On November 2, 2015, the Pakistan Sector of the Center for Near and Middle Eastern Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences held an expert meeting "Pakistan in Modern Geopolitics", which was attended by employees of the Institute of International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, IMEMO RAS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, and Moscow State Institute ofMO, ISAA MSU, RISI, Middle East Institute, Carnegie Endowment, Rossiya Segodnya news agency, etc.

In the opening speech, Zav. S. N. Kamenev, President of Pakistan, emphasized the important geopolitical place of Pakistan in the international arena, which is determined not only by its geographical location (at the junction of South, Central and West Asia, and the Far East), but also by its significant demographic potential (over 200 million people) and the presence of nuclear weapons (according to the latest data of joint research by the Stimson Center and Carnegie Endowment Pakistan has 120 nuclear warheads).

The unifying core of relations between Pakistan and its main foreign policy partners is currently international terrorism, the growth of regional extremism, and the danger of spreading the influence of the Islamic State in the states bordering Pakistan, primarily in Afghanistan.

A special place is occupied by relations between Pakistan and India, which for decades have been characterized by tension, turning into armed clashes, and regular accusations of subversive activities against each other. There are frequent non-fulfillment of agreements reached, disruptions of negotiations on a number of controversial issues, primarily on Kashmir. In addition, along with the Control Line on the actual Pakistan-India border (which is two rows of barbed wire at a height of more than four meters), a new term has recently appeared in the Indian and Pakistani media "Working Border" between the two countries.

Can we expect that the Line of Control will still turn into a state border between the two countries? Such a solution to the Kashmir problem was proposed by Russian scientists together with their American colleagues, when in 1992, on behalf of the then UN Secretary-General B. Bougros-Gali, a bilateral Russian-American commission was established to study possible solutions to this issue.

Pakistan's relations with China are characterized by a steady increase in economic and political cooperation, including in the military sphere. Nevertheless, the promised significant investment in the national economy of Pakistan in the amount of $ 46 billion still remains largely in the category of "promised", and both sides have just begun the implementation of the grand project "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor", created within the framework of the "Silk Road" (from the port of Gwadar on the coast of the Arabian Sea to the Chinese Kashgar city in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region).

Pakistan has a difficult relationship with Afghanistan. The main problem is border terrorism (we do not touch on the situation inside Afghanistan, as this is a separate topic, including the capture of Kunduz, unrest in Takhar province, the attack on the airport in Kandahar, etc.). There are constant accusations from Pakistan that terrorist fighters are preparing on the territory of Afghanistan, which attacked, for example, in September 2015 G. to Badaber Air Base near Peshawar. The Afghan leadership expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that the fighting of the Pakistani armed forces in North Waziristan and other areas of the" tribal belt " adjacent to Afghanistan is driving out militants from Pakistan to its territory. The maintenance of mutual accusations is facilitated by terrorist activities on both sides.

The problem of Afghan refugees is causing serious difficulties in relations between the two countries. They number, as stated in September 2015 by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 3 million people, although these estimates are very approximate, as well as very approximate figures for the return in 2015 of 53 thousand Afghans from the border areas of Pakistan to Afghanistan. Naturally, the constant presence of Afghan refugees on the territory of

Sergey KAMENEV-Candidate of Economic Sciences, Leading Researcher, Head of the Pakistan Sector of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, kamenev51@mail.ru.

MOSKALENKO Vladimir Nikolaevich-Doctor of Historical Sciences, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

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the territory of Pakistan causes irritation of the local population, leads to significant "pressure on land and water", increases the risk of various diseases, including large-scale epidemics.

It should also be mentioned about drugs that are sent not only to Pakistan from Afghanistan, but also to Central Asia and further to Russia. V. P. Ivanov, Director of the Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation, was appointed co-chair of the Intergovernmental Commission on Bilateral Cooperation with Pakistan in a very timely manner. In November 2015, a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation was held. There is reason to believe that a breakthrough will occur in this direction as well.

