INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ISSUES

M. L. BOGDANOV

Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Keywords: Russia, Egypt, Russian-Egyptian dialogue

On February 12-13, 2014, the first joint visit of the Egyptian Foreign and Defense Ministers in the history of Russian-Egyptian relations was held in Moscow to participate in the second meeting with their Russian counterparts in the "two plus two" format (the first such meeting was held in Cairo in November 2013).

The participants of the meeting were received by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. Speaking about the significance of the talks with First Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Abdel-Fattah Sisi and Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, our Minister Sergey Lavrov noted the mutual desire of Moscow and Cairo to further strengthen bilateral relations based on a solid foundation of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation. At the same time, it was emphasized that over the past decades, Russia and Egypt have repeatedly found joint responses to common challenges and threats faced by the Middle East and North Africa region [1].

In the light of such a statement, we believe that it would be relevant and useful to try to generalize and systematize the experience gained in the period after the collapse of the USSR in implementing our cooperation with Egypt on international and regional issues in the new geopolitical conditions.

Since the presidency of Anwar Sadat (1970-1981-ed.), it was considered that Egypt, of course, is included in the sphere of influence of the United States and in general - the West. However, this largest Arab country by population has always sought to play the role of a regional power-the leader of the Middle East and North Africa. Given these ambitions, Cairo's policy often contradicted or did not coincide with the course of the United States and the West. This objectively opened up additional opportunities for foreign policy cooperation with the USSR, and then with Russia in the interests of the two countries.

REGIONAL AGENDA OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION BETWEEN MOSCOW AND CAIRO IN THE 1990s-2000s

Among the most important areas of Russian-Egyptian political dialogue, multi-level contacts and inter-ministerial consultations, issues that form the regional agenda were almost constantly raised: the Middle East settlement (STB), the inter-Palestinian discourse, the situation in Iraq and Lebanon, the Sudanese problem, the situation around Iran and the Iranian nuclear program (INP), and more recently the Syrian crisis which has developed into an acute international problem.

At the same time, since the beginning of the 2000s, the intensity of Russian-Egyptian contacts at high and top levels has noticeably increased in the interests of coordinated actions on those problems where, in general opinion, this was necessary. This concerned both the procedural and legal aspects - the foundations of political and diplomatic efforts to resolve pressing regional problems, and their essence - goal setting, the content of planned measures, the definition of implementation tools, etc.

During a press conference following the talks between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of Russia and Egypt in Moscow, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that consultations and cooperation between the Russian Federation and Egypt on regional issues in the international arena are closely linked to the national interests of each of the partner countries within the framework of bilateral interstate relations. That is why Russia and Egypt "agreed-

Article 2. For article 1, see: Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 12.

We discussed further ways to build up our bilateral relations, including the convening in the near future of a joint Russian-Egyptian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation (the session of the Intergovernmental Commission was already held in Moscow at the end of March this year-approx. ed.), speeding up the preparation of documents that will give an additional impetus to the development of our military and military-technical cooperation " [1].

COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

This direction was the result of joint efforts of Cairo and Moscow, which opened up new prospects and opportunities for improving the effectiveness of Russian diplomacy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Among the non-Arab countries, Russia was among the pioneers in establishing strategic partnership relations with the League of Arab States( LAS), which was reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the LAS General Secretariat signed in September 2003.

Cooperation with the Arab League and its members received a qualitative boost after the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Cairo and his visit to the organization's headquarters in April 2005, during which he put forward an initiative to accredit the Russian Ambassador to Egypt to the Arab League. The Arab League member states, with the active support of the Egyptian leadership, made a positive decision on this issue, and in 2005 the Russian Ambassador to Egypt was the first foreign representative to receive official accreditation to the Arab League. So, in an interview with the author of these lines, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul-Gheit noted that until then there was no such precedent, but in the interests of the common cause, we will create one [2].

Among the topics of Russian-Egyptian contacts and consultations that took place in the 2000s within the framework of the Arab League, two aspects should be highlighted in particular:

- Regional issues of significant interest to each of the parties, with a view to contributing to the resolution of issues related to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region;

- Coordinated efforts to bring together the positions of other partners of Russia and Egypt on Middle East issues [3].

