(EARLY 1970S-FIRST HALF OF THE 1980S)

At the turn of the 60s and 70s, changes began in the political arena of Great Britain, which led to a significant violation of the post-war model of domestic political development, the stereotypes of political behavior of the masses. The agreement that had existed for many years between the two main parties on the fundamental issues of foreign and domestic policy began to give way to an increasingly noticeable aggravation of inter-party struggle. The process of polarization of the main political forces was accompanied by sharp fluctuations in the likes and dislikes of the electorate, the emergence of a new, centrist group in the political arena of the country. At the same time, as a result of the crisis of traditional British reformism, the axis of internal political development in England shifted noticeably to the right. What was the basis of such significant changes and how exactly did they manifest themselves?

Despite the best efforts of the ruling circles to overcome the chronic lag of the British economy from the economies of most other countries of developed capitalism, it continued to worsen. Attempts by first the Conservative and then the Labour governments of the 1960s to introduce elements of state-monopoly planning and programming, and to use state intervention to accelerate scientific and technological progress and economic growth, did not have the expected effect. Britain's share of industrial production in the capitalist world continued to decline steadily, from 11.6% in 1950 to 9.3% in 1960, 8.3% in 1965, and 7.1% in 1970.1 The average annual growth rate of the gross national product decreased from 3.2% in 1958-1961 to 2.2% in 1965-1970.2 and was significantly lower than in other capitalist countries. Accordingly, the growth rates of household incomes and social insurance payments have also decreased. By the late 70s and early 80s, the standard of living in the UK was 20-25% lower than in France and Germany, and accounted for 92% of the Midwestern European 3 .

A direct consequence of this kind of stagnation in the economy was an increase in social tension, an increase in the strike struggle. If during most of the 60s, the number of working days lost as a result of strikes averaged about

1 Great Britain. M. 1972, p. 17. For more information, see: Hesin E. S. England in the Economy of modern capitalism. M. 1979; Gamble A. Britain in Decline. Lnd. 1981.

2 Great Britain, p. 25.

3 The Times, 8.X.1983, p. 3.

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3 million, then in 1969 this figure jumped to 6.8 million, in 1970-to 10.97, and in 1971 - to 13.2 million .4 At the same time, there was a rather sharp shift in the number of influential trade unions, and the left wing in the Labor Party was strengthened. These changes were reflected in its adoption of a new program, which, admittedly, was the most radical document of the party in the post-war period. The program, in particular, aimed at achieving "fundamental and irreversible shifts in the distribution of power and wealth in favor of workers and their families"5.It outlined measures to significantly restrict the freedom of action of monopolistic corporations and establish control over them by the state and the public.

No less serious and far-reaching changes have taken place since the late 60s and on the opposite flank of the socio-political spectrum of Great Britain. Disillusioned with attempts to moderate the claims of the masses by colluding with the right-wing trade union leadership, influential bourgeois circles and their political representatives became increasingly determined to adopt other, more rigid methods of government. As early as 1967, the Conservative Party developed the document "Fair Relations at Work", which proposed to implement legislation aimed at restricting the rights of trade unions in the enterprise and putting serious obstacles to the conduct of the strike struggle. At the same time, this and a number of subsequent party documents and speeches of its leaders increasingly emphasized the need to revise the entire philosophy of post-war British conservatism based on reformism, to "revive" the principles of "free enterprise", individualism, and competition, to reduce the regulatory role of the state in the socio-economic sphere and, accordingly, to reduce public spending on social services. social needs, reduction of direct taxation and other measures 6 . It was precisely with such attitudes, aimed at strengthening "entrepreneurial power", increasing discipline and "diligence" in the workplace, and saving on social expenditures of the state, that the Conservatives went to the 1970 elections, and their victory in them was considered by them as a kind of mandate to implement a new approach. In the economic sphere, his goal was to increase labor productivity, increase the competitiveness of British goods, and strengthen the country's position in the world capitalist economy.. In the socio-political sphere, it was intended to strengthen the power of the bourgeoisie in general, and of big capital in particular, and to reduce the influence of the workers ' and trade union movements.

The subsequent development of the two main parties in Great Britain, however, took much more complex paths than those that were outlined by them in the late 60s and early 70s. After taking a number of measures to implement its electoral program, the Conservative government of E. Heath made a 180-degree turn and returned to the previous Keynesian methods of state regulation of the economy within a year and a half after coming to power in 1970. It also failed to show consistency in another important area of policy - the sphere of "industrial relations". Unable to break the resistance of the trade unions to their attempts to implement the anti-trade union law 7 approved by the Parliament, it did so

4 Great Britain, p. 318.

5 Labour Programme for Britain. Lnd. 1973, p. 7.

6 See Garable A. The Conservative Nation. Lnd. 1974, pp. 92 - 130.

7 For more information, see The Situation and Struggle of the British Working Class, Moscow, 1974, pp. 56-70.

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emphasis is placed on establishing trilateral cooperation between business, trade unions and the state on a non-corporate basis. However, this did not prevent him from going to a decisive clash with the miners ' union, whose strike effectively paralyzed the country's economic life and forced E. Heath to call early parliamentary elections for the end of February 1974, during which his government, as is known, was defeated. 8
The policy of the Labour Party that came to power was also far from consistent. After initially passing a series of pro-labor legislation and repealing the Conservative anti-union law, the Wilson Government essentially abandoned the requirements of the 1973 program for controlling large corporations and implementing government regulation aimed at accelerating economic growth. The "social contract" concluded with trade unions has become increasingly used to freeze wages, and it is no coincidence that three years later the British Congress of Trade Unions (BCTU) actually disavowed it.

Thus, at least on the surface, everything has returned to "normal", as both the Conservatives and Labour were unable to implement the new approach that they formulated when they were in opposition. Nevertheless, the changes in the positions of the two main parties did not go unnoticed for the overall alignment of political forces in the country and for its party-political system. Disappointed in their expectations, voters became increasingly skeptical of what these parties and their leaders were promising. In addition, many Englishmen, brought up in the tradition of political moderation, began to be shocked by the new, much sharper notes that sounded both from the left, from the Labour Party, and from the right, from the Conservatives. As a result, during the additional parliamentary and local elections of 1972-1973, the number of votes received by "third" parties, primarily the Liberals and Scottish Nationalists, significantly increased. The growth in popularity of these parties was also recorded by public opinion polls. The overall level of support for" third " parties rose from 6-10% in the 50s and 60s to 30% or more .9
In political and academic circles at that time, the question of creating a viable "party of the center", which would gather under its banners voters dissatisfied with both main parties and would be a stabilizing factor in British politics, was beginning to be widely debated .10 Supporters of this idea believed that in addition to the liberals, such a party could include some members and supporters of both main parties who adhere to" moderate " positions. However, in the 1974 elections, the "third" parties collected a smaller percentage of votes than they had hoped. Nevertheless, they managed to win the support of about a quarter of all voters. The Liberals won 19.4% of the vote in the February 1974 elections, and 18.3% in October of the same year11 . Thus, although in the political course of governments in the first by-

8 See Baykova A. N. British Trade unions and class Struggle (the second half of the 60s-early 70s), Moscow, 1976, pp. 182-189.

