Libmonster ID: UK-1438
Author(s) of the publication: I. V. GORDEEVA


National Research University "Higher School of Economics"

Keywords: Japan, Taiwan, US position, China's reaction, Senkaku (Diaoyu) In the context of the growing US-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan's importance is significantly increasing. Reuniting an island with the PRC, which has significant economic and military potential, would further strengthen the power of a rising China, which the United States and its most important ally in the Asia - Pacific region, Japan, clearly do not want to allow.

Tokyo's position as one of the main players in the Taiwan issue plays an important role in the current situation. With the return of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to power in Japan, the new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has taken a course to further strengthen the Japanese-American military alliance and take a tougher stance in relations with China in the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu).


In general, Japan continues to exercise caution and circumspection in Taiwan affairs, adhering to the positions set out in the Joint Japan-China Statement of 1972 and other joint documents with Beijing.* However, the development of events in the Asia-Pacific region encourages Tokyo to make important adjustments to its policy in the Taiwan direction, increasingly solidifying with Washington in ensuring Taiwan's security and preventing the issue from being resolved by force.

As noted in a study by Stanford University researcher J. Chen (USA), " in recent years, Japan has significantly increased its support for Taiwan in the political and security spheres." He identifies the following three main reasons for this: American pressure on Tokyo to provide more support for the United States ' actions in the Asia-Pacific region, including in the situation with Taiwan; growing concern in Japan itself about the growing power of China; increasing sympathy for Taipei in Japanese society in the context of complicated relations between Tokyo and Beijing. 3.

A well-known Japanese military expert, S. Hiramatsu, emphasizes that " Taiwan is a critical component of Japan's maritime communications. If Taiwan is united with China, the South China Sea will become the inner China Sea, putting sea routes to the Middle East and Southeast Asia under strong Chinese influence. China will also be able to have a stronger impact on the situation around the Japanese islands of Nansei (Ryukyu) in the East China Sea. Moreover, China may use Taiwan as a base of support for access to the Pacific Ocean." All this suggests, S. Hiramatsu points out, that Taiwan is of "vital importance" to Japan.4

This is echoed by Professor M. Matsu Mura, an expert on peace and security issues at the Japan Research Institute, in his paper "Japan's Policy Choices regarding Taiwan".5. It notes, in particular, the following options for the development of the situation around Taiwan::

- accelerated development of the economy-

* At the same time, it should be borne in mind that although the Chinese Government confirmed in a Joint Statement that Taiwan is an integral part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, and the Japanese Government stated that it fully understands and respects this position of the Chinese Government, the day after the signing of the statement, on September 30, 1972, Foreign Minister Ohira said that while fully understanding and respecting the Chinese position on Taiwan's ownership by the PRC, the Japanese Government does not recognize this position.1 In October 1972. Ohira confirmed the position taken by the Cabinet of S. Yoshida, who claimed, with references to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, that the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan has not been definitively resolved.2 In fact, this default position is still maintained. For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. Ni prava (mezhdunarodnogo), ni zdravogo smysla [Neither Law (international), nor Common sense].

page 2

The current level of diplomatic ties between the PRC and Taiwan will lead to Taiwan becoming too dependent on the mainland, and as a result, Taipei may be forced to unite with the PRC on Beijing's terms. In Taiwan's ruling circles, in the Kuomintang and in the business elite, there is a growing stratum of people who are ready to unite with the mainland, following the example of Hong Kong. As a result, Matsumura comes to the conclusion that the meaning of the current "soft" course of the PRC towards Taipei is precisely to achieve reunification with Taiwan, firmly tying it to itself economically;

"Taiwan is of vital strategic importance to Japan from the point of view of ensuring its national security. Since the island is located in the area of Japan's main sea communications in the southern direction, Beijing's establishment of control over them based on Taiwan is " unacceptable for Japan." Taipei is also a major trade and economic partner of Japan, with other important Japanese interests linked to it. Thus, all other things being equal, an independent Taiwan is most in line with Japanese interests.;

- until Taiwan and the "fully democratized People's Republic of China" are united peacefully, maintaining the status quo is of paramount importance;

- rivalry between the United States and China will grow, as a result of which the United States will try to prevent Taiwan's reunification with the mainland for as long as possible. Such a scenario is fraught with the possibility of a serious aggravation of the situation in the Taiwan Strait zone, and much depends on Beijing. Having significantly softened its policy towards Taipei, Beijing continues to increase its armed forces, deploying hundreds of tactical missiles aimed at Taiwan, among other things, and continuing to declare that it will use force if Taiwan declares its independence.

In general, the expert concludes that Japan should step up its efforts to consolidate the current status quo in the Taiwan issue, encourage Beijing not to build up a military grouping against Taiwan, and, if possible, restrain Taipei in its movement towards Beijing. Matsumura points out that it is necessary to fully expand and strengthen economic cooperation between Japan and Taiwan, as well as ties between financial and industrial companies of the parties, in order to reduce Taiwan's growing economic dependence on the PRC. This will also be facilitated by Taiwan's inclusion in the free trade zones (FTZs) being created in East Asia.

Важно также, чтобы Вашингтон и Тайбэй не ослабляли военного сотрудничества, продолжалось снабжение Тайваня современным американским оружием, усиливая, тем самым, возможности Тайваня противостоять военному давлению КНР.

Самой Японии, считает Мацумура, следует постепенно увеличивать свое военное присутствие в окружающих Японию районах, в т.ч. повышая возможности защитить свои морские коммуникации. Акцент в военных усилиях Японии должен быть перенесен с северного направления на южное. Японии необходимо повысить - в тесном взаимодействии с США - собственный потенциал противостояния стремительно усиливающемуся Китаю6.


На практике, как отмечают японские специалисты, Япония уже осуществила в последние годы значительные подвижки в сторону усиления ее роли в рамках американских обязательств по защите Тайваня.

Определенным водоразделом в этом плане стал очередной кризис в Тайваньском проливе в марте 1996 г., когда Вашингтон - в ответ на ракетные стрельбы Пекина в окружающей Тайвань акватории - ввел в зону Тайваньского пролива две авианосные группы ВМС США. Тогда же были предприняты шаги по более активному подключению Японии к американской стратегии в Восточной Азии. Если согласно Договору 1960 г. между США и Японией о взаимном сотрудничестве и безопасности обязательства Японии ограничивались ее территорией и не предполагалось ее участия в военных операциях, которые США вели за пределами японской территории, то постепенно в совместных американо-японских документах появились положения, предусматривающие взаимную ответственность сторон не только в обширном Азиатско-Тихоокеанском регионе, но и в глобальном масштабе. Важной вехой в этом плане стала Совместная декларация по безопасности, подписанная во время апрельского (1996 г.) визита в Токио президента США Б. Клинтона.

На заседании 23 сентября 1997 г. американо-японского Консультативного комитета по безопасности (министры обороны и иностранных дел двух стран) стороны приняли обновленные "Руководящие принципы сотрудничества США и Японии в сфере обороны", где содержалось обязательство о взаимодействии в "окружающих Японию районах"7. Хотя Тайвань там прямо не упоминался, из последующих разъяснений и интерпретаций вытекало, что эти регионы включают в себя как Тайвань, так и о-ва Сэнкаку (Дяоюйдао).

Special attention and caution on the part of the PRC was caused by Article 5 of the Guidelines on the Coordination of Actions between the United States and Japan "during the occurrence of situations in the areas surrounding Japan that may have a serious impact on the peace and security of Japan." Tokyo's role was to provide comprehensive support to U.S. troops in logistics (from the supply of fuel and lubricants to the transportation of personnel), the provision of materials and equipment, and the conduct of Japanese minesweeping operations in Japanese and international waters. At the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, K. According to the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation dated January 19, 2010, these agreements were then supplemented by the relevant law and bylaws. Role division between the United States and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region-

page 3

no, he said, will be further specified 8. As T. Nobushige, Director General of the Defense Policy Department of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, emphasized in March 2009, the conflict over Taiwan will be considered as a situation in the surrounding area of Japan.9


Beijing immediately sharply criticized the Guidelines, pointing out that the actions of the United States and Japan are aimed at "containing" China and are a tool of "American dominance and Japanese militarism" 10. It is characteristic that experts from one of the leading Chinese research centers (the Chinese Institute of Modern International Relations) came to the unequivocal conclusion that "in the event of a conflict because of Taiwan, Japan will cooperate with the United States. " 11 According to a prominent American political scientist and former managing director of the American Institute on Taiwan, R. Bush, the Chinese side actively sought from Tokyo a clear refutation that the new Guidelines cover Taiwan's territory, but the Japanese evaded this 12.

With regard to Taiwan, it welcomed the adoption of the document. The Prime Minister of Taiwan stated that "if Japan and the United States are concerned about peace and stability in the region in the context of their common concern about the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, then we regard this as a positive position." 13 In general, Taipei considers the US-Japan security treaty as an important factor in ensuring security and stability the region (including Taiwan's security) and consistently advocate further strengthening of the US-Japan alliance.

Beijing was even more irritated by the reference (in a joint communique issued on February 19, 2005 by the US-Japan Security Advisory Committee) to the fact that one of the strategic goals of the US and Japan is "a peaceful solution through dialogue of issues related to the Taiwan Strait"14.

This move was seen as essentially Japan's joining the US commitment to defend Taiwan in the event of the use of force against it. The People's Daily newspaper pointed out that " the United States and Japan should not aggravate tensions in the Taiwan Strait zone, interfere in China's internal affairs." "If the United States and Japan sincerely want to do something to ensure regional security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, then they must adhere to their commitments on Taiwan, respect the one-China principle, and do nothing that could further inspire the pro-Taiwan independence forces." 15

Premier Wen Jiabao of the State Council of the People's Republic of China spoke in the same spirit at a press conference following the results of the 3rd session of the NPC of the 10th convocation. This was followed by a decisive move by Beijing-the "Law on Countering State Division"adopted on March 14, 2005 at this session16. The law is comprehensive in nature and represents a detailed position of the PRC on the Taiwan issue. Article 1 of the law states that it was adopted in order to prevent the separation of Taiwan from China through the efforts of "schismatics" acting in the name of "Taiwan independence".

The law also emphasizes that national reunification is an internal matter of China, which does not tolerate interference from external forces. Special emphasis is placed on peaceful methods of national unification, after which Taiwan can maintain systems different from those on the mainland and enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Peaceful reunification can be achieved through consultation and negotiation on the basis of equality between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

At the same time, article 8 states that "in the event that divisive forces in Taiwan under the flag of 'Taiwan independence' act - under any pretext or by any means - in the direction of Taiwan's secession from China, or major incidents occur that lead to Taiwan's secession from China, or The possibilities for peaceful unification will be completely exhausted, and the state will use non-peaceful methods and other necessary measures to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China."


China's adoption of the law on" schismatics " has drawn sharp criticism in the United States, Japan and other Western countries. Tokyo issued a special official statement expressing concern over Beijing's move, stressing that the passage of the law "may have a negative impact on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and on cross-Strait relations."17. The United States and Japan - much to Beijing's annoyance-pressured the European Union not to lift its arms embargo on China. According to Japanese Foreign Minister M. Nobutaki, lifting the ban "will have a negative impact on the security of not only Japan, but also the whole of East Asia." 18

Tokyo has also made its own, albeit rather limited, steps in the sphere of military relations with Taiwan. In March 2004, a group of retired Japanese naval officers arrived in Taiwan as advisers to the Taiwanese Navy. A year later, another group of military instructors arrived. In August 2005, a delegation from the National Defense Committee of the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) of Taiwan visited Japan and met with members of the Japanese Parliament and retired Japanese military personnel.19

These steps did not go unnoticed in Beijing. A representative of the State Council of the People's Republic of China stated in April 2005: "We are seriously concerned about some recent negative trends in Japanese policy regarding the Taiwan issue, especially the deepening of Japan-Taiwan security ties."20

In the conditions that have worsened in the

page 4

In the recent period of Japan's relations with China on the territorial issue, Japanese observers note "a significant increase in recent mutual sympathies between Japan and Taiwan." According to a public opinion survey conducted in Taiwan in the spring of 2011 by the Japanese Informal Representation (Japanese Interchange Association), 52% of Taiwanese people named Japan as the most attractive country for them. In turn, the corresponding survey in Japan was conducted in June 2011 by the Taiwan Office of Economic and Cultural Relations in Japan. 67% of respondents said they have positive feelings about Taiwan , an increase of 11% compared to the survey conducted in 2009. 72% described relations with Taiwan as "relatively good" and 19% as "extremely good." 21

Japan ranks 2nd after China in Taiwan's foreign trade, with $97.303 billion and $177.226 billion, respectively.22 Mutual tourist exchanges are growing: in 2012 More than 1.43 million people visited Taiwan. Japanese, and Japan - about 1.4 million. 23. There is a strong sentiment in favor of more active development of ties with Taiwan in the Japanese Parliament, where a number of fairly influential pro-Taiwan lobbying groups operate.

At the same time, Tokyo is noticeably concerned about the significant expansion of Taipei's ties with Beijing since the Kuomintang returned to power in Taiwan in 2008. As noted above, the PRC has taken the 1st place in Taiwan's foreign trade. In 2012 Taiwan was visited by 2.59 million tourists from mainland China, up 45% from 2011.24 In recent years, millions of Taiwanese people have visited the PRC, although the Taiwanese authorities have imposed restrictions on travel to the mainland by civil servants.

The investment activity of the two sides is still extremely unbalanced. According to official data, Taiwanese invested $13.1 billion in mainland China in 2011, compared to $43.7 million. Chinese investment in Taiwan. In the first six months of 2012, these figures were $5.2 billion and $122.2 million, respectively.25 At the same time, unofficial estimates are known that Taiwanese capital investment on the mainland amounted to tens of billions of dollars.

At a meeting on April 8, 2013 at the Boao Economic Forum for Asia (Hainan Island, China)with former Vice-President of Taiwan Wen Xu, Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed the policy of further peaceful development of relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. 26

According to Japanese experts, if the rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing reduces the risk of a military clash in the Taiwan Strait and possible involvement of Japan in the conflict, then the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland does not meet Tokyo's interests in any way. In December 2009, Japanese expert Ya. Matsuda explicitly pointed out that as a result, the regional balance of power could be disrupted - in favor of the PRC. The answer, in his opinion, should be a more active policy of Tokyo towards Taiwan-expanding trade and economic ties, increasing the level of Japanese-Taiwanese contacts, etc. 27


According to Chinese experts, in recent years, Japan has been increasingly leaning towards the United States in terms of the policy of" containing " China and strengthening the Japanese-American alliance. This line is shared by both of Japan's leading political parties at the moment-the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party. If the Prime Minister of the Democratic Party, Yu, who came to power in September 2009, is a member of the party. Hatoyama tried to lead a more independent line from the United States (for which, to a large extent, he paid with his post), then a new cabinet from the Democratic Party headed by Prime Minister Ye. According to Chinese experts, Nodoi (August 2011 - December 2012) began to act in close cooperation with Washington on almost all issues.

Japan's annual Defense White Papers feature the growing Chinese military threat as a central theme. Tokyo is particularly concerned about the growing gap in military spending between Japan and China: the Chinese military budget grew 7-fold from 2000 to 2012, reaching over $106 billion in 2012, according to official Chinese data. According to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, China's actual military spending in 2012 was $166 billion, while the United States spent$682 billion. and Japan - $59.3 billion 28. Plans to transform the PRC into a "powerful maritime power" were announced at the XVIII CPC Congress held in November 2012.

At the first session of the 12th National People's Congress in March 2013, the current President of the People's Republic of China, Xi Jinping, called on the armed forces to raise the level of defense to a new level.-

* For more information, see: Yurlov F. N. China, India and the USA: the correlation of Forces is changing / / Asia and Africa Today, 2013, No. 2 (editor's note).

page 5

ability and army building, stating that the army must be fully prepared to win any war. According to the government budget, in 2013, China plans to increase defense spending by 10.7%, which will amount to $ 720.2 billion. yuan (about $114.3 billion) 29.

The Taiwan aspect was also not overlooked in the White Papers. So, in the "White Paper 2002" it was said: "Although the issues of China-Taiwan relations are internal issues from the Chinese side's point of view, they are nevertheless perceived as security issues that threaten regional peace and stability."30

The recent territorial conflict over the disputed Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu) has led to a serious aggravation of Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, neither Beijing nor Tokyo clearly intend to concede in this dispute and have already exchanged a number of rather threatening statements and actions.

Taiwan is also involved in the dispute, as well as the PRC, which defends China's sovereign right to these islands, but this problem, in general, has little effect on Japan-Taiwan relations. It is characteristic that Taipei did not respond to the calls of the PRC to jointly defend China's rights to the Diaoyu. Beijing was sharply dissatisfied with the conclusion of the Japan-Taiwan agreement (April 10, 2013, Taipei), under which Taiwanese fishermen were granted the right to fish in the surrounding Senkaku (Diaoyu) waters (but outside the 12-mile territorial zone around Senkaku).

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the United States actually took the side of Japan in the conflict, pointing out that the US obligations under the security treaty with Japan also apply to the mentioned islands. According to the statement of the US Secretary of State H. Clinton, at a press conference in Hanoi on October 30, 2010, said, "With regard to the Senkaku Islands, the United States has never taken a position on sovereignty, but we have made it clear that these islands are part of our mutual treaty obligations and the obligation to protect Japan." 31 Earlier, in September 2012, X Clinton stressed that " while the United States does not take any position on the ultimate sovereignty of these islands, we recognize that they are under Japanese administration and we are opposed to any unilateral action aimed at undermining Japanese administrative rights. We call on all parties to take steps to prevent incidents and resolve differences peacefully. " 32

China has no particular illusions about the return to power of LDP leader Shinzo Abe, who is known for his tough views on China. In his election program and in his first speeches, the new Prime Minister stressed the need to strengthen Japan's alliance with the United States, increase Japan's military spending, and amend the constitution to implement " Japan's rights to collective self-defense." As stated in the above-mentioned study by a researcher at Stanford University, S. At one time, S. Abe even unofficially spoke out for Japan to come to the aid of Taiwan in the event of a military action against it by the PRC.33

Although Shinzo Abe named normalization of relations with China as one of his main foreign policy goals, he also confirmed his tough stance on the territorial issue. "Both history and international law show that the Senkaku Islands are a sovereign territory of Japan," he said in a speech at the Washington Center for Strategic and International Studies during a visit to the United States in February 2013. No country should underestimate our unwavering determination. No one should doubt the strength of the Japanese-American alliance, and there is no reason for such doubts." At the same time, Shinzo Abe stressed that he "has absolutely no intention of climbing up the ladder of escalation."34

According to Chinese observers, the Japanese Prime Minister during his February visit to Washington failed to fully win over US President Boris Johnson. Obama, who took a cautious stance on the Senkaku Islands issue. "Abe failed to succeed in his attempt to gain unequivocal support in the territorial dispute with China, as Washington wavered between seeking to strengthen traditional ties with Tokyo and the growing need to maintain healthy relations with Beijing," the Xinhua news agency said in a commentary. "This time, Washington deliberately did not push out the territorial issue, refraining from explicitly supporting Tokyo." 35

Both at the official and unofficial levels, Chinese representatives sharply criticize Tokyo's policy of strengthening its armed forces and freeing it from military restrictions imposed by article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. It also points to the strengthening of Japan's foreign policy ambitions, Tokyo's policy of strengthening ties with ASEAN countries, in particular, with Vietnam, as well as with India, and support for the US position in the situation in the South China Sea, where Washington sided with a group of coastal countries in the region in their dispute with China.

At the Japanese-Chinese conference on the prospects for the development of relations between the two countries held in November 2011 in Japan, experts from the Institute for Research on Japan of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Wang Guangtao and Zhang Xuexian stressed that in the context of the offensive launched by the United States to strengthen its positions in the Asia-Pacific region, to "contain" Beijing, Japan 36. One of the main reasons for this, Chinese scientists say, is the growing concern in Japan about the growth of the"Chinese threat". The Xinhua News Agency's commentary on the release of the 2012 White Paper on Japanese Defense in Japan in July 2012 noted that the book once again raises the issue of the so-called Chinese threat and security.

page 6

It is emphasized that China's actions cause "concern" in the region. As an example, the book points out that Chinese ships are invading Japan's maritime territory in the Senkaku Archipelago, and also notes that Chinese ships are increasingly entering the Pacific Ocean.37

The current state of Sino-Japanese relations is also discussed in sufficient detail in the collection of articles published in 2012 by scholars of the Chinese Academy of Modern International Relations.38 In their opinion, the development of the situation in the Asia-Pacific region negatively affects the strategic relations of the parties, which have significantly deteriorated until the possibility of their revision. One of the main reasons for this is Tokyo's adherence to the American course.

Analyzing the current Japanese-Taiwanese relations, Professor Wang Haibing of Beijing University of Foreign Economic Affairs and Trade and Professor Tsai Liang of Shanghai Normal University note significant changes in Japan's policy, which also affected Tokyo's position on the Taiwan issue-towards greater consideration of Taipei's interests.39

Professor Liang Yunxiang, Deputy Director of the Institute of International Relations at Peking University, notes in his book "Japanese Foreign Policy and Sino-Japanese Relations" that the Japanese, although they do not directly interfere in Taiwanese affairs, are doing their best to consolidate the status quo in the situation with Taiwan. Close trade, economic, cultural ties, and people-to-people exchanges are maintained 40. Overall, as Liang Yunxiang writes, Taiwan's strategic importance to Japan has increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, especially as part of the Sino-Japanese rivalry for a dominant position in East Asia. Taiwan has become an important element in Japan's policy of "containing" China.41

* * *

Assessing the overall situation in Taiwan affairs and the prospects for a Taiwan settlement, we can conclude that the current situation is likely to continue for a long time. Although China's "soft line" towards Taiwan has allowed Beijing to make significant progress in the Taiwanese direction and very close ties have been established between the parties, Taipei still does not show any desire for reunification with the PRC, and the overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese population supports maintaining the status quo (according to a public opinion poll published in September 2011). opinions in Taiwan, 87.2% of respondents supported the status quo)42.Under such circumstances, the use of force by China against Taiwan is also very problematic, especially since both Washington and Tokyo have clearly warned Taipei against taking steps towards declaring independence, which could provoke the PRC.

Nevertheless, Taiwan's "splinter" is not helping to mitigate the slowly but surely rising intensity of the US-China and Japan-China rivalry in the Asia-Pacific region.

1 Nittu fukko. Dokumento (Restoration of Japanese-Chinese relations. Documents). Tokyo, 1972, p. 203.

2 Ibid., p. 193.


4 Sankei Shimbun, 30.01.2008.

Matsumura Masahiro. 5 Japan's Policy Options for Taiwan // RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 8. June 2009. Research Institute for Peace and Security. Tokyo - %20Taiwan.pdf

6 Ibidem.

Bunin V. N. 7 Japanese-American Security Union. Moscow, 2000, pp. 290-308.


9 Sankei Shimbun, 13.03.2009.

10 Ibid.

11 China Institute of Contemporary International Relations // Strategic and Security Review. 2005/2006. P. 144.

Bush Richard. 12 The perils of proximity. China-Japan security relations. Brookings Institution Press. Washington, D.C. 2010. P. 34.

13 Daily Yomiuri, 24.09.1997.

14 Japan Ministry of Defense, 2006, p. 221 - 223 -

15 People's Daily, 21.02.2005.

16 Law on Countering the Split of the state / / People's Daily Online. 14.03.2005.

17 Statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson on 14 March 2005.

18 Tokyo Shimbun, 09.02.2005.

19 Taipei Times, 19.08.2005 -

20 Beijing Review, 17.05.2005 - htpp//

Tadamasa Fukiura. 21 Showing our Gratitude to Taiwan // Opinion 3/11. 28.06.2011 -



24 Tourism Bureau. Republic of China -

25 Taipei Times, 13.08.2012.

26 - 04/08/c_13229 3193.htm



29 Xi Jinping called on the army to be loyal and observe discipline / / Xinhua News Agency, 12.03.2013 - cn/dossiers/2013-03/12/c_132226058.htm

30 http:www.jda.go.Jp/e/pab/wp2002




34 Statesmen's Forum: Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan. 22.02.2013 // Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) -

35 Abe "snubbed" by Obama on Senkaku issue: Chinese official media // Kyodo News, 24.02.2013 -

36 Zhiben xuekan, 2012, No. 1.

37 Xinhua News Agency, 1.08.2012.

38 Guoji zhanliue yu anquan xingshi pingu. 2011/2012 (Review of the strategic situation in the world and the security situation for 2011-2012). Shishi chubanshe, 2012. pp. 328-332.

39 Guoji longtan. 2010, N 2.

Liang Yongxiang. 40 Zhiben waijiao yu zhongzhi guanxi (Japanese foreign Policy and Sino-Japanese relations). Shijie zhishi, 2012. p. 244.

41 Ibid., pp. 241-244.



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