O. V. KIRYANOV, Correspondent of Rossiyskaya Gazeta, post-graduate student of ISAA MSU

Kim Jong DPRK, Keywords: reforms, military elite, foreign policy

The new leadership of the DPRK continued its policy of attracting foreign investment and developing trade and economic zones (TEZS).

North Korea hopes for an influx of capital and investment, primarily from neighboring China. This trend can hardly be considered a new one, since it was very noticeable even under Kim Jong Il. His successor shows that he intends to step up such cooperation. In these TEZS, North Korea creates "enclaves of capitalism" isolated from the rest of the country, trying to use them to boost the national economy as a whole.

It is possible that, as it used to be in the PRC, such zones serve or will serve the leadership of the DPRK as testing grounds where the implementation of certain reforms in the economy is checked. If successful, changes can be expected on a national scale, with an unfavorable outcome, everything will end up with negative consequences only for one or another TEZ, allowing you not to take risks on a national scale.

BACK IN THE ARMS OF THE CHINESE "BIG BROTHER"

The China pa bid for the DPRK is largely a forced and unavoidable measure. Given the inability to develop or expand trade and economic ties with other states-the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and others - for one reason or another, Pyongyang has no alternative to China*.

The first months of Kim Jong-un's rule showed that the scale of trade between the PRC and the DPRK continued to increase. This trend gained momentum under Kim Jong Il. Thus, in the first eight months of 2012, the trade turnover between the two countries exceeded $4.2 billion, which is 11% more than in the same period of ^2011.1 By the end of 2012, the bilateral trade turnover set another record - more than $6.339 billion. This is 7% more than a year earlier.²

Under Kim Jong-un, the DPRK authorities have seriously increased (up to 20 thousand) the number of workers they send to work in China. Pyongyang is very active in attracting foreign investment, emphasizing that in the DPRK, investors will not face such problems of other states as strikes, unemployment, and workers are ready to work for $30 - $80 a month.³ According to eyewitnesses, in fact, foreign investment in the vast majority of cases belongs to the Chinese. Pyongyang intends to allow free circulation of the Chinese yuan in Taezon, Wihwado and Hwang Geumphyong. The last two TEZS are located on the border of the DPRK with the PRC, while the Chinese are actively trying to penetrate the Rason zone located on the east coast of North Korea in order to reduce transport costs for transporting goods from the north-eastern to the southern regions of China. ⁴

In August 2012, Jang Song-taek, the "grey cardinal of North Korea" and "right - hand man of Kim Jong-un", to whom he is an uncle, visited China to attract Chinese capital to the DPRK's trade and economic zones. For Chinese businessmen, the DPRK authorities are also constantly simplifying visa and other formalities required to visit free economic zones.⁵

Judging by the reports that periodically get into the press, despite the desire of the DPRK authorities to attract as much pain as possible-

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa Today, 2013, No. 7.

* For more information, see: Kiryanov O. M. The DPRK has only one support left - China. The result of the growth of the Chinese economy or a consequence of Beijing's insidious plans? // Asia and Africa Today, 2012, N 6, 8 (editor's note).

the lack of investment from China and Pyongyang's promise to create "the most comfortable conditions" for business people from the Middle Kingdom, however, is not without conflicts, sometimes very serious. This, as far as can be judged, causes concern in Beijing, whose representatives do not hesitate to express their dissatisfaction with Pyongyang.⁶

Thus, in the sphere of foreign economy, even after Kim Jong-un came to power, Pyongyang continued to rely on the development of economic cooperation with the PRC, including through attracting Chinese capital to free economic zones.

"COSMETIC" OR MAJOR SYSTEM REPAIRS?

All these events and signs of some new trends in the DPRK have caused great controversy among experts about the intentions of the North Korean leadership to carry out serious reforms. Most experts expected that in 2012, the unscheduled meeting of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK would put all the dots over the "I", officially declaring in one form or another about "new measures", "changes in policy", "course adjustment taking into account new conditions" , etc. However, this did not happen. The months that followed did not bring much clarity. And in its foreign policy, Pyongyang has taken steps (testing new missiles and nuclear weapons) that have only strained its relations with the international community, including its main ally, China. Therefore, disputes do not subside, questions remain, and clarity is not added yet.

There are two main points of view. Supporters of one are inclined to believe that it is too early to talk about any serious reforms. At the same time, it is possible that the leadership of the DPRK will not be able or unwilling to go to them at all out of fear for the stability of the regime and its own security. Everything will be limited to some "cosmetic" changes ⁷.

Another" pro - reform " position is that serious changes have already begun in North Korea, but we do not yet fully know about them. This can also include the assumption that Kim Jong-un and his entourage, seeing the plight of the economy, really want to change a lot, give a new impetus, but are still cautious, initiating reforms in a dosed manner, or are testing them now in some separate areas, then taking into account the identified shortcomings to correct and implement in a new form nationwide ⁸.

According to a senior researcher at the South Korean Scientific Research Institute. "now that Kim Jong-un has gained control of the military, he can be expected to implement serious economic reforms and openness, which, in particular, will be reflected in allowing individuals to profit from trade, expanding the independence of businesses and reducing the minimum size of agricultural work collectives,"said King Sejong Jong-chan.⁹. Another South Korean expert, Lee Yong-hoon, has a similar point of view: "Recent changes in the DPRK's power structure suggest a reversal towards the priority of the economy. There is a high probability that the content of the "New Economic Management Measures of June 28" * * will be deeper and more extensive than the reform of July 1, 2002 " ¹⁰.

But no less, and rather even more among experts, especially in the United States, those who are much more cautious about all the changes. "A concert with Disney characters, women on stage in miniskirts, the public appearance of Kim Jong Un and his wife, the fall of Ri Yong Ho-a series of phenomena hinted at signs of change, and also caused speculation about the future direction of the DPRK... However, based only on these small changes, it is premature to conclude that Pyongyang is moving towards real political and economic reforms, " said Professor W. Cha, a professor at Georgetown University in Washington.¹¹ "It may well be that Kim Jong-un, having distanced himself from the military, is now planning to conduct economic reforms.-

* For more information, see: Rusakov E. M. Vertigo from nuclear successes / / Asia and Africa Today, 2 (113, N 7 (Editor's note).

** For more information, see: Kiryanov O. V. Where does the young leader lead the DPRK? Part 1 / / Asia and Africa Today, 2013, N 7.

some reforms that the same generals will not like. However, so far we have almost no evidence that these serious reforms will actually take place, " notes another American expert. Armstrong ¹².

"The new measures in the Chinese economy are aimed only at ensuring an increase in labor productivity, ensuring the smooth functioning of the distribution system and providing food to state structures. New measures in the economy do not represent the desire of the DPRK leadership to carry out real reforms or stand on the path of openness, " says Cho Min ¹³, a senior researcher at the State Research Institute for Unification of the Republic of Korea, very categorically.

THE REFORMS WILL HAVE TO WAIT

Thus, there are even more ambiguities about the DPRK than there were before. This is confirmed by disputes between experts. What do we have in the "bottom line" to come to this or that conclusion about the presence or absence of serious, real, fundamental reforms in the DPRK?

Yes, Kim Jong-un strongly "asked to move" the military, dismissing, perhaps, the most influential representative of the general staff-the Chief of the General Staff, Vice Marshal Ri Yong Ho. Various companies that allowed the military to earn foreign currency were taken away from the army structures. Judging by the personnel changes in recent months, the balance of influence from the military is gradually shifting to the government, sometimes to the party. People who are considered by many to be aimed at bringing changes to the economy of the DPRK have returned to very high positions. There was also a series of spectacular PR campaigns-from the already mentioned Mickey Mouse, songs by Frank Sinatra, relaxation in terms of appearance for women to a very active "first lady" in the person of Kim Jong-un's wife Lee Sol-joo.

There are quite persistent rumors about "new measures in the economy", which imply the introduction of certain market elements in agriculture and industry.

This, perhaps, is the end of the list of signs of "reforms" in the DPRK. It seems that in this regard, it is possible to draw a rather vague conclusion that some innovations are actually taking place in North Korea, but the scale, depth and content of these changes cannot yet be objectively assessed.