9 The Times, 30. IX. 1972; see also: Gorbik V. A. English Liberals: Problems of the "third" Party. In: Problems of British History. 1980. Moscow, 1980.

10 See, for example, Finer S. (ed.). Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform. Lnd. 1975.

11 State and Society in Contemporary Britain. Lnd. 1984, p. 261. The October 1974 election was called by Labour because it won only a relative majority in the House of Commons in February. But the elections in October also gave them an absolute margin of only three seats, which was already nullified by 1977 - 1978 due to losses in by-elections.

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In the mid-70s, there were not enough drastic changes, in general, the political arena of Great Britain began to lose its former stability quite noticeably, and its party-political system - a clearly defined two-party character.

Despite widespread skepticism in both academic and political circles about the possibility of far-reaching changes in British politics, there were quite influential forces in both the Conservative and Labour parties who believed that the failure of the radical right and left was not due to the" unviability " of their proposed course, but only to the inconsistency of forces those who took it upon themselves to conduct it, due to insufficient ideological, political and organizational preparation for it. When the Labour government that had just come to power began to implement, albeit inconsistently, a number of measures that would meet the interests of the masses, dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs naturally concentrated in the right-wing, bourgeois camp, which soon after the elections tried to regroup its forces and launch a counteroffensive. Influential bourgeois circles were not only irritated by the reformist experiments and the "consent policy" pursued by Labor. There is also growing dissatisfaction with the fact that Heath and his associates "missed" the opportunity that presented itself to them for a decisive renewal of the political course and thereby contributed to the weakening of the position of Conservative forces and the coming of Labor to power. Unsurprisingly, these sentiments resulted in a rapidly growing opposition to Heath within the Conservative Party and, as is well known, led to the assumption of the post of its leader, M. Thatcher.

The challenge to Heath by his rivals and the subsequent battle for the leadership of the Conservative Party were not personal, but political in nature. Hit was accused not of weakness, incompetence, etc., but of deviating from the agreed course, of unwillingness to pursue it. As for his opponents, the campaign they launched was again aimed not just at replacing the leader, but also at transferring the party to a consistently right-wing platform. As one of the most active supporters of changing the Tory course, C. Joseph, admitted in April 1974, only now, after 18 years in Parliament, he was converted to the true Conservative faith .12 An analysis of the behavior of a number of other right-wing conservative figures, including Thatcher, shows that, despite their long-standing affiliation with the right-wing current of the party, a decisive shift in their consciousness and behavior also occurred during that somewhat pivotal period. It is significant that E. Powell, who had been an active propagandist of "free enterprise" since the mid-60s, was not able to gain any significant support at that time and was considered rather as an odious figure on the extreme right flank of the party .13
The intensification of the struggle for power in the Tory party coincided with a general rather sharp increase in ideological and political activity on the right flank of the British establishment. Already in 1974, almost immediately after the defeat of the party in the February elections, opposition figures Joseph Thatcher created the Center for Political Research, which turned into a kind of think tank for right-wing forces, which actually opposed the research department

12 Seyd P. Factionalism in the Conservatore Party. A Paper for SSRC Conference, Oxford. 1978, p. 8.

13 In 1968, after a racist speech by Powell, Heath removed him from the Shadow Cabinet and ended his political career, at least within the Tory Party.

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under the central party apparatus of the conservatives (who held rather pro-Hit positions). The Institute of Directors, the most ideologized business organization in the country, defended similar positions with increasing determination and aggressivity. 14 Combining several tens of thousands of directors of private - capitalist firms, the institute opposed "excessive" state intervention in the economy, strongly condemned nationalization, defended the" independence "of private business, and demanded "curbing"corruption. trade unions 15 .

More broadly, the activation of right-wing conservative forces during this period was reflected in the creation of a number of new organizations that unite non-proletarian segments of the population. The most numerous of them was the National Association of Taxpayers formed in June 1974, whose number reached 350 thousand people in just six months. The Association was established on a formally non-partisan and even "non-political" basis, its main goal was to fight for limiting the sharply increased local taxation under Labor, which is mainly used to cover social needs and is levied on citizens who have real estate and a fairly high level of income. The Association launched a vigorous lobbying activity and largely contributed to the political cohesion of the right-wing radical opposition, which gained an organized and mass character.

The activities of organizations such as the National Federation of Independent Workers, the Middle Class Association, and the Association of Independent Workers, which were established in the same year in 1974, were also formally non-political, but in fact neoconservative. As researchers of the behavior of the British "middle class" of that period note, the deliberate emphasis by these organizations on their political neutrality was actually a way of expressing their dissatisfaction with the "moderate" line pursued by the then Tory leadership .16 A kind of apogee of the activity of conservative-minded strata and groups was the creation in 1975 of the National Association for Freedom (now the Freedom Association). She began to widely practice various actions aimed at disrupting strikes, and began to actively intervene in labor conflicts on the side of entrepreneurs. As one of its documents emphasized, its members "agree that the excessive power of trade unions is the greatest of all evils that hinder the prosperity of Britain." 17 The Association also waged an unbridled campaign against "Marxists" in the trade unions and the Labor Party, opposed individual concessions to workers made by the Labor government, organized anti-Soviet gatherings and demonstrations, and expressed support for racist regimes in South Africa. In addition to individual members and activists (about 15,000 in total in February 1977), the association also attracted some of the above-mentioned small and medium-sized business organizations, as well as a number of reactionary centers, such as the Goals of Freedom and Entrepreneurship, Industrial Research, and others. Having no formal ties to the Conservative Party, the association strongly supported the figures.

14 In fact, the institute is not so much an entrepreneurial organization as a "club" that unites right-wing conservative entrepreneurs (Sampson A. The Changing Anatomy of Britain. Lnd. 1983, pp. 216, 337).

15 См. The Director, 1974, July, p. 3; August, pp. 139 - 140, 166; September, p. 284.

16 King R., Ray nor J. The Middle Class. Lnd. 1981, pp. 220 - 224.

17 Morning Star, 2.VII.1977.

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its right wing, many of whom collaborated with it and, in fact, formed its leading backbone.

The activity of extreme right-wing forces outside the Conservative party or on the "border" territories with it was combined with an increased activation of the same forces within the party itself, and not least in its local organizations. According to a number of observers, it was these latter who became the epicenter of the anti-Hit campaign, and their pressure on members of Parliament played a significant role in electing Thatcher as Tory leader and further strengthening the position of the neoconservative, "Thatcherist" current in the party .18 The reason for such serious changes in the consciousness and behavior of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois masses was that, unlike the situation of previous years, when, despite all the difficulties experienced by the British economy, social measures of the state and concessions in the field of wages did not seriously affect their well-being, from the beginning of the 70s, the situation began to change radically.

The growth of social expenditures of the state required further increases in income and local taxes, and only in 1974 these taxes increased by 30% 19 . To an even greater extent than the increase in taxes, the situation of these strata began to be reflected in the growth of consumer prices. If in 1961 the average annual growth rate was 4.1%, then in 1971-1975 it was already 13%, and in 1976 it was 16.5%. To a large extent , as a result of inflation in 1974-1975, there was an absolute reduction in consumer spending in the country20, and it was often the middle strata that were most affected by it21 . Inflation has become one of the most acute social problems, and it is natural that the question of its "culprits" and ways to combat it has become the center of political debate, largely determining the political preferences of various strata and groups of the population. In this case, it was not the objective situation that was crucial, but the subjective interpretation of what was happening. The claims of conservative propaganda that the main culprit of inflation is the trade unions, which allegedly seek unduly high wage growth and, accordingly, force entrepreneurs to inflate prices, were picked up by the media and attacked the ordinary Englishman. The persistence and persistence with which the trade unions defended the interests of workers in the face of galloping inflation, the high level of strike activity was also blamed on them and caused a rather significant increase in anti-union sentiment. As public opinion polls have shown22 , this kind of sentiment was widespread not only among the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois masses, but also in other strata of the population, including the "upper" strata of the working class, who were very acutely aware of the negative effects of inflation and tax increases.

For all the spontaneity of what was happening, this was by no means an" unmanageable " activity of the conservative-minded masses. Both the membership of the leadership of right - wing conservative organizations such as the Freedom Association, which were created in 1974-1975 and existed earlier, to the elite groups of British society, and the list of "donors" of these organizations, which is dominated by monopolistic corporations.-

18 The Times, 11.II, 13.X.1975; Morning Star, 11.II.1975.

19 King R., Raynor J. Op. cit., p. 224.

20 Great Britain. Moscow, 1981, p. 157, 163.

21 Bradly I. The English Middle Classes are Alive and Kiking. Lnd. 1982, pp. 161 - 162.

22 Crew I. The Electorate: Partisan Deahgnement. Years Ten On. In: Change in British Politics. Lnd. 1984, pp. 195 - 196.

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The most active role of the "solid" conservative press in promoting neoconservative ideas, 24 and, finally, data on the social composition of the leadership of local Tory party organizations, 25 all point to the leading, leading role of "big business" in the process of reorientation of this party in 1974-1975 and in the subsequent period. At the same time, the active role played by the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois masses in this turn has left a significant imprint both on the further development of the Conservative party and on the political life of the country as a whole. This activation required not only changes in the approach, program guidelines, and specific requirements of the party, but also new, more effective forms of "communication" between leaders and the masses, a new language, and a new style of party leadership.

The role played by local Tory organizations in electing a new party leader has already been discussed above. No less important was their position in determining its general line, strengthening the positions and authority of figures who adhere to right-wing radical views. Numerous statements of observers and press materials show how much the conservative audience responded to the speeches of such figures and how coldly and unfriendly the same audience met speakers who insisted on "moderation", warned against "extremes" , etc., etc.

The peculiarity of the situation that developed in the 70s was that the usual "liberalist" sentiments among small businesses, dissatisfaction with the growing state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, carried out, as a rule, in the interests of big capital, this time became very widespread among the latter. The reason for this discontent (which was eloquently expressed by the Institute of Directors mentioned above) was the growing awareness that, as a result of the ever-increasing socio-economic expansion of the state, the "balance of power" between the state and private business is shifting not in favor of the latter, and that if this expansion is not put an end to, the moment may come when the state will be able to "dictate" its will to private business. Of course, such unanimity in relation to the" guardianship " of the state, although it was not caused in all respects by similar reasons, seriously strengthened the social base of neoconservatism, the unity of the ranks of its supporters. And this, in turn, created conditions for the further expansion of "Thatcherism", gaining support in other segments of the population. Moreover, the Labour Party, which was in power at that time, showed a clear inability to cope with the growing economic difficulties.

After the crisis of 1974-1975, industrial production experienced stagnation, the level of inflation reached truly unprecedented levels in peacetime, unemployment grew rapidly, and the economy increased-

23 См. Labour Research, 1982, N 2, pp. 37 - 42.

24 The leading Conservative newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, has resolutely adopted "Thatcherist" positions and has consistently adhered to them ever since.

25 According to empirical research, representatives of the" upper class " account for 40-42% of activists in local Tory party organizations and 85% of their chairmen. As for these latter, only 16% of their total number belong to small entrepreneurs and shopkeepers. At the same time, exactly half of them are large owners and directors of companies, medium-sized entrepreneurs, merchants and managers (Butler D., Rinto-Dutchinsky M. The Conservative Elite, 1918 - 1977: Does Unrepresentativeness Matter? Paper, Presented for SSRC Conference. Oxford. 1978, p. 6).

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A wave of bankruptcies grew as the debt increased. As noted above, the Labour Government's attempt to engage the trade unions in constructive cooperation and get them to agree to a voluntary cap on wage growth in exchange for some concessions has failed. When, in 1979, it tried to achieve the same goal by force within the state sector, the workers responded with a powerful wave of strike actions and effectively thwarted plans for" austerity " at their expense.

