K. V. MESHCHERINA, Post-Graduate Student, Institute Of Africa, Russian Academy Of Sciences

Keywords: Libya, armed groups, radical Islamists, provinces, federalism, oil export

Despite the fact that three years have passed since one of the culminating moments of the "revolution" in Libya - the siege of the capital Tripoli by armed rebel groups at the end of August 2011 - the circumstances of this event and its significance for understanding the processes of the Libyan crisis are very important. All three major cities in Libya-Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata-were then under the control of opposition forces. Your trust in the Transitional National Council (TNC) As the only legitimate authority in the country, many States expressed their support (but a number of countries recognized it long before the fall of Tripoli), followed by the restoration of Libya's membership in the Arab League ¹.

In connection with the establishment of control over the Libyan capital, the then head of the NTC executive committee, Mahmoud Jibril, made a speech on local Libyan television: "Today, all cities in Libya have become equal, we are making history together, because we suffered equally from the 42-year dictatorship. The Libyan people will work together to build a new future through the Constitution. Libya will be an example for the Arab." The NTC called for the creation of a government in the country and the holding of free elections (here and further - author's italics).

The assault on Tripoli is considered by most international military observers to be a pre-planned military action of NATO forces, in which fighters of a foreign military contingent, in particular British special forces, participated. According to The Telegraph newspaper, this information was first confirmed by the British Ministry of Defense ³.

It is worth noting that the events of the end of August 2011 were viewed ambiguously by some researchers. The point of view was exaggerated about misinformation about what is happening in the capital and about extremely contradictory media reports. This was especially true of the rebel attack on the Bab al-Aziziya government complex, which houses Gaddafi's residence.

Richard Haas, an American analyst and president of the independent Council on Foreign Relations in the United States, gave this assessment of what was happening: "The events in Libya are the beginning of the end. Now it can only be a matter of time... Behind the rebel victory is NATO's air support... It is obvious that the humanitarian intervention aimed at protecting the civilian population has turned into a "political" intervention aimed at overthrowing the regime." R. Haas also noted that " ... rebel groups are fragmented: from individuals and militant groups to former supporters of the regime and Islamic extremists... Their interests will diverge when their main goal is achieved, and their differences will come to the forefront. 4

Libya did not become the example that Jibril spoke of for the Arab world, but it became an example not only for the Arab world, but also for the whole world - what "color" revolutions can lead to if you do not show them consolidated resistance and follow the lead of foreign puppeteers.⁵ Today, the country is actually at a "point of intense expectation". There is an acute problem with security and law and order, and various armed groups and brigades remain active.

LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS

According to some reports, after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, there were hundreds of armed groups in the country. To date, this number could increase many times*. On the one hand, in the absence of a regular army and security agencies, the new Libyan authorities tried to form army units and police brigades from the detachments of former rebels.

On the other hand, armed groups associated with former revolutionaries, in the context of a weak centric system, have been able to-

The article was written with the support of the Russian Foundation for National Research in the framework of the research project "Aggressive non-state participants in geostrategic competition in "Islamic Africa" and some aspects of Russian security after the "Arab Spring"". Project N 14 - 07 - 00028.

* This fact is obvious. The Libyan National Tax Service, trying to contain the growing influence of groups, decided to pay a cash allowance to the "heroes of the revolution", which, contrary to expectations, led not to a reduction, but to an increase in the number of armed groups (editor's note). For more information, see: ch. 6.

In the face of the growing euphoria over the overthrow of the old regime, they obey their warlords and attempt to establish power in the territories they control. They are accused of violating human rights, engaging in armed clashes and seizing oil fields.

To date, law and order in the country are still trying to maintain a few units of the new national army of Libya. It also includes the elite special forces unit "Saika"*. Since mid-2013, this unit has been involved in Benghazi against the radical Islamist group Al-Sar al-Sharia. A major clash between an army unit and radical Islamists took place in Benghazi in November 2013.Due to incessant shootings, city institutions and educational institutions were closed for several days. The victims of the clashes were about 10 citizens, about 40 were injured.

The armed formation "Guard for the Protection of Oil facilities" was created by the Ministry of Defense of Libya in 2012 to protect the largest deposits. However, in practice, this guard does not cope with the tasks assigned to it, often ignoring the orders of the Ministries of defense and the oil industry and acting in their own interests. According to the latest data, in mid-May 2014, due to a strike by armed guards from this guard demanding payment and salary increases and provision of military equipment and equipment, work was again blocked at the large El-Fil field in southwestern Libya.⁷ Similar strikes have taken place at other oil developments.

