FROM THE MEMOIRS OF N. S. KHRUSHCHEV

V. V. BELYAKOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: USSR, Egypt, N. S. Khrushchev, G. A. Nasser, Aswan dam

Russia's relations with Egypt, which have noticeably warmed over the past two years, are sometimes compared to those that existed half a century ago, during the joint construction of the high-rise Aswan dam. But the grandiose construction on the Nile was the result of a difficult process of rapprochement between the two states, which began shortly after the Egyptian revolution of 1952.

At the origins of the relationship between the USSR and Egypt were two outstanding personalities-Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918 - 1970). In 1953, after Stalin's death, Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and in 1958 he took the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Nasser was the soul of the 1952 revolutionary coup, headed the government, and in 1956 was first elected President of Egypt.

Some time after his retirement in October 1964, N. S. Khrushchev began to dictate his memoirs. Their transcripts are kept in the Russian State Archive of Modern History (RGANI) in Moscow. The bulk of these memoirs are published ¹. But the extensive section (49 pages of typewritten text) on how relations between the USSR and Egypt developed was not included in this publication.² Meanwhile, it is of undoubted interest.

We offer the readers of the magazine fragments from this section of N. S. Khrushchev's memoirs with some comments.

* * *

"I want to write about Egypt, about relations with the Egyptian state and the new leadership that came to power after the revolution committed by young officers of the Egyptian army and led by Nasser and Amer.

After the first coup, Nasser and Amer, in my opinion, did not take a leading position. Then a general headed the government, I don't remember his last name. And he followed, from our point of view, a progressive direction. He was in favor of expelling the British from Egypt, but in order to preserve the capitalist foundations that were created and developed in Egypt. I don't remember how long this period of time lasted, but the officers overthrew this head of government. " ³

After the proclamation of Egypt as a republic on June 18, 1953, General Mohammed Naguib became the country's first president. The "free officers" who organized the overthrow of the pro-English monarchist regime brought him to the fore as a man who was respected in the country for his patriotic views. However, soon there was a split in the Council of Leadership of the revolution. Some of its members, including Naguib, believed that with the abolition of the monarchy, the revolution was over. Another part, representing the majority, believed that Egypt still needs serious transformations. Naguib was removed from his post in November 1954. The office of President remained vacant until June 1956, when Nasser was elected President.

"In the first period after the coup and the coming to power of Colonel Nasser, we could not determine which direction in foreign and domestic policy will be taken by the new leadership. We were inclined to believe that this was probably one of the military coups that we were already used to in South America, and we did not expect anything special from it. Yes, we had no other choice but to expect what direction this new government would take.

I do not remember now when it was in time, after what period after the coup, but the Egyptians turned to us with a request to help them with weapons. What are they serious about?-

They want to take measures to drive the British troops out of Egypt, and for this you need to have your own army, have weapons. We decided to provide such assistance. I just don't remember on what basis this assistance was provided, but I think it was on a commercial basis: not at full cost, but at a reduced price. I don't remember how many such weapons we sold, either, but apparently they were small arms and artillery weapons. I don't think it includes aviation. " ⁴

Egypt made a request to the USSR to sell modern weapons in April 1955, after its similar request to the United States hung in the air. In order not to tease the West, they decided that Egypt would sign an agreement not with the USSR, but with Czechoslovakia. The contract signed in September included the supply of aircraft, tanks, and artillery.⁵

"The Egyptians conducted their policy with dignity. They actively began to act against the British, demanding the withdrawal of troops. The British realized that they had no other choice but to understand the national demands of the Egyptians, and agreed to withdraw their troops. The troops were withdrawn. I also don't specify in what year or time after Colonel Nasser came to power, because I don't remember. But this has already given us the confidence to pay more attention to the requests of this government. That this is not another government that came to power as a result of a military coup, but a government that really pursues the national interests of its people. And that this Government deserves attention and support if it continues to defend the interests of its people against the colonialists. " ⁶

The agreement on the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt within 20 months was signed on October 19, 1954. On June 13, 1956, the last British soldier left Egypt. The British occupation of the country, which lasted 74 years, ended.