The experience of the Labour Party in power since February 1974 has clearly shown that the policy of moderate reformism pursued in the post-war period has exhausted itself and that in the context of the deepening crisis situation, it is not able to provide solutions to either economic or social problems. And it is no coincidence that, having abandoned the radical option of state regulation from the very beginning, 26 the Labor government has become more and more clearly adopting the methods proposed by the neoconservatives. This kind of" sitting on two chairs", however, could not add to his popularity, and it was not surprising that in the 1979 elections the majority was won by the Conservative Party led by Thatcher. Its advantage in the eyes of many voters was at least in the fact that it had a clear political line, an energetic and not yet lost credit in society leadership. The total share of votes cast for Labour fell to an unprecedented low in the post-war period and was only 36.9% (with 43.9% for the Conservatives and 13.8% for the Liberals). The Conservative Party won 339 seats in Parliament (out of 630), which gave it a significant advantage over all other parties combined 27 .

The unfavorable outcome of the 1979 election for the Labour party contributed to the fact that the discontent accumulated during the party's tenure in power spilled out, and a fierce factional struggle unfolded in it. At the same time, the initiative was immediately seized by the left, which relied on radical members and activists in local organizations and trade unions. Unlike the period of the late 60s and early 70s, the struggle began not around the party's program principles and guidelines, but around its organizational structure, which allowed the party leadership and the parliamentary faction to virtually ignore the decisions taken by the party conference and the national executive committee responsible to it. This was precisely what the left wing saw as the reason why the Labour government that came to power in 1974 was able to put the 1973 program under the rug and pursue policies that went against it without much difficulty. In 1979-1981. Thanks to the efforts of the left wing, which had the support of the majority of delegates to the party's annual conferences, the rules for electing the party leader were changed (he was chosen not by parliamentarians, but by an electoral college consisting of representatives of local organizations, trade unions and members of the parliamentary faction), the procedure for selecting parliamentary candidates was democratized, and the responsibility of members of parliament to party organizations in parliamentary districts was increased. At the same time, the party's conferences adopted resolutions demanding the country's withdrawal from the Common Market, the unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of American bases in England. It was also approved by-

26 See Peregudov S. P. Labor Party in the socio-political system of Great Britain, Moscow, 1975, pp. 314-318.

27 State and Society in Contemporary Britain, pp. 250, 261.

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A new party program was adopted, reproducing the basic requirements and provisions of the 1973 program28 .

In November 1981, the long-time "standard-bearer" of the left wing, M. Foote, was elected leader of the Labour Party. Although in recent years, especially in 1974-1979, he has seriously adjusted his positions on a number of issues and moved away from a consistently left-wing political orientation, his election, as well as the general shift of the party to the left, were perceived by the British establishment as evidence of the inability of the Labour Party to continue to act as a reliable pillar of the existing A similar conclusion was reached by many right-wing figures within the party itself, who claimed that as a result of the changes that took place, it moved away from the traditions of moderation, "tolerance" and social democracy and switched to "extremist", almost Marxist positions.

Of course, such assessments had nothing to do with reality, and the Labour Party did not go from reformist to revolutionary. Nevertheless, the changes that took place in it really seriously worried the British ruling circles, since they opened up the possibility of implementing a number of radical changes in the country's foreign and domestic policy, and deprived them of confidence that the party would continue to pursue policies that pleased them. It is no coincidence that just a few months after the party's transition to the opposition, the establishment began to actively encourage the split of the party and the creation of an alternative "centrist" political force. Within the party, a group of high-ranking far-right figures, led by R. Jenkins and former Ministers D. Owen, S. Williams and W. Rogers, became the conductor of this line. Outside the Labour Party, this line was taken up by the bourgeois press and other influential mass media. As you know, in the beginning of 1981 the aforementioned group proclaimed the creation of a new Social Democratic Party (SDP), which immediately set a course for close cooperation with the liberal party and in the summer of the same year formed an electoral union ("Alliance") with her 29 .

The sensational success of the Alliance parties in the 1981 parliamentary by - election and the results of numerous public opinion polls, according to which 35-45% of voters were ready to vote for them, showed that there is indeed a great potential in British society for the activity of" third " parties and their more active inclusion in political life. However, the short-term nature of this success and the rather sharp decline in the Alliance's popularity that occurred already in 1982 showed that it is not easy to realize this potential, that voters who have lost firm party ties are not at all inclined to firmly connect their future with a new political entity, especially when they see that this novelty is very relative and that The Alliance's ability to solve the country's problems is far from certain.

For all that, the split at the top of the Labour Party has seriously undermined its influence in the country, and at the same time, it has not lost much ground.-

28 Labour Programme 1982. Lnd. 1982.

29 For more information, see: Problems of British History. 1984. Moscow, 1984, pp. 73-90. A number of works by British historians and political scientists are devoted to the history of the creation of a new party, the analysis of its program and political attitudes, the social base and relations with other parties in the country. The biggest ones are: Bradley I. Breaking the Mould? The Birth and Prospects of the Social Democratic Party. Lnd. 1981; Zentner P. Social Democraty in Britain. Must Labour Lose? Lnd. 1982.

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increased the situation within the party itself. Moreover, if in the beginning the internal party struggle was mainly between the left and right wings, then as the party grew and especially after the formation of the SDP, it spread to the left wing itself. What happened was something that quite often happened before - as soon as the internal party struggle intensified and the left received fresh reinforcements, part of the" traditional " left wing moved to the center, took more moderate, center-left positions. This time, such a shift occurred with a significant part of the parliamentary group "Tribune", which actually split. The more radical members of this group, led by A. Benn, sought to complete the changes that had been initiated and push the right wing out of power in the party. The other part of the group considered it necessary to prioritize reaching a compromise with the right wing and restoring party unity on this basis. Hence her refusal to support Benn's candidacy for deputy leader in 1981, and her opposition to further radicalization of the party's program.

The intensified factional struggle provided rich fodder for the bourgeois press to attack the "hard" left, to portray the situation in the Labour Party in the darkest possible terms. The active activity of Trotskyist groups also caused considerable damage to the party's reputation. In a number of local organizations, taking advantage of the narrowing of the active core and the general weakening of the capacity of these organizations, they became almost masters of the situation , 30 and the attitude towards them also became the subject of sharp disagreements in the party ranks. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the party was growing within the party, which, naturally, could not but affect its size. The number of individual members decreased from 350,000 in 1980 to 300,000 in 1982. The number of collective members also declined (from 6 million 260 thousand in 1978 to 6 million 190 thousand in 198231), mainly due to the beginning decline in the number of trade unions associated with economic stagnation and rising unemployment.

