V. M. VISHNEV
Graduate student
Kyiv National University named after V. I. Abramovich. Taras Shevchenko
Keywords: Republic of Korea, North Korea, 2013 crisis on the Korean peninsula, "nuclear domino", extended deterrence guarantees
The latest crisis on the Korean peninsula in March-April 2013, caused by new missile and nuclear weapons tests in the DPRK and large-scale US-South Korean maneuvers in the Yellow Sea [1], led to a noticeable change in sentiment in South Korea regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Previously, this topic was taboo in the country's political circles. It was addressed only by some marginal figures, such as the right-wing conservative Kim Dae-jung, who spoke in 2011 in the newspaper "Chosop ilbo" with a call for mastering the nuclear status [2]. However, after the third nuclear test in North Korea in February 2013, this issue has become a major topic of political debate in South Korea. Even deputies from the inner circle of the newly elected President Park Geun-hye say that "Seoul cannot afford to defend itself only with a stone from a neighboring rogue state armed with a submachine gun" [3].
TO BE OR NOT TO BE?
American experts consider their own security concerns, technological capabilities, and political will to be among the most important factors that motivate states to make decisions about developing nuclear weapons [4]. The Republic of Korea( ROK), Japan and Taiwan have sufficient economic, scientific and technical capabilities to develop nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time. At the same time, they feel a threat to national security from the new nuclear power, the DPRK, as well as China's claims to regional dominance.
Thus, K. Campbell, R. Einhorn, and M. Rice noted in the early 2000s that the non-nuclear states of Northeast Asia (NEA) were on the verge of making a decision to create nuclear weapons due to uncertainty about the reliability of Washington's guarantees in the event of a nuclear confrontation [5]. The main question remains: "Is the US ready to trade Los Angeles for Seoul?" They are echoed by G. Snyder, who believes that South Korea is pushed to acquire nuclear status by the fear of "being left to fend for itself" by a stronger ally [6]. A certain role is also played by such a factor as the desire to increase national self-esteem [7, 8].
At the same time, Canadian researcher T. V. Paul explains the restraint of threshold countries in their nuclear ambitions from the position of "prudent realism": a particular state tries to find such a balance of its own interests and potential in order to minimize the possibility of a threat to the security of other states. "Technologically advanced non-nuclear states, especially those that cannot be classified as 'large', try not to create an external threat to other powerful players, " he said. In his opinion, the Republic of Korea, having the technological capabilities to create nuclear weapons and being in a long-term confrontation with the DPRK, nevertheless does not seek nuclear status, relying on the US nuclear umbrella and American security guarantees [9].
HAWKS WANT MORE FROM WASHINGTON
Facing a threat from a nuclear Power, a non-nuclear country has the following options for ensuring national security:: 1) obtain guarantees against pressure and possible blackmail from nuclear Powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and other international agreements: negative guarantees (non-use of nuclear weapons against it) and positive ones (provision of assistance by nuclear Powers in the event of a nuclear attack on it); 2) conclude a strategic alliance with a nuclear Power; 3) create a nuclear-weapon-free zone with the participation of this non-nuclear country; 4) acquire nuclear weapons.
The Republic of Korea is currently implementing the first two options: as a nuclear-weapon-free state, it has received security guarantees under the NPT, and the United States has provided it with a nuclear umbrella as its ally.
After the first North Korean nuclear tests and a series of incidents that were perceived in South Korea as military provocations by its northern neighbor, [10] public opinion in South Korea swung in favor of gaining nuclear power status and returning American tactical nuclear weapons that had been withdrawn by Washington
in 1991. The last two surveys conducted in March 2013 by the independent Asan Institute for Political Studies after the third North Korean nuclear test showed that two-thirds of the population of the Republic of Korea are in favor of mastering nuclear weapons, and only 30% of respondents were against it [11].