The situation is also complicated by the inter-army reshuffle and the prevailing ideas of federalism and the division of oil fields in Libya.

Ibrahim al-Jadran, a former "guardsman" and leader of the self-proclaimed Cyrenaica Political Bureau, took up these ideas. Summer 2013 he and several thousand of his supporters [armed "ex-revolutionaries"] "broke away" from the "Guard for the Protection of Oil Facilities" and was able to capture several oil ports in eastern Libya-Es-Sidr, Ras Lanuf, Zuitina, Marsa al-Hariga. Thus, he managed to take control of a significant part of the country's oil industry.

I. al-Jadran accused the Libyan government of unfairly distributing revenues from "black gold" and demanded an increase in the share of oil revenues for the eastern region, as well as an investigation into corrupt officials. ⁸

At the end of 2013, then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan spoke about this on Libyan television: "We produce only 1/5 of the country's total oil reserves, and at the same time we still face difficulties in exporting oil... The problem is that the armed guards who are supposed to protect the oil facilities have seized them and thus betrayed their country."

Since the beginning of 2014 Jadran and his troops, numbering several thousand armed fighters, tried to export oil from their base in Ajdabiya, bypassing the Libyan authorities, who called the actions of these rebels "piracy" and repeatedly threatened to recapture the oil ports they controlled. According to the then Oil Minister Abdelbari al-Aroussi, all options were considered for the resumption of oil facilities, including military ones. However, it did not come to the implementation of specific power actions. The actions of the groups caused huge damage to the country's budget and the economy as a whole.

This issue was not ignored at the UN Security Council meetings. Determining that the situation in Libya constitutes a threat to international peace and security, paragraph 1 of resolution 2146 of 19 March 2014 (on taking appropriate measures to prevent the illicit export of crude oil from Libya) "condemns attempts to illegally export crude oil from Libya". Paragraph 3 of the same resolution "Requests the Government of Libya to appoint a coordinator to notify the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011)of any vessels illegally exporting crude oil" ^.9

In April 2014, the Libyan government managed to reach the first agreements with former revolutionaries to resume work after a nine-month blockade in the ports of Marsa al-Hariga and Zuitina. As conditions for the transfer of control over oil ports to the state, they put forward demands for the withdrawal of Libyan army units from port areas and the refusal of military operations, as well as an investigation of corruption in the oil industry.¹⁰ However, it is agreed-

* "Saika "(Arabic for "lightning"). This unit in Libya is considered as a symbol of the revival of the national army.

relations with the central government were limited, which also did not affect the volume of oil exports. In addition, the crisis that occurred during this period, in May of this year, in the Libyan parliament (whose terms of office expired in February 2014-a few months before the new parliamentary elections at the end of June) regarding the illegal appointment of Ahmed Maitig as the country's Prime minister under the already acting head of the cabinet, Abdallah Abdurrahman al-Thani, It has also exacerbated the already difficult situation in the country.

It is noteworthy that A. Thani, as the media reported in early July, made another attempt to "negotiate" with armed groups on the transfer of ports and lifting the blockade. However, this may not yet be considered a long-term solution to the oil problem.

In the country, the powerful pro-government paramilitary brigade "Shield of Libya", consisting of former rebels and controlled from Misrata, has legal status. It has its own headquarters and detachments in different cities of Libya. However, civilians do not perceive this brigade as designed to provide security in the country. According to media reports, in January 2013, in Kufra, in southern Libya, there were armed clashes between representatives of the Tubu tribe and the "Shield of Libya"detachments. They broke out after members of this brigade intervened to stop armed clashes between the Tubu and Zuwaya tribes on the territory of the city university.

Another surge in violence in Benghazi involving the brigade's fighters in June 2013 resulted in the death of about 30 civilians. A protest rally of citizens near the headquarters of this military formation in the city turned into shelling. General Youssef al-Mangush, Chief of the General Staff of the Libyan Army, has resigned due to the unrest in Benghazi.¹¹

UNDER THE GUN OF EXTREMISTS

After the fall of the Gaddafi regime, the number of Islamist groups increased. The Benghazi-based Islamist "February 17 Battalion" is considered the most numerous (up to 3,500) and well-armed group. Since February 2011, he has actively participated in mass protests in Benghazi against the former regime.

