Libmonster ID: UK-1353
Author(s) of the publication: N. B. LEBEDEVA

N. B. LEBEDEVA, Candidate of Historical Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Key words: India, China, Asia Pacific, South China Sea, ASEAN, Disputed Territories, Navy

Every year, the South China Sea (SCM) is becoming increasingly important as a strategic outlet from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, a source of large oil and gas reserves and a route for their transportation from the Middle East.

Because of these factors, since about 2008, conflicting strategic, economic and energy interests of many countries have been drawn into a tight knot here, and as a result, long-standing territorial disputes and conflicts at the seemingly regional level have become global. India, which has embarked on the path of becoming a world Power, cannot stand aloof from them.


In terms of geostrategy, the South China Sea occupies a key location, providing control not only over Southeast Asia, but also over South and East Asia. At the same time, it has a special status due to the peculiarities of its semi-closed configuration. If we follow the UN Maritime Convention of 1982, the rights of closely located coastal countries to transport and economic use of the South China Sea are complex and confusing. In particular, the borders of free economic zones (FEZs) that they set are often superimposed on each other, which is why interstate disputes are inevitable. As well as disputes concerning large hydrocarbon reserves in the sea area 1.

Back in 2008, the US Energy Information Administration estimated oil reserves in the KZHM at 213 billion. bbl. This (according to BP's Statistical Review of July 24, 2013) exceeds the proven reserves of most countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. According to Chinese experts, gas reserves in the waters of the so - called disputed islands amount to 25 billion cubic meters, and oil-at least 265 billion cubic meters. bbl. The numbers are impressive, but apparently not conclusive. In addition, 80-90% of oil is delivered to Japan, China and the Republic of Korea via the South China Sea, mainly from the Middle East.

India, due to its geographical proximity to the South China Sea and its special importance in the global transport system, has a number of its own interests here. Therefore, it cannot remain aloof from territorial disputes in the region and, in particular, ignore the position that India's main economic rival in Asia, the People's Republic of China, takes in these disputes. It is also important for India to use the South China Sea as productively as possible in its economic and political advancement in the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in order to strengthen its influence in this region.

Since the beginning of this century, Indian Navy ships have regularly appeared in the South China Sea. This immediately led to a number of questions from the countries of the region: why, with what tasks, and for how long? Most likely, the presence of warships in the South China Sea is connected with the "Look East" policy of India proclaimed by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1991.

In its first phase, this course was aimed at large-scale domestic market reforms, liberalizing the Indian economy, and expanding foreign economic relations, primarily with the dynamically developing Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Then it was time to realize a wide range of Indian economic, strategic and political interests outside the region, in particular in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. The Indian leadership, studying and using the positive experience of ASEAN, decided to give impetus to the development of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In addition, New Delhi was clearly concerned about the intensification of ties between rapidly developing China and ASEAN, as well as in the entire space of Southeast Asia, which occupies an extremely important strategic position at the junction of two oceans.

Directly in the South China Sea, India intends to create not only a zone of its expanded influence, but also a strategic platform for solving a number of important political and foreign economic tasks. 2

These include providing:

- Freedom of navigation to deliver 55% of Indian goods to Northeast Asia (NEA). Their volume is expected to increase after the signing of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements in 2010 with South Korea, the Free Trade Area (FTA) in 2010 with ASEAN, and in 2011 with Japan. India is currently negotiating an FTA with Australia and a regional preferential trade agreement with China.;

- access to the only so-far research polar base Himandri on one of the Norwegian islands in the Arctic, which is acquiring military-strategic, resource and transit significance, etc.;

- Access of Indian companies to oil and gas exploration in the waters off the coast of Vietnam and to the production of oil on the Sakhalin shelf since 2001, which at that time became the largest overseas project of India in this industry.

