a good sense of taste and ability to dress. It is characteristic of her appearance in a pantsuit, which was previously forbidden to women in North Korea. She has already scored "Dior handbag", "Tiffany necklace" and "Movado watch" ²⁶. Meticulous South Korean media even conducted a special assessment of "Lee Sol Joo's style" with the involvement of stylists and fashion designers. The latter highly appreciated the taste of Kim Jong-un's wife, but did not fail to note that in North Korea, fashion lags behind South Korean fashion.²⁷

"Lee Sol-joo is Kim Jong - un's greatest asset," said one South Korean political analyst, commenting on the furor the girl is causing in foreign media.²⁸ While Kim Jong-un was expected to reform politics and the economy, it seems that he has already implemented a kind of mini-revolution in the person of his wife, showing that for the first time the DPRK has a full-fledged "first lady" in the Western sense of the word.

NEP QUIETLY, OR "MEASURES OF JUNE 28"

Of course, Mickey Mouse, allowed shoes on the "platform",

fraternization with the people and even a beautiful wife accompanying the leader are noticeable, but, in general, rather superficial indicators of possible changes.

The most serious reason to speak more reasonably about the reforms in the DPRK was given by a message that was first announced in early August 2012 by Radio Free Asia. It said, citing anonymous sources in the North, that a "new system of economic management" had begun to operate in the DPRK, which, according to the date of their adoption, was called "measures of June 28". It was noted that these very large-scale innovations were developed under the personal leadership of Kim Jong-un, and "since August 6, 2012, lectures have been held in workers' collectives, organizations, factories, factories and institutions, in which representatives of the central office of the party explain the content of the new system. " ²⁹

In general, the content of the "measures of June 28", at least in the form in which they were reported in the media (and there are no other sources), is as follows^::

Overall management of the new economic policy is entrusted to a specially created structure within the framework of the DPRK government, which guarantees a large share of independence and freedom from interference by party and other (primarily military) branches of government.

In the field of agriculture, the minimum allowed number of members of individual labor collectives is reduced from 10-25 people to 4-6. This is a very important innovation, because it allows you to create a "labor collective" within one or two families, effectively allowing family farms. After harvesting, the state buys 70% of the crop from farmers at market prices, leaving 30% to the producers themselves with the possibility of selling these products independently on the market. If a particular farm produces more than the planned output, the surplus also remains with the peasants. Thus, a serious incentive was introduced for the work of peasant farms, which now did not have to hand over the entire crop to the "state bins", but gave part of it at the market price, and some could even sell themselves. ³¹ Later, it was reported that farmers, depending on the region, will be allowed to keep up to 50% of the crop and sell it on their own.³²

In the industrial sector, the "June 28 measures" also provide for the introduction of market elements, including the calculation of production costs and the cost of products at market prices, free trade between enterprises in products, materials and electricity. Enterprises are allowed to invest their earned profits in the development of their own production, but a special ban on the creation of factories and factories by private individuals was specifically stipulated. At the same time, employees of the enterprise are allowed to invest in it.

It is obvious that, despite the introduction of a new economic policy, the DPRK authorities do not want to let everything "float freely". Heads of enterprises are still appointed by party structures.

There have been some conflicting reports about changes to the ration card system. Most often, the version is mentioned that the "new measures" leave guaranteed food supply through cards for employees of military enterprises, production facilities of central subordination, civil servants and employees of the education and medicine sectors. All the others are left with only the wages issued at the enterprises. But some media outlets reported that the cards were canceled even for civil servants.³³

In any case, the "June 28 measures", if they were really adopted and implemented, are the most important proof of the DPRK leadership's intention to change something in the economy. Obviously, we are not talking about "perestroika", but rather about reforms of the Chinese type of the initial period, when market elements were introduced gradually.

Many foreign experts expected that officially about

the introduction of the "new economic management system" in the DPRK will be announced at a meeting of the DPRK Parliament-the Supreme People's Assembly (GNC), which was held on September ²⁵, 2012.34 Given that the GNC in 2012 was already meeting in April, the unscheduled second meeting, taking into account all the rumors about the "measures of June 28", was expected to be legislative securing the start of reforms. However, this did not happen. Officially, only the introduction of compulsory 12-year secondary education (previously it was 11 years) was announced, as well as some not very significant changes ³⁵.

Pyongyang has once again shown itself to be a master of surprises. However, many experts here make an important reservation: it cannot be completely ruled out that the September meeting of the National Assembly still approved innovations in the economy, but it was decided not to report this officially. The same" July 1, 2002 measures " were not officially mentioned for a long time. Since the end of 2012, some isolated references to the "measures of June 28" again began to leak into the foreign media.

Despite the growing tension on the Korean peninsula, at the April 1, 2013 session of the Supreme People's Assembly /Parliament/ of the DPRK, deputies called for large-scale economic transformation. The new Prime Minister of the country is a supporter of economic reforms Park Bong-du, who already held this post from 2003 to 2007. ³⁶

However, uncertainty about the future of economic reforms in the DPRK remains.

(The ending follows)

^{Delury John.} 1 Glasnost in North Korea? 27.07.2012 -http://www.realclearworId.com/articles/2012/07/27/glasnost_in_northkorea__100158.html; Kim Jong-un's brother says North Koreaheading for collapse // The Telegraph. 17.01.2012.

^{Cha Victor.} 2 Kim Jong Un is no reformer // The Foreign Policy -http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/21/kimjong_un_ is_no_ reformer

³ Leadership shake-up adds to signs of change in N.Korea // The Korea Herald. 23.08.2012.

^{Xa Tae Kyung.} 4 Pukhan sizhan noroco (Report on the market in North Korea) / / Chayukyobwon, 10.04.2009; Annual Market Crackdown Ensnaring the Careless / / Daily NK, 7.02.2012; Haggard Stephan, Nolland Marcus. Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform // Columbia University Press, New York, 2007.

⁵ Kimjongchonkown chhotchisi, Pukhan NJ wehwasaen ilchechuji! (The first decree of the Kim Jong-un regime: A complete ban on the use of foreign currency!) // Newsfocus. 12.01.2012; Kimjongil yuhun? Puk, wehwasaengkimjren (Kim Jong Il's legacy? In the North there was a decree banning the use of foreign currency) / / Daily NK, 2.01.2012.

⁶ Plans for N. Korea-China Economic Zones Leaked // Chosun Ubo. 26.05.2011.

⁷ Puk, 8 go toshi inpheera kabal kehwek ol chak-su (the DPRK has formed infrastructure development plans in 8 cities this year) / / Yonghapnews. 16.04.2010.

⁸ Ri Yong Ho, Kim Jung Eun kunthongjekanghwa vihepchoe munchhaek haim (Ri Yong Ho was removed from his post by Kim Jong Un for unwillingness to help strengthen control over the military) / / Yonghapnews. 27.07.2012.

^{Kwon Yang Joo.} 9 Pukhang, Ri Yong Ho Cheongchammojan haim pagengwa hubs (North Korea: The situation regarding the removal of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Ri Yong Ho). Seoul: KIDA, 2012. pp. 1-2.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

¹¹ Taebukchonbommu 26nen. Yoo Seong Ok Kukkaanbochollyakengusosojan / / Choson Ilbo.. 26..08..2012..

¹² " Puk Riengho, Kimjongunkwa katheung chulye sottagaheim?" ("Ri Yong Ho fired because he was on the same line with Kim Jong Un?" / / Yonhap News. 24.08. 2012.

¹³ KRA Chief of Staff "Relieved" of Position 16.07.2012 - http://nkleadershipwatch.wordpress.com

¹⁴ North Korea Said to Remove Military's Lucrative Export Privilege // The New York Times. 20.07.2012.

¹⁵ North Korean leader, military waging 'money war' // The Korea Times. 13.08.2012.

¹⁶ Puk gyeongjekaek, 4inban, kimjongeong chaejoeso "puhwal" (4 people who previously led the reforms, returned to power with the advent of Kim Jong-un) / / Yonghapnews. 20.08.2012.

¹⁷ Kim Jong-eun, yeghunpudae sachhal (Kim Jong-un checked the women's military units) / / Asianews. 24.08.2012.

¹⁸ Mickey Mouse and Winnie the Pooh entertain Kim Jong-un // The Telegraph. 8.07.2012.

¹⁹ North Korea's New Image Shaped by Platform Shoes, Earrings and Cell Phones // ABC News. 2.07.2012.

²⁰ North Korea Admits Rocket Launch Failure // Voice of America News. 13.04.2012.

²¹ Ri Sol-Ju, North Korea's New First Lady, Remains A Style Mystery // The Huffington Post. 25.07.2012.

²² North Korean First Lady steps out in trouser suit // The Telegraph. 3.09.2012.

²³ Kim Jung Eun puin And Sol Jub 2005 byung namhan panmun (Kim Jong Un's wife Lee Sol Ju visited South Korea in 2005) / / Hanguk gyeongjae. 26.07.2012.

²⁴ 50il mane nathanan And Sol Joo... Imsinhandyt (Lee Sol Joo who appeared after 50 days... probably pregnant) / / Chunan ilbo. 31.10.2012.

^{Nelson Sara С.} 25 Kim Jong Un 'Has A Daughter': Dennis Rodman Claims North Korean Leader & Ri Sol-Ju Are Parents // Huffington Post UK, 21.03.2013 - http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/03/21/kim-jong-un-daughter-dennis-rodman-north-korean-le ader-ri-sol-ju-parents_n_2922229.html

²⁶ Puk Lee Sol Jooga tyn pegyn pyransy "Diora" sa chephum (The bag that Lee Sol Joo had, produced by the French company "Dior") // Choson ilbo. 8.08.2012.

²⁷ Pukhai Lee Sol Joo sythail aikonyro tyngyk? (North Korean Lee Sol Joo turns into a style icon?) / / Hanguk ilbo. 7.09.2012.

²⁸ Kim Jong-un's Wife Is His Greatest Asset // Joseon ilbo. 7.09.2012.

²⁹ Chayuasiapansonpodo: "Puk, kehwekkyeongje sasilsan phogi "(Free Asia Radio Station report: "The North actually abandoned the planned economy") / / Meil gyeongje. 9.08.2012.

³⁰ Further, information from foreign media reports in August-September 2012 was used to describe specific steps under the "June 28 measures": Joseon ilbo, Chunan ilbo, Hangere sinmun, Daily NK portal, Yonhap News Agency (South Korea), Mainichi Shimbun, Sankei Shimbun (Japan), Free Asia radio station.

^{Kwon Yong-kyung.} 31 Pukhan kaheok kaban chujin silthe: hyeonghwangwa chengjom (The situation around the reforms and opening of the DPRK: current situation and main problems) / / Pukhany chaejoe kaheok kaban kangynson: pyeongkawa jeongman. 2012 nen pukhan kaheok kaban kukcheekondon-haksulhwe (The possibility of opening and reforming the system in the DPRK: assessment and prospects). Seoul, KINU, 2012. p. 32.

³² North Korea plans agriculture reforms - source // Reuters. 24.09.2012.

³³ Puk pegypche pyeji dung "se gyeongje kwally" sibom unen ("The North cancels the system of redistribution, etc. - an attempt at "new economic management") / / Gyeongyang sinmun, 9.08.2012.

³⁴ Pukhan, neil chwegoinminhwei kaechhwe... Gyeongjekaekchochi naolkka (The Supreme People's Assembly opens in North Korea tomorrow. Will there be measures for economic reform?) // Yonghapnews. 24.09.2012.

^{Rare N.} 35 Korean parliament meet blunts reform expectations // Agence France-Presse. 26.09.2012.

³⁶ ITAR-TASS. 1.04.2013.

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