A number of Russian and foreign media outlets have published articles about the expansion of Russian-Pakistani ties, which say that Russia is conquering the Pakistani market, and Pakistani food and manufactured goods are pouring into it from there, and that Russia is crowding America and China there. This is not true. The United States will remain Pakistan's main strategic partner in the long term, despite the occasional difficulties in their relations. Apparently, only China will compete with Washington, but only in military and economic terms, given first of all Beijing's desire to build a new "Silk Road", part of which will pass through the territory of Pakistan.

T. N. Shaumyan, V. N. Moskalenko, V. Ya. Belokrenitsky, N. A. Zamaraeva (All-IB RAS), A. L. Safronova (ISAA), B. M. Volkhonsky (RISI) tried to identify possible ways of solving the Kashmir problem within the framework of complex Indo - Pakistani relations. They pointed out that not only in the short term, but probably in the medium term, this problem will not be solved, and it is unlikely that a referendum will be held in this part of the South Asian region on the ownership of Kashmir. The international community should be extremely careful to insist on an early resolution of this issue by India and Pakistan, since both States possess nuclear weapons and theoretically do not exclude the possibility of their limited use in the event of a serious armed conflict. Most likely, the status quo similar to the post-1962 Indian-Chinese relations will be maintained for a long time.

The option of turning the current Line of Control on the Pakistani and Indian parts of Kashmir into a state border between the two countries should not be completely ruled out. Here it is important not to confuse the Line of Control with the Working Border - the section that runs from Kashmir, where the border with Azad Kashmir ends and the border of Kashmir with Punjab begins. The dividing line between the Pakistani province of Punjab and the state of Jammu and Kashmir is a very important part of the border. This is where conflict situations arise, which should be taken into account when analyzing the geopolitical situation in the South Asian region. The Pakistani military is interested in maintaining a military confrontation with India, which allows them to occupy a certain place in the country's political system.

India and Pakistan and a number of other neighboring countries, primarily Afghanistan, find common ground in the joint fight against international terrorism, including the Islamic State in the region. This was discussed by E. L. Zhigun (Institute of Middle East Studies), S. N. Kamenev, Omar Nessar, U. Okimbekov (Institute of Middle East Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences), S. L. Kuznetsov (former head of the Russian Cultural Center in Karachi), P. Topychkanov (IMEMO), V. Ya. Belokrenitsky, V. N. Moskalenko, A. Zamaraeva, I. N. Serenko (IB RAS).

As far as ISIL is concerned, two sides of the Islamic State's actions should be distinguished. The first is its functioning within the framework of radical ideology, which can be traced all over the world. The second is its actions as an organized structure that has a very well-coordinated team and its geographical capital. It is also important that many terrorist organizations that pledge allegiance to ISIL, in practice, do not have any contacts with this "state". At the same time, in Mosul (the center of ISIS), as a rule, there is no information about such groups, and only propaganda instructions are received from this center. The only link that can unite such groups is the State of Qatar, which is the main sponsor of ISIS. It is the Qataris who transfer ISIS supporters from Syria to those fronts where they consider their presence necessary (for example, to Libya or Yemen).

It is difficult for India and Pakistan to achieve joint action in the fight against ISIL, because they have different attitudes to this problem. Pakistan categorically denies the existence of supporters of the Islamic State on its territory, expressing a firm view that

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those who claim to belong to it are impostors and in reality have nothing to do with ISIL. This is exactly how General Raheel Sharif (Chief of the Joint Army Staff of Pakistan or, as he is called in Pakistan, "Head of the Army")reacted in response to the comments of the American side about the existence of followers of the Islamic State in Pakistan during his visit to the United States in November 2015.

As for the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan, there are several groups operating in the north of this country that have declared that they are fighting on the side of ISIS. However, there is no serious confirmation of the atom. If we consider the ethnic origin and geographical location of ISIS supporters in Afghanistan, then we should distinguish two main groups: the first, which is located in the east of the country, in particular in Nangarhar (according to official data of the Afghan press, Pakistanis also fight in this group), and the second, supporters of the Islamic State operating in the east (these are mainly Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and natives of Russia). While the first group pursues its specific goals only in the eastern part of Afghanistan (without going beyond the country's borders), the second group focuses mainly on spreading Islamic radical ideology in Central Asia.

Speaking about the actions of ISIL directly in Pakistan, the speakers noted that the first information on this issue appeared in November 2014, when former Interior Minister Malik said that he had a dossier on militants of various organizations,including those from the Islamic State. Today, the country's leadership denies the existence of independent IS factions in Pakistan. But back in 2014, there was a split in the Pakistani Taliban movement, as a result of which one of the many factions broke away and ideologically associated itself with the Islamic State. It is important that both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban see the followers of the Islamic State as competitors in their activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan and do not support this group in any way.

At the same time, the speakers emphasized that ISIL propaganda videos and materials are very popular among a large part of Pakistan's youth. Now it is not yet a threat to the national security of the country, but with the change of generations in the Pakistani Taliban, it can become real. In general, the situation associated with ISIL is currently constantly and significantly changing, which requires regular monitoring in order not to make mistakes in assessments.

Currently, terrorist activities directly in Pakistan are carried out in a significant part of its territory, primarily in the north-western regions of the country bordering Afghanistan, in the "tribal belt" and in large cities-in Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad, etc. The country's authorities have been fighting terrorism for many years. In 2014, the "State Action Plan for Combating Terrorist Activities"was adopted. Almost immediately after the above-mentioned tragedy at a military school near Peshawar in late 2014, the moratorium on the death penalty for terrorist crimes was lifted, military tribunals were established, special forces were created to combat subversive activities, and control over the activities of religious schools-madrasas-was tightened. Nevertheless, terrorism continues to pose a serious threat to the stability and national security of Pakistan.

As for the question of whether Pakistan controls the Taliban in Afghanistan, the speakers believe that it is appropriate to talk about two sides of this process. The first one is of a large-scale nature, allowing us to conclude that there is no such control, which there is a lot of evidence for. In particular, former Pakistani President P. Musharraf, in an interview in October 2015, stressed that when the Taliban entered Kabul at the time, Pakistan almost lost the ability to control them. At the same time, there is no denying that some Afghan groups are sponsored from Pakistan. The Taliban included former members of the Pakistani armed forces. In other words, Pakistan's influence on the Taliban is still there to a certain extent, but there is no control, especially on a large scale.

President of Afghanistan A. Ghani expressed his desire to cooperate with Pakistan to solve the Afghan problem. This line turned out to be quite constructive, the foreign policy situation became calmer, contacts were established between the two countries, and discussions were held on the possibility of holding negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban.

However, in the summer of 2015, the negotiations that had begun were disrupted, and there was some activity of the Taliban against federal forces in south-eastern Afghanistan, which then spread to Kunduz. According to the authoritative World War Journal, in 2015 alone, the Afghan Taliban completely captured 14 districts, and to some extent controlled at least

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25 districts. Thus, the expansion of the Taliban's influence is gradually increasing and to a certain extent - with the tacit consent and, probably, assistance of Islamabad, which causes extreme irritation to the Afghan authorities.

A group of Taliban warlords announced in the fall of 2015 that they were creating a new organization headed by Mohammad Rasul, called the Supreme Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Once again, Qatar, where the official foreign representation of the Taliban movement is located, has declared itself in the international arena. It is Qatar that considers itself the main intermediary in the Middle East between the Taliban and the rest of the world; it is Qatar that actively sponsors this representation and participates in negotiations. It seems that the unfavorable events noted above in Afghanistan in the summer of 2015 were largely due to the position of Qatar and its policy.

Talk that the Taliban can be controlled is untenable. It is impossible to control them, this is not an army where the order of a superior officer is not discussed. However, control over them, along with some management, was carried out in the period after the death of Mullah Omar in April 2013, for about two and a little years. At that time, the main forces of the Taliban were largely consolidated, and Akhtar Mansour, Mullah Omar's right-hand man, became his successor, led in that period on behalf of the Mullah and gave instructions to the Taliban, hiding his death from a large part of his supporters.

But after it became widely known about Omar's death, serious disagreements emerged in the camp of the Taliban, and the main rival of A Mansur became Mullah Zakir. The Taliban were already divided into three parts, and it is possible that Rasul acted together with Zakir. It is obvious that the Taliban are no longer united, divided and divided in their actions since 2015. Now they are not the same "iron" Taliban that marched across Afghanistan from north to south in the 1990s, they are not so strong and have repeatedly suffered defeats.

Experts who spoke expressed doubts that the Taliban would go to the north of Afghanistan, where the Northern Alliance operates - a kind of" iron bastion " on their way. And then there is the Tajik border, which is well fortified.

After the failure of the negotiation process, Pakistani-Afghan relations became more complicated, and anti-Pakistani sentiments increased in the Afghan society. This was largely facilitated by the appearance in the local press of a list of Pakistani demands to the leadership of Afghanistan, among which the main one is the mandatory improvement of Pakistan's image among the Afghan population. It was ordered not to link the terrorist attacks in Afghanistan with any actions on the part of Pakistan, to minimize contacts with India, not only in the political but also in the economic sphere, and to optimize transit trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Since all the states associated with Afghanistan are interested in stabilizing the situation in this country in one way or another, they contribute to the development of Pakistani-Afghan relations and the conduct of a dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban. These are India, China, Russia, and the United States.

The extremely difficult internal political situation in Afghanistan is having a negative impact on one of the most painful problems of the region's economy-energy. International projects that have not yet been implemented due to the unstable situation in Afghanistan could solve this problem. These include the construction of the TAPI gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and further to Pakistan with a possible extension to India (with a length of 1,800 km and an increased cost of up to $ 10 billion in recent years), as well as a power transmission line (the CASA-1000 project worth almost $ 1 billion) from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan.

The total electricity generation in Pakistan is currently, as noted by the country's Minister of Planning and Development Ahsan Iqbal, 16 thousand tons. MW; with the missing 6 thous. The country is trying to make up for MW by purchasing energy resources abroad. This situation has not only economic but also political significance, as the government of N. Sharif has promised to fully solve this problem by 2018 (the year of new general elections). Failure to fulfill a promise can seriously affect their results.

Back in 2005, in connection with the TAPI project (the Asian Development Bank financed a brief feasibility study of this gas pipeline), the official representative of the Afghan Taliban movement, Mufti L. Hakimi, said that "we will blow up everything in Afghanistan that will be created with the money of Western financial organizations." According to the participants of the meeting - S. N. Kamenev, U. Okimbekov, O. Nessar-even if an agreement is reached between the leadership of Afghanistan and the Taliban movement to stabilize the situation in the country, it will be

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it is extremely fragile and can be destroyed at any time, which will have a very negative impact on the construction of energy facilities. President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov is ready to start construction of the TAPI gas pipeline (the groundbreaking ceremony took place in Mary in mid - December 2015), but only the Turkmen part of it is about 100 km long-from the Galkynysh gas field to the border with Afghanistan.

The construction of the Mir gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan (with a continuation to India) can be considered quite realistic after the problems related to Iran's nuclear program are resolved and after international sanctions are lifted from it. This is what stopped Pakistan from building part of the pipeline on its territory. Meanwhile, according to the Iranian side, the pipeline from the South Pars gas field to the border with Pakistan has already been built.

The Russian side expressed its readiness to participate indirectly in the CASA-1000 project to supply Russian electricity to Pakistan via a future power transmission line during the winter period. However, the economic value of the CASA-1000 project is not very high. In addition, it is impossible not to take into account the extremely negative attitude of Uzbekistan to this project.

The meeting highlighted the significant growth of Russian-Pakistani cooperation, primarily in the military field. S. I. Kamenev, V. N. Moskalenko, T. N. Shaumyan, V. Ya. Belokrenitsky, I. E. Maksimenko (Rossiya Segodnya), and L. A. Vasilyeva (IB RAS) spoke on this topic. The expansion of relations between the two countries is likely to occur on an increasing basis, which is to some extent due to the general tendency of Russia to turn to the East.

The state of a number of sectors of the national economy of Pakistan makes it possible to continue bilateral cooperation in the field of metallurgy, energy, irrigation and land reclamation, research in the field of outer space, etc.

One of the most important new initiatives of the Russian side is Gazprom's proposal to supply liquefied gas to Pakistan, which was previously expressed informally, but in practice was put forward only during the first Russian-Pakistani investment Forum. Gazprom is interested in entering the Pakistani market with liquefied natural gas, which will make it possible to fully load the pipeline (12 billion cubic meters), which is planned to be built.

Another proposal from Moscow is Russia's direct participation in the modernization of the Karachi Metallurgical Plant (KMZ), which was built with the help of the USSR and put into operation in the mid-1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this issue receded into the background, and it was only during the visit of President Pervez Musharraf to Moscow in February 2003, when a Memorandum of Understanding was signed on Russia's participation in the modernization of the KMZ. But these agreements remained on paper.

It is necessary to mention the importance of increasing cooperation in the supply of Pakistani agricultural products to Russia, which has become very relevant recently as a result of the sharp aggravation of relations with Turkey. An agreement was reached with the Rosselkhoznadzor to lift the existing restrictions on food supplies in Pakistan. The Pakistani side is ready to supply Russia with various types of meat and fish, increase exports of fresh vegetables and fruits, dried fruits, nuts, and other foodstuffs. This will increase the volume of trade turnover, which is at a very low level (according to V. P. Ivanov at a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission, the trade turnover in 2014 amounted to only $ 457 million).

But it is not only about selling weapons to Pakistan or expanding the supply of Pakistani food products to Russia, but also about establishing political cooperation. At one time, Russia promoted Pakistan's accession to the SCO, first as an observer, and in Ufa in July 2015 - as a full member of this organization. Pakistan promoted Russia's entry into the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as an observer. This was a good start to political interaction. But why shouldn't Russia, with the help of Pakistan, be an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)? After all, SAARC is not only seven states of South Asia, but also Afghanistan; this organization includes the United States, China, Japan, Iran, the Republic of Korea, the EU as observers, and Russia may well occupy its niche here.

N. A. Zamaraeva, S. N. Kamenev, and E. L. Zhigun discussed issues of cooperation between Pakistan and China. They noted a significant expansion of trade and economic ties between them in recent years, as well as the persistence of strong military contacts (in this area, China).

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It is ahead of the United States, having sold more than $ 13 billion in weapons to Pakistan since 1964, while arms purchases from the United States were only at the level of $ 8 billion), as well as political interaction between the two states, in particular on Afghanistan. In terms of trade turnover with Pakistan, China came out on top (according to official data, about $ 10 billion), ahead of the United States. But the main argument in favor of expanding friendly relations between the two countries was the decision during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan in the spring of 2015 to create a China-Pakistan economic corridor from the port of Gwadar to the Chinese city of Kashgar, as well as related infrastructure facilities, for which China intends to spend $ 46 billion. In addition, in November 2015, an agreement was signed with China on the creation of a free economic zone in the area of this port, which is transferred to the use of the Chinese side.

China also supports Pakistan at the political level-it fully supports the actions of the Pakistani leadership in the fight against terrorism (including the lifting of the moratorium on the death penalty after the shooting of children at a military school near Peshawar on December 16, 2014), as well as the military actions of the Pakistani federal forces in North Waziristan. Islamabad complied in 2015 with Beijing's urgent request to eliminate the militants of the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan, a group based in Pakistan that advocates the separation of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region from China.

The construction of the China-Pakistan economic corridor is also beneficial for Afghanistan, but at the same time raises serious concerns and concerns of India-regarding the possibility of gradually turning the port of Gwadar into a naval base of the Chinese Navy (Pakistan has already promised to lease part of the port of Gwadar to China for 40 years); the corridor passes through the territory of Azad Kashmir, It has a presence not only in the disputed territory of Kashmir, but also in South Asia as a whole.

Naturally, there are certain problems in Beijing's relations with Islamabad, in particular, the unresolved issue of the safety of Chinese workers and engineers during the construction of joint facilities on Pakistani territory, and the lack of specific agreements on granting the promised tax benefits to Chinese companies involved in the construction of industrial infrastructure enterprises. However, these problems are not fundamental.

The implementation of Pakistan's nuclear program is another important issue that has not been resolved at the international and regional levels. P. Topychkanov, S. N. Kamenev, T. P. Shaumyan, V. N. Moskalenko, N. Melekhina, and N. A. Zamaraev devoted their speeches to this topic. It was emphasized that India and Pakistan are actively pursuing military nuclear programs without being de jure nuclear-weapon States and without having acceded to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Moreover, India is likely to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and this cannot be said about Pakistan, although India has not fulfilled its earlier promise to clearly divide its nuclear program into two parts - military and peaceful, and has not provided guarantees for the full protection of its nuclear facilities.

The United States and Pakistan are holding consultations on its nuclear program, but Islamabad is avoiding a detailed discussion of this issue, considering it an internal matter. During Sharif's visit to the United States in late October 2015, Washington strongly advised the Pakistani leader to limit the country's nuclear program, not build up its nuclear arsenal, but pay more attention to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and significantly increase electricity generation in order to solve the main problem of the country's national economy - the energy crisis. However, this provoked a negative reaction from Pakistan, which saw such recommendations as "American diktat", as a result of which the Pakistani Prime Minister announced his intention to continue implementing the national nuclear program. It is possible that Pakistan's resentment towards the world's leading powers, which supported India's desire to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, also affected this case.

Speaking about the joint report published in the summer of 2015 by the Stimson Center and the Carnegie Endowment on the possible number of Indian warheads (100) and Pakistani warheads (120), according to speakers at the expert meeting, these and some other conclusions of the report are highly politicized, and they can hardly be considered completely reliable. It is purely hypothetical to say that in 10-15 years Pakistan will have 350 nuclear warheads, and it will take the third place after the United States and Russia in the nuclear row. Most likely, China is and will continue to be in third place, with its nuclear potential.

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it remains "out of brackets". In addition, Pakistan objectively does not have sufficient economic potential to produce more than 200 nuclear warheads, not to mention the fact that Pakistan is forced to actively develop its nuclear power industry in the face of an acute shortage of electricity. At the end of 2013, Sharif announced that an additional six nuclear reactors would be put into operation in the coming years, in addition to the three already operating in the country.

Due to a number of factors related to the development of India and Pakistan, their security problems, aspirations and ambitions, both states are unlikely to immediately abandon their nuclear programs. This can happen very slowly and as a result of extraordinary circumstances, but it is necessary to simultaneously involve both competing parties.

During the meeting, another issue was raised - the role of cultural contacts of Pakistan in geopolitics for the development of diverse international relations, strengthening cooperation and mutual understanding, expanding humanitarian dialogue between the countries both at the regional and global levels. This was discussed by L. A. Vasilyeva, I. E. Maksimenko, S. L. Kuznetsov. The active work of a number of cultural centers at embassies and consulates of foreign countries in major cities of Pakistan, including Russian ones, was noted; for example, events dedicated to the activities of the famous poet, philosopher and public figure of the East, Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938).

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