The acute internal party struggle distracted the intellectual forces of the Labor Party from further developing its ideological and theoretical platform and improving its political tactics. When the Conservatives changed their previous orientation quite dramatically and fought for the electorate, putting forward a number of new or updated ideas and provisions, the Labor Party still relied on its old "baggage" and showed almost complete indifference to its renewal. And this is despite the fact that, as already noted, in the second half of the 70s, the complete incapacity of the policy based on the traditional approach was revealed. The impasse that the Wilson government's policies reached in 1975-1976 largely explains the reasons for his resignation, which was so unexpected for many. It is no coincidence that when explaining its motives, he emphasized the need for the party to have a leader who is more free than he is from adhering to established ways and means of solving emerging problems .32
He was succeeded in March 1976 as Prime Minister by J. R. R. Tolkien. Callaghan did break away from traditional Labour orthodoxy in some ways. However, this departure was mainly reflected in the fact that the government headed by him went even further than the Wilson cabinet in making concessions to big business and international financial cooperation.-

30 See Tribune, 22. VI. 1984, p. 8.

31 Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party. Lnd. 1979, p. 98; Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party. Lnd. 1983, p. 1; The Times, 26.III.1982; 26.IV.1983.

32 The Times, 17.III.1976.

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In exchange for their support in the Parliament, the Government of the Republic of Moldova, rather resolutely embarked on the path of implementing a policy of "austerity", and also concluded a "pact" with the liberals, pledging in exchange for their support in the parliament not to carry out further nationalization and other "socialist" measures. However, the lurch to the right in practical politics only made the loss of clear guidelines for political behavior by the Labor Party even more obvious, contributed to the growth of discontent and disillusionment among its members and supporters, and increased internal party disagreements.

The ideological and theoretical stagnation created in the late 70s and early 80s was, however, not only the result of subjective miscalculations and omissions. It was both a consequence and a manifestation of a deep crisis of the values, ideas and guidelines that formed the basis of the ideology of Laborism and the core of which were the Fabian-Keynesian concepts of state intervention in the economy and social relations. Labour was unable to move beyond this range of ideas and approaches, and this was the main reason for its passivity. The widespread anti-etatist sentiment among the masses at that time, despite its considerable democratic potential, was almost completely exploited by the Conservatives without any resistance from the Labor Party, who made considerable political capital from this and easily won ideological and political hegemony in British society.

The Labour Party was also unable to counteract the Conservatives ' rather successful attempts to inculcate and take advantage of the sentiments of "social egoism" in certain sections of the working class, among other categories of workers. These sentiments were manifested mainly in dissatisfaction with the growth of social expenditures of the state, in a more critical attitude towards trade unions, allegedly making "excessive" demands, in unwillingness to participate in solidarity actions, etc. The decline in the number of trade unions that began at that time, as well as a rather sharp decrease in strike activity, mainly related to the crisis phenomena in the economy and the 33s, which reflected the general decline and "confusion" in the labor movement, were naturally immediately used by conservatives to attack the rights of trade unions and carry out other anti-labor measures. In other words, the Conservatives managed not only to divide the working class politically, but also to significantly weaken the part of it that was being dealt the main blow.

The weakening of Labour's influence among the masses was particularly acute during the Falklands conflict and in the period following it, when the Conservative Party and its leadership were able to use the success of reactionary, imperialist action to incite nationalist, chauvinist sentiments in the country. It is significant that only the "hard left" wing of the party strongly condemned the government's actions to "liberate"the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). As for the majority of the parliamentary faction and the "shadow cabinet", they supported the government's policy both formally (when voting in parliament) and in fact, while speaking in favor of negotiations. Unsurprisingly, this line only served to exacerbate an already unfavorable situation for the Labour Party. Its ideological and political crisis, which had been hidden for some time, turned into an open crisis of trust and became, as they say, public.

Results of the general parliamentary elections held on June 9, 1983-

33 Morning Star, 30.X.1982.

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We have quite accurately recorded the balance of party and political forces in the country that was created in 1982-1983, the imbalance that was revealed in the influence of the two main political parties, and the split that occurred in the opposition camp. If the Conservatives did not manage to maintain the level of support reached in 1979 (the share of votes they received fell by only 1.5% - from 43.9 to 42.4%), then the share of votes cast for Labor fell to an all - time low-27.6%. If the level of support in 1979 (36.9%) was a record low for the entire post-war period, the result in 1983 was the lowest since 1918. The magnitude of the drop in the share of votes compared to the previous elections is the most significant in the entire history of the party. As for the Alliance parties, they received 25.4% of the vote, almost 2 times more than the Liberals managed to win in 1979 (13.8%), and only 2.2% less than was cast this time for Labor .34 Thus, in fact, the votes of the opposition were split almost equally between the "old" Labor Party and the new centrist bloc. However, as for the distribution of seats in parliament, thanks to the majority system, the Labor Party was able to retain the overwhelming number of seats on the opposition benches (209 against only 23 for the Alliance parties).

However, no electoral system could disguise the fact that the Labour Party had suffered a severe defeat, that its constituency had been narrowed to the extreme, and that its very ability to remain potentially in power had been called into question. The seriousness of the situation in which the party finds itself becomes especially obvious when analyzing the election results from the point of view of who specifically refused to trust it this time. According to surveys conducted on election day, the number of votes cast for Labour has sharply decreased not only among those belonging to the upper and middle strata of society, but also among those who traditionally gave their votes to them, i.e. among the majority of working people. For the first time in the entire post-war period, the Conservatives equaled the Labor Party in terms of the number of workers who voted for them. Each of these parties received 37% of the vote in this category, while the Alliance party received 26%. Even more striking results were revealed by a survey of the vote of skilled workers, who, as is well known, have traditionally been the main social pillar of Labour reformism. This time, this stratum of the working class overwhelmingly preferred the Conservatives and the Alliance, for which a total of more than 2/3 of people in this category voted (38 and 30%, respectively). Only 32% of votes were cast for Labor .35
A similar picture emerges when analyzing the voting of trade union members. And among this category of working people, in 1983, the Labor Party failed to get even half of the vote, collecting only 39%. By way of comparison, 73% of Trade Unionists voted for them in 1964, 71% in 1966, 66% in 1970, 55% in 1974, and 51% in 1979. However, as in the case of skilled workers, the bulk of the votes that passed from Labour went not to the Conservatives, but to the Alliance parties. The Tories received 32% of the trade union vote (compared to 33% in 1979 and 22-30% in 1964), i.e. 1% less than in 1979, while the Social Democrats and Liberals received 28% - 15% more than the Liberals in 1979. (on average, the percentage of trade Unionist votes received by Liberals was

34 Public Opinion, 1983, June - July, p. 7.

35 The Times, 11.VI.1983; Morning Star, 20.VI.1983.

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4-6% in 1964-1970 and 13-15% in 1974-1979.)36 . Conservatives were much more successful among those workers who, during the prosperity years, bought their own homes, moved to the suburbs, and actually broke away from the traditional working environment. Only 28% of workers who own their own homes voted for Labor. The same amount was received by the Alliance parties among them. But the Conservatives managed to significantly outperform both those and others and get almost half (47%) of their votes. 37
The promotion of the ideas of the "nation of property owners", as well as concrete steps aimed at their implementation, 38 brought the Conservatives quite tangible dividends and allowed them to invade the Labour electorate quite deeply. There is every reason to believe that among the other two groups discussed above (skilled workers and trade unionists), the lion's share of those who voted for the Conservatives was precisely this, the most "prosperous" part of the working class. This conclusion is supported indirectly by the fact that the support given to Labour by the "lower" categories of the working class far exceeded that given to the Conservatives (43% and 33%, respectively) .39 Although here, too, the Labor Party failed to attract even half of the voters to its side. The Labour Party won more than half (55%) of the votes cast in council houses alone .40 Having lost a significant part of the workers ' support, the Labor Party did not compensate for it at the expense of other groups of workers. Moreover, the percentage of low-ranking employees who voted for them, who are objectively part of the working class, was only 17%, while the share of "middle-class" people who supported them was 11%, i.e., it decreased by 50% compared to 197941 .

The consequence of such a sharp narrowing of the social support of the Labor Party was no less dramatic reduction of its territorial base. Only the traditional industrial areas of Scotland, Wales, and Northern England remain relatively strong bastions of Labour, where the old industries that are suffering from acute crisis - coal, metallurgy, and mechanical engineering-prevail. As for the areas of Southern and Mid-England where new industries are mostly located, as well as businesses and service establishments, Labour candidates were generally unable to take second place and in more than 100 constituencies were unable to return even the electoral deposit. 42 The concentration of Labour voters in relatively narrow areas helped them avoid a crushing defeat under the current electoral system and hold a disproportionately large number of parliamentary candidates. But it also called into question the party's influence in a large part of the country, and the most promising in economic and social terms.

In the light of the above facts and circumstances, it would seem that,

36 Trade Unions in British Politics. Lnd. 1982, p. 299; New Society, 1.IX.1983, p. 311.

37 Political Quarterly, 1983, N 4, p. 347.

38 In line with the commitments of their election manifesto, the Conservatives passed a law through Parliament in 1980 allowing residents of municipal apartments and houses to buy them out on relatively easy terms and thus become their owners. As of 1984, over the following years, about 600,000 families, i.e. about 1/10 of all those living in municipal houses, took advantage of this right (Economic Affairs, 1984, No. 2, pp. 25-28). The total percentage of people living in their own home increased from 48% in 1971 to 55.7% in 1981 and 62% in early 1984 (ibid.; The Times, 1. VII. 1982).

39 Development in British Politics. Lnd. 1984, p. 35.

40 Public Opinion, 1983, June - July, p. 9.

41 Development in British Politics, p. 35.

42 Sampson A. Op. cit., p. 115.

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The conclusions reached by some British political scientists about the "deep division of the Labour base" caused by the creation of the SDP are reasonable .43 However, these conclusions do not take into account the whole peculiarity of the situation that has developed as a result of the Social Democrats ' withdrawal from the Labour Party and their formation as an independent party. The fact remains that, having recruited about a tenth of the parliamentary faction and lured a significant part of the Labour electorate to their side, the SDP leaders did not manage to "steal" any of the local organizations and not a single trade union belonging to the Labour Party. Very few ordinary members of these organizations were transferred to them. According to surveys, the percentage of former Labour members among the SDP membership is very small, with the bulk of the SDP previously having no firm party affiliations44 . The statement of this fact, which refutes the thesis of a split in the entire Labour Party, is important if only because it shows the limited, inconclusive nature of the division that has taken place in the ranks of the Labour Party and its supporters. It also points to a kind of "semi-success" of the policy of creating a viable "party of the center", which was carried out after the 1979 elections by influential circles of the British establishment.

A real split in the Labour Party, which all this line was aimed at, would indeed lead to irreversible consequences for it and would throw it on the "sidelines" of political life. However, if this does not happen, the party retains a real chance of regaining its weakened position. Moreover, its very defeat in the 1983 elections and its scale were largely due to purely conjunctural factors related both to the general political situation in the country (the "Falklands factor") and to the unsettled internal party relations. In other words, despite the very definite success of the divisive tactics of right-wing and centrist forces, the process of fragmentation of anti-conservative forces was slowed down, and the question of what would be the closest alternative to "Thatcherism" remained unresolved. And this is the main peculiarity of the political situation in the country after the 1983 elections. Both the Labour Party and the Alliance parties are clearly unhappy with the status quo, and each is determined to turn the tide in their favor.

What has been said above about the situation in the Labour Party and its grassroots base leaves no doubt as to how difficult the challenges it faces are. However, some of these problems have already begun to be solved. In the person of N. Kinnock, who was elected in the autumn of 1983, the party has a new, energetic leader who is determined to restore its unity and combat capability. And a lot has been done in this regard. Despite the persistence and even aggravation of differences between the right and left wings on a number of issues of domestic and foreign policy, the main emphasis is still on the fight against a common enemy, i.e., the conservative government of Thatcher. A more favorable environment has been created for modernizing Labor's attitudes and demands. Attempts are being made to re-formulate the party's positions on such issues as nationalization (in particular, to introduce new criteria that are more appropriate to modern conditions).45, go back to the section-

43 Gamble A. Thatcher. The Second Coming. - Marxism Today, 1983, July, p. 10.

44 New Society, 8.IX.1983, p. 351.

45 The author of one of these proposals, D. Thomas, writes, for example, that when developing a nationalization program, Labor should proceed primarily from economic and social expediency. With this approach, the author emphasizes, there is a question of nationalization of banks (which was not provided for in the pre-election legislation).

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development of cooperative and municipal socialism ideas and develop measures to democratize public administration 46 .

The proposals of the Labour research group on housing have been published. Based on her analysis of the situation, she concluded that Labour had allowed the Conservatives to "embrace the potentially lucrative theme of 'freedom and control', and that as a result, they had succeeded in pitting tenants against owners of their own homes, attracting the latter to their side, as well as those who want to become homeowners. The Group offers a different solution, namely, a significant extension of the rights of tenants, while retaining the possibility of acquiring a municipal apartment OR house in ownership. It rejects as one-sided and unrealistic both the position of some on the left, which believes that home ownership should eventually disappear, 47 and the position of the right, which suggests actually borrowing the way to solve the issue that the conservatives have embarked on .48
Of course, the work on modernizing the Labour party's policy framework is by no means" neutral " and takes place in an environment of confrontation between the left and right wings of the party (although it is more muted than before). The post-election balance of power in the "shadow cabinet" and the national executive committee, 49 the" pragmatic " tendencies of the new leader, and the divisions within the leftmost wing all seem to make a relatively far-reaching drift of the Labour Party to the right inevitable. Moreover, some of its leadership sees the main reason for the party's failures in identifying it too closely with the" traditional " working class and trade unions, and would be reluctant to sharply weaken existing ties. As the deputy leader of the Labour Party, R. Hattersley, stated in early 1984, the existing "coalition of interests" (between the party and its allied forces) should be replaced by a "coalition of ideas".50
However, does everything here depend on the subjective aspirations of the right wing of the Labour party and all those who see ways to overcome the crisis of confidence and restore the party's viability in weakening its ties with the" traditional " working class and the labor movement? Historical experience shows that it is relatively easy for reformist parties to pursue such a line in the context of a relative "lull" in the class struggle and the socio-political passivity of the workers ' and trade union movements. Immediately after the 1983 elections, right-wing activists still had some reason to expect this kind of passivity. However, the laws of capitalist development

the party's manifesto and other program documents) and at the same time the list of enterprises previously planned for nationalization may be reduced (New Socialist, 1983, July - August, pp. 16-18).

46 См. The Times, 5.IV.1984, p. 10; New Socialist, 1984, July - August, pp. 10 - 17.

47 According to a 1983 survey, 77% of British households considered owning their own house or apartment to be "their ideal" (compared to 69% in 1975). The number of council tenants who hope to become homeowners within the next 10 years has increased from 62% in 1975 to 78% in 1983. Experts predict that the percentage of owners of their own homes and apartments will rise from 62 to 70 over the next 10 years (Economic Affairs, 1984, N 2, pp. 25-27).

48 Morning Star, 22.III.1984.

49 After the leftists lost their majority in the national executive committee at the 1983 conference, this body has lost much of its former political weight and no longer opposes the" shadow cabinet "and the parliamentary faction with their right-wing majority, as it was in the late 70s and early 80s, but rather"complements" it them.

50 The Times, 16.I.1984.

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They have taken their toll, and, as is well known, since the spring of 1984, the country has been experiencing a new round of aggravation of the class struggle. The miners ' strike, which lasted almost a year, was the largest, but far from the only, manifestation of it. The strike demonstrated the great potential of struggle and resistance that the workers ' and trade union movements possess. Although it was not fully mobilized due to sabotage by right-wing reformist leaders and the miners were forced to return to work without obtaining concessions from the government, the strike only strengthened the left's resolve to continue fighting. As the strike leaders wrote in the Morning Star on March 18, 1985, "we believe that... the labor movement has benefited from this historic event, and that our future struggle will become even stronger as a result." More broadly, as a result of pressure from the left and the growing political activity of trade unions, since the spring of 1985, there has been a kind of "counter-movement" between the Labour Party and the trade unions, aimed at strengthening existing ties between them and involving ordinary trade Unionists in more active participation in party life.

The main feature of the new situation is the change of mood in the labor and trade union movement as a whole, the rejection of the line of "constructive cooperation" with conservatives adopted after the elections by right-wing trade union leaders. And whether the right-wing leaders of the Labour Party want it or not, they are forced to react to these new sentiments, to moderate their revisionist aspirations. We must also not forget the "historical mission" of reformism in general and its Labour variety in particular, which is to "extinguish" revolutionary sentiments in the working class and weaken the influence of its revolutionary organizations. No matter what difficulties the Labour Party may face, no matter how much its right wing seeks to weaken ties with the organized labor movement, the implementation of such plans would mean opening the way for them to fill the vacuum with other forces and organizations with unpredictable consequences for the labor movement itself and for the socio-political development of the country as a whole. No matter what the authors of the concepts that are fashionable in the West write and say, according to which the time of the worker and trade union movement is supposedly overIt is obvious that it is almost disappearing, and "new social movements" are already claiming its place, real politicians, those who deal with the actual processes taking place in society, are perfectly aware of the potentials that this movement retains, and of the role that is by no means peripheral, which it is not necessary to play. the role it continues to play in political life.

As for the mass democratic movements, they are by no means opposed to the workers ' movement, but, on the contrary, develop in close connection with it. The largest and most influential force in the mass democratic movement of Great Britain is the peace fighters movement, which has a serious impact on the political situation in the country as a whole and on the situation in the Labor Party in particular. Although it has no organizational ties to the party, it involves a significant part of both Labour and trade union activists, as well as many prominent figures from the left wing of the Labour Party and trade unions. The anti - war movement and its most popular organization, the Movement for Nuclear Disarmament, traditionally draw their mass support from the environment on which they rely

51 Gortz A. Farewell to the Working Class: An Essay on Postindustrial Socialism. Lnd. 1982.

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labor 52 . And it is no coincidence that the rise of the anti-war movement and the growth of anti-war sentiment in the country coincided with the adoption, first by the national executive committee, and then by the annual conference of the Labour Party, of a detailed document "Defense and Security for Britain" 53, in which the party undertakes, if it comes to power, to implement unilateral nuclear disarmament of the country bases equipped with nuclear weapons.

The increased activity of both the Labour and Democratic movements is thus encouraging the Labour Party to take a clearer stance and more resolutely oppose Conservative forces. Although at the same time, those forces in the party that rely on winning the "wavering" electorate and are inclined to achieve this by gradually "deradicalizing" Labor programs do not weaken their activity. It was precisely because of these forces that the party's support for the miners ' strike was half-hearted, and only its left wing strongly and unconditionally sided with them.

At the same time, the very logic of political struggle in the context of escalating social and class antagonisms is increasingly pushing Labor and Conservatives together, and intensifying rivalry between them. At the same time, the initiative in the escalating confrontation begins to slip more and more clearly from the hands of the Conservatives and pass to the Labor Party. The attempts of the Tory Thatcherist leadership to solve the country's economic problems by methods that lead to increased social contrasts, the attack on the living standards of the most vulnerable groups of the population, the persistence of mass unemployment, the decline of social service systems, the growth of military spending and, consequently, taxation, the growth of authoritarian tendencies-all this weakens the influence of "Thatcherism", leads to conservative Party 54 , the overall increase in discontent in the country with the domestic and foreign policies of the Tory government. Just a few months after the election, Labour's popularity level was almost equal to that of the Conservatives, and since the spring of 1985, it has been quite confidently ahead of them. In the local government elections held in May, 10% fewer voters voted for the Conservatives than in the 1983 general election. At the same time, support for Labour increased by 9% 55 . Encouraged by this, the Labour leadership intensifies attacks on the Thatcher government, forcing it to go on the defensive all the time. Naturally, national and racial problems, especially the Ulster crisis, do not add to the popularity of the Conservatives. As you know, all attempts to stifle the resistance of the liberation movement in Northern Ireland by brute force are failing, RA-

52 See Zhigalov I. I. Peace-loving forces of Great Britain in the fight against military danger and nuclear weapons. In: History of the Anti-war Movement in the Capitalist Countries of Europe (1945-1976), Moscow, 1981.

53 Defence and Security for Britain. Lnd. 1984.

54 One of the manifestations of the growing opposition to Thatcherism within the Conservative Party was the creation in May 1985 of the "advanced Center" group headed by former Foreign Minister Fr. Pim. The group consists of about 30 members of Parliament and aims to achieve changes in the government's policy aimed at more active state intervention in the socio-economic sphere, returning to the policy of "social partnership", and taking effective measures to reduce unemployment. Pym stated that his opinions are shared by the leadership of the Confederation of British Industry (which is the main business organization of the country), the top management of a number of major industrial corporations (The Times, 15.V.1985).

55 Ibid., 4.V.1985.

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stet solidarity of the English working class with the struggle of the Northern Irish workers 56 .

The Alliance parties are also trying to take advantage of the reduced prestige of the Conservatives, and especially the SDP, which significantly changed its line after the elections. Not counting on the increase in votes at the expense of the Labor party, the leader of this party, D. Owen, began to put forward more and more insistently ideas that were in many ways similar to the ideas of "Thatcherism", although not identical to them. In his speeches and articles, one of which, by the way, was published in the right-wing conservative journal 57, he talks at length about the" advantages "of the market economy, the orientation towards" personal initiative", competition and" personal success", and the idea of selectivity of social services of the state, which, in general, should be used only by those who do not know how to use them. able to "provide for yourself". The SDP's foreign policy orientation is also shifting to the right. If in 1982 it still opposed (albeit with reservations) the deployment of American medium-range missiles in the country, then in the fall of 1983 it actually withdrew its objections. This kind of line, which the bourgeois press described as" Thatcherism with a human face", is aimed at" capturing " the votes of Conservative voters, for whom, as SDP leaders believe, the Labour Party looks too radical. In other words, if in the first period after the creation of the SDP, the center-left orientation was the main one (based on the members and voters of the Labor Party), then after the elections it becomes more and more clearly center-right. As The Economist weekly pointed out, not without sarcasm, the SDP's drift to the right has led to a situation where the Liberal party looks "more social democratic" than the party that has assumed this title .58
The sophisticated maneuvering of the SDP and its leaders is not just a consequence of their political opportunism. It is also stimulated by the situation in which the party found itself after the euphoria of 1981 and early 1982, when disillusioned voters in both main parties swayed (but, as it turned out, not for long) in its direction. The SDP's" semi-success "in creating a split in the ranks of the Labour Party, as well as the sharp decline in the number of its representatives in Parliament as a result of the 1983 elections (from 23 to 6), seriously complicated the position of the party itself and the Alliance as a whole after the elections. The size of the SPD 59 has noticeably decreased , and the mood in favor of its merger with the liberals has increased. The party is increasingly divided between its" pro-liberal " wing (led by R. Jenkins and W. Rogers) and D. Owen's faction.

Sharp internal disagreements are also tearing apart the Liberal party. At the same time, it is very active both at the national and especially at the local level. And the Social Democrats, despite all their difficult problems, continue, as they say, to stay afloat. Both of them retain fairly strong political and electoral positions. In the July 4, 1985 by-election in one of the Conservative constituencies, they even managed to win and outperform,

56 For more information, see: The Working Movement of Great Britain: National and Racial Problems, Moscow, 1982; Orlova M. E. The working class of Great Britain and the liberation struggle of the Irish People, Moscow, 1983; Gribin N. P. The Tragedy of Ulster, Moscow, 1983.

57 Economic Affairs, 1983, October, pp. 26 - 33.

58 The Economist, 25.V.1985, p. 20.

59 According to the party's own data, its number in May 1984 was about 50 thousand, a decrease of 25% compared to 1982. The number of the Liberal party remains at the level of 150-170 thousand (The Times, 7. V. 1984, p. 2).

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although not by much, in terms of the number of Labor votes received. This success, as well as polling data showing that they are supported by 25 to 30%, and sometimes even a large share of the population, indicates that the Alliance parties are a serious competitor to Labor in the fight for voters who are disillusioned with the Conservatives.

It seems that this kind of stability of support for the "center" is by no means accidental. The growth of social tension, which is an inevitable consequence of the economic difficulties experienced by the United Kingdom, the structural adjustment of the economy, as well as the policies pursued by conservatives, has led to the preservation of political polarization as a permanent or, in any case, long-term factor in political life. This means that the "free space" that has been created in the "center" also continues to exist, but with the difference that now there is a candidate who, although not very strong, has already definitely declared himself, who will fight for this space and will try not only to retain it, but also to expand it. An important point that is currently present is, as already noted, the trend towards a decline in the popularity of conservatives, which, in turn, can not but strengthen the political rivalry of existing parties. Moreover, the conservatives themselves do not think about a "respite" and are determined to achieve a third consecutive election victory.

Summing up the above, we can conclude that the process of regrouping the political forces of Great Britain, which began in the 70s, is by no means over. Accordingly, the crisis of the two-party system continues, although thanks to the current electoral system, it has not yet led to its collapse. The process of fragmentation of political forces that has been observed for a long time is an expression of the deepening crisis of British capitalism, the growth of social tension, and the aggravation of political confrontation in the country. At this stage, these processes have not led to the strengthening of the radical left forces, which suffered a serious defeat due to the narrow mass base on which they relied. However, the "unfrozen" situation itself, the greater mobility of political forces, as well as the prospects for further aggravation of social and class contradictions, create more favorable opportunities for left - wing forces than was the case in the 40s and 60s.

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