A. M. VASILIEV

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Afghanistan, "April Revolution", introduction of Soviet troops, B. Karmal, Najibullah

The war, in which the Soviet leadership dragged its armed forces, continued for almost a decade and cost the Soviet people more than 13 thousand lives, according to official casualty figures. Tens of thousands were wounded, maimed, and hundreds perished in Afghan captivity. "After many years, it is clear that all our sacrifices in Afghanistan, alas, were in vain," wrote Lieutenant General V. Kirpichenko, former first deputy head of foreign intelligence.¹

On December 27, 1979, at 12 a.m., L. P. Bogdanov, a representative of the KGB under the security agencies of Afghanistan, received a call from Yu. V. Andropov's deputy, V. A. Kryuchkov, head of the First Main Directorate (Foreign Intelligence, PSU): "We need to give instructions to cover up our tracks."

All written plans of the operation, all combat logs were destroyed.

LOGIC OF THE FATAL DECISION

The logic of making a decision on intervention had several levels. The first is military-strategic considerations. In the context of a global confrontation with the United States, they reasoned like this:"If not us, then they". If Afghanistan is not our ally, then if the opposition wins, it will be the American one. Having lost Iran, Washington "should" rush to Afghanistan either by itself or through its ally, Pakistan. To prevent the creation of Western military positions in Afghanistan, perhaps even its missile bases - this was the logic of the Soviet Union's "defensive aggression", as the London Times called the Soviet military intervention.²

In Western Europe, NATO has just decided to deploy medium-range missiles covering the European territory of the USSR (formally-in response to the appearance of Soviet medium-range missiles, referred to in the West as "SS-20"). What if the same bases appear in Afghanistan? The flight time of Pershing-2 rockets is 6-8 minutes. Even the military-political leadership will not have time to hide in reliable underground shelters and save their priceless, necessary lives for humanity in the event of a nuclear military conflict using such weapons. And if there are similar missiles in Afghanistan , you can't hide in Siberia either.

Neither the level of Afghan infrastructure, nor the political impossibility for the Afghan leadership to accept this kind of American military presence, nor the decision-making process in the United States-nothing was taken into account. The chimerical idea was already gaining independent life, becoming, from the point of view of supporters of military intervention, a political reality.

The "complex of June 22, 1941" - i.e., the situation in which the USSR found itself after the attack of Nazi Germany-was still sitting in the minds of Soviet leaders.

The fear of "if not us, then the Americans" was imperceptibly intertwined with another idea, also caused by confrontation, but on a different, purely military level. "We are two wars behind the Americans. They fought in Korea and Vietnam, but we didn't, " senior Soviet military officials told me. - We must test our troops in combat conditions, "fire" them, first of all, the officer corps, check military equipment and new types of weapons. Our future defense minister should be some general with combat experience and military awards." (During these conversations, I was reminded of the monument in Lausanne to a Swiss general whose military prowess consisted in the fact that he did not participate in any battle.)

"As for the military success of the operation, we are not Americans who need to carry hot steaks to combat positions, because our actions in Czechoslovakia were such that Western strategists only gasped. They screamed for a few weeks, got hoarse and calmed down. Winners are not judged. After all, we are economically weak, and military power is the only thing we have, so we must use it.

We have seen that it is possible to change the political situation by military means, as we have just done in Angola and Ethiopia, with the transfer of Cubans trained by us and our weapons and equipment. The imperialists and their hirelings could do nothing. So, is it really here, in our backyard?

Ending. For the beginning, see: Asia and Africa today. 2014, N 5.

The study was supported by RGNF (project N 14 - 18 - 03615).

don't you think our guys will quickly restore order and leave with honor and glory?"

I don't think that everyone thought so, but many people certainly did. This opinion was shared by Yu. V. Gankovsky: "Of course, there were appeals from the Afghan leadership about sending Soviet troops. A group of our top military officials were against it. But the other group clearly wanted - I got the impression - to get a training ground where it would be possible to test both equipment and people in combat conditions. " ³

It seems to me that the propaganda cliche "international duty", which was imposed on the Soviet Army, also had a certain weight. After all, if a bourgeois military dictatorship were established in Afghanistan, even if it was "anti-imperialist" (anti-Western) and "progressive", it would be absurd to send troops to protect it from internal opposition. But there were "friends", "fraternal party", which took power under the banner of Marxism-Leninism, "loyal followers of the ideas of socialism", "ardent revolutionaries". It was only necessary to support the "healthy forces" in the party. The "international duty" was to support the "class brothers" who were going to sculpt Afghanistan in the image and likeness of the older brother.

The author found support for this point of view from the pragmatist and outstanding diplomat G. M. Kornienko...From some nuances, I got the feeling that not only Suslov, but also Andropov, Gromyko, and Ustinov were more or less under pressure, in addition to the very real concern for the security of the Soviet Union in connection with the prospect of replacing the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul with a pro-American one, there was also an ideologically conditioned false impression that it was about the danger of losing not just a neighboring country, but an "almost socialist" one, " he wrote. "From this point of view, the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan, in my opinion, was rather the culmination, and not the beginning, of our erroneous, overly ideologized course in Afghan affairs since April 1978."⁴. (Although there were no supporters of intervention among the employees of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Party, apart from its leadership, they were not asked.)

Helping the Afghan Marxists was perhaps the last convulsive act of mythologized politics, an attempt to translate into yet another reality the Messianic idea laid down in the foundation of the Soviet state. After all, it was not the Afghan revolutionaries or the Soviet leadership who acted in those circumstances, but Their Majesties ' Historical Laws, which provide that as day follows night, so does the socialist formation replace the capitalist one. Afghanistan may be a backward country, but it does not even have capitalism, but "with the fraternal help of the USSR" it can jump to socialism. So, socialism must move on the planet, and it does. Afghanistan is just another point on his victory march...

And a few more words about the ideological component of the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. When the military adviser to the Afghan government, Lieutenant General L. M. Gorelov, reported to D. F. Ustinov about the armed uprising in Herat on March 14, 1979, the marshal gave him the order: "Raise and arm the working class of Afghanistan!" Gorelov answered: "I'm listening!"⁵.

This phrase contained a deep political and cultural ignorance, perhaps not only of the old man Ustinov, who on many issues could have a clear mind and strategic thinking. The author is convinced that both he and Brezhnev, Suslov, Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko "came out of the "Greatcoat" of Stalin"*, i.e. somewhere in the depths, perhaps in the subconscious, based their worldview on the "Short Course of the CPSU(b)".

It's not just that there was no working class in Afghanistan, but in other countries, for some reason, they were not in a hurry to follow the communist Soviet banner. It is a matter of a naive, blinkered vision of the world that existed, radically changed and developed on its own, and dogmas and ossified beliefs largely determined the behavior of the Kremlin elders. The reckoning was near.

None of the top leaders had any idea of the Afghan theater of operations, the potential reaction of the Afghan population, or the social conditions. No one even opened the Soviet "Military Encyclopedia", which in the first volume, in the article" Afghanistan", described the difficult terrain and defeats of the British troops.

No one respected the history of their own country - how many decades it took for the Russian Empire to conquer small Dagestan. But Afghanistan is fifteen Daghestans with wilder and higher mountains, in which the military-technical superiority of the attacking side in tanks, artillery, even in planes and helicopters is largely lost, and the fate of the war is decided in land forces clashes, often at the level of units where traditional weapons are more important. They did not remember that the conquest of the North Caucasus, where the majority of the population was hostile to Christian Russia and the "white tsar", cost the Russian troops several hundred thousand victims.

All the gerontocrats who participated in this are dead: Brezhnev, Ustinov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov. No one will say anything anymore. The documents haven't been opened or destroyed yet. No "White Paper" has been published that contains all the embassy's reports and correspondence with the center. The resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies No. 982 - 1 of December 24, 1989 is declarative in nature and is too silent about many things. Some publications in the Soviet press, in particular in Komsomolskaya Pravda, shed some light on this matter.

December 27, 1990. the newspaper pub-

* Recall that many Russian writers came out of Gogol's "Overcoat".

I was delighted with the material collected by Valery Ochirov, Colonel, Hero of the Soviet Union, People's Deputy of the USSR ⁶. In Afghanistan, he served in a helicopter squadron of a mixed aviation regiment.

This article contains a list of requests from the Afghan leadership in September-December 1979.

A cipher telegram was mentioned, from which it becomes clear that for a long time the Center, despite the pressure of its representatives in Kabul, tried to stay away from adventures.

"1. It is considered expedient, taking into account the real state of affairs, as it is currently developing in Afghanistan, not to refuse to deal with Amin and the leadership headed by him. At the same time, Amin must be restrained in every possible way from reprisals against supporters of Taraki and other persons who are not enemies of the revolution. At the same time, it is necessary to use contacts with Amin to further identify his political face and intentions.

2. It is also recognized that it is appropriate for our military advisers serving in the Afghan forces, as well as security and internal affairs advisers, to remain in their positions. They must perform their direct functions related to the preparation and conduct of military operations against rebel formations and other counter-revolutionary forces. They, of course, should not take any part in repressive measures against persons objectionable to Amin if the units and divisions in which our advisers are located are involved in these actions.

15.09.79

Gromyko".

But the pressure on Moscow from the Afghan leadership and our Kabul representatives, who did not suspect that the decision to send troops had actually been made, also increased.

"On December 12 and 17, a KGB representative met with X. Amine. Among Amin's statements, the following are noteworthy.

Amin persistently pursued the idea of the need for direct participation of the Soviet Union in deterring the fighting of gangs in the northern regions of the DRA. His reasoning ran as follows:

- The current Afghan leadership will welcome the presence of Soviet Armed Forces in a number of strategically important locations in the northern provinces of the DRA;

- Amin said that the forms and methods of providing military assistance should be determined by the Soviet side;

The U.S.S.R. may have military garrisons in such places as it wishes;

The USSR can take under protection all objects of the Afghan-Soviet cooperation;

Soviet troops could take over the protection of DRA communications...

17.12.79

KGB representative"

At the expert level, the question of whether or not to send troops was not considered at all. As the author can judge based on conversations in various departments, the opinion of all experts, without exception, was unequivocal-do not enter. They just weren't asked.

(On the day of the announcement of the entry of troops, I was on duty in the editorial office of Pravda together with my colleague Yu. Glukhov, who spent several years working at the Soviet embassy in Kabul. Neither of us agreed, and it wasn't because we were so "smart"that we predicted the course of events in almost every detail. For the specialist, the consequences were obvious. There was no need to have the gift of clairvoyance.

That same evening, I had the opportunity to share my thoughts with Viktor Grigoryevich Afanasyev, editor-in-chief of the Pravda newspaper. "You'd better not tell them to anyone," he advised coldly, flicking ash from his cigarette. He was just giving me friendly advice.

Two years later, Pravda expelled its own correspondent in Kabul, Leonid Mironov, who dared - not in correspondence, not on the pages of the newspaper, but in a narrow Pravda circle at a party meeting of international journalists-to express cautious doubts about Soviet policy in Afghanistan. He was denounced by a former editorial employee who participated in the meeting, and the management of Pravda was forced to transfer him from the newspaper to another job for "insufficient political maturity". Those who did not hesitate to pass off black as white and shamelessly lied were held in high esteem.)

MONOPOLY OF THE PB OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The monopoly of a narrow group of Politburo members on decision-making was such that neither the Supreme Soviet nor even the Central Committee participated in this process.

An important role belonged to Leonid Brezhnev personally. And it's not just the objective factors or misinformation that pushed him in this direction. He was humanly offended, hurt by Taraka's murder. (How so! The man he had just received, the man who embodied the continuation of Lenin's great work, was murdered. How dare some Amin do this to you?! After all, he personally insulted the beloved leader of the Soviet people, an outstanding figure in the international communist and labor movement, four times Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor, three times Hero of Czechoslovakia, Marshal of the Soviet Union... Who is Amin? Did he have any contacts with the CIA? An American agent, then. We'll send in troops for two or three weeks, restore order, and leave.)

It is interesting that this hypothesis, expressed by the author in the previous edition of the book, i.e. 22 years ago, was confirmed in conversations with people who were close to those who made decisions. And then there were the memoirs of the chief "Kremlin doctor" E. I. Chazov, who wrote:: "Brezhnev, despite the decline in the ability of critical perception-

I was very, very excited about this event. Most of all, he was outraged by the fact that only on September 10, shortly before these events, he received Taraki, promised him help and support, assured that the Soviet Union fully trusted him. "What a scumbag Amin is: to strangle a man with whom he participated in the revolution together. Who is at the head of the Afghan revolution? - he said when we met. - And what will they say in other countries? How can you believe the word of Brezhnev if all his assurances of support and protection remain words?"

In much the same spirit, as Andropov told me, Brezhnev spoke in his presence and in the presence of Ustinov. It is unlikely that Brezhnev's remarks were the catalyst for the invasion of Afghanistan, but there is no doubt that the events following Taraki's assassination and the loss of confidence in Amin on the part of Brezhnev and his entourage played a role in the entry of troops into Afghanistan. It was after these events that preparations for the invasion began. " ⁷

What was the role of other Kremlin centenarians?

I don't think that the cautious A. A. Gromyko was in favor of this decision. But he couldn't break the Kremlin's principle of never contradicting his boss. And, after all, wasn't the experience of Czechoslovakia or Ethiopia a success? Are the mountains in Afghanistan higher than in Czechoslovakia? The fact that they are higher, he hardly thought.

Yu. N. Chernyakov*. Gromyko apparently understood what was happening in Afghanistan. Of course, he would oppose the entry of troops if he could. But he knew that then the next day he would be nothing, and someone else would come in his place. Internally, Gromyko was against ⁸.

E. D. Pyrlin**. As far as I know, Ustinov, of course, pushed Brezhnev to decide on intervention. In the Ministry of Defense, many believed that the army should be shelled. Sokolov, when he became minister, believed that it was even good that there was an Afghan war, the entire army should pass through Afghanistan. Gromyko never contradicted Brezhnev. If Brezhnev made decisions, he played along with them. Besides, Gromyko was already old. In Czechoslovakia, everything was "successful". What's the difference? ⁹

An. A. Gromyko***. To determine the responsibility of each person for the decisions made, it is necessary to raise the documents of those years. In any case, no diplomatic agency is inherently interested in a military conflict breaking out. Brezhnev had a surge of personal emotions after the murder of Taraki Amin. But there were also reports that were submitted to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the KGB, and the Ministry of Defense. From what I heard from my father, I was quite clear that after the fall of the Shah's Iran, there was a danger that the Americans would move their main base, directed against our facilities in the south, to Afghanistan.

Author. I would just like to clarify: there were no American air, missile or other bases in Iran at all. Large electronic intelligence bases were located in northern Iran. Iran had large weapons depots and about 40,000 advisers. They created the infrastructure for the possible deployment of American troops, but there were no American bases in Iran as such.

An. A. Gromyko. In any case, it was understood that "advisers" was a euphemism for a fairly significant American military presence. This threatened the security of the Soviet Union on its southern borders. There were powerful American military bases in Iran. The Americans have lost them. But the fact that the Soviet leadership did not want to use military force in Afghanistan for so long is due to its reluctance to get involved in this conflict. If there was such a sudden turnaround and a decision was made to intervene, Brezhnev's emotions obviously played a big role here. Brezhnev, of course, was not the only one who made this decision. Obviously, a collective opinion was formed, which was adopted in the body, the only then highest body for making foreign policy decisions.

Author. I assume that Afghanistan saved us from intervention in Poland in the early 1980s.

An. A. Gromyko. I think, of course, that the bitter lessons of Afghanistan have cooled everyone in Moscow.

(E. M. Rusakov****. That's not so. Yu. V. Andropov and, especially, V. Yaruzelsky were saved from the disaster. They understood that the Polish Army might enter the battle. Yes, and NATO-behind the fence. And this is not Amin and his bodyguards in the palace in Kabul ¹⁰.)

Author. Anatoly Andreevich, don't you think that in Afghanistan, as in other areas, the opinion of experts was not taken into account?

An. A. Gromyko. On the one hand, of course, it was not taken into account, and on the other-they did not seek to report it "up". In scientific institutes, situational analyses were conducted, in which, in general, the opinion was expressed that Afghanistan could become an American missile base ¹¹.

THE ROLE OF YU. V. ANDROPOV. A COURTIER OR AN OUTSTANDING LEADER?

The role of the clever Andropov remains mysterious. Couldn't he have calculated the chess game two or three moves ahead? Some light on his behavior is shed by the words of B. N. Ponomarev, dropped in a conversation with the author: "But Babrak Karmal was on the hook of the chekists. After all, he visited Andropov in Lubyanka when he was exiled to Czechoslovakia. " ¹²

It is possible that Andropov was dominated by his Hungarian experience in 1956-the successful suppression of an anti-communist, anti-Soviet uprising and the selection of a strong and flexible figure for the post of leader of Hungary, Janos Kadar, to ensure, as then

* Yuri Nikolaevich Chernyakov (1918-2004) - Soviet diplomat, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR to the Syrian Arab Republic (1977-1979). Author of several books and articles on international relations.

** Evgeny Dmitrievich Pyrlin (1932-2001) - Soviet and Russian diplomat, orientalist.

** Anatoly Gromyko is a well-known Soviet and Russian international scholar and Africanist.

**** Evgeny Maksimovich Rusakov-former employee of the PSU of the KGB of the USSR.

it seemed that the success of a fairly liberal communist regime in Hungary, which retained loyalty to the USSR.

Andropov was described by both the KGB and the diplomats who worked with him as an outstanding person. But that is precisely why (before coming to power) he had to play the role of the most cautious courtier in the Politburo, where he joined Ustinov and Gromyko in 1973.

He should not have aroused suspicion either among the senile Brezhnev, or among the political old age and dullness of the other members of the Politburo (the author does not include Ustinov and Gromyko as such). Otherwise, he would simply have been eaten by "comrades" in the highest party and state body. Perhaps he was destined for the role of the Russian Deng Xiaoping, but he was "late": his own illnesses did not allow him to do this. In the meantime...

(E. D. Pyrlin: "He should have come to power sooner! He would have done the same thing that they are trying to do now, but smarter, more consistent, would not have rushed from side to side, would not have destroyed the country. After all, from the very beginning, he took on one of the most important things for us - discipline. This corresponded to the mood of the people-to restore order. I'm late, I'm late... It is curious that he passed the Stalinist years undamaged... Old man Shepilov is again a lost chance. He was thrown out of the leadership, apparently because he stood out too much. " ¹³)

For many years, being on the edge of a confrontation with the United States, drawing information, i.e. information and disinformation, from his intelligence officers, Andropov seriously believed that the elimination of Amin and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan would not make it possible to turn it into an American ally. His personal responsibility for that fateful decision is beyond doubt.

E. M. Rusakov. W. Churchill in 1939 called the Soviet Union of the Stalin era "an incomprehensible puzzle wrapped in the mystery of a riddle." The same can be said about the decision to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. True, the main characters of this "riddle" are known: Brezhnev, Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko, Suslov. It does not matter who, apart from the General Staff, was against such a decision. After the fact, almost everyone was "against". As the Americans say, victory always has many "parents", and defeat remains an "orphan".

Initially, the Soviet leadership repeatedly rejected requests from Afghan leaders to send troops.

What happened? Why did the mood change at the top? Most likely, it was a combination of different factors that created the cumulative effect.

Author. In other words, you agree that you are entwined in one thing: the fear (erroneous) that Amin has defected to the Americans and is going to "take Afghanistan with him", and the country will become an ally of the United States, and American missile bases will appear there, and Brezhnev's personal resentment over the murder of Taraki, and the opportunity to "stretch" the increased military muscle, and confidence in the short-term operation...

E. M. Rusakov. In general, so. However, experts claimed that there was quite convincing evidence of Amin's betrayal. But this does not remove the question of whether it was possible to find another solution to this problem, less fraught with far-reaching consequences. For example, to "turn over" Amin and report to Leonid Ilyich that he repented and took the path of correction. As for the missile bases in Afghanistan, it is true that the Americans were much more interested in deploying Pershing-2 medium-range missiles in Germany (as far as I understand, they did not bother with Siberia).

Author. How, in your opinion, was this ill-fated decision to send troops to Afghanistan made?¹⁴

N. G. Yegorychev*. It seems to me that the decision was made in a very short time, largely on impulse, without sufficient elaboration, with confidence that we have the strength, the power is there - and we will restore order. But it turned out to be much more complicated. What was the reason for this decision? I think that the CEO's ambitions are first and foremost. He was a narrow-minded, old, infirm man. You remember that there was an episode when Taraki, returning from Havana, stopped in Moscow. He had a very warm meeting with Brezhnev. It was all shown on television, in film magazines, as they kissed, as they greeted each other. Taraki returned to Afghanistan, where he was overthrown and then killed. Brezhnev took this as a personal insult. "How so? Some Amin did not take into account such a great man as Brezhnev? Where did our people look? Who do you support there? How many people do you need? Fifty thousand? Ustinov! Mitya! Move, restore order!" Mitya didn't know Afghanistan. Lenya didn't know Afghanistan. But they have already decided to intervene. Under this, politics began to be unprincipled.

Author. How did the embassy react to this?

N. G. Yegorychev. The diplomats who were in the embassy understood the situation and spoke out against interference. They weren't asked.

Author. There were good experts there, and I knew many of them personally.

N. G. Yegorychev. When I was in Afghanistan, I worked with them in constant contact. Many have already been to Afghanistan for the second or third time. We had a lot of detailed conversations with them, and I believed that these experts really understood that it was impossible to send troops, but their opinion was not taken into account. The role of other organizations? As far as I know, the military took this decision with great reluctance.

I mean serious military personnel, the General Staff, first of all. I do not consider Ustinov a military man, because he was a foreign body as a minister. He was rather a politician, but also a shallow politician... Andropov was a very careful man. Gromyko is also a very cautious person, although

* Nikolay Grigoryevich Yegorychev (1920-2005) - prominent Soviet state and party leader, secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU (1962-1967). Ambassador to Denmark (1970-1984), Ambassador to Afghanistan (February-November 1988).

I've never been able to go against the current. Maybe it was his mistake. Maybe he had other moves in store. It's hard for me to say right now. I don't believe he would play this game so unscrupulously. I don't understand his position yet.

The Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR did not get to the truth. Let's see what historians will say when all the documents are opened... We are now trying to put all the blame on the military. I don't agree with that. The military did a significant part of what it was supposed to do. They guarded communications, roads, airfields, and garrisoned all major cities. They managed to create conditions in which the new government could strengthen. They helped create the army, trained it. That's all we can ask of the military. But the military cannot strengthen the political system. It is impossible to sit on bayonets. But politicians have not done everything. Everyone talked about the "revolutionary situation" and how to develop the revolution. They were especially interested in Ponomarev's arguments, in his office. It did a lot of damage.

We have transferred our methods to the land of Afghanistan, which do not work for us either. They (with our submission) hit the small capitalist there, the merchant. Then they began to correct it. Our party advisers were there; among them were good guys, honest, conscientious, intelligent, brave. But they didn't understand the conditions.

Author. Even if we assume that some honest second secretary of the regional committee came as an adviser to some Afghan province and gave recommendations, then he could not do anything but harm. Do you agree with this?

N. G. Yegorychev. Not quite, not completely. We have always warned them: please do not interfere. We asked them not to give advice, but to give me, at the embassy, real information about what was happening there, in the province. The Afghans messed up with religion, and then Comrade Najib expressed the opinion that in connection with the flight of an Afghan into space, it would be necessary to build a mosque in Afghanistan. But they don't have that capability. Can we help you? We even carefully passed his information to the Center. But the Center did not respond ¹⁵.

DID THE USSR NEED THE PERSIAN GULF?

The Soviet leadership did not calculate the situation in Afghanistan. It could not anticipate the reaction of the West, the Muslim world, and China. There was no confidence in the Soviet leadership in the West.

The neoconservatives who came to power in one Western country after another advocated harshness towards the USSR. US President Carter's position was undermined by the Iranian revolution, Soviet and Cuban actions in Africa. The axis of political life in the United States was shifting towards greater conservatism for internal reasons. Detente and before Afghanistan went downhill. It was decided to deploy medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Afghanistan itself was not so important. What if tomorrow the Soviet Union breaks through to the Persian Gulf?

US President Carter's National Security Aide Z. Brzezinski put a note on the chief's desk the day after the 40th Army entered Afghanistan. Its essence boiled down to the fact that the Soviet Union was about to reach the "warm seas", i.e., the Persian Gulf with its oil. We need to help the armed Afghan opposition by all possible means. If the" breakthrough to warm seas "was propaganda nonsense, then the task of dragging the Soviet Union into its" Vietnam " and making it pay dearly for it was, alas, realistic.

"Was there a desire to move towards the warm Indian Ocean or not? - reasoned Professor Yu. V. Gankovsky. - You can only move towards the ocean through Balochistan. But we held back the Baloch people. According to the information that I have and can assess, any talk about our desire to move to the Indian Ocean seems to me untenable. " ¹⁶

Author. Was there an underlying intention to move closer to the Persian Gulf when making the decision to send troops?

N. G. Yegorychev. I have not seen any evidence of this idea anywhere - not in any documents, not in writing, not orally, not in conversations with Afghan leaders, not in conversations with our leaders.

Author. But there is one dangerous thing about politics: we don't plan anything ourselves, it's not part of our tasks, but our actions are such that they can't be interpreted by others in any other way than what they look like to outside observers. You know an example of this in Europe. If we were not going to "iron" Europe with tanks to the Atlantic, then why did we have a triple superiority in tanks in Europe? Do you understand me?"

N. G. Yegorychev. Sure.

Author. The same applies to Afghanistan. We are approaching the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf is the oil, the lifeblood of the entire Western economy. And we say: no, we don't need the Persian Gulf. If you were the Americans, the Japanese, and the British, how would you explain our actions?

N. G. Yegorychev. Americans and others may have thought that such a threat may exist in the future. But I have never received any confirmation that such plans existed.

Author. Yes. But if you are a politician, you must take into account the reactions of others to your actions.

N. G. Yegorychev. The West, from the very first days of the entry of our troops, began to put forward this argument against us. At that time, we did not set such political and military tasks, but objectively our actions could frighten the other side. They had every reason to do so.

Author. Do you think the thesis that the USSR was threatened by the appearance of American missiles in Afghanistan on the eve of the entry of our troops is correct?

N. G. Yegorychev. No, I do not accept this thesis. First of all, the Americans after Vietnam would not have gone anywhere at all at that moment-

Secondly, they are pragmatists and would not invest money and political capital in Afghanistan. We shouldn't have done that either.

Author. I still believe that the Afghan epic played a tragic but great role. Just as Afghanistan was the result of the supposedly successful intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, so our difficulties in Afghanistan saved us from a greater tragedy in Poland.¹⁷

At that time, a "Sovietized" Afghanistan seemed like a threat to China - bypassing China from the flank and putting pressure on its friendly Pakistan. The proposed "breakthrough" to the Persian Gulf would give the Soviet Union a significant strategic advantage over China. Therefore, among the three conditions for normalizing relations with the USSR, Beijing set not only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, but also Soviet troops from Afghanistan. China has actively supported the armed Afghan opposition. Meanwhile, Sino-American cooperation against the Soviet Union was growing. Digital relations between the two countries were restored in December 1978, and in January 1980, US Secretary of Defense H. Brown visited China. The parties agreed "on separate but temporarily established actions against the USSR in Afghanistan." ¹⁸

For the Muslim world, the actions of an atheistic communist power-the USSR-were an aggression against a Muslim country on the outskirts of the Persian Gulf. And then there is Saudi Arabia, not only with its oil wealth, but also with the holy places of Islam-Mecca and Medina. In the south of Arabia, the Marxist regime was strengthened. In Ethiopia, the "communists" came to power. This is how the situation was viewed from Riyadh and other Muslim capitals. Therefore, not only their negative political reaction to the actions of the Soviet Union was natural, but also financial and military assistance to the armed Afghan opposition.

LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT

By deploying troops to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union faced a hostile, long-term guerrilla war-ready population that received military, material, financial, and other support from virtually all over the world. It was becoming clear to many in the Soviet leadership that a military defeat of the opposition was unrealistic.

Yu. V. Pankovsky. When the stay of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was prolonged and not limited to a few weeks, then they tried to analyze the situation. Already in 1980, prominent Soviet military leaders visited Afghanistan one after another. The unanimous conclusion was that there is no military solution. What did Ustinov do? In early 1981, he wrote a memo to the Politburo stating that there was no military solution. There is not a single mark on this document. I read it. "It can be slippery to walk on other pebbles." This document went to the archive, as if it was not there ¹⁹.

"Having made sure during the first year that the presence and military actions of our army in Afghanistan did not contribute to either stabilizing the situation in the country or consolidating the friendly regime, we had to leave Afghanistan," wrote V. Kirpichenko. - The Soviet leadership did not show any sobriety, courage, or foresight in this matter, although some of our military leaders and politicians understood the situation well.

At regular meetings where the situation in Afghanistan was discussed and at which I was present, Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev, now deceased, and Army General V. I. Varennikov said in a low voice: "Understand, after all, the Soviet army is at war with the people, and there can be no victory in Afghanistan!" ²⁰

Having made a criminally wrong decision, the Kremlin leaders would like to let events take their course. They could no longer take any action, pretending that nothing special was happening, repeating the same wording-incantations, sending their young citizens in military uniforms by inertia to participate in a war that was unnecessary for the Soviet Union, spending billions of rubles, whose accounts they did not know.

Babrak Karmal was a weak leader. "For many years I had to meet with him (B. Karmal - A.V.)," writes Chazov. - This is a nice, pleasant, intelligent person, well-read, who is interesting to talk to, especially since he knows English perfectly. But he is a refined intellectual, devoid of organizational talent, unable to lead people, instill in them faith in the propagandized idea. Every time I met him, he looked confused, overwhelmed by the responsibility that had fallen on his shoulders. I had the impression that, isolated in his palace, he did not know what to do, how to get out of this situation. He started abusing alcohol, there were changes in the liver, and we had to strictly warn him about the need to comply with the regime. He agreed, but I think he continued to lead the same lifestyle. I warned Andropov, who took care of Karmal and supported him, that if he did not listen to our recommendations, everything could end sadly. " ²¹

The struggle between the" Parchamites "and" Khalqists " continued to divide the party and the army. And the armed opposition, fueled by money, weapons, personnel, and Islamist volunteers from dozens of countries, strengthened and expanded its territory of control.

Yu. V. Andropov personally flew to Kabul with all the necessary precautions.

Looking ahead, Soviet aviation losses increased after 1986, when the United States openly began to supply the Mujahideen with Stingers, advanced surface-to-air missiles.

The Soviet leadership, as if coming to its senses, was looking for a political solution. But the hopes of withdrawing troops while maintaining a friendly regime - at least in the same form, at least in a head start-

me coalitions - were unrealistic. The United States did not want to let the USSR out of the Afghan trap, so all agreements with Pakistan or through the UN, 95 percent ready, remained on paper. But it was necessary to leave.

"The fact that Andropov, who became the first person in the party and the state in November 1982, was ripe for such a decision, I judged, in particular, from his conversation with UN Secretary - General Perez de Cuellar on March 28, 1983," writes Kornienko. - The Soviet leader did not just tell him about his desire for a peaceful solution to the Afghan problem, but frankly listed five reasons why he considered it necessary. Counting on his fingers, Andropov said that the current situation caused serious damage to relations between the Soviet Union, first, with the West; second, with the socialist countries; third, with the Islamic world; fourth, with other "third world" countries; and finally, fifth, it caused serious damage to relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. it is very painful for the internal situation of the USSR, for its economy and society. " ²²

Well, that's right. But didn't our "outstanding" leader know all these arguments when he voted for the ill-fated decision?

After Andropov's death on February 9, 1984, behind-the-scenes work on the Afghan settlement continued.

Both Marshal S. F. Akhromeyev and First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Kornienko insisted on a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops. They believed that without Soviet military support, the PDPA would not be able to hold power, and some kind of coalition government should be created in advance. E. A. Shevardnadze (Minister of Foreign Affairs) and V. A. Kryuchkov insisted on preliminary strengthening of the PDPA so that it would hold on even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. M. S. Gorbachev hesitated. Kornienko, who did not work together with Shevardnadze, was transferred to the first deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, which was then headed by A. F. Dobrynin.

In May 1986, the weak Babrak Karmal was replaced as the Afghan leader by the Pashtun Muhammad Najibullah, who was "elected" President of Afghanistan in 1987. But the war continued. Negotiations with the United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan opposition dragged on.

On February 8, 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev announced a specific date for the start of the withdrawal of troops-May 15, 1988, in order to complete it within 9 months. The relevant Geneva agreements were signed, which neither the United States, nor Pakistan, nor the Alliance of Seven, which led the armed opposition, were going to implement. (Soon, both Kornienko and Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff, "retired". Both were too independent and inconvenient for Gorbachev-Shevardnadze.)

The withdrawal of Soviet troops was completed on February 15, 1989, when the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel-General B. V. Gromov, was the last to cross the border on the bridge over the Amu Darya. None of the top Soviet leaders showed up for their meeting. The Najibullah regime was fed from the USSR and lasted until 1992, but the aid to it was already completely stopped by Boris Yeltsin on January 1, 1992.

When the Mujahideen occupied Kabul, Najibullah took refuge in the UN mission, where he remained for several years.

Fighting immediately broke out between various opposition groups. It became impossible for Russian diplomats to stay in Kabul, as heavy shells fell on the embassy's territory. Three Il-76 military transport planes were sent to evacuate the embassy staff and all Russian citizens. In the first two, 167 Russians, including women, and almost three dozen employees of other embassies took off under fire from the Afghans.

The main part of the diplomats, together with Ambassador E. D. Ostrovenko and his wife, were supposed to fly on the third board, which was hit by a rocket and caught fire. Crew members and security paratroopers managed to leave the burning plane. Everyone was still alive. The empty plane exploded. 66 people spent a day in the airport bunker.

Ambassador Ostrovenko traveled to burning and shooting Kabul, spoke with Acting President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Foreign Ministry, and received worthless security guarantees. Uzbek Abdurrashid Dostum, a representative of the leader of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, singled out three An-36 motor aircraft. 66 people, including the ambassador and his wife, flew to Mazar-I-Sharif on August 29. From here, everyone took buses to Uzbekistan ²³.

In 1996, the radical Islamist movement "Taliban"seized power. Ignoring the international status of the UN mission, armed Taliban broke into its premises, captured, tortured, then killed Najibullah, and hung his body in the square.

The long-suffering country was about to experience new acts of tragedy.

^{Kirpichenko V.} 1 Razvedka: litsy i lichnosti [Intelligence: faces and personalities], Moscow, 1998, p. 358.

² The Times, 02.01.1980.

³ Conversation with Yu. V. Gankovsky, January 1990

^{Kornienko G.} 4 Kholodnaya voina [Cold War]. Certificate of its participant, Moscow, 2001, p. 388.

^{Bogdanov L.} 5 Afghan Notebook, Moscow, 2008, p. 218.

⁶ Komsomolskaya Pravda. 27.12.1990.

^{Chazov E.} 7 Zdorov'e i vlast ' [Health and Power]. Memoirs of the Kremlin doctor, Moscow, 1992, p. 153.

⁸ Conversation with Yu. N. Chernyakov, March 1990

⁹ Interview with E. D. Pyrlin, May 1990

¹⁰ Interview with E. M. Rusakov, December 2013

¹¹ Conversation with A. A. Gromyko, May 1990.

¹² Interview with B. N. Ponomarev, July 1990.

¹³ Conversation with E. D. Pyrlin...

¹⁴ Conversation with E. M. Rusakov...

¹⁵ Interview with N. G. Yegorychev, January 1990

¹⁶ Conversation with Yu. V. Gankovsky...

¹⁷ Conversation with N. G. Yegorychev...

Foreign policy of the USSR in the years of the "Cold War" and "new thinking", Moscow, 2014, pp. 407 - 408.

¹⁹ Conversation with Yu. V. Gankovsky...

^{Kirpichenko V.} 20 Decree. soch., pp. 348-349.

^{Chazov E.} 21 Edict. soch., p. 154.

^{Kornienko G.} 22 Decree. soch., pp. 392-393.

^{Ostrovenko E. D.} 23-30 years with Afghanistan and Iran, Moscow, 2011, pp. 101-104.

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