The most radical groups also operate in Benghazi: the Salafist Ansar al-Sharia ,which also controls the cities of Sirte and Derna, and Rafallah al-Shahati* (eastern Libya and Kufra). In Derna, the Abu Salim Martyrs ' Brigade, formed by a group of former - allegedly political-prisoners of the Abu Salim prison in Libya.¹²

In the attack on the American consulate in Benghazi in September 2012 and the death of Ambassador K. Stevens and three other representatives of the diplomatic mission are accused by the Ansar al-Sharia group. The American TV channel CNN broadcast official statements by the US authorities that linked the attackers on the diplomatic mission with Al-Qaeda in Iraq. This group, according to media reports, engaged in vandalism and destroyed ancient Sufi shrines, which allegedly need to be cleansed of Islam in Libya. She declared herself a defender of Islam and Sharia law. The largest number of destruction of Sufi shrines was recorded almost simultaneously in Libyan cities in November 2011. Ansar al-Sharia is active on its social media pages. It has at its disposal the Paradise Media Fund in Benghazi ¹³.

The Islamist group Rafallah al-Shahati, which, according to various sources, has more than 1 thousand members, is best known for attacks on government bodies and law enforcement agencies. She is credited with several murders of representatives of the Libyan authorities committed in 2012-2013. In December 2012, the group attacked a police station in Benghazi to free one of its leaders from custody.¹⁴

The eastern part of the country remains by far the most turbulent region. In May 2014, retired Libyan General Khalifa Haftar announced the launch of a large-scale operation "Dignity of Libya" to eliminate radical Islamist groups in the country. Its subordinate armed groups, which identified themselves as members of the Libyan army, clashed with extremists, including those from the Ansar al-Sharia group and the February 17 Battalion. On General X's support. Haftar was declared then by officers of the air base in Tobruk, the capital's National Security Directorate and the Saika army special forces. A few days earlier, the head of the Libyan intelligence directorate in the eastern region of Libya, Ibrahim al-Senusi, was killed in Benghazi. The attackers, who are believed by local security agencies to be linked to radical Islamists, managed to escape. Khalifa Haftar also issued statements against the Government, which he called illegitimate because it is unable to provide security.¹⁵

According to the Libyan media, since the beginning of this operation, a series of strikes have been carried out on the positions of radical Islamist groups in the east of the country, in particular, the most large - scale ones-in Benghazi. At the end of June this year, two longboats with a large amount of weapons and ammunition were sunk in the port city of Ras al-Hilal. An extremist checkpoint was destroyed in the vicinity of the coastal town of Derna, located 30 km east of the city.

Uncontrolled stockpiles of weapons and the weakness of the central government are some of the main drawbacks-

* Rafallah al-Shahati , a young engineer who was killed during the Gaddafi crackdown in March 2011.

key factors in the spread of extremism in Libya. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned against this back in September 2011 in an interview with the Daily Telegraph: "Libya risks falling into the hands of Islamic extremists if a permanent government is not appointed soon"¹⁶. However, the situation has not changed today. Now the main challenge to Libya and its international partners is the rise of extremism in the country, US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, who visited Tripoli for a short visit in April 2014. ¹⁷

According to many experts, this region can turn into a center of Islamic extremism, and the main danger for Libya is the powerful Islamist group Al-Qaeda. In August 2012, the Library of Congress prepared a report on the spread of the group's influence in Libya. According to this study, Libya's geographical location represents the "gateway to Africa", a convenient springboard for spreading radical ideas on the continent. The main goal of the group is to establish an Islamic emirate here as part of the Islamic caliphate. ¹⁸ A few years ago, the then deputy leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, considered Iraq as the center of the coming caliphate, from where Islam's victorious march around the world would begin.¹⁹

In general, the "mosaic" of armed groups in Libya adds some ambiguity to the worrying domestic political and socio-economic situation in the country. After all, in fact, the state in this situation and the obvious dominance of armed groups turned out to be subordinate to them. This is one of the factors why the "ex-revolutionaries" remain an unruly force in Libya, and any actions taken by the government do not bring a clear result.

FEDERALIZATION: THE THREAT OF DISINTEGRATION PERSISTS

Against this background, analysts are increasingly linking the future of the Libyan state with the prospect of federalization. In the eastern part of the country, Cyrenaica, not only favorable conditions for separation have been formed for some time, but also practical steps are being taken to lay its institutional foundations.

On March 6, 2012, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (later renamed the Council of Cyrenaica in Libya) was established in Benghazi, headed, presumably, by a relative of King Idris I, Ahmed Zubair al - Senusi, and a Declaration was adopted on the possible semi - autonomous status of the province. The 8-point declaration read: "... hereby confirm the establishment of the Local Council of Cyrenaica, whose purpose is to manage the affairs of the province and protect the rights of citizens...";"...The Council recognizes the NTC as a symbol of the unity of the country and the legitimate authority, the main representative of Libya in the international arena." The main provision of the Council was also a return to the 1951 Constitution, according to which the United Kingdom of Libya retained its federal status until 1963.

This step is understandable. First, Cyrenaica occupied a privileged position in the 1950s and 1960s, during the reign of Idris I, which it lost under Gaddafi. This province was one of the first places where protests began in 2011, and it was in Benghazi that the first unrest took place on February 15, two days before the" day of anger " in Libya. Secondly, and most importantly, this part of the country contains the main reserves of hydrocarbon resources that this province wants to control itself.

The legal status of the Cyrenaica Council of local authorities and tribal heads was not recognized by central Tripoli. NTC Chairman M. A. Jalil confirmed that the creation of the Council threatens the national unity of Libya. "...We will protect national unity, even if it requires the use of force... " Mufti of Libya Sheikh Sadiq al-Gharyani, condemning the ongoing processes in the country, issued a fatwa:"...Federalism will inevitably lead to a large number of conflicts and disagreements ... "²⁰

Later, Al-Senusi repeatedly addressed supporters of federalism in the cities of the province with statements about the implementation of the Council of Europe declaration-

ta of Cyrenaica, the return of the 1951 Constitution and the creation of a parliament.

In the fall of 2013, at a meeting in Ajdabiya, members of the movement for the autonomy of Cyrenaica, together with former rebel Ibrahim al-Jadran, announced the creation of an independent regional government - the Political Bureau of Cyrenaica. Former Libyan Air Force officer Abd Rabbo al-Barassi was appointed Prime Minister. The Barassi government, which includes more than 20 ministers, said the new body will be responsible for matters related to the province's internal affairs, without interfering in international affairs. The bureau first established its own regional oil company, the Libyan Oil and Gas Corporation (LOGC)²¹.

The creation of the political bureau as a possible governing body for the province was announced at the end of August following the work of the Cyrenaica Youth Movement. I. Jadran was appointed the head of the bureau.

In the south, in Fezzan, the ideas of federalism were developed in connection, as some researchers suggest, with the attempt of the Seif al-Nasr clan* to restore their historical dominance in this province.²²

According to some sources, Fezzan allegedly declared its independence at the end of ^{2013. The National Council of}.

According to other sources, in September 2013, local tribal elders held a preliminary meeting in Ubari (oasis), where they discussed the possibility of creating the Fezzan Supreme Council [similar to the Council of Cyrenaica], which in the future will appoint a military governor who will be responsible for the creation of a regional army, police, and judicial issues protection of provincial borders, as well as control over oil and gas fields and underground water sources. According to the elders, the first step towards autonomy was made due to the weakness of the central government, ignoring the needs of Libyan society, especially in the province of Fezzan. Following the meeting, organizations such as the Sebha Council of Elders, the Shura Council, and the Sebha Union of Civil Society Organizations condemned the steps taken by local tribal leaders to discuss the possibility of an autonomous status for Fezzan24.

Such developments and" self-declarations " indicate that the de facto process of disintegration of the country is underway, and the centrifugal tendencies are only getting stronger. The progressive disintegration is observed not only along the borders of the three historical regions. According to some researchers, Libya is "spreading" into quasi-state entities or so-called "city-states" with their own system of self-government. One such example is the large coastal city of Misrata, which remains isolated, in particular in terms of subordination to the central government, and there is a strict access control system at the entrance to the city.²⁵

In addition, in modern Libya, the problems of ethnic (non-Arab) minorities have become more acute, which has caused another split in Libyan society. Opposition-minded minorities are quite actively involved in sabotage and seizure of pipelines, and claim their rights to income from the sale of hydrocarbon resources. However, the main requirements are recognition of their national language and greater political rights.