Meetings and conversations with Arab permanent representatives to the Arab League during the period under review showed that the attitude of the Arab world as a whole towards Russia as a partner in solving urgent problems of the MENA countries was positive, and this allowed Moscow to pursue its course in the Middle East more successfully.

It is significant that Ahmed Kattan, permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia , one of the largest and most influential states in the Middle East, highly appreciated the meeting with President Vladimir Putin at the League's headquarters in 2005. "All of us," A. Kattan noted in an interview with the author of this article, " were deeply impressed by the friendly attitude and cooperation between the two countries. the Russian President's attention to the Arab world, his informative speech on the most pressing problems of the region."

The Russian leader's statements on the topics of Second World War II, Syria, and Iraq were perceived in Cairo and other Arab capitals as objective and balanced, consonant with the approaches of the Arabs themselves, who advocate compliance with the norms of international legality and law in resolving conflict situations in the Middle East. The visit of the first person of the Russian state to the Arab League was a convincing evidence of Moscow's desire to develop and deepen ties with Arab states, to contribute to ensuring peace, security and stability in this geopolitically important region [4].

Regular consultations and an active exchange of delegations gave grounds for asserting that both the Egyptian leadership and the Arab League as a whole were becoming more interested in continuing coordination with Russia on key regional issues. The Egyptian partners stressed the crucial importance of cooperation with Russia on STB issues, including working with Israel, the Palestinians and Syria. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Egypt and the Arab League Secretary General's Office have always been keenly interested in our assessments of the activities of the international "quartet" on the Second World War, and sought to increase mutual efforts with us in this area, which is extremely important for Egypt, based on the fact that "Moscow's position is closest to Cairo" [5].

Such topics of the Russian-Egyptian consultations, which were of particular interest to the Arab League, as the situation in Chechnya, the dialogue of civilizations, cooperation in cultural, scientific and technical fields, etc. were closely related and intersected. At the same time, it was taken into account that the same topics were the subject of active discussion and decision-making within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which unites 57 Muslim countries with a population of 1.2 billion. human. In this regard, it should be noted that the President of ARE H. Mubarak strongly supported President Vladimir Putin's initiative to allow Russia to join the OIC as an observer, which he put forward during his visit to Malaysia in August 2003.

MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

STB issues were undoubtedly one of the most important issues in the world.-

the main topics of Russian-Egyptian contacts during the entire period under review. At the same time, Cairo assumed that Russia traditionally plays a key role in Middle Eastern affairs, was a co-sponsor of the Madrid Conference in 1991 along with the United States, and then became a member of the Quartet together with the United States, the European Union and the UN.

Since the mid-1990s, and especially after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the situation in the Middle East and North Africa region has become significantly more complicated, and the agreements reached after Madrid and Oslo and developments in the context of the Second World War, primarily on the Palestinian track, have been significantly eroded.

The assessment of Egypt as the leading Arab country of the current situation in the Second World Bank was particularly alarming and in many respects consonant with the Russian assessment. Cairo expressed its concerns, the essence of which was that A. Sharon, after the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, would try to freeze the peace process for an indefinite period. Verbally declaring his readiness to implement the" road map "initiated by the Quartet and confirmed by UN Security Council resolution 1515, the Israeli Prime Minister put forward conditions that made the implementation of this document obviously impossible in such a situation. According to our common assessment with the Egyptians, additional international efforts were needed to ensure the positive dynamics of the STB process. In this regard, Cairo welcomed the Russian proposal to hold an international meeting on the Middle East in Moscow in the fall of 2005. At the same time, as the Egyptians noted, such a document should have been carefully prepared through further contacts with all interested parties [6].

At the same time, there was growing concern in Moscow and Cairo about the situation in the Palestinian territories, and emphasis was placed on the need to reach an inter-Palestinian agreement on a programme of action for the coming period.

At the same time, the efforts of the head of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), M. Abbas, were supported to achieve reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas on the PLO platform and integrate Islamists into the PNA structures [7].

The Russian side has always welcomed the inter-Palestinian meetings held in Cairo under Egyptian auspices aimed at overcoming the split among the Palestinian movements operating in Gaza and the West Bank.