Kim Jong-un really brought a certain fresh stream to North Korean society. However, based on these facts alone, it is still too early to conclude that the DPRK has embarked on the path of fundamental reforms.

The young leader does not actually have a team of his own and is forced to use the resources of his closest aides, who are difficult to suspect of "violent" reformism" and intentions to "lead the North along the path of Western democracies." Kim Jong-un seems to rely primarily on the" grey cardinal of the DPRK " Jang Song-taek, deputy chairman of the State Defense Committee of the DPRK. In this regard, some experts have repeatedly expressed the opinion that all new trends are the product of the" joint creativity " of Kim and Jang, but at the same time the vacant posts are invariably filled with people of the "gray cardinal" ¹⁴. But even if the DPRK authorities announce the beginning of the implementation of "new measures" (the words "reform" from Pyongyang In general, there is no need to wait, it is practically taboo in North Korea), then it remains to be assessed how, in what direction and with what intensity these innovations will be implemented. At least for the reason that the DPRK has a rich history, when after the start of the next "new measures" very quickly followed by a strong tightening of the screws, which not only negated all the changes, but also led to a rollback of two steps back.

In addition, having seen enough of how the reforms ended for the leadership of the "socialist camp" countries, the ruling elite of the DPRK, at least out of an instinct for preservation, is unlikely to show much caution. Both Kim Jong-un's youth and his experience of studying in Western Europe (which is often recalled by those analysts who are already inclined to see the beginning of reforms) will most likely not be enough to decide on radical measures. And judging by the first year of the young leader's rule, he is well versed in where he personally and the ruling system as a whole can come from.

Even if reforms are possible, it is no more than an attempt to find a way out of the chronic economic crisis that the DPRK has been in for a long time. The country's leadership is well aware of this, and therefore, for sure, it has begun to "pull up" those who advocate certain changes, but these changes will not extend to the political sphere. And it cannot be ruled out that after some improvement in the economic situation due to certain "new measures", the "thaw" in the DPRK will be replaced by severe "frosts", a rollback from previously introduced eases and market elements, at least for banal reasons, to stay "out of harm's way".

In this regard, it is appropriate to quote Daniel Pinkston, a representative of the International Crisis Group, regarding the general assessment of the situation in North Korea: "Many people are now beginning to draw conclusions about the beginning of reforms in the DPRK, based only on superficial scenes that show nothing but the personal characteristics of Kim Jong-un's management style. But does it also mean changes in laws, regulations, institutions, and ideologies? Does this mean that the North has started to rely more on the market as a resource allocation mechanism? I'm not saying that the DPRK has to open up and change everything before I admit that reforms are really underway. But so far, I'm still

I haven't seen any changes in deep, meaningful areas. Maybe they do happen after all? Maybe. But the appearance of Mickey Mouse at a concert that Kim Jong-un watched does not mean reform. " ¹⁵

Summing up, we can say that certain innovations have appeared in the DPRK, including those that previously did not exist at all. But they are superficial, and there is still insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about the existence of deep reforms.

IN PYONGYANG STARTED FOR HEALTH...

Perhaps, the foreign policy sphere is the area where Kim Jong-un was most expected to make major changes, up to a" breakthrough", primarily in American.

Initially, the actions of the new leader showed signs of a desire to at least establish a dialogue with Washington. He did not take a long pause in diplomatic contacts with the United States.

The result was the February 29, 2012 agreement, where the DPRK and the United States agreed on a wide range of issues based on the principle of "large-scale humanitarian assistance and the resumption of bilateral contacts in exchange for the freezing of the nuclear missile program and the admission of inspectors to the North's nuclear facilities." ¹⁶ These agreements raised hopes in the West for the possibility of the resumption of the six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and real progress on this issue.

But then Pyongyang poured cold water on those hopes by launching a satellite launch vehicle in April 2012. These actions were perceived by the international community, including Russia and China, as a violation of UN sanctions by the DPRK.¹⁷

Another missile launch in December 2012 and the third nuclear test in the DPRK's history in February 2013 had an even more negative effect, after which the situation on the Korean Peninsula sharply worsened.