Thus, Berbers and representatives of the Tubu tribe made demands for more seats in the central government bodies. In addition, the Tuba in the areas of their residence - Kufra and Sebha - are oppressed by the Arab Zuwayya tribe. Other hostile tribes are trying to portray them as Chadian mercenaries. ²⁶

In a study on interethnic and tribal differences in modern Libya, Suzanne Tarkowski of the American Institute of Peace cites the results of her field work in Libya:"...After the revolution, the Arabs became our brothers, and Islam became our religion. Today, we hope that the new Libya will not only be for the Arabs, " says one of the leaders of the Toubou tribe^. 27

The situation of the Tuaregs of Libya has changed. During the 2011 revolution, they fought on the side of Muammar Gaddafi. In the post-revolutionary period, Tuaregs began to be harassed in their area of residence in Ghadames. Some of them were able to settle in other cities of Libya and Algeria. Part of it is to join combat groups. Tuaregs, mostly of Nigerian or Malian origin, former soldiers of Gaddafi's army, returned to their countries with a large number of weapons and with the idea of joining Tuareg militant groups and, in particular, supporting the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)in Mali**²⁸. Having formed the main backbone of this movement, they significantly increased its combat capability and mobility. Thus, in January 2012, the MNLA launched an uprising that became radical and triggered a new crisis in the Sahel-Saharan region29.

* * *

There is a high probability that the long-term unstable situation in the country, and to some extent even the "smoldering civil war", pose a serious threat to the future

* The Seif al-Nasr clan is one of the main clans in the Aulad Suleiman tribe. In the 19th century, this clan had a huge influence in Fezzan. Under King Idris al-Senusi, members of the clan were governors of Fezzan Province from 1951 to 1969. author's note).

** The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) emerged in October 2011 as a result of the merger of the political "National Movement of Azawad" and the "Tuareg Movement of northern Mali" (author's note). For more information about the Tuaregs of Mali, see: ch. 28.

development. Has Libya, as a result of the events of 2011, found itself in a vicious circle, a never-ending carousel of instability and self-destruction? As the theoretical developments of domestic experts show, such a course of events can turn it into a "failed", "failed" state ³⁰.

In the three years since the end of the tragic events caused by NATO's military intervention in the internal crisis, nothing positive has yet been created in the country, which previously, a few years ago, successfully coped with its socio-economic tasks. In our view, this "revolution" has created more problems for the people of Libya than it has solved. The overthrow of the previous regime led to what can be seen today: Libya is like a large terrarium with armed groups, with a power vacuum remaining in the country at the same time and the threat of final disintegration into autonomous zones, which at best can form a federation - as it was under the monarchical regime - with three historical provinces: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. In this case, the Iraqi scenario is not excluded-legally it is a single country, in fact-three separate independent regions.

Apparently, Libya is not a region where you can build democratic institutions with an extensive system of government in a short time. Political parties here are more like clan associations, so conflicts between them are inevitable, and a democratically elected government can only exist nominally. To save Libya as a state today is one of the main tasks that a future charismatic leader, a strong statesman, could solve - to unite the country with its numerous tribes, ethnic minorities, and now armed groups.

¹ Libya: the fall of Tripoli // The Guardian, 24.08.11 -http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2011/aug/24/ libya-rebels-take-gaddafi-compound-live-updates

² http://libya.tv Live streaming. News, 24-27.08.2011. (Hereafter, statements on Libyan television are quoted on live streaming.)

³ Libya: SAS leads hunt for Gaddafi // The Telegraph, 24.08.2011.

^{Haass N.} 4 Libya Now Needs Boots on the Ground // Council on Foreign Relations - http://www.cfr.org/libya/libya-now-needs-boots-ground/p25683?cid-soc-Twitter-in-Libya-bo ots_on_ground-082211

^{Fituni L. L.} 5 Middle East: technologies of protest potential management / / Asia and Africa today. 2011. N 12, с. 8 - 16. (Fituni L.L. 2011. Blizhniy Vostok: tekhnologii upravleniya protestnym potentsialom // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian)

^{Doroshenko E. I.} 6 The next experiment / / Russia in Global Politics. 2014. Т. 12. N 3. (Doroshenko E.I. 2014. Ocherednoy eksperiment // Rossiya v globalnoy politike. T. 12. N 3) (in Russian)

^{Jamal A.} 7 El Fil Oilfield closed again by Petroleum Facilities Guards // Libya Herald, 17.05.2014 - http://www.libyaherald.com/2014/05/ 17/el-fil-oilfield-closed-again-by-petroleum-facilities-guards/

⁸ Iklim Barka yatahaddi al-Hukuma al-Libiyya: lian Naftah mawaniyah Tasdir al-naft (Barka threatens the central Libyan government: we will not open oil ports) http://www.turess.com/assabahnews/78691

⁹ Cit. Resolution 2146 (2014), adopted by the Security Council at its 7142nd meeting, on 19 March 2014- http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N14/501/23/PDF/N1450123.pdf?Open Element

¹⁰ Libya restarts oil exports from Hariga port / / Asharq al-Awsat, 17.04.2014 "- http://www.aawsat.net/2014/04/article55331320 Isti'naf tasdir an-naft min mina ' az-zuitina sharq libya (Resumption of oil exports from the port of Zuitina in eastern Libya) / / Alhurra, 03.05.2014 - http://www.alhurra.com/conten

¹¹ Libyan army chief quits after deadly clashes // Al-Jazeera, 09.06.2013 - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/06/20136916 201458523.html

¹² Libya's Post-Qaddafi Transition // RAND Corporation research report - http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_ reports/RR100/RR129/RANDRR129.pdf

^{Ward S.} 13 The Battle of the Shrines // Foreign Policy, 12.09.2012 -http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/12/the_battle_of_the_ shrines

¹⁴ An Armed Attack on a Police Station to free Al-Dhub, Libya al-Jadidah, December 17,2012.

¹⁵ Emalia karama libia tamtaddu ilia tarabulus min banigazi (Operation "Dignity of Libya" in Benghazi "reached" Tripoli) / / Elaph Jarida, 19.05.2014 - http://www.elaph.com/Web/News/2014/ 5/905483.html

¹⁶ Libya 'cannot exclude' extremist exploitation, NATO chief says // The Telegraph, 12.09.2011 - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8758553/Libya-cann ot-exclude-extremist-exploitation-Nato-chief-says.html

¹⁷ U.S. vows to help Libya tackle 'rising violent extremism' // Reuters, 24.04.2014 - http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/24/us-libya-usa-security-idUSBREA3N0MW201404 24

¹⁸ Al-Qaeda in Libya: a profile // Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. August 2012. P. 1, 2.

^{19 "Al} -Qaeda" in Iraq / / Asia and Africa today. 2009. N 10. ( Nechitailo D.A. 2009. Alkaida v Irake // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 10) (in Russian)

²⁰ Barca Sharqiyah Libia tattajihu lil huqm al-zatiy (Barca in eastern Libya seeks autonomy). ВВС Arabic 06.03.2012 - http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/multimedia/2012/03/ 120306_libya_fedral.shtml?bw=bbmp=wmbbcws=1news=1

²¹ East Libya movement launches government, challenges Tripoli // Reuters, 03.11.2013 - http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/ll/03/uk-libya-security-idUKBRE9A20ER20131103

^{Lacher W.} 22 Fault Lines of the Revolution. Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya. Berlin, 2013.

²³ Libya's southern Fezzan region declares autonomy // Al Arabiya, 26.09.2013 - http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/ 09/26/-Libya-s-southern-Fezzan-province-declares-autonomy.html

²⁴ Meeting in Obari Preparing the Way for the Establishment of Fezzan Supreme Council - http://jamahiriyanewsagency.wordpress.com/2013/09/27/meeting-in-obari-preparing-the-way- for-the-establishment-of-fezzan-supreme-council/

²⁵ See also: Doroshenko E. I. Livia: na puti ot Jamahirii k "demokratii" [Libya: on the Way from the Jamahiriya to "democracy"]. 2014. N 6. (Doroshenko E.I. 2014. Liviya: na puti ot Jamahirii k "demokratii" // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 6) (in Russian)

^{Cole P.} 26 Borderline Chaos? Stabilizing Libya's Periphery, Carnegie Paper. October 2012.

^{Tarkowski S., Manal O.} 27 Shakeholders of Libya's February 17 Revolution. Special report. January 2012. P. 10.

²⁸ JTIC Brief: MNLA re-awakens Tuareg separatism in Mali -http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx? ID=1065932249 & channel=security; Filippov V. R. Tuaregs of Mali: a long way to peace / / Asia and Africa today. 2012. N 7, 9 (Philippov V.R. Tuaregi Mali: dolgiy put k mini // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2012, N 7, 9) (in Russian)

²⁹ Conflicts in Africa: causes, genesis and problems of settlement (ethnopolitical and social aspects). Moscow, IAfr RAS, 2013, p. 313. (2013. Konflikty v Afrike: prichiny, genesis i problemy uregulirovaniya (etnopoliticheskie i socialnye aspecty)) (in Russian)

^{Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L., Sapuntsov A. L.} 30 "Emerging" and "failed" states in the world economy and politics. 2007. (Abramova I.O., Fituni L.L., Sapuntsov A.L. 2007. "Voznikayushchie" i "nesostoyavshiesya" gosudarstva v mirovoi economike i politike) (in Russian)

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