India is approximately 70% (and 80% in the foreseeable future) dependent on external energy sources. To ensure its own energy security, it needs their diversification. In recent years, India has repeatedly expressed a desire to increase its presence in the Russian Far East, in particular, to participate in

page 9

in gas production at Sakhalin-3, though not directly, but as a partner of Gazprom4. At Sakhalin-1, Indian companies are already producing up to 50 thousand barrels of oil per day. In July 2013, Rosneft announced that it was considering the possibility of attracting ONGC, an Indian company, as a partner in the construction of a natural gas liquefaction plant with an annual capacity of 5 million cubic meters on Sakhalin in 2018-2019. 5

As the goals of the second phase of the "Look East" course have become more complex and deeper, there has also been an interest since the beginning of the new century in:

- strengthening political, strategic and naval relations with the ASEAN countries, and later with South Korea, Japan and Australia;

- Establishing partial control of maritime areas in and around the South China Sea. Such control can be carried out by conducting joint maneuvers of military fleets of different countries, patrolling strategically important straits, as well as exchanging visits of ship detachments. All this is supposed to provide security from traditional and non-traditional threats in a complex region where piracy, terrorism, poaching, illegal transportation of weapons, etc. have become widespread. 6


Thus, India's desire to become one of the world's leading maritime powers is evident. Part of this goal has already been achieved. At the East Asia Summit (EAC) held in December 2005, a number of ASEAN member States, as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea, declared recognition of India as a "Pacific Power". After that, New Delhi has clearly increased its desire to strengthen political ties with East Asian countries and with remote island states of the South Seas, where there is a support for the Indian diaspora. For example, from Fiji, where the Indian diaspora accounts for over 40% of the population.7 A concrete expression of this desire was the joint naval exercises held in August 2006 in the Pacific by a detachment of the Indian Navy with ships from Australia and New Zealand, as well as with ships from Tonga, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, which were included in such exercises for the first time.8 These maneuvers, among other things, aimed to balance Chinese ambitions in this part of the World Ocean, and this goal was achieved.

This is one of many steps taken by India to implement the principles of the document "Freedom of the High Seas: India's Naval Strategy 2007", which provides for the protection of the country's national interests in the entire World Ocean.

Today, India participates in almost all the most important regional and international organizations, including EAC, SCO( Shanghai Cooperation Organization), BRICS (association of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), AR-SIO (Association of Cooperation of the Indian Ocean countries), IBSA (Association of India, Brazil, South Africa). Africa), BIMSTEC (Comprehensive Technical and Economic Cooperation of the Countries of the Bay of Bengal), TTL (Western Pacific Maritime Symposium), Regional Agreement on Combating Pirates and Armed Robbery at Sea against Ships in Asia, the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation Council, etc.

However, it seems unnatural that India - the third largest economy in Asia and the eighth largest in the world-is not a member of such a large structure of international economic cooperation as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).


India's economic relations with the member States listed above are almost exclusively carried out by sea. In this regard, it is of great importance to solve the problems of ensuring the safety of maritime navigation, which is possible only due to the presence of a powerful navy in the country.

India also needs a strong Navy due to the significantly increased threats to merchant ships from pirates and terrorists in recent years. The Navy today performs not only the traditional functions of protecting the state in the event of conflict situations, but also is able to come to the aid of the population in the event of natural disasters, which have also become frequent. Given all this, the Indian leadership, on the one hand, is making efforts to strengthen and re-equip the navy, and on the other, it is trying to expand its functions - from purely military to humanitarian.

India is successfully implementing the "Long-term Naval Construction Plan", adopted in 2011, as part of the overall military modernization plan for 2012-2017. For the period from 2010 to 2020, the Indian Navy should receive 3 aircraft carriers, 31 submarines of various classes, including 5-7 with nuclear installations, including the most modern Arihant, 89 destroyer-frigate-corvette and amphibious warships, over 400 aircraft, etc. In August 2013, Arihant put to sea for the last tests. The Navy Department is discussing a proposal to build a special submarine base on the east coast of the country, 200 km from Visakhapatnam, modeled on the ultra-modern Chinese base on Hainan Island. 9 In November 2013 India has received 3 squadrons of Mig-29K/KUB carrier-based fighters, most of which will be stationed on the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier (in Russia it was called Admiral Gorshkov).