Proponents of strengthening the nuclear arsenal in South Korea put forward the following arguments in support of their point of view:
- the return of US tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula will strengthen the positions of Washington and Seoul in negotiations with North Korea and help bring Pyongyang back to the negotiating table to curtail its nuclear program. * U.S. tactical nuclear weapons could be used as a bargaining chip for denuclearization of both parts of the peninsula, and once the North Korean nuclear issue is resolved, they could be removed again;
- North Korea's recent nuclear tests have reinforced the concerns of ROK citizens about the viability of the US-South Korean alliance and the reliability of security guarantees. The only option to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue is a tougher nuclear deterrent. The return of American nuclear weapons will allow "repairing the broken nuclear umbrella." It would also be useful to deploy submarines with nuclear missiles in the East China Sea to track the DPRK;
- the creation of its own nuclear weapons would help to change the balance of power in negotiations with North Korea, since the return of American nuclear weapons to the peninsula alone would not be enough. A South Korean nuclear program would force Beijing and Washington to exert more pressure on Pyongyang to curtail its nuclear program. Only in the face of the real threat of a "nuclear domino" effect (the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan and Taiwan) will Beijing be forced to curb North Korea's nuclear ambitions.;
- It is better for the ROK to have its own nuclear deterrent facilities independent of the United States, since if Pyongyang successfully develops intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, the reliability of the American nuclear umbrella would be in doubt [2].
WHAT IS THE DANGER OF SOUTH KOREA'S "NUCLEAR SOVEREIGNTY"?
According to a number of foreign experts, the acquisition of nuclear status by the Republic of Korea would have more negative consequences than positive ones.
So, inter-Korean relations would change dramatically. Based on the experience of the regional nuclear deterrent system in South Asia, it can be assumed that the ROK would follow the example of India and observe the principle of non-use of nuclear weapons first. At the same time, Pyongyang, inferior to South Korea in conventional weapons, would be forced to adopt the doctrine of a possible first nuclear strike only if there is a serious external threat to the existence of the current North Korean regime. Such a situation would further freeze the conflict, which has been going on for 60 years already.
As for the possible denuclearization of the peninsula if the Republic of Korea acquires nuclear status, this scenario is not very likely, given the different goals of the nuclear programs of the States of the peninsula. If South Korea wants to secure its existence in the neighborhood of an irrational player, Pyongyang is primarily interested in preserving the existing political regime. The South Koreans ' possession of nuclear weapons would not pose a greater threat to the Kim Jong-un regime than the current situation.
In addition, the presence of a close border, the insignificant strategic depth of the territory and the fierce political confrontation between the two Koreas would require significant efforts to prevent accidental launches and reduce the level of combat readiness of nuclear weapons on both sides. And this is not to mention the possible consequences of the DPRK leadership's misinterpretation of the goals of the South Korean nuclear program, which may lead to a preemptive strike.
Thus, the development of its own nuclear weapons by the Republic of Korea would not bring it the expected increase in security. The current US nuclear umbrella remains a more effective deterrent to its northern neighbor.
At the regional level, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Seoul could lead to a "nuclear domino"effect. After all, such states of the region as Japan and Taiwan also have the technical capability to create nuclear weapons and in the implementation of the scenario of their proliferation will also be forced to protect themselves due to the presence of many territorial disputes, which will not add stability to relations in the region [12].
WASHINGTON IS FIXING THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA
Washington has repeatedly stated its negative attitude to the nuclear encroachments of the ROK. The Americans consider the security guarantees that they have already provided sufficient. The Republic of Korea's acquisition of nuclear status would result in the imposition of trade and economic sanctions against it, which would negatively affect the country's economic situation and worsen its image in the international arena. In addition, plans to turn the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone would be put to rest [13].
Given the growing urgency of the issue of the reliability of American security guarantees for South Korea, the insufficient effectiveness of international sanctions imposed on the DPRK, and the unclear prospects for the six-party talks* * on denuk-
* Denuclearization - the diplomatic language adopted in September 2005 at the Six-party talks, which allowed Pyongyang to replace "nuclear disarmament of the DPRK" with "denuclearization of the entire Korean peninsula" (approx. ed.).
** China, the United States, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and Japan are participating in the six-party talks. They were interrupted by Pyongyang in 2009.
In addition to the de-escalation of the Korean Peninsula [14], Washington considers practical steps to ensure the viability of American security guarantees to be the main means of preventing South Korea's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons.
In 2010, US-South Korean consultative talks on security issues were held. According to their results, three documents were signed:
- Strategic Alliance-2015 (according to which the operational military management in 2015 will be transferred by the Americans to South Korea);
- A guide to U.S.-ROK Defense Cooperation (which sets out a vision for the future of the bilateral alliance);
- Management of Strategic Planning (which gives the joint military Committee the authority to develop operational plans) [15].
Thus, in order to increase the effectiveness of ensuring the security of the Republic of Korea, the United States provided it with extended deterrence guarantees - the possible use of American nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and missile defense systems (ABM) in the event of an attack on the territory of South Korea.
Moreover, the Nuclear Posture Review, prepared by the US Department of Defense in 2010, noted that one of the five main goals of US nuclear policy was "strengthening regional deterrence regimes and providing repeated guarantees to US allies and partners" [16].
However, the South Korean leadership remains concerned. In particular, they were caused by statements by American representatives that the United States is able to provide expanded nuclear deterrence with such non-nuclear means as the deployment of a regional missile defense system (and the Republic of Kazakhstan is not involved in this project) and a military presence in the form of non-nuclear forces. There is also the question of preserving the integrity of the US extended deterrent after the full transition of the military operational command to the military leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
Seoul is pinning its hopes on the Expanded Deterrence Policy Committee established in October 2010. It has the following tasks: to regularly assess the effectiveness of the US extended nuclear deterrent, non-nuclear military capabilities and missile defense system in the region; to disseminate information on measures to ensure extended deterrence, to ensure the effectiveness of the nuclear umbrella and conventional security means of the Republic of Kazakhstan [17].
The South Korean military command seeks to develop the nuclear component of military plans in the event of war, which will clearly specify which North Korean targets and in which cases will be subjected to a nuclear strike [15, p. 38], the possibility of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons (for example, when refueling North Korean missiles with nuclear warheads). It also seeks to prepare plans for the use of missile defense systems during possible combat operations.
Thus, a paradoxical situation has emerged in which blocking the nuclear encroachments of South Korean "hawks" depends on the reliability of American security guarantees for South Korea (as well as Japan). This is fueling an arms race in Northeast Asia and is fraught with increased regional tensions.
1. For more information, see: Rusakov EM. Vertigo from nuclear successes / / Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 7 (Rusakov Е. М. Golovokruzhenie ot yadernykh uspekhov // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2013, N 7) (in Russian)
2. Dalton T. Reading into South Korea's Nuclear Debate // Pacific Forum CSIS. 18.03.2013 - http://carnegieendowment. org/2013/03/18/reading-into-south-korea-s-nuclear-debate/ frdc
3. MacKinnon M. In the Korean standoff, will Seoul go nuclear? - http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-the-korean-standoff-will -seoul -go-nuclear/article 10115881 /
4. Dong-joon Jo, Gartzke E. Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation // Journal of Conflict Resolution. 2007, N 1.
5. Campbell K.M., Einhorn R.J., Reiss M.B. The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices. Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press. 2004.
6. Snyder G.H. The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics // World Politics. 1984. Vol. 43, N 4, p. 461 - 495.
7. Sagan S.D. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb // International Security. Winter 1997/1998, N 3;
8. Easley L. -E. Defense Ownership or National Security: Autonomy and Reputation in South Korea and Japanese Security Policies // SAIS Review. 2007, N 2.
9. Paul T.V. Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press. 2000.
10. For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. Prizraki vozvrashchayutsya iz "kholoda" // Asia and Africa today, 2010, N 10 (Rusakov E. M. Prizraki vozvrashchayutsya iz "kholoda" // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2010, N 10) (in Russian)
11. Hihbs M.Will South Korea Go Nuclear? // Foreign Policy - http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/15/ will_south_korea go_nuclear
12. Dorell O. Some suggest S.Korea should go nuclear // USA Today. 11.03.2013 - http://www.usatoday.com/story/ news/world/2013/03/11 /south-korea-thinks-nuclear/1979051
13. Jong Kip Choi. Nuclear advocates have little pull in S.Korea // Global Times. 21.03.2013 - http://www.globaltimes. cn/content/769732.shtml#.UWFXcJNHKSo
14. For more information, see: Korean Peninsula: Dangerous games. Vorontsov A.V., Agaltsov P. Yadernaya intriga Koreiskogo poluostrova // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2010, N 10) (in Russian); Regional security. A nuclear ghost on the Korean Peninsula. Zhebin A. Z. Who is to blame?; Denisov V. I. Is there a way out of the impasse? // Asia and Africa Today, 2011, N 11. (Zhebin A. Z. Kto vinovat?; Denisov V. I. Estj li vykhod iz tupika? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. 2011, N 11) (in Russian)
15. Zie-eun Yang. South Korea's Nuclear Decision: Explanations for South Korea's Nuclear Motivation and Renouncement. 2011. Washington D.C. P. 18.
16. http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%2 0posture%20review%20report.pdf
17. Gwang-il Chang. ROK and US Governments agree to institutionalize the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee // Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. 2010. Vol. 40.
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