The leadership of Egypt has consistently and persistently stressed that the impasse in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation process creates very serious problems, including for the national security of Egypt itself. The number of refugees from the Palestinian territories has increased, and criticism on the Egyptian "street" has increased against the authorities for Cairo's" compromise " policy towards Israel, while ignoring the legitimate demands of the Palestinians, in particular the lifting of the blockade of Gaza and the cessation of settlement construction in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

In an effort to unblock the negotiation process, the Egyptians did not reject any initiative that could bring even a limited positive result. This, in particular, concerned the international meeting in Annapolis (2007), initiated by Washington. While the Egyptians were skeptical about the forum's effectiveness, they were convinced that the Annapolis event should be held under all circumstances, even if no substantive outcome document could be reached in the remaining time. The main thing is to launch the stalled Palestinian-Israeli dialogue, otherwise, according to Cairo, such an opportunity will no longer present itself in the foreseeable future, and the overall regional situation will further deteriorate, become unmanageable and catastrophically dangerous not only in regional but also global dimensions.

The Egyptians were actively interested in the Russian position, considering it important to seek an announcement in Annapolis about the start of direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on the final status on a generally accepted international legal basis. In Cairo, they also counted on increasing the influence of the Americans on the position of Israel, believing that President George W. Bush was really serious about ensuring a real shift in the STB before the end of the term of office of the Republican administration of the United States [8].

The role of the United States in Cairo was also linked to the possibility of finding a solution on the issue of time parameters for reaching agreements between the Palestinians and Israelis. The exchange of assessments between Cairo and Moscow on this issue allowed us to come to a common opinion: in three or four months after Annapolis, an international meeting should be held in Moscow to assess the progress of negotiations, at which it could be agreed to hold a full-scale international conference in the future to approve an eventual peace agreement.

In addition, Cairo called for the early establishment of a monitoring mechanism under the auspices of the international quartet, designed to make an impartial verdict on the negotiating position of each of the parties, and subsequently on the implementation of the final status agreement. Focusing on the need to move towards a comprehensive second-tier bank, which coincided with Russian approaches, Cairo

He stressed that it would be nice to give a fairly clear signal in Annapolis about the real prospect of reviving the multilateral negotiating tracks that were being worked on after the Madrid Conference.

The problem, they believed in Cairo, in the Americans and Israelis, they do not want to give any "bonuses" to Damascus yet. At the same time, Rice explained in her contacts with the Egyptians that, in principle, any delegation in Annapolis is free to raise various topics of interest, including the problem of the Golan Heights. According to the Egyptian side, there was still an opportunity to move Washington to more favorable positions on this issue [9]. This would expand the possibility of Syrians participating in the international meeting, which was considered very necessary in Cairo. The situation could have defused and even opened up prospects for the start of serious Syrian-Israeli negotiations if Damascus had abandoned the idea of organizing a forum of Palestinian oppositionists at that time and "did not put a spoke in the wheels" on another issue that has an intra - Lebanese and regional sound-the election of a Lebanese president [10].

However, the situation began to become clear only during the Annapolis meeting itself, which, as it turned out, did not prevent a further slide into a deadlock in the negotiation process, and this was greatly facilitated by both the resumption of Israel's settlement policy and the terrorist attacks of Palestinian extremists against the civilian population of this country.

At the same time, despite the failure of Annapolis and other attempts to promote the Second World War, the principled coordinated positions of Moscow and Cairo were not subject to opportunistic changes and were based on a common conviction that there is no reasonable alternative to the negotiated peace process and cannot be. This was once again emphasized in the Joint Statement following the Russian-Egyptian two-plus-two meeting in Moscow in February 2014. It states that the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories within the 1967 lines, including East Jerusalem, and the establishment of a territorially integral, viable and sovereign Palestinian State is of great importance, will contribute to strengthening security in the region, eliminate a serious source of instability, and create favorable conditions for development, well-being and interaction among peoples. It was emphasized that the task of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be pushed into the background by any other processes taking place in the region. They reaffirmed the determination of Russia and Egypt to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of this conflict on an internationally recognized basis, including UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the Madrid Principles, the Road Map, and the Arab Peace Initiative [1].

AROUND IRAQ

Relations with Baghdad have been among the most important issues on the regional agenda of the Russian-Egyptian political dialogue since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (August 1990) and then the American occupation of Iraq itself.

In Cairo, deep skepticism about the possibility of real stabilization in that country prevailed for almost the entire period after the entry of international coalition forces into Iraq in March 2003. The government in Baghdad, according to the Egyptians, was unable to start a real process of achieving national accord. Egyptians were acutely aware of the problems in Iraq, one of the key countries of the World Bank, which was experiencing the consequences of the Kuwaiti adventure, a heavy legacy of the long rule of the dictatorial regime. Iraq has accumulated a huge potential for conflict, and the intra-Iraqi conflicts that broke out after the fall of Saddam Hussein and the end of the active stage of the international coalition's military campaign have worsened.

The relevance of Russian-Egyptian contacts on the "Iraq problem" was determined by a combination of factors - the special economic ties of the USSR/Russia and Egypt with Iraq, the geopolitical significance of this country. It became particularly significant after the capture and murder of five employees of the Russian Embassy in Baghdad in 2006. In this situation, the Egyptians stressed that Egypt is ready to provide us with any assistance. At the same time, referring to the murder of the Egyptian ambassador in Baghdad, a version was expressed in Cairo that attacks on foreign embassies and their employees were aimed at preventing international recognition and legitimization of the new Iraqi authorities [11].

Cairo warned, first of all, the Americans about the extremely dangerous consequences of foreign military intervention from outside and assessed the situation in Iraq critically, noting that in Egypt "they do not see the light at the end of the tunnel." In particular, it was emphasized that with all the crimes committed by the dictatorial regime of S. Hussein,"there was stability and order in the country then, but in the post-Saddam era, chaos ensued, and, in fact, a civil war began, claiming dozens and hundreds of innocent victims every day." During the Russian-Egyptian consultations, Moscow and Cairo were guided mainly by the search for consolidated actions aimed at stopping the bloodshed, terrorist attacks, and overcoming the armed conflict.-

the search for lasting national accord.

In Egypt, some hopes were pinned on the planned July-August 2004 pan-Iraqi conference on national accord in Baghdad, but they believed that if it ended without success, this would be an even worse outcome than the postponement or cancellation of this event [12].

In general, in practical terms, Cairo and Moscow adhered to the approach to unraveling the "Iraqi knot" by coordinating the efforts of the international community aimed at a political solution to intra-Iraqi problems without outside interference, based on a broad consensus between various socio-political forces and ethno-religious groups.

During the preparation and holding of the Brussels Conference on Iraq (2005), the Russian and Egyptian approaches were based on the following postulates: recognition of the importance of including in the documents agreed by the international community provisions on the need for national reconciliation in Iraq through a broad political dialogue; formation of a mechanism for supporting the political negotiation process with Russian participation following the Brussels Conference; recognition that The wording concerning the forces of the international coalition must fully comply with the decisions of the UN Security Council. These approaches were understood by the participants of the international conference and were taken into account in the final document. This was largely due to the coordinated actions and perseverance of Cairo, which sought to include Russia in the preparatory group and participants of the conference [13].

In general, the Russian-Egyptian consultations and coordinated efforts on the Iraqi problem have contributed to the formation of positive trends in the development of the intra-Iraqi situation, which have recently reinforced the hope for stabilization in Iraq and the real promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation with Baghdad in various areas.

AROUND SYRIA

The Syrian issue, being one of the key issues on the "regional agenda", was constantly in the focus of consultations between Moscow and Cairo.

Given the historical Syrian-Lebanese ties, the Arab Republic's leadership had extremely anxious expectations regarding the development of the situation in and around Syria, especially in Lebanon.

Cairo feared that the UN Security Council's investigation into the terrorist attack that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, might eventually serve as a basis for an international anti-Syrian campaign. There were prospects for taking tough measures against Damascus, including a whole set of political, diplomatic, economic and other sanctions, as well as the use of a special international tribunal to pass sentence on those responsible for the murder of R. Hariri, regardless of their situation (according to the US Permanent Representative to the UN, John Kerry).Bolton, "even if it turns out to be Bashar al-Assad himself") [14].

At the same time, it was believed in Cairo that countries such as Russia, China, Algeria, and to a lesser extent France, taking into account the peculiarities of its approach to the situation around Syria, have the potential to exert a deterrent influence on the initiators of reprisals against Damascus. As for its own investigation of the assassination of R. Hariri and a number of other Lebanese public and political figures, Cairo considered it appropriate to focus on the following three points.

First, it is necessary to give the international community, including the UN Security Council, the opportunity to calmly and without fuss finish the work, understand the background of crimes and identify all those responsible. At the same time, it is necessary to avoid politicizing the investigation, since the murder of the former Lebanese prime minister could have been committed due to a clash of financial interests or because of personal hostility.

Secondly, a weighty argument against the introduction of sanctions against Syria was seen in the fact that the blame of individuals, even high-ranking ones, should not be shifted to the shoulders of the entire Syrian people.In this context, Cairo considered it useful to use a reference to the fact that even the "victims" themselves, including the son of the late Prime Minister Saad Hariri, as well as the leader of the Lebanese friends Walid Jumblatt, whose father Kamal Jumblatt was killed in 1977, and other opponents of the Bashar al - Assad regime, categorically rejected the idea of imposing sanctions against Iran. "the brotherly Syrian people". In short, the opinions of the aforementioned Lebanese politicians should have been taken into account.

Finally, the third "core" element of the approach, which should have been actively used, was that under any circumstances that will be revealed during the investigation, it is necessary to prevent the destabilization of the situation in Syria at all costs. This destabilization can lead to serious military and political upheavals in neighboring countries-Lebanon, Iraq, the Palestinian territories, and the entire region, which will directly affect Egypt's national interests.

When discussing the situation around Syria and Lebanon, the Egyptians with

It was noted with concern that the United States continued to increase pressure on Damascus, hoping for the removal of the Assad regime. They did not rule out an eventual repetition of the "Iraqi scenario"in the SAR. Under the current circumstances, the Egyptians strongly advised the Syrians to show maximum flexibility and prevent Damascus from interfering in internal Lebanese affairs, especially at the very delicate stage of preparation for the country's parliamentary elections scheduled for this time.

Cairo agreed with Moscow's arguments regarding the need to conduct targeted work with Washington and Paris, additionally involving the support of key Arab countries. In this regard, the Egyptians have taken appropriate steps that could give stability to the further development of Lebanon and prevent the collapse of the situation, which is fraught with devastating consequences for the Middle East peace process [15].

In the 2000s, the rapprochement between Damascus and Tehran, to which the international community had well-known claims, primarily on the Iranian nuclear program (INP), prompted Cairo to make comprehensive attempts aimed at" returning " Syria to the pan-Arab line on the main aspects of the Second World War, supporting collective decisions of the Arab League, and refusing to rely on force methods for solving intra-Lebanese problems. In Cairo, they believed that in the current regional conditions, the formation of a" Shiite axis"of Damascus-Tehran-Hezbollah was not in the interests of the Syrians. This, according to Cairo, led to the isolation of Syria in the Arab world: states, primarily in the Persian Gulf zone, "turned away" from the Syrians [16].

LEBANESE "NODE"

Cairo and Moscow believed that the situation in and around Lebanon would largely determine the STB's progress, the situation in the region as a whole, and the international community's attitude towards Damascus.

Egyptians in the first decade of the 2000s, as before, showed extreme concern about the development of the situation in the intra-Lebanese arena. Nevertheless, Cairo believed that the chances of a gradual denouement of the "intra-Lebanese knot", despite all the existing and emerging difficulties, remained.

That is why Cairo often delegated high-ranking representatives of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to Beirut to conduct contacts with all Lebanese leading political and religious leaders in order to clarify the most pressing issues: the election of the president, the investigation of the circumstances of the "Hariri case", the role of Damascus in intra-Lebanese events, etc. [17]

In this regard, the positions and assessments of the main actors on the Lebanese political scene by the Egyptians are indicative. It should be noted that, like us, Egypt and the Arab League supported that the head of the Lebanese state should be elected in accordance with the proven long-term practice on a consensual basis, which most fully reflects the interests of the key socio-political and religious forces of Lebanon.

Cairo was pleased to note that Paris, whose influence in Lebanon has historically been significant, has also "reached" similar positions. Unfortunately, the Egyptians noted, Washington's line ran counter to this approach, which, according to the Egyptians, tried to keep the parliamentary majority of S. Hariri from reaching a compromise with the pro-Syrian opposition [17].

At the same time, Cairo assumed that the longer the consensus agreement was delayed, the greater the risk of intra-Lebanese conflicts would increase. Hence the active work of the Egyptians with the leadership of the Lebanese army in order to strengthen the position of the armed forces as a national guarantor of stability in the country.

The Syrian-Lebanese issue, being in the center of attention of public and political circles of the Arab world, has traditionally been one of the key topics of discussion in the Arab League with the participation of Russian representatives. Almost all participants in such discussions spoke in favor of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Lebanon, confirming the desire of their countries to prevent its destabilization. At the same time, no one questioned the need for a complete withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.: the Egyptians, Jordanians, and Saudis insisted on this [17]. At the same time, there were statements in favor of providing Damascus with an "Arab umbrella" so that Syria would come out of a difficult situation with dignity, "saving face". The Arab foreign Ministers, recalling the positive role that Damascus has played in ending the civil war in Lebanon, shared the view that the implementation of the Taif Agreement should be the basis for normalizing Syrian-Lebanese relations* [17].

THE INTER-ARAB ASPECT

The Russian-Egyptian dialogue on regional issues was largely devoted to the growing differences between Arab countries in their assessment of the situation in the Middle East.

* The Taif Agreement of 1989 ended the civil war in Lebanon that had been going on since 1975, with numerous casualties and huge material losses. As a result of this agreement, the influence of Damascus and the role of the Muslim community in the power structures of Lebanon sharply increased.

Israel's military actions in Lebanon in 2006 seriously complicated the already difficult relations in the Arab world. Emergency meetings of Arab League foreign ministers on Lebanon were marked by sharp internal disagreements, which simultaneously had a negative impact on the unity of the Palestinian ranks and the prospects for holding an international conference on the Middle East in one format or another.

Cairo was highly critical of Damascus 'support for Hezbollah's" provocative "actions and called for" neutralizing Iran's destructive interference in the affairs of the region, including Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine." The Egyptian leadership did not see the possibility of holding an extraordinary Arab summit with the participation of Bashar al-Assad, including to consider the issue of preparing a conference on STB, even though it was understood that Syria's position, given its real influence on Lebanese and Palestinian radicals, was important for Cairo to consolidate the Arab League's approaches to unblocking the Arab-Israeli settlement, in accordance with the provisions of the Arab Peace Initiative adopted in Beirut in 2002.

EGYPT AND THE WEST

Following one of the fundamental principles of its foreign policy, Cairo sought to maintain a balance in its relations with the world's leading powers.

During the consultations with Moscow, the Egyptians did not hide their concern about some steps taken by the European Union to implement its neighborhood and partnership policy, which also includes a number of states in North Africa and the Middle East. Agreeing on a plan of action within the framework of such a "neighborhood" was given to the Egyptians "very difficult". They were also wary of the EU's attempts to "adjust other Mediterranean mechanisms to the neighborhood standard": this was seen as a danger of weakening the role of Egypt as a regional leader, the desire to turn it into a" junior partner " [18].

Nevertheless, the Egyptians considered it important to preserve and expand the Barcelona process as one of the channels of multilateral interaction between the countries of the region and the EU, as well as other existing regional formats of interaction with the EU. However, it was emphasized that the attitude towards NATO in Cairo is traditionally restrained [19].

Egyptian assessments of NATO's goals and objectives were close to Russia's or coincided with Russia's. In particular, Cairo was concerned about the direction of the transformation of NATO: whether this organization will become a "global police officer", whether the North Atlantic Alliance will rely on the norms of international law and act only on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions. In Cairo, they made it clear that they would prefer to strengthen the military component of the UN, rather than turning NATO into a "military unit" of this organization. At the same time, the Egyptians projected their views on the Middle East region, directly noting that they were not interested in any role of NATO in the Second World War, including the Egyptian-Israeli direction [19].

Cairo's reticent attitude toward NATO also affected operational cooperation. The Egyptians stressed that they will try to avoid the implementation of NATO initiatives to improve the compatibility of the armed forces, the organization of joint training centers in the region, and participation in joint events until a clearer political basis for interaction appears.

It is obvious that the relations of Egyptians with NATO were influenced by Brussels ' policy of rapprochement with Israel, and the negative attitude of public opinion in Egypt, both towards NATO as a whole and towards some of its members, which was not overcome in the course of the entire previous history, which developed back in the 1950s.

At the same time, Cairo followed with interest the development of the dialogue between Russia and NATO, understanding the assessment of the Russian side of factors that hinder cooperation: the expansion of NATO and the approach of its military infrastructure to the borders of Russia, non-ratification of the CFE Treaty, etc.

Similar assessments were made about the possible consequences of US plans to deploy missile defense elements in Europe. According to Cairo, the implementation of such American projects could pose a threat to global and regional stability and hinder efforts to strengthen non-proliferation regimes. Egyptians were also concerned that by starting to "cover" NATO countries, Washington could go further, covering all other US allies, including Israel, with a" missile shield", which would weaken Egypt's geostrategic position and upset the existing balance in the Middle East.

As for the OSCE, the Egyptians agreed with the Russian position that attempts to project OSCE values to other regions of the world are counterproductive. In their relations with Europe, the Egyptians were determined to resist attempts to mechanically transfer Western standards to Middle Eastern soil. At the same time, Cairo believed that the OSCE's developments in the field of arms control and confidence-building measures could in principle be in demand in the Middle East, but only in the regional context.-

and provided that mutually acceptable solutions are found to the main problems that exist here [20].

In general, Cairo's approaches to cooperation " in the western direction "were characterized by a" flexible " sequence. This was reflected in the position and assessments of the Egyptian leadership regarding the idea of holding a summit of the Union for the Mediterranean (UDF)* on the problems of the Middle East settlement - the so-called initiative of Nicolas Sarkozy from 2008.

Paris, in its contacts with Cairo, periodically proposed to force the implementation of the idea of holding a multilateral meeting in France in order to unblock the STB process. At the same time, the French side sought to secure the consent of Cairo to convene such a multilateral meeting within the framework of the SDF, in which Egypt, along with France, was a co-chair. However, Paris stipulated that such a forum could be held if the Israeli government freezes settlement activity and starts a substantive bilateral dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.

The Egyptians did not immediately reject the French president's calls, but refrained from making their own statements, and even more so from taking practical steps in support of his initiative.

According to the assessments made in Cairo, the initiative to hold the SDF summit was "spontaneous, unworkable and premature". In addition, the SDS format, according to the Egyptians, is "by definition" not quite suitable for serious consideration and decision-making on STB issues due to the absence of the world's leading players - the United States and Russia. At the same time, the Egyptians believed, not without reason, that it would be extremely difficult to persuade Damascus and Beirut to engage in a constructive discussion with Israel, especially within the framework of the SDF [21].

Thus, on the main issues of cooperation in the international STB framework and partnership with NATO, the EU, the OSCE, etc., the approaches of Moscow and Cairo coincided or were close. This situation has been stable throughout the last decade of the XX century - the first decade of the XXI century.

RUSSIA, EGYPT AND THE AFRICAN UNION**

The African direction of foreign policy for both Russia and Egypt is one of the priorities due to the special geopolitical importance of the Black continent. Africa has unique mineral resources and vast agroclimatic resources and human potential that are of particular value and interest to the entire modern world. Russia has long-standing historical socio-political, humanitarian and business ties with the peoples and countries of Africa.

In turn, Egypt is one of the" heavyweights " of the African continent, traditionally playing the role of one of the leaders of a large group of Arab-African countries. Vital to Egypt's population of 90 million is the waters of the Nile, in the basin of which is located a group of African States with which Cairo should maintain good neighborly relations. These and many other factors - humanitarian, economic, and political-form an extensive "platform" for Russian-Egyptian consultations on African issues of mutual interest.

The agenda of the Moscow-Cairo dialogue regularly includes issues of peacekeeping in Africa in order to prevent and eliminate numerous conflicts on the continent, international regulation of resource use, environmental protection, economic cooperation, including through BRICS-Africa, and providing economic and humanitarian assistance to African countries suffering from relapses of violence and devastating droughts. The Russian-Egyptian consultations also cover issues related to the reform of the UN, the African representation in the Security Council, improving the effectiveness of the African Union's activities, preventing maritime piracy, countering drug trafficking, arms trafficking, etc. At the same time, Cairo welcomes the positive dynamics in the development of Russia's partnership with the AU in general on a wide range of African issues.

* * *

Of course, the coordinated or combined efforts of Moscow and Cairo alone were not enough to achieve the most complex global and regional tasks, including the Second World Bank, which required consolidated actions of the entire international community, but, nevertheless, Russian-Egyptian political cooperation at the turn of the XXI century had a positive impact on the international climate in the interests of moving towards common goals, in accordance with the principles and decisions of the United Nations.

* The Union for the Mediterranean (VTS) was established in 2008. Its participants were the Mediterranean countries and a number of EU states: a total of 43 countries, as well as the Arab League. The VTS was formed as a continuation of the Barcelona process with the aim of deepening integration ties in the region.

** The African Union (AU) unites all the countries (54) of the African continent with the exception of Morocco, which left the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984 in protest against the admission of the so - called Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) to the OAU. In July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan was admitted to the AU.

1. Joint statement on the results of the Russian-Egyptian meeting in the "2+2" format. Moscow, February 12-13, 2014 // Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 13.02.2014; Speech and answers on media issues by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a press conference following the results of joint negotiations between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of Russia and Egypt. Moscow, February 13, 2014 / / Official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 13.02.2014.

2. On the meeting of Russian President Vladimir Putin with Secretary General of the Arab League A. Musa and permanent Representatives of the Arab League member countries. Cairo, 27.04.2005 / / Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry. 28.04.2005; Russia-Egypt: a comprehensive partnership / / ITAR-TASS. Compass, November 2006, N 45. From the author's archive. 2008

3. Russia-Egypt: a Comprehensive partnership / / ITAR-TASS. Compass, November 2006, N 45.

4. Conversation with the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the Arab League, Ahmed Qatan, May 2005. From the author's archive.

5. Interview with the Deputy Head of the Department. Egyptian Foreign Minister Salih Shoukry, April 2005. From the author's archive.

6. Abstracts of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's speech at the first ministerial meeting of the Russia - Gulf Cooperation Council strategic dialogue. Abu Dhabi, 1.11.2011 / / Official website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, 2.11.2011; Conversation with Kuwait's Permanent Representative to the Arab League Ahmed Kuleib, August 2005. From the author's archive.

7. Conversations with O. Suleiman, Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Wafa Basim and Fatma Itman, June 2007. From the author's archive.

8. Interviews with Mohammed Basyuni, Chairman of the Arab and International Affairs and National Security Committee of the Arab Consultative Council, March 2005 and January 2009. From the author's archive.

9. Conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Ahmed Abul-Gheit, and the Palestinian Ambassador to Cairo, Munzer Jad-jani, October 2010. From the author's archive.

10. Interviews with Mohammed Basyuni, Chairman of the Committee on Arab International Affairs and National Security of the Arab Consultative Council of Egypt, and Ibrahim Kamel, member of the Political Secretariat of the National Democratic Party, October 2005 From the author's archive.

11. Conversation with Ra'ad Allusi, Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Arab League. November 2006 From the author's archive.

12. Interview with Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, December 2006 From the author's archive.

13. ria.ru/world/200050622/40743961.html; ria.ru/trend / conference Iraq Brussels 220605; Shelest A. International Conference on Iraq in Brussels - www.iimes.ru/9p =3725

14. Internet resources; from the author's archive, 2008.

15. Conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Ahmed Abul-Gheit, May, 2005. - From the author's archive.

16. Interview with Mohammed Basyuni, Chairman of the Committee on International Arab Affairs and National Security of the ARE Advisory Council, August 2006-From the author's archive.

17. Conversations with Chairman of the People's Assembly of Egypt Fathi Surour, Secretary General of the League of Arab States Amr Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Ahmed Aboul-Gheit, Chairman of the Committee on International and Arab Affairs and National Security of the Advisory Council of EGYPT Mohammed Basyuni, March 2005. From the author's archive.

18. Conversations with Fatma Itman, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, and Abul-Gheit, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, April 2007 From the author's archive.

19. Interview with the Deputy Head of the Department. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Ihab Nasr, September 2009 From the author's archive.

20. Conversations with the deputy. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Fatma Itman and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Ahmed Abul-Gheit, April 2007 From the author's archive.

21. Interview with the Deputy Head of the Department. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt Ihab Nasr, September, 2009...; see also: Mossi Raz. The role of Russia and the European Union in the Middle East. Why should Europe and Russia have a role in the Middle East // Problems and prospects of settlement in the Middle East-Center for Strategic and Political Studies, IV RAS, 2010, pp. 160-167.

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