After completing this program, the Indian Navy can begin its primary mission, which includes patrolling in the Strait of Malacca, controlling a large part of the South China Sea, and operating outside the Indian Ocean. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the country's Navy has been conducting an increasing number of naval exercises in the South China Sea on a regular basis. In 2000, such exercises were conducted jointly with the Vietnamese Navy, in 2005 and 2009-with the Singapore Navy, in 2007 and 2009-with the ships of the United States, Japan, Australia, in 2007-with the United States and Japan; the latter were conducted off the western coast of Japan and in the South China Sea.

The current technical level of the Indian Navy is such that it is able to operate at a considerable distance from its own shores. So, in 2007 and 2011, he participated in joint maneuvers with the Russian fleet "INDRA" in the Vladivostok region. There was also a long - term campaign - from March to May 2007-of a detachment of Indian ships to the western Pacific Ocean.

page 10

At the beginning of 2013 India announced that budget expenditures for the development and maintenance of the country's Navy have increased from $181 million in 1988 to $6.78 billion in 2012.10


The steps taken by India to gain Pacific positions are actively discussed by international experts. Their opinions are also ambiguous in determining the place and role of India in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, D. McDougall (USA) believes that India is only trying to expand cooperation through various channels with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region11. Professor of King's College, University of London, Indian X. Pant argues that India has already become a major actor in the Asia-Pacific political arena, along with the United States, China, and Japan.12 Brunel D., an expert at the University of London. Scott is inclined to a more modest assessment: India has become an equal player in regional international relations. Finally, W. S. Ladwig (Oxford, UK) believes that the influence and presence of India is increasingly felt in Southeast Asia every year13.

We can agree with the latter conclusion. India has already sent unequivocal signals about its ambitious aspirations to enter the Asia-Pacific region, and most importantly, it has taken many practical steps in this direction. And it seems that she does not intend to stop there.

There are a number of factors that help India build up its potential as an active East Asian and Pacific player. First, the above - mentioned "Look East" course has demonstrated high efficiency and moved the country from the category of a South Asian and Indian-Pacific state to a more significant category-a power of pan-Asian significance. Secondly, the constructive nature of New Delhi's participation in various structures of regional cooperation has played a significant role. Third, it should be recognized that the country's strategic cooperation with the leading countries of the Asia - Pacific region - the United States, Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and the ASEAN member states - has recently significantly deepened.

New Delhi recognizes that the current numerous internal problems make it difficult to solve the problem of expanding the country's geostrategic and geopolitical positions in the Asia-Pacific region, increasing its economic presence in the pan-Asian processes. These problems include the need to further boost the economy, address acute issues of poverty and youth employment, strengthen the land and naval forces, etc. However, the country's leadership does not intend to curtail programs aimed at strengthening India's position in the Asia-Pacific and adjacent regions.


The implementation of India's chosen foreign policy course in the Asian direction met with rejection from China. Beijing was not inclined to welcome New Delhi's participation in the East Asian Community and other multilateral Asian structures. The Chinese were also ambivalent about India's desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, criticizing the "Look East" course and India's desire to become a global power, trying to limit the field of influence and interests of this country to the borders of South Asia or the Indian Ocean. China expressed its displeasure at the 2011 statements by the Indian leadership about its intention to" expand " its presence in the South China Sea14.

The competition and contradictions between the parties in the energy sector, where India has become a party to the long-standing disputes between Vietnam and China, have become very acute. Cases of rivalry over energy resources between Delhi and Beijing have also occurred in other parts of the world - in Myanmar, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Latin America.

The PRC is extremely energetically looking for new sources of energy resources. At the end of 2010, China's national oil companies were involved in approximately 200 energy projects in more than 50 countries, with a total investment of $50 billion.15 India follows China in this regard. But its performance is slightly lower - it operates an energy business in about 40 countries. India plans to invest up to $500 billion in the next 10 to 15 years. in the energy sector - in their own and in foreign countries.

The interests of Indian and Chinese oil producers often clash in the most bizarre ways. For example, in 2006, ONGC Videsh Limited, an Indian company, signed a contract with Petrovietnam for joint exploration of sectors 127 and 128 in the Nam Con Son basin, and a little later - a deal for seismic exploration in these areas, which were at the center of a territorial dispute between India, Vietnam and China. The Chinese authorities decided that India is trying to affect the interests of the PRC in its zone of influence 16.