"But it was very difficult to determine the policy of the new Egyptian government. What are the socio-political goals of this Government? On what basis does it think to develop and strengthen its state? Because big capital and banks were not affected. It was a national coup. We believed that a bourgeois government had come to power. But it was in our interest to support even such a government, because it was directed against the colonial rule of England. That is, it weakened England in the Middle East. And this was in the interests of the Soviet Union. Because Britain, relying on the Middle East, pursued a policy against the Soviet Union. So we supported Nasser's policies.

In Yugoslavia, in particular, in the hands of Comrade Stalin. Tito (President of Yugoslavia. - V. B.), developed better relations with Egypt. I think when Tito went to India, he took a ship through the Suez Canal and visited many countries. He's been to Indonesia, India, and Egypt. Then the Yugoslav press wrote a lot of flattering things about the new Egyptian policy and the Egyptian leadership. That this guide is progressive, deserves attention and support.

We did not have good relations with Yugoslavia at that time, but they were improving, and when we met Tito, when we exchanged views on international issues, we mentioned Egypt. Tito was very complimentary about Nasser's policies at the time. I was just saying: "From his performances, it's hard to understand what he wants. He wants to create some kind of progressive system, but how is this possible? It does not touch the bourgeoisie, it does not touch the banks, so it is difficult for us to assess what kind of policy this is and what goals are being pursued." Tito argued that he was still a very young man, politically inexperienced, so his intentions were good, but he himself had not yet found a foothold. But you have to deal with him, you have to support him, because he wants what's good for his people. It can be negotiated with, and it can be influenced in a way that is useful for the communist movement.

I want to make it clear that what is meant here is not influencing Nasser in the selfish interests of those who want to influence. Here the interests are intertwined: those who would like to influence, and the interests of the people whose leadership they would like to influence. This is a mutual investment-

teresa. This is not some conspiracy of one side against the other, but the desire of one side to share its experience and influence the other side to adopt this experience in the interests of its people.

But we were still cautious about Nasser. Of course, they supported him, sold him weapons. We sold him enough weapons. By this time, we were selling him naval weapons - torpedo boats. In my opinion, even something from aviation. It doesn't matter what time we did it, but we eventually sold all kinds of weapons: small arms, infantry, artillery, tanks. We sold aircraft and naval warships, primarily torpedoes, in the quantities that Nasser needed.

In his speeches, I think already influenced by Tito, Nasser began to speak out about building socialism. But he expressed his ideas about this socialism in such a way that we could not understand it, and we thought that he himself did not understand or deliberately said so. Because in modern conditions, the word "socialism" has become fashionable. Even Hitler slapped the word socialism into his party. And the whole world knows what kind of socialism it is. Therefore, we have been wary of people who adopt this word, but do not specifically show how they understand it, how they specifically think to use it, and what goals they want to achieve this socialism. " ⁷

The young officers who came to power as a result of the 1952 revolution dreamed of building a truly independent, prosperous Egypt. "The main thing for Nasser at that stage was the desire to solve two problems: to buy weapons and get help in the construction of the High - rise Aswan dam," said Primakov. "Both of these problems were regarded by Cairo as vital."⁸. The solution of the first problem began with the acquisition of a large batch of Soviet weapons in 1955. At the same time, the Egyptian leadership was also preparing for the second task, this time relying on the West. An English firm prepared the dam project, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the United States and England promised to provide the necessary loans. It would seem that you can already start construction. But in mid-July 1956, the Western creditors abruptly reneged on their promises.

It was necessary to give a decent answer to the West, and get other funding. The solution matured quickly: nationalize the Suez Canal company. Nasser, who was elected president in June, made the announcement at a rally in Alexandria on July 26.

Britain and France, the main shareholders of the Suez Canal company, tried various kinds of pressure to force Egypt to abandon this decision. It didn't help. And then at the end of October, in collusion with Israel, they went to direct aggression.