Despite its actions that escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula, Pyongyang initially continued to look through various channels for ways to resume dialogue with the United States. This, in particular, happened during the forum "Dialogue on Cooperation in Northeast Asia", which was held in late September 2012 in the Chinese city of Dalian. Experts ' attention was drawn to the fact that official representatives of the countries participating in the six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program - the United States, North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan-gathered in one place. This was the first time since 2009 that these negotiations were interrupted. A preliminary probe of the positions of all countries was conducted, and a direct bilateral meeting of representatives of the US and DPRK delegations was held on the sidelines of the forum. Although there was no need to talk about a diplomatic breakthrough, the forum participants noted that the North Korean envoys made it clear that they wanted to resume contacts and negotiations with Washington.¹⁸

According to a number of experts, it is quite possible that Pyongyang was hoping to "put the squeeze on" the United States and force them to sit down at the table of direct bilateral negotiations.

After the end of the last Korean crisis, the State Defense Committee of the DPRK in June 2013 proposed holding high-level US-North Korean talks "in the interests of defusing the situation on the Korean peninsula and achieving regional peace and stability." White House National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlin Hayden said that Washington is ready for such talks, but they "must include North Korea fulfilling its obligations to the international community, including UN Security Council resolutions, and ultimately lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."*

If the DPRK's strategic goal of developing contacts with the United States was not something new for Pyongyang and was traced back to Kim Jong-un, then the relative novelty (at least in recent years) was the North's focus on normalizing relations with Tokyo. North Korea's relations with Japan have been frozen for quite some time. A stumbling block was the unresolved, in Tokyo's opinion, issue of Japanese people who were abducted in the 1970s-1980s by the special services of the DPRK**. But after Kim Jong-un came to power, the parties for the first time-

* ITAR-TASS, 16.06.2013.

** For more information, see: Grinyuk V. A. Japan-North Korea: a painful point of relations / / Asia and Africa Today, 2012, No. 9 (editor's note).

Over the past few years, we have held bilateral official talks at the level of representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, agreeing on the continuation of contacts, possible improvement of their level, and positively assessing the preliminary results.¹⁹ The last such meeting was held in November 2012.

However, after the North Korean missile tests, Tokyo canceled the planned talks with the DPRK. Meanwhile, after a rather long break, the Liberal Democratic Party returned to power in Japan in December 2012. The new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, who has a reputation for being a hawk, has taken a tough stance. During the crisis, Pyongyang and Tokyo exchanged recriminations. Abe increased the country's military spending, called on Washington to return the DPRK to the list of countries that the United States declared sponsors of terrorism. As stated by the Minister of Defense of Japan and. Onodera in February 2013, in order to counter the development of missile technology in the DPRK, Tokyo and Washington decided to deploy Japan's second X-band radar for tracking ballistic missiles in Kyoto.²⁰

Since the end of the last Korean crisis, Tokyo has turned from anger to mercy.

In May, the Japanese Prime Minister's strategic adviser, Isao Iijima, visited Pyongyang and received a very friendly reception. In particular, the "number two person" in the hierarchy of the DPRK, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly / Parliament, held talks with him/ Kim Yong Nam. After that, Japanese Cabinet Secretary General Yoshihide Suga confirmed that the Japanese government is looking for ways to resume the interrupted dialogue with the DPRK.²¹

In South Korea, a new leader also came to power in the person of 61-year-old Park Geun-hye, who won the presidential election in December 2012, and in February officially assumed the post of head of state. Although Park represents the conservative ruling camp, she has promised to restore relations with Pyongyang, which deteriorated under her predecessor Lee Myung-bak, and even promote "better living conditions" for North Koreans. But the Korean crisis has dampened the enthusiasm of the new South Korean leadership for cooperation with the North.²²

Nevertheless, Seoul understands that it is necessary to talk to Pyongyang in one way or another. In the midst of the Korean crisis, the representative of the Ministry of National Unification of the Republic of Korea, Kim Hyun-seok, said that the ROK Government regrets that the DPRK announced the termination of all non-aggression agreements with the Republic of Korea and declared the Joint Declaration on the Nuclear-weapon-free Status of the Korean Peninsula invalid. He also confirmed the immutability of the position of the President of the Republic of Korea, Park Geun-hye, who believes that the "trust process on the Korean peninsula" can be resumed if the DPRK shows sincerity towards this process.²³

In May 2013, Ju Chol Ki, a representative of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Korea, announced South Korea's intention to offer humanitarian assistance to the DPRK in the event of a resumption of dialogue between the two countries.²⁴

Thus, in the foreign policy sphere, with the arrival of Kim Jong-un, initially there were signs of Pyongyang's desire to achieve some progress in at least some foreign policy areas. However, the aggravation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula not only negated these modest initiatives, but also seriously worsened the situation.