Meanwhile, according to the UN Maritime Convention of 1982, these areas are located on the Vietnamese continental shelf and in the Vietnamese free economic zone. An Indian official responded to Beijing's hostile reaction by saying that his country's energy cooperation with Vietnam, or any other state, is in line with international norms and rules.17

A few years later, this story was continued. In July 2011, the Indian ship Erawat was returning home from a "goodwill visit" to Vietnam and, while in Vietnamese waters 45-49 km from the coast, i.e. in the Vietnamese economic zone, was detained by Chinese patrol boats, and according to some sources, even fired at them. A similar incident was repeated 11 months later with the Indian Navy frigate Shivalik 18 heading from the Philippines to South Korea.

In September 2011, India announced its decision to continue the work of the Indian oil and gas company ONGC on the same blocks 127 and 128. A month later, India signed a new agreement with Vietnam, which, by the way, has similar partnership agreements with 60 companies from different countries.

In November of the same year, the Chinese side responded to this act by demanding that Indian companies obtain Beijing's permission to develop disputed areas. It considered the agreement "illegal" and violates Chinese sovereignty in the waters of the South China Sea. At the same time, the confrontation between the warships of Hanoi and Beijing began, and an information war unfolded between the two countries. Both conducted exercises with shooting in disputed areas.

page 11

China's maritime territorial disputes with the Philippines in the South China Sea and with Japan in the East China Sea have escalated. A "war of renaming" of seas and islands broke out.

India's leaders ignored China's demarche and decided to continue exploration in the South China Sea in accordance with generally accepted international maritime law regarding access to natural resources. In essence, it was a real "cold war" between the parties to the dispute, which could destabilize the situation in the South China Sea and in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

The situation eased somewhat in May 2012, when Deputy Minister of Oil and Gas R. P. N. Singh announced ONGC's withdrawal from the project at section 127 due to its economic futility. In June of the same year, Vietnam extended the exploration period for Block 128 and invited India to start further joint exploration. Such a decision by Vietnam could mean an understanding of the importance of India's presence in the South China Sea to ensure strategic balance - after all, by that time the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company-CNOOC-had initiated the provision of 9 blocks for foreign exploration in Vietnamese waters at once, because it considered them its own. Starting in 2015, Beijing plans to produce 15 billion cubic meters of gas annually from fields in the South China Sea. By 2020, its production (in oil equivalent) may reach 1 million barrels. on day 19.

By mid-2012 India has invested about $50 million in Block 128 exploration. But after a second joint survey, the parties found that this block is not so promising because of the particularly hard ocean floor, and it is not worth continuing to implement the expensive project 20.

Thus, India, although not a direct participant in the dispute, indirectly fueled a new stage in the long-standing and sluggish current confrontation between Beijing and Hanoi. At particularly sensitive moments, Admiral D. K. Joshi twice declared India's readiness to send warships to the South China Sea to protect Indian energy interests.

In response, China granted the authorities of its Hainan province the right to mandatory search of foreign ships when they appear in the waters of the South China Sea, which Beijing arbitrarily considers its own. Washington immediately condemned the Chinese intention to inspect foreign ships in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Singapore have also declared these acts illegal by China.

India's withdrawal from Vietnam's oil fields has disappointed Vietnam. Some analysts saw this as an example of clumsy diplomacy in the difficult situation in the South China Sea, which could complicate the implementation of India's foreign policy course aimed at moving East. The country's business community called on its leadership to take measures to return Indian business to the South China Sea.

But India has not really left the South China Sea at all. After calculating all the pros and cons, Delhi recalled that back in 1988 OVL signed a contract for the exploration of gas fields in block 06.1 - also off the coast of Vietnam. In this situation, as experts called for, India decided to continue geological exploration here. Moreover, this site is located far from the disputed areas.

According to the Hindustan Times newspaper of May 15, 2013, the Indian company intends to invest $145.94 million in exploration in this block, despite the displeasure expressed by China about new Delhi's plans to continue cooperation with Vietnam in the energy sector. In an effort to take advantage of the perhaps less lucrative chance of a business return to the South China Sea, the Indian leadership tactically correctly played the card, strategically wisely unleashing its hands on further progress in the Asia-Pacific region. And it didn't fail.

India's flexible maneuver did not affect and maintained the same level of strategic partnership with Vietnam in the context of a delicate geopolitical game in the South China Sea. Hanoi, a long-time and loyal ally of India, with which it has close military and strategic ties, granted the country, the first foreign country, access to an important naval base in Cam Ranh and to ports in Nha Trang and Holong. Economic relations between the two countries are developing successfully - plans have been developed to increase trade turnover from $6.1 billion in 2012 to more than $7 billion by 2015. Vietnam supports India's desire to participate in projects for the production of agricultural and metallurgical products, in IT technologies, fishing, etc. In 2013, the Indian company Tata Power won a major tender for the development of a hydrothermal power plant project worth $1.6 billion. in Sok Trang Province in southern Vietnam, ahead of strong competitors from South Korea and Russia 21.


Amid rising tensions between several parties involved in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the long-running energy rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi has taken an unexpected 180-degree turn.

On June 18, 2012, an agreement was signed between Indian and Chinese oil companies on joint search for energy resources in third countries. In essence, it not only updates the previous similar agreement of 2006, but also expands it to the format of cooperation in oil and gas processing, construction and management of pipelines.22

Some experts see this shift in the positions of India and China as a search for a compromise in their energy interests, burdened by mutual friction and claims, in order to jointly counter the growing oil and gas appetites of Western powers.

The convergence of the two countries ' positions in energy policy came after several failed attempts by India to beat China in Angola, Myanmar, Ecuador and Kazakhstan to acquire and then develop oil fields. However, even earlier, in 2006, India's ONGC and China's CNPC jointly acquired a fairly large oil production enterprise in Syria for $573 million, after which an agreement was signed in 2006. In addition, the two companies jointly developed the Mughlad oil basin in Sudan and built a 940-mile pipeline from this field to the Port of Sudan on Red Sea coast 23. Both sides have also initiated the construction of a gas pipeline from the Myanmar coast of the Bay of Bengal to southwest China, which will be completed in the coming months.

page 12

However, it must be admitted that the Chinese were not particularly in a hurry to expand cooperation at the expense of any new fields and saw in it, rather, an opportunity to observe India's projects in the oil and gas fields. Nevertheless, the Indian side calls on the Chinese to increase the number of joint developments 24.

In our opinion, the current situation should be viewed in the broader context of the fragile and extremely complex India-China relations, which are characterized by a desire for cooperation, mutual reproaches, and lack of trust.

In the Indo-Pacific zone, China has managed to strengthen its position with the help of the so-called "string of pearls" strategy-by creating a number of strongholds in friendly countries-Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, Pakistan, etc. It is planning to expand its network of port berths on the east coast of Africa, as well as in Yemen, which plays an important strategic role in the Gulf of Aden. But if China managed to sign an agreement on the establishment of a military base in the Seychelles in 2012, similar plans failed in Yemen - the United States "outplayed" Beijing and did not allow it to gain a foothold in this country.

The issue of turning the Chinese-modernized Pakistani port of Gwadar, which occupies a strategically important position in Hormuz (through which large oil flows to Northeast Asia, Europe and the United States pass) into a military base in Beijing, is now widely discussed. According to media reports, it seems that preparatory work is already underway here. In February 2013, it became known that the Pakistani side, dissatisfied with the results of the six-year operation of the Singapore firm, transferred the port to the management of the Chinese state-owned company Chinese Overseas Port Holding. By simultaneously expanding its stronghold in Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Beijing will be able to partially protect oil supplies through the Indian Ocean zone to the Middle Kingdom.

Such actions of the PRC in the Indian Ocean basin cause caution in Delhi. Some high-ranking military officials and politicians are demanding that adequate measures be taken, not only in the Indian Ocean, but also in the South China Sea. The possibility of resorting to the concept of an "iron chain" consisting of 572 Indian islands in the Bay of Bengal is being debated. There are several strongholds, military air bases (including since 2007-for drones) and the largest naval base - in Port Blair, which can be used to block the Strait of Malacca.

India's peculiar "retaliatory measures" are unlikely to go too far. New Delhi clearly does not want to lose the benefits of growing trade with China (in 2012, the trade turnover reached $75 billion), which it decided to bring to $100 billion by 2015, despite the roll of $27 billion in 2011 and $33 billion in 2012 in the trade balance in favor of China. 25 India's leaders cannot fail to appreciate some improvement in India-China relations in other areas as well. In particular, military cooperation was resumed, which in recent years has been repeatedly interrupted for minor reasons.

Business relations have noticeably revived - in December 2011, the first significant deal of a large Indian company, Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited (IL&FS), was signed with a state-owned enterprise in China in the amount of $150 million. Regular exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries has been established. Thus, during Premier Li Keqiang's visit to New Delhi in 2013, several memoranda were signed on economic issues, hydrology, irrigation and culture.26

For India, its role as a "swing state" (a pendulum state, as defined by the developers of the CIA Report from 2005) and its readiness to act as a kind of "balance beam" in the region is important. Historically and geographically, China and India are destined to live side by side: mostly to be friends, although sometimes to quarrel.

(The ending follows)

Subhash Kapila. 1 The South China Sea Disputes: Strategic Implications and Perspectives on Conflict Resolution // Paper N 5480, South Asia Analysis Group, 03.05.2013; Singh Amit. South China Sea Dispute and India - May 2011; India and the World: Interview of Professor Toshi Yoshihara (16.03.2012)

Lebedeva N. B. 2 India i ASEAN (problemy i perspektivy vzaimodeystviya na sovremennom etape) [India and ASEAN (Problems and prospects of interaction at the present stage)]. Issue XIII. Moscow, IV RAS, 2009, pp. 29-48: aka: India-ASEAN-features of the second phase of the course "Look to the East" and a new configuration in the Asia-Pacific region // In the same place. Issue XVIII. Moscow, IV RAS, 2012, pp. 67-97.

Kondapalli S.A. 3 New Configuration in the East - gateawayhouse

4 (18.10.2010); Alternative Sakhalin, 08.12.2011.

5 RIA Novosti. 16.07.2013.

Lebedeva N. B. 6 Kurs Indii "Smere na Vostoka" - itogi dvadtsatiletiya i novye vyzovy [The 6th Course of India "Look to the East" - results of the twentieth anniversary and new challenges]. Internal, regional and global aspects", ed. on CD. Moscow, IV RAS, 2013, pp. 377-407.

7 Ministry of External Affairs. Annual Report, 1 January-31 March, 2004. New Delhi, 2004, p. 38.

Scott D. 8 India's "Extended Neighborhood" Concept // Indian Review. Vol. 8, 2009, N 2, p. 107 - 143.

9 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, Annual Report and SIPRI Arms Transfer Database; (14.06.2010, 08.08.2013)

10 (26.06.2013); com (10.07.2012)

Mc Dougall D. 11 Asia-Pacific in World Politics // Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

Pant H. 12 India in Asia-Pacific: Rising Ambitions with an Eye on China // Asia-Pacific Review. Vol. 14, 2007, N 1, p. 54 - 71.

Ladieig III W.C. 13 Delhi's Pacific Ambitions: Naval Power, "Look East Policy" and India's Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific //Asian Security. Vol. 5, 2009. N 2, p. 87 - 113.

14 India intends to establish a permanent presence in the South China Sea

15 China and India's Growing Energy Rivalry // Bloomberg Business Week. December 16, 2010.

Airy A. 16 "ONGC's Vietnam Foray illegal - says China" // Indian Express. December 3, 2007.

Singh Teshu. 17 The Curious Case of India's Withdrawal from the South China Sea. ISN - (19.06.2012)

18, 25.06.2012.

19 The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Vol. 26, 2012, N 2, Fall/Winter, p. 63.

Singh Teshu. 20 Op. cit.

21 (11.07.2013)

22 ONGC, CNPC sign Agreement on jointly Explore Oil and Gas // The Economic Times. 19.06.2012.

23 The Financial Times. 11.03.2007.

Rakesh Sharma. 24 India, China to explore Energy Assets // Deal Journal, India. June 19, 2012.

25 Hindu, 07.06.2012; Weekly Economic Review. N 518, April 24 - 30, 2013.

26 China, USA: the balance of power is changing. 25.05.2013


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