The Egyptian army was just beginning to modernize, and although the Egyptians put up a stubborn resistance to the invaders, they could not expel them. And then the Soviet Union had its say, threatening to use force against the aggressors. Here is how N. S. Khrushchev recalled those days::

"Our intervention in favor of Egypt when it was attacked by Israel, Britain and France has greatly raised our prestige in the Arab world, and especially in the Egyptian people. President Nasser said many truthful and flattering things about the policy of the Soviet Government. And we sincerely helped, without any conditions and selfish hopes. We provided ideological assistance to help the colonial peoples win their independence, to repel the aggressive forces that would like to restore the reactionary government in Egypt, to return it to the path of the reactionary policy pursued by King Farouk of Egypt.

So our action was based on humane principles, and not on any mercantile interests of our country. We don't need anything. We have almost all the wealth that Egypt has. We have oil and produce our own rice. Our country is richer in its natural resources. And if we lack something, we need something-raw materials or products that are produced by other countries, then we try to acquire it not by war or any other machinations, as the colonialists do, but on a commercial basis, as is practiced among all civilized peoples. " ⁹.

Vadim Kirpichenko, who worked at the Soviet Embassy in Cairo at the time, recalled the reaction of the Egyptians to the Soviet position: "We immediately gained the status of the savior of Egypt and its best friends. Once my small Austin with the image of two flags of the USSR on the windows was lifted by the crowd and carried along with me for several meters. Even the Russian emigrants who left their homeland after the October Revolution experienced the ardent enthusiasm of the Egyptians. " ¹⁰

But let's return to the memoirs of N. S. Khrushchev.

"Nasser stated that the war was ended as a result of Soviet assistance: our intervention, roughly speaking, a threat; our appeal to Eisenhower ( US President-V. B.) - under the flag of the United Nations to unite the military efforts of our two countries against the aggressors who attacked Egypt.

We knew that Eisenhower would not want to merge with

We continued our efforts against our NATO allies, but we wanted to tear off the peacemaker's veil that he put on, to show his true face as a political figure who adheres to the same positions, only, perhaps, does not agree with the place and time of the aggression that was launched.

I would also like to say why Israel retreated from the occupied territory (the Sinai Peninsula - V. B.). Then it, together with the French and British, occupied vast territories. When the war ended, the British and French withdrew their troops. Israel also withdrew its troops. Apparently, there was an agreement between the allies-three powers-this is one thing. And the second thing is that we have raised this issue at the UN and have achieved condemnation of this aggression. And not only condemnations, but we then publicly, through the press, announced the recruitment of volunteers to the Egyptian army-tankers, pilots, gunners and other military specialists. To provide real support, help, give people who would be perfectly able to own more advanced weapons. This, apparently, prompted a correct understanding of the need to withdraw troops and liberate the territories that were captured as a result of the triple attack on Egypt. " ¹¹

Britain and France withdrew their troops from Egypt on December 23, 1956, and the Egyptians celebrate this day as Victory Day. But Israel delayed its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula until the beginning of March.

"Я считаю, что эта деталь в нашей политике была очень существенной и была правильно применена. Во-первых, мы перед Израилем поставили конкретные условия: если он не сделает выводов и не послушается рекомендаций ООН, то столкнётся с военной силой Египта, в составе войск которого могут быть и наши добровольцы. Это тоже было очень высоко оценено египетским народом и самим Насером. Об этом Насер говорил в своих выступлениях.

Но после нормализации положения у нас всё-таки были разные понимания. В его выступлениях, в которых он излагал политическую позицию о переустройстве египетского государства, мы видели его непоследовательность. Или он не понимал, или сознательно извращал. Тито мне говорил, что он просто не понимает, что ему надо помогать. Но мы Насера знали, поэтому не могли исходить из таких позиций и считали, что он вводит в заблуждение свой народ. Насер начал пропагандировать какой-то особый путь развития, говорить об арабском социализме. То же самое и насчёт победы. Раньше он это приписывал нашим усилиям, нашему вмешательству. После обострения, которое произошло между нами, он стал объяснять, что они победили с помощью Аллаха.