However, after the end of the crisis, the North Korean leadership again began to establish contacts. It remains to be hoped that the period of bellicose "self-assertion" of the young leader of the DPRK is over, and he is set up in a more constructive way.

¹ Ol 1 - 8 zero pukchunksk 40 ok tallo... Чапмснпи 11% чынга(.In the period from January to August of this year, the volume of North Korean-Chinese trade amounted to $4 billion... Growth by 11% compared to last year) / / Enhannews. 29.09.2012.

² Chinanghae puk-chun kyoekaek sasan chwedae. 60% of tallo tolnha (Last year, the volume of trade between China and the DPRK reached a record high, exceeding the figure of 6 billion) // Yonhap News. 06.02.2013.

³ Puk... Vegugin thujaja yoochee chokkeek (North Korea actively attracts foreign investors) / / NoCulNews. 28.09.2012.

⁴ N.Korea to allow circulation of yuan in economic zones // Yonhap News. 28.09.2012.

⁵ North Korean leader seeks trip to China for economic help // Reuters. 24.08.2012.

⁶ China did not give the DPRK pi dollar / / Russian galeta. 21.08.2012.

⁷ Muk patypcheepheji, kehen-kebanyn anida (The North's abolition of the distribution system does not mean reform and openness) / / Munkhna Ilbo. 15.11.2012.

⁸ Puk 6-28 chochi kaehyun-kaban haesok kepgerop taedu (There is a point of view about the need to be careful with the assessment of measures from June 28 as reforms and openness) / / Yonghannews. 15.08.2012.

⁹ Leadership shake-up adds to signs of change in N.Korea // The Korea Herald. 23.08.2012.

¹⁰ Puk eipkyenzhechochhye choimuigadyl "sipzhuisok chokkak" (Experts with caution evaluate new economic measures of the North) / / Nphapnyos. 10.08.2012.

¹¹ Shake-up in Pyongyang // Center for International & Strategic Studies, 19.07.2012 - http://csis.org/publication/shakc-pyongyang.

¹² Reading North Korean Tea Leaves// CNN. 17.07.2012.

¹³ Puk (6-28 sekepchekwallichhechjepyn kaheek-yuban mugwan (The new Economic Management System of June 28 is not related to reforms and openness) / / Chosoi Ilbo. 4.10.2012.

¹⁴ North Korean leader seeks... 30.09.2012.

¹⁵ Analysis: Signs emerge Kim leading N Korea his way // The Guardian. 17.07.2012.

¹⁶ North Korea pledges to halt nuclear program in exchange for US aid // The Guardian. 29.02.2012.

¹⁷ UN Security Council Condemns North Korea Rocket launch // Voice of America News. 12.04.2012.

¹⁸ Nuclear-talk envoys in 'casual meeting' // UPI.com -http://www.upi.com/Top_Ncws/World-News/2012/09/28/Nuclear-talk-envoys-m-casual-mee ting/UPI-:S7401348848fi.'S7/

¹⁹ Pukil, 15 il mopolso kukchangyphvedam kzhchwe (the DPRK and Japan will hold talks at the level of department heads in Mongolia on the 15th) / / Aeia kepzhe. 14.11.2012.

²⁰ http://russian.news.cn/world/201.'!-02/2fi/c_1.'!2194111.htm

²¹ ITAR-TASS. 22.05.2013.

^{Harlan Chico.} 22 South Korea faces quandary over potential human rights.probe of North //The Washington Post. 20.02.2013.

²³ Xinhua News Agency. 8.03.2013.

²⁴ ITAR-TASS...

Permanent link to this publication: