On November 14, 1906, the official Chinese newspaper "Beiyang Guangbao" published the manifesto of the court about the upcoming official trip of the shangshu (ministers) Zai Zhen and Xu Shichang to Manchuria [AVPRI, f. 188, op. 761, d. 295, l. 15]. The first of these dignitaries headed the important department of agriculture, industry and trade (Nungongshan-bu), the second was the head of the Ministry of People's Administration (Minzheng-bu) and the chief of the imperial police. The manifesto, in particular, stated: "Their Majesties the Dowager Empress and the Emperor, sorrowfully remembering the hardships of the people, ordered the local authorities to do everything possible to ease the fate of the population, to postpone the collection of land tax and to find possible measures to help the needy." Control over the implementation of these instructions was the declared purpose of the business trip of high-ranking officials [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 157]. The document contained hopes for a better future and a hint of upcoming reforms: "... With the cessation of hostilities and the appointment of a deadline for the evacuation of troops, you can breathe more freely and should help to improve your situation. In addition, recently the Highest Decree has been issued to take measures to introduce the constitution and diligently explain its meaning to the population, in order to successfully prepare them for enjoying the benefits of this reform " [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 164].

Keywords: Minister Zai Zhen, Manchuria, Qing Empire, Russia and China.

The translation of the manifesto immediately went to the desk of the Russian envoy in Beijing, D. D. Pokotilov, and a little later was sent to the Russian Foreign Minister. The close attention of diplomats to the upcoming visit of Beijing emissaries to the northern outskirts of the Middle Kingdom becomes clear if you take a closer look at the personality of Minister Zai Zhen (1876-1947). He was the eldest son of Yi Kuan (1838-1917), who held the title of Prince of the 1st degree (Qinwang) Qing Yi played a crucial role in the entourage of Empress Dowager Cixi. Like his father, Zai Zhen belonged to the Manchu family of Aixin Gioro and had the court title of Beizi, or prince of the 4th degree [BKRS, p. 669]. Due to this circumstance, his trip was considered by Russian diplomacy as a visit of a representative of the ruling Qing dynasty to the ancestral homeland. The practice of "going around the eastern provinces and visiting the ancestral graves" (dong-xun yelin) has long occupied an important place in the life of the Manchu emperors of China. For example, the Kangxi Emperor (1662-1722) visited the Northeast three times, and Qianlong (1736-1796) made such trips as many as four times. The last Qing emperor to visit Manchuria was Daoguang (1820-1850), who visited in 1829. In May 1886, the seventh son of Daoguang and the father of the Guangxu Emperor, Prince Chun (1840-1891), visited the Liaodong Peninsula. However, the program of his visit was limited to visiting Liushun Harbor (Port-

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Arthur) and the inspection of the Beiyang Fleet: the prince was the head of the Chinese Naval Department [Chen Yue, pp. 20-21]. Thus, Zai Zhen would become the first descendant of the founder of the dynasty to visit the ancestral lands after a break of more than 70 years.

Zai Zhen was considered a promising figure and was well known to the Russian mission staff. By the way, it was he who was sent by Empress Cixi to attend the funeral of our envoy P. M. Lessard, who died of cancer in Beijing on the night of April 7-8, 1905.At the farewell ceremony with the diplomat, the prince made a small speech on behalf of the court [Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1906, p. 381]. Of course, Zai Zhen's impending appearance in Manchuria was announced at the embassy much earlier than the official Chinese press reported. Already in October 1906, a lively correspondence began between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Military Department and the Ministry of Finance. The telegram received by the envoy on October 14 stated:: "It is considered absolutely desirable to give the son of Prince Qing and the dignitary traveling with him the appropriate rank of their reception while traveling along the line and when visiting points where there are Russian authorities" [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 7].

According to N. V. Bogoyavlensky, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Jilin, "much depended on the Prince's report to Bogdokhan in the settlement of various issues in Manchuria" [AVPRI, 295, p.36].1 There were a lot of questions. The unsuccessful war with Japan not only led to the loss of a fair share of foreign Russian property, but also greatly shook the position of St. Petersburg in relations with China. Under the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the 1905 Portsmouth Peace Treaty, Russia was obligated to" fully and fully " return to the administration of China all territories under the control of Russian troops [Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 348 - 354]. Negotiations on the terms of this return promised to be difficult. In "Yellow Russia"-as the Russian-controlled exclusion zone of the China-Eastern Railway (CER) was ironically called-the administration was choking on the evacuation of thousands of troops. The sad consequences of the war were a severe economic crisis and an unprecedented increase in crime [Krotova, 1995, p. 127]. It was necessary to fight it in the face of a sharp drop in the prestige of the Russian authorities in the eyes of the Chinese population. Meanwhile, the military forces that remained at the disposal of the CER to protect its concession territories after the withdrawal of the army were severely reduced. Under the terms of the same Peace of Portsmouth, the number of railway guards that Russia and Japan could keep in Manchuria should not exceed 15 people per 1 km of track [Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1906, pp. 348-354]. Seeing the failure of its colonial policy in China, St. Petersburg sought to return its relations with its neighbor to the level that preceded the" lease "of Liaodong (1898) and the events of the Boxer Rebellion (1900). The Manchurian "prince" Zai Zhen could become a good intermediary in this matter.

It was decided to involve the forces of all three Russian departments represented in Manchuria in the reception of distinguished guests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for the protocol, the military was supposed to provide security and a guard of honor along the way, and the Ministry of Finance, represented by the CER Society, was supposed to provide guests with a special train. The situation was complicated by the fact that even the local Chinese authorities "were in difficulties", not knowing how to take such a high-level person [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 44]. After consulting together, the military and civilian officials decided: 1. Send a dragoman with a convoy of 13 Cossacks to the demarcation line defined by the Sypingai agreement with the Japanese command. The route of the dignitaries ' trip ran from south to north, and they had to show that they had arrived on "Russian territory"; 2. Submit a special train to the station closest to the demarcation line for the ministers to continue; 3. Arrange meetings of the guests with the highest officials-

1 In Russian diplomatic correspondence, Prince Zai Zhen was often referred to as "prince".

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Russian military and civil authorities at all points of stay; 4. Prepare to receive return visits from the "prince" - no one doubted that they would follow; 5. Give a solemn dinner in honor of the "prince" in Harbin; 6. Organize a solemn send-off of dignitaries [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 44 - 44 ob].

Zai Zhen and Xu Shichang left Beijing on October 30, 1906.2 Their journey took them through Tientsin, where they arrived by sea on the Kwantung Peninsula, where the supreme command of the Japanese forces that had won the recent war was located. Already on November 3, the dignitaries reached Mukden (Shenyang). On the morning of November 7, 1906, at the Ershilipu station, they were met not only by the Girin military commissar N. M. Manakin and Dragoman Mosin, but also by Knyaz Khilkov, the assistant manager of the CER, who arrived with a special train, and "Mr. Daniel, the commissioner for relations with the Chinese authorities from the same road" [AVPRI, D. 295, L. 45]. It was obvious that the Japanese also tried not to lose face: the palanquins of the guests were accompanied to the train by two squadrons of cavalry, and along the road line until the very transition to the territory of the CER were placed paired mounted sentries. In Ershilipu, the Beijing emissaries were welcomed by the head of the Southern Line of the Zaamursky District of the Border Guard, General Bochinsky, at the head of the equestrian hundred "at the choir of music". The train made its first stop at Kuanchengzi Station (now Changchun). There, Major Kalinovsky boarded the train and conveyed greetings from the commander of the Russian Consolidated Corps, General of Infantry L. M. Dembovsky. In Kuanchengzi, the special train stayed until 8 pm. All the Russian representatives were received by the dignitaries in a very short time (literally standing up), and as for the local Chinese authorities, the Beijing authorities did not want to meet with them at all. Moreover, Tsai Zhen ordered the ceremonial Chinese dinner served in the salon to be "taken out" [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 45-45 ob].

At 11 a.m. on November 8, 1906, the ministers arrived in Harbin, the capital of Yellow Russia. Chief of the CER D. L. Horvat and Commander of the Zaamursky district Lieutenant-General N. M. Chichagov met the guests on the platform and gave a ceremonial dinner in their honor at the Portsmouth restaurant. At the station and in the restaurant there was a "full staff of Foreign Ministry officials" from the Russian Consulate General. The ministers accepted the invitation to the meal, but did not make any visits. Immediately after lunch, the guests left for Qiqihar, the capital of Heilongjiang Province [AVPRI, f. 188, op. 761, d. 295, l. 20]. On the morning of November 9, they were met by the Governor (Jiangjun) Cheng Dequan at the entrance to the city. At the same time, the secretary of the Russian Consulate, M. F. Geftler, and the military Commissar introduced themselves to the ministers. On November 11, Geftler paid a visit to the guests, but only Zai Zhen received him - Xu Shichang was ill (or claimed to be ill). The next day, the diplomat was invited to lunch at the residence of the "prince", where he raised a toast to the friendship of Russia and China. At the same time, Zai Zhen avoided a return visit to the consulate, again citing Xu Shichang's illness. In a personal conversation with Geftler, the "prince" expressed satisfaction with the attention of the Russian authorities, and also noted the convenience of Russian cars, which he rated much higher than the Japanese ones. On November 14, officials of the prince's entourage, including Yuan Caeding3, came to the consulate with congratulations on the occasion of the"royal holiday". The next day, the guests departed back to Harbin. In his report to the envoy, Heftler wrote:: "Among the Chinese, the prevailing opinion is that the arrival of the ministers did not bring any benefit" [AVPRI, d. 295, p. 22].

Although the ministers ' second visit to Harbin was limited to one day, they still managed to arrange a gala dinner for Russian military and civilian officials. Neither Zai Zhen nor Xu Shichang made any visits, confining themselves to sending business cards to the chief of the Zaamursky district, the road manager and the commander of the Consolidated Corps [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 20, 45 ob].

2 hereafter-art.

3 The eldest son of the famous Yuan Shikai (1859-1916), who served in the Ministry of Zai Zhen.

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On the night of November 17, 1906, the guests went to Kuanchengzi to move from there to Jilin - the last point of their route. On the platform of Kuanchengzi station, they were again met by General Bochinsky with fifty border guards and a band. After spending the night at the home of the local Chinese chief (Difangguan), the ministers and their entourage settled in carriages provided by the famous merchant Ni Tifontai (Ji Fengtai) early in the morning of November 18. The journey took three days, with the dignitaries traveling under the protection of Cossacks and spending the night at Russian military staging posts. According to the military commissar N. M. Manakin, "the movement was arranged with special precautions: when meeting with anyone, the carriages of dignitaries were surrounded by a convoy in several rows" [AVPRI, d. 295, L. 46]. Meanwhile, in Jilin, the final preparations for the grand reception were being completed. N. V. Bogoyavlensky, mentioned above, agreed with Jiangjun Da Gui of Jilin that the meeting of dignitaries would take place at two idols in front of the city gate. The governor, with Chinese officials and troops, intended to stand at the first temple, and the Russian authorities, with their honor guard and orchestra, at the second. Colonel Manakin offered to line up all available Russian soldiers along the road, but the diplomats rejected this idea, fearing to frighten the "prince" with a show of force. The order of visits was also thoroughly thought out. It was decided to receive Zai Zhen at the apartment of the diplomatic representative, since the military officials were located "in the Chinese premises occupied by the Chinese military.".. forced" in 1900 [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 36 ob]. All the organizational efforts were almost in vain, because the meeting of ministers turned into an embarrassment.

Guests were expected in Jilin by 3 p.m. on November 20. In the morning, a messenger from Jiangjun came running to N. V. Bogoyavlensky, informing him that the meeting would take place two hours earlier. Everyone rushed to the city gate in a rush. Bishop Lalouet, head of the French Catholic mission, joined the Russians. Arriving at the site, the international society was forced to freeze for two hours in the autumn cold. At about two-thirty, the interpreter of Saintu's ministerial entourage announced the arrival of the courtiers. The Russians watched from afar the ceremonies being performed at a nearby shrine. At this time, Saintu reappeared with an unexpected piece of news. According to him, the "prince" decided not to enter the second shrine, but simply to talk to Russian representatives at the crew's door. Reluctantly agreeing, they all went out onto the road. Then came the scene described by N. V. Bogoyavlensky in a letter to the envoy: "The police ran ahead, then a military convoy trotted along, including our Chita Cossacks... there was a crowd of people, and finally, about 20 fathoms ahead of the carriages and palanquins, the son of the famous Yuan-shikai rode on horseback and, rushing past us, shouted that " the dignitaries will come out now, wait a bit!" Then the music started, and we all lined up and waited for the dignitaries to stop. But we were sorely mistaken" [AVPRI, d. 295, p. 38].

Zai Zhen contented himself with a slight nod from the carriage window. In the words of N. Bogoyavlensky, "for a minute we all stood completely numb, and only the music continued to play some kind of cheerful aria" [AVPRI, d.295, p. 38]. Jiangjun tried to smooth over the tactlessness of the "prince", but his confused explanations did not satisfy the audience. The Foreign Ministry representative just went home. The military commissar behaved differently, sharply expressing his indignation to the Chinese. That same evening, a written protest was also sent to Jiangjun. The next day, the dignitaries sent Dragoman Sainta and official Song Dazhen to the Russians to settle the incident. The envoys visited the head of the garrison, Major General Novoselov, the military commissar and N. V. Bogoyavlensky. The translator told the representative of the Foreign Ministry: "The friendship of our two states is much more important than our mistake, so on behalf of the envoys, I ask you not to be angry with us for a small omission that occurred yesterday at the meeting." Saintu asked the diplomat to pay a visit to the prince, mentioning that the military had already agreed to be there. The reception took place and passed without roughness. Prince " drank to the health of Go-

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He thanked the Emperor of Russia and Russia for the reception and for coming to see us." Zai Zhen didn't say a word about the incident at the shrine, and it was already inconvenient for the Russians to "remember the old things". Jiangjun was most pleased: he mentioned that the commissioner's protest might have had unpleasant consequences for him [AVPRI, d. 295, p. 39].

On November 22, the Russian residents of Jilin met Zai Zhen again at a banquet at the Jiangjun residence. No one received any return visits from the" prince". In a telegram dated November 24, D. D. Pokotilov recommended N. V. Bogoyavlensky "not to impose on dignitaries if they do not want it." Bogoyavlensky, probably relieved, immediately decided not to accompany the ministers when they left the city. N. M. Manakin, on the contrary, intended to do this, but a note was immediately brought from the" prince "with a request" not to bother " [AVPRI, d.295, l. 393]. However, Tsai Zhen did not refuse the Russian convoy: 12 Cossacks under the constable accompanied him on the way to Kuanchengzi, where the nobles left on the morning of November 26. On November 28, the Prince received the Vice-consul, officers of the garrison and representatives of the Russian colony of Kuanchengzi. The next day, the imperial relative and his companions left for the Japanese occupation zone and then on to Beijing [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 48].

N. V. Bogoyavlensky considered Tsai Zhen's act at the entrance to Jilin to be deliberate rudeness. According to the diplomat, the representative of the ruling dynasty expressed his dissatisfaction with the presence of Russians in Manchuria in this way [AVPRI, d.295, l. 40-40 ob]. Colonel N. M. Manakin wrote that, according to the Chinese, the prince was afraid to get out of the carriage in full view of the huge crowd of people. Local authorities blamed Xu Shichang, whom Manakin in a letter to the Consul General in Harbin V. F. Lyuba called a "Japonophile", as well as a certain "dignitary Wu". The first suggested that the prince not go to the shrine, and the second at the last moment even dissuaded to accept the greeters. Manakin concluded: "The prince's expression of inattention to the Russians and ignoring the elementary conditions of correctness is not a suggestion from Beijing or a pre-planned plan, but was due to the individual qualities of the prince himself, who is not a supporter of Russia" [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 47-47 ob]. Both correspondents - both a military man and a diplomat - noted the obvious desire of the ministers to minimize contacts with the Russians. N. V. Bogoyavlensky concluded that dignitaries were considered "only when absolutely necessary with the presence of guests - Japanese and Russian military authorities" [AVPRI, d. 295, l.35]. The reason for the" independent and even arrogant " behavior of the emissaries, the diplomat believed, was that they began their trip to Manchuria from Liaodong and already in the first days paid tribute to politeness to the highest ranks of the Japanese expeditionary forces. Secondary Japanese commanders and defeated Russians no longer deserved such an honor [AVPRI, d.295, l. 34 ob-35].

Official correspondence of the Russian Foreign Ministry contains many interesting details of the last Qing "highest review" of Manchuria. Speaking about the goals of the trip of Zai Zhen and Xu Shichang, Russian diplomats rightly identified internal and external aspects in them. The first was "familiarization with the state of affairs in Manchuria and with the needs of the local population." It should be noted that the main "need" of Northeast China at that time was the abolition of the archaic banner system of government, which had been preserved since the XVII century. The first attempts at administrative transformation were made in Manchuria in 1905, and the visit of the Beijing ministers was undoubtedly intended to contribute to the development of this experience [History of North-Eastern China..., 1987, pp. 283-284]. The external purpose of the mission was to gather information about the actions of the Japanese in Manchuria. Having seized part of the Russian sphere of influence, Japan formally limited itself to the old concession rights of the Russian government and the CER Society. In fact, no one doubted that the victors of the recent war would not be satisfied with the current state of affairs. 295, l. 34 ob]. Beijing was also irritated by the loss of control over the most important waterways in Manchuria: the Russians enjoyed the exclusive right of navigation on the Sungari,

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and the Japanese wanted to do the same for Yalujiang. According to N. V. Bogoyavlensky, the ministers drew up a project to create a waterway in Manchuria, "which would be outside the sphere of influence of foreign powers, for which purpose they would consider it necessary to improve the navigability of the Liao River, and the amount of the necessary allocation for this purpose is estimated at 200,000 lan" [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 34].].

The reports of N. V. Bogoyavlensky and N. M. Manakin show how the Beijing dignitaries carried out inspections of the local administration's activities. In the first days of his stay in Jilin, Zai Zhen conducted a "strict audit", traveling around the city in person and sending out officials of his retinue everywhere. In his residence, the prince received many complainants every day. In order to increase the "attractiveness of power", Zai Zhen even ordered to feed all visitors lunch. The ministers soon saw a broad picture of provincial abuses. Jiangjun Da Gui himself did not disdain levying levies on merchants, imposed an increased tax on enterprises, and was fully engaged in playing the Liang course, for which he used state funds [AVPRI, d. 295, l.41 ob, 48 ob. -49]. The officials kept pace with the governor. The commander of one of the military units by the name of Cheng patronized the honghuz (bandits) and even took part in the robbery of an inn, during which two owners of the establishment were killed. Noting that the " prince "was satisfied with visiting the barracks and city schools, Jiangjun said that the" shadow income " went exclusively to the development of these facilities. Zai Zhen immediately demanded a financial report, which was not in favor of the governor [AWPRI, d. 295, l. 41 vol. 49]. Things were getting bad, and Da Gui decided to resort to a tried - and-true trick: a bribe. Its size surprised even the Chinese, who were used to corruption. According to N. V. Bogoyavlensky, Jiangjun presented 100 thousand liang to the ministers, fudutong-60 thousand, and one of the Daotai added 50 thousand liang [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 41 ob]. N. M. Manakin added that the Jilin military and police participated in the offering (50 and 20 thousand liang). liang, respectively), and private firms were forced to fork out 100-200 liang each. In addition to money, the dignitaries were presented with many expensive furs, gold products and pearls. Within two days, the price of these items in the city skyrocketed [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 49].

The offering had a magical effect: According to Russian observers, the audit was immediately stopped, and complaints were ordered to be filed... to the very authorities against whom they were directed! [AVPRI, f. 188, op. 761, d. 295, l. 41 ob-42]. The latter immediately began to crack down on the most active intercessors. The people openly began to talk about the fact that dignitaries came to Manchuria solely for profit. In a conversation with a Russian diplomat, the secretary of the Jilin Jiangjun explained the ministers ' strange behavior as follows: they were simply traveling and did not have the right to conduct an audit. In this regard, N. V. Bogoyavlensky wrote ironically: "No one, of course, believes such an explanation, but, according to the Chinese concept, "the face is preserved" and the authorities are satisfied with this " [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 42].

For some time after the departure of the "prince", it seemed to everyone that the old order in Manchuria would remain unshakable. In December 1906, N. V. Bogoyavlensky reported to the envoy that the arrival of dignitaries "apparently met the expectations of the Jiangjun Heilongjiang and Jilin provinces" [AVPRI, d. 295, l. 34]. However, already on April 7, 1907, a decree was issued on the reorganization of the administration of Manchuria, according to which the general government was formed there, headed by Zundu, and the post of governor (xunfu) was introduced in the provinces with direct subordination to Zundu. The first governor-general of Manchuria was Xu Shichang, the post of Jilin governor went to the Chinese Zhu Jiabao, and Duan Zhigui became the Heilongjiang Xunfu [History of North-Eastern China..., 1987, p. 284]. By decree of September 14, 1907, all privileges of the Manchus were abolished. Within a year, almost all Manchu officials were replaced by Chinese [Istoriya Severo-Vostochnogo Chinya..., 1987, p. 285].

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For Zai Zhen, the trip also received an unexpected continuation. On April 26, 1907, a report by the censor (yushi) Zhao Qilin was published in the Beijing official press, containing serious accusations against the "prince" and his father, Prince Qing. The official wrote: "Now a general government and governorates have been established in Manchuria. The reason for this reform is that the named country, which is the indigenous possession of the dynasty, was exposed to more and more dangers every day, and therefore the government directed all efforts to settle local affairs by recognizing the greater authority of the local administration in order to turn this country into a stronghold of the state "[AVPRI, d. 296, l. 70]4. The following statement followed: "Prince Qing and Tsai-zhen are only capable of taking large bribes, are indifferent to the difficult circumstances of the present time and do not care about the great state plans, for which they can be called people devoid of all meaning" [AVPRI, d. 296, l. 72]. According to the censor, the appointment of Duan Zhigui ("a man without merit or talent") to the post of governor was due to his friendship with Zai Zhen, which began during the stopover of the "prince" and Xu Shichang in Tianjin. Duan Zhigui gave Zai Zhen the singer Yang Cuixi, bought at the Daguyuan Theater for 12 thousand liang. Another 100 thousand liang were spent by Duan on a gift to Prince Qing [AVPRI, d. 296, l. 71].

The very fact that the report was published so startled the Russian envoy that he considered it necessary to attach a translation of the document to the report addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia A. P. Izvolsky dated April 28, 1907. The envoy was extremely interested in the court intrigues that cast doubt on the future careers of the powerful Yi Kuan and his eldest son. In his opinion, their main goal was Yuan Shikai [AWPRI, d. 296, l. 74-81]. However, already on May 4, D. D. Pokotilov informed the minister that the storm had passed for Prince Qing and Tsai Zhen [AVPRI, d. 296, l. 84-85]. There was nothing surprising in this. The last Qing Emperor, Pu Yi (1906 - 1967), later wrote in his famous memoirs: "Despite the fact that Yi Kuan's opponents, the princes, secretly plotted against him, and the censors openly spoke about his greed, violation of laws and corruption, his position did not change in any way" [Pu Yi, 1968, p.38]. True, Zai Zhen had to resign from his ministerial post, but Duan Zhigui became the main "scapegoat" in this case [AWPRI, d.296, l. 85]. He was removed from the duties of governor and later replaced by the retired president Cheng Dequan [History of North-Eastern China..., 1987, p. 284].

The trip of Prince Zai Zhen was the last visit of the Qing "august person" to Manchuria. Already in 1911, the empire ceased to exist. If this meant political death for Zai Zhen, then for his companion Xu Shichang, on the contrary, it was the beginning of a rise to the heights of power. In 1918, he became President of the Republic of China.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). f. 188, op. 761.

Big Chinese-Russian Dictionary (BKRS), vol. 4. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1984.

Yearbook of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. St. Petersburg, 1906.

Istoriya Severo-Vostochnogo Kitaya XVII-XX vv. Kn. 1. Manchuria v epokhu feodalizma (XVII - nachalo XX vv.) [History of North-Eastern China in the 17th-20th centuries]. knizhnoe izd-vo, 1987.

Krotova M. Commercial and industrial life of Harbin in 1906-1914 / / Problems of the Far East. 1995, N 1.

Pu I. The first half of my life, Moscow: Progress Publ., 1968.

Wang Peihuan. Qindi dongxun (Qing Emperors ' Visits to Northeast China). Shenyang chubanshe, 2004.

Chen Yue. Beiyang haijun jianchuan zhi (Description of the Beiyang Fleet). Beijing, 2006.

4 The report was translated by the staff of the Russian Imperial Mission in Beijing.

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