Когда между нами стали хорошие, дружеские отношения, я другой раз намекал на то, кто же помог - мы или Аллах. Насер смотрел и улыбался, как бы говоря, что другого нельзя было сказать; что мы, мол, с вами находились в состоянии спора, поэтому вместо того, чтобы признать, что агрессия была прекращена в результате вашего вмешательства, говорилось о помощи Аллаха. А на Аллаха всё можно свалить: и успехи, и всякие провалы. Как русский на Бога валит, так и египтянин валит на своего бога - Аллаха.

But our relationship has steadily improved. The aggravation was on the issue of unification of Egypt with Syria. As a result of this association, the Syrian Communist Party was driven underground. And when she criticized Nasser, he took his anger out on us. Of course, there were reasons for this. True, we did not take any organizational measures in favor of the Syrian Communist Party, but we were morally on its side. On other occasions, our press gave her moral support. This irritated Nasser, and he reacted accordingly in his speeches. " ¹²

At the initiative of Syria, in February 1958, a federal state was created-the United Arab Republic (UAR), consisting of the Egyptian and Syrian regions. The Soviet leadership reacted negatively to this step.

"We did not see this as a progressive direction. Firstly, because Syria was a bourgeois-democratic country with a parliament, a legal communist party and other parties. This is a French-style parliamentary system. Consequently, for progressive forces, conditions were better in Syria than in Egypt. There was no democracy in Egypt. There were colonels there. < ... > We, in fact, are not against such an organizational form with the aim of uniting Arab forces. And sometime it will be. And this will be a progressive phenomenon. But we were against such an association at a time when the Communist Party of Egypt was underground, when communists were in prison and the people did not enjoy any democratic rights. Naturally, this country did not promise anything progressive for Syria when it merged with Syria. Therefore, we did not support such an association. " ¹³

Egypt as stronger (Nasser was elected President of the UAR) he began to adjust Syria "for himself", and the further he went, the more this displeased the Syrians. In September 1962, a military coup took place in Damascus, and Syria withdrew from the UAR. But even before the 1971 Constitution was adopted. Egypt was officially called the United Arab Republic.

"The failure of the unification of Egypt with Syria has further increased the risk of war.-

This is our credibility in the eyes of Nasser and other Egyptian leaders. Because it turned out as we understood and warned about. < ... > And we were really sincerely on their side, sincerely did everything in our power to strengthen the regime created in Egypt. And they were tolerant of what they didn't agree with. Because we thought that this was an internal phenomenon, that the time would come when they would see for themselves that they had misunderstood this issue. " ¹⁴

With the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956, Egypt received a substantial additional source of foreign currency. But this was not enough to finance the construction of the high-rise Aswan dam. In addition, the Egyptians did not have the necessary equipment for such a grandiose project, they had almost no specialists in the field of hydraulic engineering. As the West turned away from Egypt, Egypt turned to the Soviet Union.

A word to N. S. Khrushchev.

"The Egyptians began to approach us with a proposal that we agree to build the Aswan dam.

At first, we refused to do this. I think that with a convincing request, which was a kind, friendly pressure, they were advised to contact us by Tito. He advised us to persuade them to agree to the construction of the Aswan dam. Why do I think so? When we met with Comrade Tito and talked about various topics, we always exchanged opinions about Egypt. Tito always stood up for Egypt, praised Nasser and argued that they should be helped. He was absolutely right about that. Life and history have confirmed the correctness of his reasoning on this issue. Now (in the late 1960s-V. B.) we have the best relations with Egypt. And this is in the interests of Egypt, the Soviet Union and all progressive forces.

At first, this issue was raised in conversations with our embassy staff in Egypt. Then came Amer (the vice-president of Egypt, V. B.). < ... > He was able to show his perseverance, but not intrusiveness. He tried to convince his interlocutor that a strong Egypt was in the interests of the Soviet Union. We have a weak economy right now, and without the Aswan dam, it is impossible to raise the economy of Egypt. Egypt's energy sector is weak, and the Aswan dam will provide an opportunity to increase irrigation land by a third. And this is a huge wealth for the country and the people.

"We agree with this," I say, " it is true. But it will require a lot of capital investment, and we can't do that."

After the meeting, we in our government and the Central Committee of the party exchanged views on what we should do. We have instructed our economists and Gosplan to study the proposals. They studied for a long time and reported on how much it could cost, and how long it would take us to build this Aswan dam, and what it would do. It was suggested that this deal could be politically and economically beneficial for us. But you need to understand some conditionality of economic benefits. The benefit is that we strengthen our friend, strengthen him economically. And, therefore, we secure his friendly relations with us. This is already a matter of policy. That this money is not a waste. They will be returned to us in the form of deliveries. Egypt can supply us with the best cotton-Egyptian long-fiber, rice and other goods.

In a word, this money is not a gift, but a loan that will be paid to us in reality. In addition, we receive an enormous prize - the trust of the Egyptian people. And not only the Egyptian people, but the entire Arab world and the peoples of other poorly developed countries, especially Africa, who will see that the Soviet Union exists and can be relied upon, that it is unselfish and sympathetic to the needs of peoples who are freeing themselves from the colonial dependence of the imperialist Powers. So here it was mainly of political significance for us. And sometimes the political interest is more important than the economic one. What does it mean to strengthen Egypt, strengthen the Arab countries and strengthen their friendly relations with us? This means weakening the hostile camp. If we do not fight to strengthen our ties with the peoples being liberated, imperialism will look for every crack to secure these peoples for itself, thus pitting vast territories and great forces against us. And this will force us to spend more on the maintenance of our army, our armed forces. That's how it turns out. It seems that we lose on this, but if we study it more deeply, we get a win.

Therefore, when we thoroughly discussed and weighed it, we came to the conclusion that we can build this Aswan dam, that it is feasible for us, with such and such allocations and in such and such a time we can cope with this matter. We agreed. We signed an agreement with Egypt on the construction of the Aswan dam " ¹⁵.

On December 27, 1958, an agreement was signed in Cairo to grant Egypt a Soviet loan in the amount of 90 million rubles. foreign currency rubles for the construction of the first stage of the Aswan dam. The financial terms of the agreement were not burdensome for Egypt. It was supposed to start paying off the loan in five years, in 1964 (this year it was planned to complete the first stage of the construction of the hydroelectric complex), in equal shares in the tech-

for the last 12 years, and not in currency, but by supplying their goods to the USSR. The loan was granted at 2.5% per annum ¹⁶.

"Thus, step by step, our relations with Egypt improved, even began to develop into friendly ones. The conclusion of the agreement on the construction of the Aswan dam, the understanding of the Egyptian leadership turned in the direction of understanding our policy as friendly. This understanding was shared not only by Egypt, but also by all the countries that took the path of struggle for their liberation or freed themselves from the colonialists and embarked on the path of restructuring their economy on a new basis. <...>

The Egyptian leaders began to raise the question that the Soviet delegation should come to Egypt in order to get acquainted on the spot and establish closer friendly relations. At that time, I was in a high position, so when people talked to me, they directly said that they were inviting me. I really wanted to go to Egypt. This is not only my dream, but every person who wants to know, contemplate, feel out the lives of other people, and especially the Egyptians. Egypt is the cradle of human civilization. Therefore, it seemed to us to be a kind of mysterious, not solved, where a huge historical experience of humanity was accumulated. Such a country, of course, was interesting to look at.

I could understand why the Egyptians wanted me to lead the delegation. I held the appropriate position in my country, and they wanted to establish more friendly relations, pursuing their own goals, that is, receiving economic assistance from us and supporting the policies that the Egyptian government has pursued and is pursuing. So they thought that the best thing to do would be to negotiate with me.

They invited us to come to the moment when the construction of the Aswan dam was laid. But I didn't have the opportunity to go then, there were some other issues that interested me."¹⁷.

The first stone in the body of the dam was solemnly laid on January 9, 1960. On this occasion, gold medals were minted. One of them was awarded by Nasser to Khrushchev. In a telegram of thanks on January 15, the Soviet leader announced that the USSR was ready to finance the construction of the second stage of the Aswan hydroelectric complex - on the same terms as the first stage. Looking ahead, here are the following figures. Of the total amount of two loans in the amount of 292.5 million rubles, 279.3 million were spent. The loans were fully repaid in January 1983. Additional interest was received in the amount of 62 million rubles. ¹⁸ rubles.

The joint construction of the high-rise Aswan dam, in general, went according to plan. The completion of the first stage of the hydroelectric complex - the Nile overlap-was approaching. It was scheduled for mid-May 1964. A word to N. S. Khrushchev:

"When the time came to block the Nile channel, they insistently began to ask to come. Arrive not only at the time of the overlap, but in advance to live freely, get acquainted with Egypt, and conduct useful conversations. And then they said that they had literally several communists in prison, but the president said that they would all be released by the time we arrived. " ¹⁹

The persecution of Communists for criticizing President Nasser's regime was a stumbling block in Soviet-Egyptian relations.

"We agreed to such a trip. This was in the month of May, 1964. I headed this delegation. <...>

The meeting was arranged according to my rank and our relationship. Nice meeting. The conversations we had during my stay were also very good and friendly. We got acquainted with the cities, with the facilities that were built with our assistance and already worked, provided products. This greatly increased our credibility. For example, we have built a drug manufacturing plant. Before that, they paid a lot of money to buy these drugs in England and suddenly began to produce them themselves. This has created great opportunities for the use of this medicine. Because in Egypt, people are very poor, low-income, and expensive medicine could not afford poor people. And suddenly they began to be able to meet the needs of the people with cheap means.

We went to a number of factories, watched, and everywhere people met us with great sympathy and expressed joy that we were helping to build factories and factories. In addition, thousands of people got jobs.

The day of overlap has come. Diversion tunnels were prepared to allow the Nile's waters to flow through a different channel and create conditions for the construction of a dam and the installation of equipment. Nasser and I took the train to the Aswan Dam. I must say that Nasser made a very good impression on me. Nasser was literally a leader for the Egyptians. His authority was colossal. He was greeted with great enthusiasm: Nasser! Nasser! Nasser! Well, I know how they do it other times, when they artificially create conditions. Of course, this was also done in Egypt. But I also saw the genuine enthusiasm expressed by the Egyptian people for their President and other leaders. But mostly Nasser.

We arrived in Aswan. Ben-Bella, the President of the Algerian Republic, the Prime Minister of Yemen came there to block the riverbed, I forgot it

last name, Aref-President of the Republic of Iraq. <...>

When there was a solemn overlap, it was decorated so that a huge number of people were present. The president made a speech, and the minister who was directly involved in the construction of the Aswan dam made a kind of report to the president. In a word, some form of ceremonial order was developed. Then there was the launch. The president invited me: "Since the dam is ours, but you are actually building it, you are lending it, your technical project and your people, so I ask you to press the button with me to blow up the diversion dam in order to send water along a new channel." This is actually an honorable mission, so there was no point in refusing. It's an honor. So I thanked him and accepted with pleasure. " ²⁰

The closure of the Nile lasted 62 hours, from the morning of May 13 to the evening of the 15th. The climax was the explosion of a bridge in the canal that supplies water to the future hydroelectric power station. At 12: 35 p.m. on May 14, Nasser and Khrushchev pressed the button together. There was a huge explosion, and the Nile flowed into a new channel. Meanwhile, dump trucks dumped granite blocks left in the old channel of the proran. And soon the great river was tamed.

"The closure was very solemn. It was necessary to see this, because it is impossible to convey how the faces of the Egyptians shone, how their eyes sparkled as they watched the powerful stream of Nile water move along a new channel.

I was warned that Aswan has a particularly dry climate, with rain falling once every few years. I prepared myself for these conditions. And yet, when we arrived in Aswan, it was like we were in the oven. There was no escape from the sun anywhere. But the room in which I was placed was good, with air cooling, with water. But taking a cold shower was only a name, because the water in the shower was warm, warmed by the Aswan sun.

A rally was scheduled for the evening. And before that, in my opinion, there was a meeting of our specialists and workers. They had their own club there, and they invited me to perform for them. I agreed with pleasure. I talked to them and told them about the situation in the country. The situation was good and people were in a good mood.

At sunset, a rally was held. Why in the evening or at night? Because it was impossible to be outdoors during the day. The president made a speech. The President spoke for the first time about the socialism that they are building and will continue to build on the basis of scientific socialism. In other words, he departed from the usual standard of building Arab socialism. Here he spoke for the first time about scientific socialism. He did not refer to Marx and Lenin, but said that scientific socialism. It's the same thing, actually. He did not refer not only because of his inner understanding, but apparently took into account the mood of his opponents, and mainly his allies, who did not fully understand these issues. So he made a temporary concession. In any case, it was a step forward, and I was pleased to hear it <...>

The time has come to leave there. <...> I only remember from the flight (from Aswan to Cairo) that the Nile River stretches from a height of very narrow strip. And it looks pretty sad. Because only in a small space to the right and left of the Nile can you observe vegetation, and the rest of the space is a lifeless desert. It is also known from geography that there is a desert. But you get an even greater impression when you observe this desert from the air..."²¹

N. S. Khrushchev's trip to Egypt lasted more than two weeks, from May 9 to May 25. In addition to Cairo and Aswan, he also visited Alexandria, Port Said, and Luxor. And everywhere the Soviet leader was greeted by enthusiastic crowds of Egyptians.

^{Nikita Khrushchev.} 1 Memories. In 4 books. Moscow, 1997. (Krushchev Nikita. 1997. Memories. Moscow) (in Russian)

² The section of N. S. Khrushchev's memoirs "On Egypt" is published in the journal Voprosy Istorii (1994, No. 1, pp. 75-97), but in a different version than the cited archival document, and with minor abbreviations.

³ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 1.

⁴ Ibid., l. 2.

^{Yurchenko V. P.} 5 Egypt: problems of national security, Moscow, 2003, p. 21. (Yurchenko V. P. 2003. Egipet: problem natsionalnoy bezopasnosti. M.) (in Russian)

⁶ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 2.

⁷ Ibid., l. 2-4.

^{Primakov E. M.} 8 The Middle East on the stage and behind the scenes. Moscow, 2006. pp. 42-43. (Primakov E. M. 2006. Blizhniy Vostok na stsene i za kulisami. M.) (in Russian)

⁹ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 12.

^{Kirpichenko V.} 10 From the archive of the intelligence officer. Moscow, 1993. p. 42. (Kirpichenko V. 1993. Iz arkhiva razvedchika. M.) (in Russian)

¹¹ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 12-13.

¹² Ibid., pp. 13-14.

¹³ Ibid., l. 5.

¹⁴ Ibid., l. 24.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 15-18.

^{Sukharev G. I.} 16 Feat on the Nile. Moscow, 1970. p. 29. (Sukharev G. I. 1970. Podvig na Nile. М.) (in Russian)

¹⁷ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 19-21.

^{Kulev I. A.} 18 Notes of an economist. Egypt and Soviet-Egyptian Economic Relations under President G. A. Nasere, Moscow, 1996, p. 6. (Kulev I. A. 1996. Zapiski ekonomista. Egipet i sovetsko-ekonomicheskie svyazi pri prezidente G. A. Nasere. M.) (in Russian)

¹⁹ RGANI. F. 52. Op. 2. D. 8. L. 25.

²⁰ Ibid., l. 25-28.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 28-35.

Permanent link to this publication: